CHAPTER XXX. The Regard for Truth and Good Faith

THE REGARD FOR TRUTH AND GOOD FAITH

THE regard for truth implies in the first place that we ought to abstain from lying, that is, a wilful misrepresentation of facts, by word or deed, with the intention of producing a false belief. Closely connected with this duty is that of good faith or fidelity to promises, which requires that we should make facts correspond with our emphatic assertions as to our conduct in the future. Within certain limits these duties seem to be universally recognised, though the censure passed on the transgressor varies extremely in degree. But there are also many cases in which untruthfulness and bad faith are looked upon with indifference, or even held laudable or obligatory.

Various uncivilised races are conspicuous for their great regard for truth; of some savages it is said that not even the most trying circumstances can induce them to tell a lie. Among others, again, falsehood is found to be a prevailing vice and the successful lie a matter of popular admiration.

All authorities agree that the Veddahs of Ceylon are models of veracity. They "are proverbially truthful and honest." They think it perfectly inconceivable that any person should say anything which is not true. Mr. Nevill writes, "I never knew a true Vaedda to tell a lie, and the Sinhalese give them the same character." Messrs. Sarasin had a similar experience:{73}--"The genuine Wood-Wedda always speaks the truth; we never heard a lie from any of them; all their statements are short and true." A Veddah who had committed murder and was tried for it, instead of telling a lie in order to escape punishment, said simply nothing.

Other instances of extreme truthfulness are provided by various uncivilised tribes in India. The Saoras of the province of Madras, "like most of the hill people, . . . are not inclined to lying. If one Saora kill another he admits it at once and tells why he killed him." The highlander of Central India is described as "the most truthful of beings, and rarely denies either a money obligation or a crime really chargeable against him." A true Gond "will commit a murder, but he will not tell a lie." The Kandhs, says Macpherson, "are, I believe, inferior in veracity to no people in the world. . . . It is in all cases imperative to tell the truth, except when deception is necessary to save the life of a guest." And to break a solemn pledge of friendship is, in their opinion, one of the greatest sins a man can commit. The Korwás inhabiting the highlands of Sirgúja--though they show great cruelty in committing robberies, putting to death the whole of the party attacked, even when unresisting--"have what one might call the savage virtue of truthfulness to an extraordinary degree, and, rightly accused, will at once confess and give you every required detail of the crime." The Santals are noted for veracity and fidelity to their word even in the most trying circumstances. A Kurubar "always speaks the truth." Among the Hos "a reflection on a man's honesty or veracity may be sufficient to send him to self-destruction." Among the Angami Nagas simple truth is highly regarded; it is rare for a statement to be made on oath, and rarer still for it to be false. In the Chittagong Hills the Tipperahs are the only people among whom Captain Lewin {74} has met with meanness and lying; and they, too, have previously been said to be, "as a rule, truthful and simple-minded.**" The Karens of Burma have the following traditional precept:--"Do not speak falsehood. What you do not know, do not speak. Liars shall have their tongues cut out." Among the Bannavs of Cambodia "severe penalties, such as slavery or exile, are imposed for lying."

The Andaman Islanders call falsehood y[=u]bda, that is, sin or wrong-doing. The natives of Car Nicobar are not only very honest, but "the accusation of untruthfulness brings them up in arms immediately." The Dyaks of Borneo are praised for their honesty and great regard for truth. Mr. Bock states that if they could not satisfactorily reply to his questions they hesitated to answer at all, and that if he did not always get the whole truth he always got at least nothing but the truth from them. Veracity is a characteristic of the Alfura of Halmahera and the Bataks of Sumatra, who only in cases of urgent necessity have recourse to a lie. The Javanese, says Crawfurd, "are honourably distinguished from all the civilised nations of Asia by a regard for truth." "In their intercourse with society," Raffles observes, "they display, in a high degree, the virtues of honesty, plain dealing, and candour. Their ingenuousness is such that, as the first Dutch authorities have acknowledged, prisoners brought to the bar on criminal charges, if really guilty, nine times out of ten confess, without disguise or equivocation, the full extent and exact circumstances of their offences, and communicate, when required, more information on the matter at issue than all the rest of the evidence." Among the natives {75} of the Malay Archipelago there are some further instances of trustworthy and truthful peoples; whereas others are described as distrustful and regardless of truth. Thus the natives of Timor-laut lie without compunction when they think they can escape detection, and of the Niase it is said that "truth is their bitter enemy."

