The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas

CHAPTER I. The Emotional Origin of Moral Judgments

THE EMOTIONAL ORIGIN OF MORAL JUDGMENTS

The moral concepts essentially generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth moral emotions, pp. 4-6.--The assumed universality or "objectivity" of moral judgments, p. 6 sq.--Theories according to which the moral predicates derive all their import from reason, "theoretical" or "practical," p. 7 sq.--Our tendency to objectivise moral judgments, no sufficient ground for referring them to the province of reason, p. 8 sq.--This tendency partly due to the comparatively uniform nature of the moral consciousness, p. 9.--Differences of moral estimates resulting from circumstances of a purely intellectual character, pp. 9-11.--Differences of an emotional origin, pp. 11-13.--Quantitative, as well as qualitative, differences, p. 13.--The tendency to objectivise moral judgments partly due to the authority ascribed to moral rules, p. 14.--The origin and nature of this authority, pp. 14-17.--General moral truths non-existent, p. 17 sq.--The object of scientific ethics not to fix rules for human conduct, but to study the moral consciousness as a fact, p. 18.--The supposed dangers of ethical subjectivism, pp. 18-20.

CHAPTER II. The Nature of the Moral Emotions

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS

The moral emotions of two kinds: disapproval, or indignation, and approval, p. 21.--The moral emotions retributive emotions, disapproval forming a sub-species of resentment, and approval a sub-species of retributive kindly emotion, ibid.--Resentment an aggressive attitude of mind toward a cause of pain, p. 22 sq.--Dr. Steinmetz's suggestion that revenge is essentially rooted in the feeling of power and superiority, and originally "undirected," pp. 23-27.--The true import of the facts adduced as evidence for this hypothesis, pp. 27-30.--The collective responsibility usually involved in the institution of the blood-feud, pp. 30-32.--Explanation of it, pp. 32-35.-- {viii} The strong tendency to discrimination which characterises resentment not wholly lost even behind the veil of common responsibility, p. 35 sq.--Revenge among the lower animals, p. 37 sq.--Violation of the "self-feeling" a common incentive to resentment, p. 38 sq.--But the reaction of the wounded "self-feeling" not necessarily, in the first place, concerned with the infliction of pain, p. 39 sq.--Revenge only a link in a chain of emotional phenomena for which "non-moral resentment" may be used as a common name, p. 40.--The origin of these phenomena, pp. 40-42.--Moral indignation closely connected with anger, p. 42 sq.--Moral indignation, like non-moral resentment, a reactionary attitude of mind directed towards the cause of inflicted pain, though the reaction sometimes turns against innocent persons, pp. 43-48.--In their administration of justice gods still more indiscriminate than men, pp. 48-51.--Reasons for this, p. 51 sq.--Sin looked upon in the light of a contagious matter, charged with injurious energy, pp. 52-57.--The curse looked upon as a baneful substance injuring or destroying anybody to whom it cleaves, p. 57 sq.--The tendency of curses to spread, pp. 58-60.--Their tendency to contaminate those who derive their origin from the infected individual, p. 60 sq.--The vicarious suffering involved in sin-transference not to be confounded with vicarious expiatory sacrifice, p. 61.--Why scapegoats are sometimes killed, pp. 61-64.--Why sacrificial victims are sometimes used as scapegoats, p. 64 sq.--Vicarious expiatory sacrifices, pp. 65-67.--The victim accepted as a substitute on the principle of social solidarity, p. 67 sq.--Expiatory sacrifices offered as ransoms, p. 68 sq.--Protests of the moral consciousness against the infliction of penal suffering upon the guiltless, pp. 70-72.

