CHAPTER III. The Nature of the Moral Emotions (_continued_)

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (continued)

Whilst, in the course of mental evolution, the true direction of the hostile reaction involved in moral disapproval has become more apparent, its aggressive character has become more disguised, p. 73.--Kindness to enemies not a rule in early ethics, p. 73 sq.--At the higher stages of moral development retaliation condemned and forgiveness of enemies laid down as a duty, pp. 74-77.--The rule of retaliation and the rule of forgiveness not radically opposed to each other, p. 77 sq.--Why enlightened and sympathetic minds disapprove of resentment and retaliation springing from personal motives, p. 78 sq.--The aggressive character of moral disapproval has also become more disguised by the different way in which the aggressiveness displays itself, p. 79.--Retributive punishment condemned, and the end of punishment considered to be either to deter from crime, or to reform the criminal, or to repress crime by eliminating or secluding him, pp. 79-81.--Objections to these theories, p. 82 sq.--Facts which, to some extent, fill up the gap between the theory of retribution and the utilitarian theories of punishment, pp. 84-91.--The aggressive element in moral disapproval has undergone a change which tends to conceal its true nature by narrowing the channel in which it discharges itself, deliberate and discriminating resentment being apt to turn against the will rather than against the willer, p. 91 sq.--Yet it is the instinctive desire to inflict counter-pain that gives to moral indignation its most important characteristic, p. 92 sq.--Retributive kindly emotion a friendly attitude of mind towards a cause of pleasure, p. 93 sq.--Retributive kindly emotion among the lower animals, p. 94.--Its intrinsic object, p. 94 sq.--The want of discrimination which is sometimes found in retributive kindness, p. 95.--Moral approval a kind of retributive kindly emotion, ibid.--Moral approval sometimes bestows its favours upon undeserving individuals for the merits of others, pp. 95-97.--Explanation of this, p. 97 sq.--Protests against the notion of vicarious merit, p. 98 sq.

{ix} CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (concluded)

Refutation of the opinion that moral emotions only arise in consequence of moral judgments, p. 100 sq.--However, moral judgments, being definite expressions of moral emotions, help us to discover the true nature of these emotions, p. 101.--Disinterestedness and apparent impartiality characteristics by which moral indignation and approval are distinguished from other, non-moral, kinds of resentment or retributive kindly emotion, pp. 101-104.--Besides, a moral emotion has a certain flavour of generality, p. 104 sq.--The analysis of the moral emotions which has been attempted in this and the two preceding chapters holds true not only of such emotions as we feel on account of the conduct of others, but of such emotions as we feel on account of our own conduct as well, pp. 105-107.