Veracity and probity were conspicuous virtues among various uncivilised peoples belonging to the Russian Empire. Georgi, whose work dates from the eighteenth century, says of the Chuvashes that they "content themselves with a simple affirmation or denial, and always keep their word"; of the Barabinzes, that "lying, duplicity, and fraud, are unknown among them"; of the Tunguses, that they "always appear to be what they really are," and that "lying seems to them the absurdest thing in the world, which prevents them being either suspicious or necessitated to accompany their affirmations by oaths or solemn protestations"; of the Kurilians, that they always speak the truth "with the most scrupulous fidelity." Castrén states that the Zyrians, like the Finnish tribes generally, are trustworthy and honest, and that the Ostyaks have no other oaths but those of purgation. Among them "witnesses never take the oath, but their words are unconditionally believed in, and everybody, with the exception of lunatics, is allowed to give evidence. Children may witness against their parents, brothers against brothers, a husband against his wife, and a wife against her husband."

The Aleuts were highly praised by Father Veniaminof for their truthfulness:--"These people detest lying, and never spread false rumours. . . . They are very much offended if any one doubts their word." They "despise hypocrisy in every respect," and "do not flatter nor make empty promises, even in order to escape reproof." The regard in which truth is held by the Eskimo seems to vary among different tribes. Armstrong blames the Western Eskimo for being much {76} addicted to falsehood, and for seldom telling the truth, if there be anything to gain by a lie. The Point Barrow Eskimo "are in the main truthful, though a detected lie is hardly considered more than a good joke, and considerable trickery is practised in trading." Of the Eskimo at Igloolik, an island near Melville Peninsula, we are told that "their lies consist only of vilifying each other's character, with false accusations of theft or ill behaviour. When asking questions of an individual, it is but rarely that he will either advance or persist in an untruth. . . . Lying among them is almost exclusively confined to the ladies." In his description of the Eskimo on the western side of Davis Strait and in the region of Frobisher Bay, Mr. Hall says that they despise and shun one who will shag-la-voo, that is, "tell a lie," and that they are rarely troubled by any of this class. The Greenlanders are generally truthful towards each other, at least the men. But if he can help it, a Greenlander will not tell a truth which he thinks may be unpleasant to the hearer, as he is anxious to stand on as good a footing as possible with his fellow-men.

The Thompson River Indians of British Columbia maintain that it is bad to lie, that if you do so people will laugh at you and call you a "liar." Speaking of the Iroquois, Mr. Morgan says that the love of truth was a marked trait of the Indian character. "This inborn sentiment flourished in the period of their highest prosperity, in all the freshness of its primeval purity. On all occasions and at whatever peril, the Iroquois spoke the truth without fear and without hesitation. Dissimulation was not an Indian habit. . . . The Iroquois prided themselves upon their sacred regard for the public faith, and punished the want of it with severity when an occasion presented itself." Loskiel likewise states that they considered lying and cheating heinous and scandalous offences. Among the Chippewas there were a few persons addicted to lying, but these {77} were held in disrepute. The Shoshones, a tribe of the Snake Indians, were frank and communicative in their intercourse with strangers, and perfectly fair in their dealings. The Seminole Indians of Florida are commended for their truthfulness. With special reference to the Navahos, Mr. Matthews observes, "As the result of over thirty years' experience among Indians, I must say that I have not found them less truthful than the average of our own race." Among the Dacotahs lying "is considered very bad"; yet in this respect "every one sees the mote in his brother's eye, but does not discover the beam that is in his own," want of truthfulness and habitual dishonesty in little things being prevalent traits in their character. So, also, the Thlinkets admit that falsehood is criminal, although they have recourse to it without hesitation whenever it suits their purpose. Of the Chippewyans, again, it is said that they carry the habit of lying to such an extent, even among themselves, that they can scarcely be said to esteem truth a virtue. The Crees are "not very strict in their adherence to truth, being great boasters." Heriot and Adair speak of the treacherous or deceitful disposition of the North American Indians; but the latter adds that, though "privately dishonest," they are "very faithful indeed to their own tribe."

Of the regard in which truth is held by the Indians of South America the authorities I have consulted have little to say. The Coroados are not deceitful. The Tehuelches of Patagonia nearly always lie in minor affairs, and will invent stories for sheer amusement. "In anything of importance, however, such as guaranteeing the safety of a person, they were very truthful, as long as faith was kept with them. After a time," Lieutenant Musters adds, "when they ascertained that I invariably avoided deviating in any way from the truth, they left off lying to me even in minor matters. This will serve to show that they are not of the treacherous nature assigned to {78} them by some ignorant writers." Among the Fuegians, according to Mr. Bridge, no one can trust another, lying tales of slander are very common, great exaggeration is used, and it is not even considered wrong to tell a lie. Snow, however, speaks of "the honesty they undoubtedly evince in many of their transactions"; and Darwin states that the Fuegian boy on board the Beagle "showed, by going into the most violent passion, that he quite understood the reproach of being called a liar, which in truth he was."