CHAPTER III. The Nature of the Moral Emotions (_continued_)

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (continued)

Whilst, in the course of mental evolution, the true direction of the hostile reaction involved in moral disapproval has become more apparent, its aggressive character has become more disguised, p. 73.--Kindness to enemies not a rule in early ethics, p. 73 sq.--At the higher stages of moral development retaliation condemned and forgiveness of enemies laid down as a duty, pp. 74-77.--The rule of retaliation and the rule of forgiveness not radically opposed to each other, p. 77 sq.--Why enlightened and sympathetic minds disapprove of resentment and retaliation springing from personal motives, p. 78 sq.--The aggressive character of moral disapproval has also become more disguised by the different way in which the aggressiveness displays itself, p. 79.--Retributive punishment condemned, and the end of punishment considered to be either to deter from crime, or to reform the criminal, or to repress crime by eliminating or secluding him, pp. 79-81.--Objections to these theories, p. 82 sq.--Facts which, to some extent, fill up the gap between the theory of retribution and the utilitarian theories of punishment, pp. 84-91.--The aggressive element in moral disapproval has undergone a change which tends to conceal its true nature by narrowing the channel in which it discharges itself, deliberate and discriminating resentment being apt to turn against the will rather than against the willer, p. 91 sq.--Yet it is the instinctive desire to inflict counter-pain that gives to moral indignation its most important characteristic, p. 92 sq.--Retributive kindly emotion a friendly attitude of mind towards a cause of pleasure, p. 93 sq.--Retributive kindly emotion among the lower animals, p. 94.--Its intrinsic object, p. 94 sq.--The want of discrimination which is sometimes found in retributive kindness, p. 95.--Moral approval a kind of retributive kindly emotion, ibid.--Moral approval sometimes bestows its favours upon undeserving individuals for the merits of others, pp. 95-97.--Explanation of this, p. 97 sq.--Protests against the notion of vicarious merit, p. 98 sq.

{ix} CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (concluded)

Refutation of the opinion that moral emotions only arise in consequence of moral judgments, p. 100 sq.--However, moral judgments, being definite expressions of moral emotions, help us to discover the true nature of these emotions, p. 101.--Disinterestedness and apparent impartiality characteristics by which moral indignation and approval are distinguished from other, non-moral, kinds of resentment or retributive kindly emotion, pp. 101-104.--Besides, a moral emotion has a certain flavour of generality, p. 104 sq.--The analysis of the moral emotions which has been attempted in this and the two preceding chapters holds true not only of such emotions as we feel on account of the conduct of others, but of such emotions as we feel on account of our own conduct as well, pp. 105-107.

CHAPTER V. The Origin of the Moral Emotions

THE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS

We may feel disinterested resentment, or disinterested retributive kindly emotion, on account of an injury inflicted, or a benefit conferred, upon another person with whose pain, or pleasure, we sympathise, and in whose welfare we take a kindly interest, p. 108.--Sympathetic feelings based on association, p. 109 sq.--Only when aided by the altruistic sentiment sympathy induces us to take a kindly interest in the feelings of our neighbours, and tends to produce disinterested retributive emotions, p. 110 sq.--Sympathetic resentment to be found in all animal species which possess altruistic sentiments, p. 111 sq.--Sympathetic resentment among savages, p. 113 sq.--Sympathetic resentment may not only be a reaction against sympathetic pain, but may be directly produced by the cognition of the signs of anger (punishment, language, &c.), pp. 114-116.--Disinterested antipathies, p. 116 sq.--Sympathy springing from an altruistic sentiment may also produce disinterested kindly emotion, p. 117.--Disinterested likings, ibid.--Why disinterestedness, apparent impartiality, and the flavour of generality have become characteristics by which so-called moral emotions are distinguished from other retributive emotions, p. 117 sq.--Custom not only a public habit, but a rule of conduct, p. 118.--Custom conceived of as a moral rule, p. 118 sq.--In early society customs the only moral rules ever thought of, p. 119.--The characteristics of moral indignation to be sought for in its connection with custom, p. 120.--Custom characterised by generality, disinterestedness, and apparent impartiality, p. 120 sq.--Public indignation lies at the bottom of custom as a moral rule, p. 121 sq.--As public indignation is the prototype of moral disapproval, so public approval is the prototype of moral approval, p. 122.--Moral disapproval and approval have not always remained inseparably connected with the feelings of any special society, p. 122 sq.--Yet they remain to the last public emotions if not in reality, then as an ideal, p. 123.--Refutation of the opinion that the original form of the moral consciousness has been the individual's own conscience, p. 123 sq.--The antiquity of moral resentment, p. 124.--The supposition that remorse is unknown among the lower races contradicted by facts, p. 124 sq.--Criticism of Lord Avebury's statement that modern savages seem to be almost entirely wanting in moral feeling, pp. 125-129.--The antiquity of moral approval, p. 129 sq.

