CHAPTER XIII. Why Moral Judgments Are Passed on Conduct and Character--Moral

WHY MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE PASSED ON CONDUCT AND CHARACTER--MORAL VALUATION AND FREE-WILL

Explanation of the fact that moral judgments are passed on conduct and character, p. 314.--The correctness of this explanation proved by the circumstance that not only moral emotions, but non-moral retributive emotions as well, are felt with reference to phenomena exactly similar in nature to those on which moral judgments are passed, pp. 314-319.--Whether moral or non-moral, a retributive emotion is essentially directed towards a sensitive and volitional entity, or self, conceived of as the cause of pleasure or the cause of pain, p. 319.--The futility of other attempts to solve the problem, p. 319 sq.--The nature of the moral emotions also gives us the key to the problem of the co-existence of moral responsibility with the general law of cause and effect, p. 320.--The theory according to which responsibility, in the ordinary sense of the term, and moral judgments generally, are inconsistent with the notion that the human will is determined by causes, p. 320 sq.--Yet, as a matter of fact, moral indignation and moral approval are felt by determinists and libertarians alike, p. 321 sq.--Explanation of the fallacy which lies at the bottom of the conception that moral valuation is inconsistent with determinism, p. 322.--Causation confounded with compulsion, pp. 322-324.--The difference between fatalism and determinism, pp. 324-326.--The moral emotions not concerned with the origin of the innate character, p. 326.

{xiv} CHAPTER XIV

PRELIMINARY REMARKS--HOMICIDE IN GENERAL

Necessity of restricting the investigation to the more important modes of conduct with which the moral consciousness is concerned, p. 327 sq.--The six groups into which these modes of conduct may be divided, p. 328.--The most sacred duty which we owe to our fellow-creatures generally considered to be regard for their lives, ibid.--Among various uncivilised peoples human life said to be held very cheap, p. 328 sq.--Among others homicide or murder said to be hardly known, p. 329 sq.--In other instances homicide expressly said to be regarded as wrong, p. 330 sq.--In every society custom prohibits homicide within a certain circle of men, p. 331.--Savages distinguish between an act of homicide committed within their own community and one where the victim is a stranger, pp. 331-333.--In various instances, however, the rule, "Thou shalt not kill," applies even to foreigners, p. 333 sq.--Some uncivilised peoples said to have no wars, p. 334.--Savages' recognition of intertribal rights in times of peace obvious from certain customs connected with their wars, p. 334 sq.--Savage custom does not always allow indiscriminate slaughter even in warfare, p. 335 sq.--The readiness with which savages engage in war, p. 337.--The old distinction between injuries committed against compatriots and harm done to foreigners remains among peoples more advanced in culture, p. 337 sq.--The readiness with which such peoples wage war on foreign nations, and the estimation in which the successful warrior is held, pp. 338-340.--The life of a guest sacred, p. 340.--The commencement of international hostilities preceded by special ceremonies, ibid.--Warfare in some cases condemned, or a distinction made between just and unjust war, pp. 340-342.--Even in war the killing of an enemy under certain circumstances prohibited, either by custom or by enlightened moral opinion, pp. 342-344.