Of the Australian aborigines we are told that some tribes and families display on nearly all occasions honesty and truthfulness, whereas others "seem almost destitute of the better qualities." According to Mr. Mathew, they are not wantonly untruthful, although one can rely on them being faithful to a trust only on condition that they are exempt from strong temptation. Mr. Curr admits that under some circumstances they are treacherous, and that it costs them little pain to lie; but from his own observations he has no doubt that the black feels, in the commencement of his career at least, that lying is wrong. Mr. Howitt has found the South Australian Kurnai "to compare not unfavourably with our own people in their narration of occurrences, or as witnesses in courts of justice as to facts. Among them a person known to disregard truth is branded as a liar (jet-bolan)." Among the aborigines of New South Wales people who cause strife by lying are punished, and "liars are much disliked"; Dr. Fraser was assured by a person who had had much intercourse with them for thirty years that he never knew them to tell a lie. Among the tribes of Western Victoria described by Mr. Dawson liars are detested; should any man, through lying, get others into trouble, he is punished with the boomerang, whilst women and young people, for the same fault, are beaten with a stick. In his description of his expeditions into Central Australia Eyre writes, "In their intercourse with each other I {79} have generally found the natives to speak the truth and act with honesty, and they will usually do the same with Europeans if on friendly terms with them." With regard to West Australian tribes Mr. Chauncy states that they are certainly not remarkable for their treachery, and that he has very seldom known any of them accused of it. He adds that they are "habitually honest among themselves, if not truthful," and that, during his many years' acquaintance with them, he does not remember ever hearing a native utter a falsehood with a definite idea of gaining anything by it. "If questioned on any subject, he would form his reply rather with the view of pleasing the enquirer than of its being true; but this was attributable to his politeness." According to a late Advocate-General of West Australia, "when a native is accused of any crime, he often acknowledges his share in the transaction with perfect candour." Very different from these accounts is Mr. Gason's statement concerning the Dieyerie in South Australia. "A more treacherous race," he says, "I do not believe exists. They imbibe treachery in infancy, and practise it until death, and have no sense of wrong in it. . . . They seem to take a delight in lying, especially if they think it will please you. Should you ask them any question, be prepared for a falsehood, as a matter of course. They not only lie to the white man, but to each other, and do not appear to see any wrong in it." The natives of Botany Bay and Port Jackson in New South Wales are by older writers described as no strangers to falsehood. And speaking of a tribe in North Queensland, Mr. Lumholtz observed that "an Australian native can betray anybody," and that "there is not one among them who will not lie if it is to his advantage."

According to Mr. Hale, the Polynesians are not naturally treacherous, by no means from a horror of deception, but apparently from a mere inaptitude at dissembling; and it is said that the word of a Micronesian may generally be relied upon. To the Tonga Islanders a false accusation appeared more horrible than deliberate murder does to us, and they also put this {80} principle into practice. We are told by Polack that among the Maoris of New Zealand lying is universally practised by all classes, and that an accomplished liar is accounted a man of consummate ability. But Dieffenbach found that, if treated with honesty, they were always ready to reciprocate such treatment; and, according to another authority, they believed in an evil spirit whom they said was "a liar and the father of lies." The broad statement made by von Jhering, that among the South Sea Islanders lying is regarded as a harmless and innocent play of the imagination, is certainly not correct. The treacherous disposition attributed to the Caroline Islanders and the natives of New Britain does not imply so much as that. The New Caledonians are, comparatively speaking, "not naturally dishonest." The Solomon Islanders are praised as faithful and reliable workmen and servants, though cheating in trade is nowadays very common among some of them. Of the people of Erromanga, in the New Hebrides, the Rev. H. A. Robertson states that "truth, in heathenism, was told only when it suited best, but," he adds, "it is not that natives are always reckless about the truth so much as that they seem utterly incapable of stating anything definitely, or stating a thing just as it really occurred." In the opinion of some authorities, the Fijians are very untruthful and regard adroit lying as an accomplishment. Their propensity to lie, says the missionary Williams, "is so strong that they seem to have no wish to deny its existence, or very little shame when convicted of a falsehood." The universal prevalence of the habit of lying is so thoroughly taken for granted, "that it is common to hear, after the most ordinary statement, the rejoinder, 'That's a lie,' or something to the same effect, at which the accused person does not think of taking offence." But the same writer adds:--"Natives have often told me lies, manifestly without any ill-will, and when it would have been far more to their advantage to have spoken the truth. The Fijians hail as agreeable companions those who are {81} skilful in making tales, but, under some circumstances, strongly condemn the practice of falsehood. . . . On matters most lied about by civilised people, the native is the readiest to speak the truth. Thus, when convicted of some offence, he rarely attempts to deny it, but will generally confess all to any one he esteems. . . . The following incident shows that lying per se is condemned and considered disreputable. A white man, notorious for falsehood, had displeased a powerful chief, and wrote asking me to intercede for him. I did so; when the chief dismissed the case briefly, saying, 'Tell--that no one hates a foreigner; but tell him that every one hates a liar!'" Other writers even deny that the Fijians were habitual liars; and Erskine found that those chiefs with whom he had to deal were so open to appeals to their good faith as to convince him "that they had a due appreciation of the virtue of truth."

