CHAPTER I. The Emotional Origin of Moral Judgments

THE EMOTIONAL ORIGIN OF MORAL JUDGMENTS

The moral concepts essentially generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth moral emotions, pp. 4-6.--The assumed universality or "objectivity" of moral judgments, p. 6 sq.--Theories according to which the moral predicates derive all their import from reason, "theoretical" or "practical," p. 7 sq.--Our tendency to objectivise moral judgments, no sufficient ground for referring them to the province of reason, p. 8 sq.--This tendency partly due to the comparatively uniform nature of the moral consciousness, p. 9.--Differences of moral estimates resulting from circumstances of a purely intellectual character, pp. 9-11.--Differences of an emotional origin, pp. 11-13.--Quantitative, as well as qualitative, differences, p. 13.--The tendency to objectivise moral judgments partly due to the authority ascribed to moral rules, p. 14.--The origin and nature of this authority, pp. 14-17.--General moral truths non-existent, p. 17 sq.--The object of scientific ethics not to fix rules for human conduct, but to study the moral consciousness as a fact, p. 18.--The supposed dangers of ethical subjectivism, pp. 18-20.