CHAPTER II. The Nature of the Moral Emotions

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS

The moral emotions of two kinds: disapproval, or indignation, and approval, p. 21.--The moral emotions retributive emotions, disapproval forming a sub-species of resentment, and approval a sub-species of retributive kindly emotion, ibid.--Resentment an aggressive attitude of mind toward a cause of pain, p. 22 sq.--Dr. Steinmetz's suggestion that revenge is essentially rooted in the feeling of power and superiority, and originally "undirected," pp. 23-27.--The true import of the facts adduced as evidence for this hypothesis, pp. 27-30.--The collective responsibility usually involved in the institution of the blood-feud, pp. 30-32.--Explanation of it, pp. 32-35.-- {viii} The strong tendency to discrimination which characterises resentment not wholly lost even behind the veil of common responsibility, p. 35 sq.--Revenge among the lower animals, p. 37 sq.--Violation of the "self-feeling" a common incentive to resentment, p. 38 sq.--But the reaction of the wounded "self-feeling" not necessarily, in the first place, concerned with the infliction of pain, p. 39 sq.--Revenge only a link in a chain of emotional phenomena for which "non-moral resentment" may be used as a common name, p. 40.--The origin of these phenomena, pp. 40-42.--Moral indignation closely connected with anger, p. 42 sq.--Moral indignation, like non-moral resentment, a reactionary attitude of mind directed towards the cause of inflicted pain, though the reaction sometimes turns against innocent persons, pp. 43-48.--In their administration of justice gods still more indiscriminate than men, pp. 48-51.--Reasons for this, p. 51 sq.--Sin looked upon in the light of a contagious matter, charged with injurious energy, pp. 52-57.--The curse looked upon as a baneful substance injuring or destroying anybody to whom it cleaves, p. 57 sq.--The tendency of curses to spread, pp. 58-60.--Their tendency to contaminate those who derive their origin from the infected individual, p. 60 sq.--The vicarious suffering involved in sin-transference not to be confounded with vicarious expiatory sacrifice, p. 61.--Why scapegoats are sometimes killed, pp. 61-64.--Why sacrificial victims are sometimes used as scapegoats, p. 64 sq.--Vicarious expiatory sacrifices, pp. 65-67.--The victim accepted as a substitute on the principle of social solidarity, p. 67 sq.--Expiatory sacrifices offered as ransoms, p. 68 sq.--Protests of the moral consciousness against the infliction of penal suffering upon the guiltless, pp. 70-72.