Nowhere in the savage world is truth held in less estimation than among many of the African races. The Negroes are described as cunning and liars by nature. They "tell a lie more readily than they tell the truth," and falsehood "is not recognised amongst them as a fault." They lie not only for the sake of gaining some advantage by it, or in order to please or amuse, but their lies are often said to be absolutely without purpose. Of the natives of the Gold Coast the old traveller Bosman says, "The Negroes are all, without exception, crafty, villainous and fraudulent, and very seldom to be trusted, being sure to slip no opportunity of cheating an European, nor indeed one another." Among all the Bakalai tribes "lying is thought an enviable accomplishment." The Bakongo, in their answers, "will generally try and tell the questioner what they think will please him most, quite ignoring the truthfulness we consider it necessary to observe in our replies." Miss Kingsley's experience of West African natives is likewise that they "will say 'Yes' to any mortal thing, if they think you want them to." The Wakamba are described as great liars. {82} Among the Waganda "truth is held in very low estimation, and it is never considered wrong to tell lies; indeed, a successful liar is considered a smart, clever fellow, and rather admired." Untruthfulness is said to be "a national characteristic" of the tribes inhabiting the region of Lake Nyassa. From his experience of the Eastern Central Africans, the Rev. D. Macdonald writes: "'Telling lies' is much practised and is seldom considered a fault. . . . The negro often thinks that he is flattered by being accused of falsehood. So, when natives wish to pay a high compliment to a European who has told them an interesting story, they look into his face and say, 'O father, you are a great liar.'" To the Wanika, says Mr. New, lying is "almost as the very breath of their nostrils, and all classes, young and old, male and female, indulge in it. A great deal of their lying is without cause or object; it is lying for lying's sake. You ask a man his name, his tribe, where he lives, or any other simple question of like nature, and the answer he gives you will, as a rule, be the very opposite to the truth; yet he has nothing to evade or gain by so doing. Lying seems to be more natural to him than speaking the truth. He lies when detection is evident, and laughs at it as though he thought it a good joke. He hears himself called a mulongo (liar) a score of times a day, but he notices it not, for there is no opprobrium in the term to him. To hide a fault he lies with the most barefaced audacity and blindest obstinacy. . . . When his object is gain, he will invent falsehoods wholesale. . . . He boasts that ulongo (lying) is his pesa (piece, ha'pence), and holds bare truth to be the most unprofitable commodity in the world. But while he lies causelessly, objectlessly, recklessly in self-defence or for self-interest, he is not a malicious liar. He does not lie with express intent to do others harm; this he would consider immoral, and he has sufficient goodness of heart to avoid indulging therein. . . . I have often been struck with the manner in which he has controlled his tongue when the character and interest of others have been at stake." If a Bantu of South-Eastern Africa "undertakes the charge of any form of property, he accounts for it with as great fidelity as if he were the Keeper of the Great Seal. But, on the other hand, there are many circumstances in which falsehood is not reckoned even a disgrace, and if a man could {83} extricate himself from difficulties by lying and did not do so, he would be simply thought a fool." Andersson speaks of the "lying habits" of the Herero. Of the Bachapins, a Bechuana tribe, Burchell observes that among their vices a universal disregard for truth and a want of honourable adherence to their promise stand high above the rest, the consequence of this habitual practice of lying being "the absence of shame, even on being detected." Among the Kafirs "deception is a practised art from early childhood; even the children will not answer a plain question." It is considered a smart thing to deceive so long as a person is not found out, but it is awkward to be detected; hence a native father will enjoy seeing his children deceive people cleverly. "In trading with them, you may make up your mind that all they tell you is untrue, and act accordingly. . . . Your own natives, on the other hand, if they like you, will lie for your benefit as strongly as the opposite party against you; and both sides think it all fair trade." And in a Kafir lawsuit "defendant, plaintiff, and witnesses are allowed to tell as many lies as they like, in order to make the best of their case." But we also hear that Kafirs do not tell lies to their chiefs, and that there are many among them who would never deceive a white man whom they are fond of or respect. Among the Bushmans veracity is said to be too often, yet not always, disregarded, "and the neglect of it considered a mere venial offence." "The first version of what a Bushman or any native has to say can never be relied on; whatever you ask him about, he invariably says first, 'I don't know,' and then promises to tell you all he does know. Ask him for news, and he says, 'No; we have got no news,' and shortly afterwards he will tell you news of perhaps great interest." In Madagascar there was no stigma attached to deceit or fraud; they "were rather admired as proofs of superior cunning, as things to be imitated, so far at least as they would not bring the offender within the penalties of the native laws." Ellis says that "the best sign of genius in children is esteemed a quickness to deceive, {84} overreach and cheat. The people delight in fabulous tales, but in none so much or universally as in those that relate instances of successful deceit or fraud. . . . Their constant aim is, in business to swindle, in professed friendship to extort, and in mere conversation to exaggerate and fabricate." These statements refer to the Hovas; but among the Betsileo, inhabiting the same island, lying and cheating are equally rife, and "neither appears to have been thought a sin, so long as it remained undiscovered." At the same time many of the Madagascar proverbs are designed to put down lying, and to show that truth is always best.

