CHAPTER IX. The Will As the Subject of Moral Judgment and the Influence of

THE WILL AS THE SUBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL EVENTS

Cases in which no distinction is made between intentional and accidental injuries, pp. 217-219.--Yet even in the system of self-redress intentional or foreseen injuries often distinguished from unintentional and unforeseen injuries, pp. 219-221.--A similar distinction made in the punishments inflicted by many savages, p. 221 sq.--Uncivilised peoples who entirely excuse, or do not punish, persons for injuries which they have inflicted by mere accident, p. 222 sq.--Peoples of a higher culture who punish persons for bringing about events without any fault of theirs, pp. 223-226.--At the earlier stages of civilisation gods, in particular, attach undue importance to the outward aspect of conduct, pp. 226-231.--Explanation of all these facts, pp. 231-237.--The great influence which the outward event exercises upon moral estimates even among ourselves, pp. 238-240. --Carelessness generally not punished if no injurious result follows, p. 241.--An unsuccessful attempt to commit a criminal act, if punished at all, as a rule punished much less {xii} severely than the accomplished act, p. 241 sq.--Exceptions to this rule, p. 242.--The question, which attempts should be punished, p. 243.--The stage at which an attempt begins to be criminal, and the distinction between attempts and acts of preparation, p. 243 sq.--The rule that an outward event is requisite for the infliction of punishment, p. 244 sq.--Exceptions to this rule, p. 245.--Explanation of laws referring to unsuccessful attempts, pp. 245-247.--Moral approval influenced by external events, p. 247.--Owing to its very nature, the moral consciousness, when sufficiently influenced by thought, regards the will as the only proper object of moral disapproval or praise, p. 247 sq.