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CHAPTER VI. Analysis of the Principal Moral Concepts

ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS

Our analysis to be concerned with moral concepts formed by the civilised mind, p. 131.--Moral concepts among the lower races, pp. 131-133.--Language a rough generaliser, p. 133.--Analysis of the concepts bad, vice, and wrong, p. 134.--Of ought and duty, pp. 134-137.--Of right, as an adjective, pp. 137-139.--Of right, as a substantive, p. 139 sq.--Of the relations between rights and duties, p. 140 sq.--Of injustice and justice, pp. 141-145.--Of good, pp. 145-147.--Of virtue, pp. 147-149.--Of the relation between virtue and duty, p. 149 sq.--Of merit, p. 150 sq.--Of the relation between merit and duty, p. 151 sq.--The question of the super-obligatory, pp. 152-154.--The question of the morally indifferent, pp. 154-157.

CHAPTER VII. Customs and Laws As Expressions of Moral Ideas

CUSTOMS AND LAWS AS EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS

How we can get an insight into the moral ideas of mankind at large, p. 158.--The close connection between the habitualness and the obligatoriness of custom, p. 159.--Though every public habit is not a custom, involving an obligation, men's standard of morality is not independent of their practice, p. 159 sq.--The study of moral ideas to a large extent a study of customs, p. 160.--But custom never covers the whole field of morality, and the uncovered space grows larger in proportion as the moral consciousness develops, p. 160 sq.--At the lower stages of civilisation custom the sole rule for conduct, p. 161.--Even kings described as autocrats tied by custom, p. 162.--In competition with law custom frequently carries the day, p. 163 sq.--Custom stronger than law and religion combined, p. 164.--The laws themselves command obedience more as customs than as laws, ibid.--Many laws were customs before they became laws, p. 165.--The transformation of customs into laws, p. 165 sq.--Laws as expressions of moral ideas, pp. 166-168.--Punishment and indemnification, p. 168 sq.--Definition of punishment, p. 169 sq.--Savage punishments inflicted upon the culprit by the community at large, pp. 170-173.--By some person or persons invested with judicial authority, pp. 173-175.--The development of judicial organisation out of a previous system of lynch-law, p. 175.--Out of a previous system of private revenge, p. 176.--Public indignation displays itself not only in punishment, but to a certain extent in the custom of revenge, p. 176 sq.--The social origin of the lex talionis, pp. 177-180.--The transition from revenge to punishment, and the establishment of a central judicial and executive authority, pp. 180-183.--The jurisdiction of chiefs, p. 183 sq.--The injured party or the accuser acting as executioner, but not as judge, p. 184sq.--The existence of punishment and judicial organisation among a certain people no exact index to its general state of culture, p. 185.--The supposition that punishment has been intended to act as a deterrent, p. 185 sq.--Among various semi-civilised and civilised peoples the criminal law has assumed a severity which far surpasses the rigour of the lex talionis, pp. 186-183.--Wanton cruelty not a general characteristic of the public justice of savages, pp. 188-190. Legislators referring to the deterrent effects of punishment, p. 190 sq.--The practice of punishing criminals in public, p. 191 sq.--The punishment actually inflicted on the criminal in many cases much less severe than the punishment with which the law threatens him, p. 192 sq.--The detection of criminals was in earlier times much rarer and more uncertain than it is now, p. 193.--The chief explanation of the great severity of certain {xi} criminal codes lies in their connection with despotism or religion or both, pp. 193-198.--Punishment may also be applied as a means of deterring from crime, p. 198 sq.--But the scope which justice leaves for determent pure and simple is not wide, p. 199.--The criminal law of a community on the whole a faithful exponent of moral sentiments prevalent in that community at large, pp. 199-201.

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