But in Africa, also, there are many peoples who have been described as regardful of truth and hostile to falsehood. Early travellers speak very highly of the sincerity of the Hottentots. Father Tachart says that they have more honesty than is almost anywhere found among Christians; and Kolben agrees with him, asserting that the word of a Hottentot is sacred, and that there is hardly anything upon earth which he looks upon as a fouler crime than breach of engagement. According to Barrow, the Hottentots are perfectly honest and faithful, and, "if accused of crimes of which they have been guilty, they generally divulge the truth." Of the Manansas Dr. Holub states that, so far as his experience goes, they are beyond the average for honesty and fidelity, and are consequently laughed at by the more powerful tribes as "the simpletons of the North." The Bahima in the Uganda Protectorate are usually very honest and truthful, and most of the Nandi think it very wicked to tell a lie. Among the For tribe of Central Africa "lying is held to be a great crime; even the youngest children are severely beaten for it, and any one over fifteen or sixteen who is an habitual liar suffers the loss of one lip as a penalty." Speaking of the natives of Sierra Leone, Winterbottom remarks that, in proportion as we advance into the interior of the country, the people are found to be more devoid of art and more free from suspicion. "Those who have dealings with the Fán universally {85} prefer them in point of honesty and manliness to the Mpongwe and Coast races," and it is an insult to call one of them a liar or coward. Monrad, who wrote in the beginning of the nineteenth century, asserts that among the Negroes of Accra lying is by no means common and that they are as a rule honest towards their own people. According to an early authority, the people of Great Benin were very straightforward and did not cheat each other. Mr. and Mrs. Hinde write that the Masai are as a race truthful, and that a grown-up person among them will not lie; "he may refuse to answer a question, but, once given, his word can be depended on." Dr. Baumann, on the other hand, says that they often lie, but that they regard lying as a great fault. The Guanches of the Canary Islands are stated to have been "slaves to their word." Of the Berbers of Morocco Leo Africanus writes:--"Most honest people they are, and destitute of all fraud and guile. . . . They keep their couenant most faithfully; insomuch that they had rather die than breake promise." M. Dyveyrier found the same virtue among the Touareg, another Berber people:--"La fidélité aux promesses, aux traités, est poussée si loin par les Touareg, qu il est difficile d'obtenir d'eux des engagements. . . . Il est de maxime chez les Touâreg, en matière de contrat, de ne s'engager que pour la moitié de ce qu'on peut tenir, afin de ne pas s'exposer au reproche d'infidélité. . . . Le mensonge, le vol domestique et l'abus de confiance sont inconnus des Touâreg." As regards the truthfulness of the African Arabs opinions vary. Parkyns asks, "Who is more trustworthy than the desert Arab?" According to Rohlfs and Chavanne, on the other hand, the Arabs of the Sahara are much addicted to lying; and of the Arabs of Egypt Mr. St. John observes:--"There is no general appreciation of a man's word. . . . 'Liar' is a playful appellative scarcely reproachful; and 'I have told a lie' a confession that may be made without a blush." Herodotus' statement that "the Arabs observe pledges as religiously as any people," is true of the Bedouins of Arabia in the {86} present day. "No vice or crime is more deservedly stigmatised as infamous among Bedouins than treachery. An individual in the great Arabian Desert will be forgiven if he should kill a stranger on the road, but eternal disgrace would be attached to his name, if it were known that he had robbed his companion, or his protected guest, even of a handkerchief." Wallin affirms that you may put perfect trust in the promise of a Bedouin, as soon as you have eaten salt and bread with him. But whilst faithfulness to a tacit or express promise is thus regarded by him as a sacred duty, lying and cheating are as prevalent in the desert as in the market-towns of Syria. Speaking of the Bedouins of the Euphrates, Mr. Blunt observes:--"Truth, in ordinary matters, is not regarded as a virtue by the Bedouins, nor is lying held shameful. Every man, they say, has a right to conceal his own thought. In matters of importance, the simple affirmation is confirmed by an oath, and then the fact stated may be relied on. There is only one exception to the general rule of lying among them. The Bedouin, if questioned on the breed of his mare, will not give a false answer. He may refuse to say, or he may answer that he does not know; but he will not name another breed than that to which she really belongs. . . . The rule, however, does not hold good on any other point of horse dealing. The age, the qualities, and the ownership of the horse may be all falsely stated."

Various statements of travellers thus directly contradict the common opinion that want of truthfulness is mostly a characteristic of uncivilised races. And we have much reason to assume that a foreigner visiting a savage tribe is apt rather to underrate than to overestimate its veracity. Mr. Savage Landor gives us a curious insight into an explorer's method of testing it. "If you were to say to an Ainu, 'You are old, are you not?' he would answer {87}'Yes'; but if you asked the same man, 'You are not old, are you?' he would equally answer 'Yes.'" And then comes the conclusion:--"Knowingly speaking the truth is not one of their characteristics; indeed, they do not know the difference between falsehood and truth." It is hardly surprising to hear from other authorities that the Ainu are remarkably honest, and regard veracity as one of the most imperative duties. Speaking of the Uaupés and other Brazilian tribes, Mr. Wallace observes:--"In my communications and inquiries among the Indians on various matters, I have always found the greatest caution necessary, to prevent one's arriving at wrong conclusions. They are always apt to affirm that which they see you wish to believe, and, when they do not at all comprehend your question, will unhesitatingly answer, 'Yes.'" Savages who are inclined to give inaccurate answers to questions made by strangers, may nevertheless be truthful towards each other. As the regard for life and property, so the regard for truth varies according as the person concerned is a foreigner or a tribesman. "Perfidy and faithlessness," says Crawfurd, "are vices of the Indian islanders, and those vices of which they have been most frequently accused by strangers. This sentence against them must, however, be understood with some allowances. In their domestic and social intercourse, they are far from being a deceitful people, but in reality possess more integrity than it is reasonable to look for with so much misgovernment and barbarity. It is in their intercourse with strangers and with enemies that, like other barbarians, the treachery of their character is displayed." The natives of the interior of Sumatra are "dishonest in their dealings with strangers, which they esteem no moral defect." Dalager states that the same Greenlanders who, among themselves, in the sale of an object {88} which, the buyer had not seen, would depreciate it rather than overpraise it--even though the seller was anxious to get rid of it--told frightful lies in their transactions with Danish traders. The Touareg, whilst scrupulously faithful to a promise given to one of their own people, do not regard as binding a promise given to a Christian; and their Arab neighbours say that their word, "like water fallen on the sand, is never to be found again." The Masai, according to Herr Merker, hold any kind of deceit to be allowable in their relations with persons of another race. The Hovas of Madagascar even considered it a duty for anyone speaking with foreigners on political matters to state the exact opposite to the truth, and punished him who did otherwise.

In point of truthfulness savages are in many cases superior to nations more advanced in culture. "A Chinese," says Mr. Wells Williams, "requires but little motive to falsify, and he is constantly sharpening his wits to cozen his customer--wheedle him by promises and cheat him in goods or work." His ordinary speech is said to be so full of insincerity that it is very difficult to learn the truth in almost any case. He feels no shame at being detected in a lie, nor does he fear any punishment from his gods for it; if you call him a liar, "you arouse in him no sense of outrage, no sentiment of degradation." Yet the moral teachings of the Chinese inculcate truthfulness as a stringent duty. One of their injunctions is, "Let children always be taught to speak the simple truth." Many sayings may be quoted from Confucius in which sincerity is celebrated as highly and demanded as urgently as it ever was by any {89} Christian moralist. Faithfulness and sincerity, he said, should be held as first principles. Sincerity is the way of Heaven, the end and beginning of things, without which there would be nothing. It is as necessary to truly virtuous conduct as a boat is to a man wishing to cross a river, or as oars are to a boat. The superior man ought to feel shame when his conduct is not in accord with his words. But there are instances in which sincerity has to yield to family duties: a father should conceal the misconduct of his son, and a son that of his father. Moreover, the great moralists themselves did not always act up to their lofty principles. Confucius and Mencius sometimes did not hesitate to tell a lie for the sake of convenience. The former could excuse himself from seeing an unwelcome visitor on the ground that he was sick, when there was nothing the matter with him; and he deliberately broke an oath which he had sworn, because it had been forced from him. In Japan, Burma, and Siam, truth is more respected than in China. "In love of truth," says Professor Rein, "the Japanese, so far as my experience goes, are not inferior to us Europeans." The Burmese, though partial to much exaggeration, are generally truthful. And "the mendacity so characteristic of Orientals is not a national defect among the Siamese. Lying, no doubt, is often resorted to as a protection against injustice and oppression, but the chances are greatly in favour of truth when evidence is sought."

Lying has been called the national vice of the Hindus. "It is not too much to assert that the mass of Bengalis have no notion of truth and falsehood." A gentleman {90} who has been brought into the closest intimacy with natives of all classes, declares "that when a question is asked, the full bearing of which on themselves or those connected with them they cannot see, you may rely upon it that the first answer you receive is false; but that, when they see that the truth cannot injure themselves or any one they care for, they will speak the truth." The testimony of a Hindu is not generally regarded as evidence. Forgery is frequently resorted to, cheating is rife. "In almost all business transactions of the smallest kind a written agreement must be made on both sides, and this must be stamped and registered, because it is believed that a man's word is not binding." Nor is a lie held disreputable, especially if not found out. But in India, as elsewhere, the question whether truth or falsehood is to be spoken depends on the relationship between the speaker and the party addressed. In their relations with each other, says Sir W. H. Sleeman, members of a village community spoke as much truth as those of any other community in the world, but in their relations with the government they told as many lies; "if a man had told a lie to cheat his neighbour, he would have become an object of hatred and contempt--if he had told a lie to save his neighbour's fields from an increase of rent or tax, he would have become an object of esteem and respect." Of the Sûdra inhabitants of Central India Sir John Malcolm likewise observes that "they may be said, in their intercourse with strangers and with officers of government, to evade the truth, and often to assert positive falsehoods"; whereas, "in their intercourse with each other, falsehood is not common, and many (particularly some of the cultivators) are distinguished by their adherence to truth." The ancient Hindus were praised for their veracity and good faith; {91} in his History of India, written in the second century of the Christian era, Arrian states that no Indian was ever known to tell an untruth. In the sacred books of India truthfulness is highly celebrated. "If veracity and a thousand horse-sacrifices are weighed against each other, it is found that truth ranks even higher than a thousand horse-sacrifices." "Verily the gods are the truth, and man is the untruth." "There is one law which the gods do keep, namely, the truth. It is through this that their conquest, their glory is unassailable: and so, forsooth, is his conquest, his glory unassailable whosoever, knowing this, speaks the truth." Attendance on, or the worship of, the sacred fire means speaking the truth:--"Whosoever speaks the truth, acts as if he sprinkled that lighted fire with ghee; for even so does he enkindle it: and ever the more increases his own vital energy, and day by day does he become better. And whosoever speaks the untruth, acts as if he sprinkled that lighted fire with water; for even so does he enfeeble it: and ever the less becomes his own vital energy, and day by day does he become more wicked. Let him, therefore, speak nothing but the truth." Fearful denunciations are particularly pronounced against those who deliver false testimony in a court of justice. By giving false evidence concerning small cattle, a witness commits the sin of killing ten men; by false evidence concerning cows, horses, and men, he commits the sin of killing a hundred, a thousand, and ten thousand men respectively; but by false evidence concerning land, he commits the sin of killing the whole human race. The sin of falsehood thus admits of different degrees according to the magnitude of the injury inflicted by it. Indeed, "in some cases a man who, though knowing the facts to be different, gives such false evidence from a pious motive, does not lose heaven; such evidence they call the speech of the gods." {92} Moreover, "whenever the death of a Sûdra, of a Vaisya, of a Kshatriya, or of a Brâhmana would be caused by a declaration of the truth, a falsehood may be spoken; for such falsehood is preferable to the truth." According to Buddhist conceptions of lying, "the magnitude of the crime increases in proportion to the value of the article, or the importance of the matter, about which the lie is told." And it is a lesser wrong to lie in self-defence than to lie with a view to procuring an advantage by injuring one's neighbour. Thus, to deny the possession of any article, in order to retain it, is not a lie of a heinous description, whereas to bear false witness in order that the proper owner may be deprived of that which he possesses, is a lie to which a greater degree of culpability is attached. The Buddhist precept of truthfulness is more restricted than that laid down by Brahmanism:--"It is said by the Brahmans that it is not a crime to tell a lie on behalf of the guru, or on account of cattle, or to save the person's own life, or to gain the victory in any contest; but this is contrary to the precept." One of the conditions that make a Buddha is, never, under the influence of desire and other passions, to utter a conscious lie, for the sake of wealth or any other advantage. From the time that Gautama became a Bodhisattva, or claimant for the Buddhaship, through all his births until the attainment of the Buddhaship, he never told a lie; and "it were easier for the sakwala [or system of worlds] to be blown away than for a supreme Buddha to utter an untruth." His followers are not equally scrupulous. The Buddhists of Ceylon, we are told, lie without compunction, and are not ashamed to be detected in a lie. And religious Mongols "do not hesitate to tell lies even when saying their prayers."

{93} According to Zoroastrianism, truthfulness is a most sacred duty. Lying is a creation of the evil spirits, and the most efficacious weapon against it is the holy religion revealed to man by Zarathustra. In one of the Pahlavi texts it is said that when the Spirit of Wisdom was asked, "Through how many ways and motives and good works do people arrive most at heaven?" he answered thus: "The first good work is liberality, the second truth." Contracts are inviolable, both those which are pledged with hand or pawn, and those by a mere word. It is a duty to keep faith even with an unbeliever:--"Break not the contract, O Spitama, neither the one that thou hadst entered into with one of the unfaithful, nor the one that thou hadst entered into with one of the faithful who is one of thy own faith." Greek historians and cuneiform inscriptions also bear witness to the great detestation in which falsehood was held by the ancient Persians. Herodotus writes:--"Their sons are carefully instructed from their fifth to their twentieth year in three things alone--to ride, to draw the bow, and to speak the truth. . . . The most disgraceful thing in the world, they think, is to tell a lie; the next worse, to owe a debt: because, among other reasons, the debtor is obliged to tell lies." In the inscriptions of Darius lying is taken as representative of all evil. He is favoured by Ormuzd "because he was not a heretic, nor a liar, nor a tyrant." His great fear is lest it may be thought that any part of the record which he has set up has been falsely related; and he even abstains from narrating certain events of his reign "lest to him who may hereafter peruse the tablet, the many deeds that have been done by him may seem to be falsely recorded." Professor Spiegel tries to prove that {94} falsehood, not truthfulness, was a national characteristic of the ancient Eranians, to which their noblest men offered fruitless resistance; but the facts he quotes in support of his opinion refer to their dealings with foreign nations, and have consequently little bearing on the subject. The modern Persians are notorious liars, who do not even claim to be believed, and smile when detected in a lie. The nomad alone is faithful to his word; the expression, "I am a nomad," means, "You may trust me."

Falsehood is a prevailing vice in other Muhammedan countries also. "Constant veracity," says Mr. Lane, "is a virtue extremely rare in modern Egypt"; and a deceitful disposition in commercial transactions is one of the most notorious faults of the Egyptian. Mr. Lane partly ascribes this habit to the influence of Islam, which allows, and even commands, falsehood in certain cases. The common Moslem doctrine is, that a lie is permissible when told in order to save one's own life, or to reconcile persons at variance with each other, or to please or persuade one's wife, or to obtain any advantage in a war with the enemies of the faith. But in other cases lying was highly reprobated by the Prophet; and that the people have not forgotten its sinfulness appears from the phrase, "No, I beg forgiveness of God, it was so and so," which they seldom omit when retracting an unintentional mis-statement. I think it is erroneous to regard the want of truthfulness among Muhammedan nations as a result of their religion. The Eastern Christians and Buddhists are no less addicted to falsehood than the Muhammedans.

The Homeric poems make us acquainted with gods and men who have recourse to fraud and lying whenever it suits their purpose. The great Zeus makes no difficulty {95} in sending a lying dream to Agamemnon. Pallas Athene is guilty of gross deceit and treachery to Hector; she expressly recommends dissimulation, and loves Odysseus on account of his deceitful character. No man deals more in feigned stories than this master of cunning, who makes a boast of his falsehood. In the period which lies between the Homeric age and the Persian wars veracity made perhaps some progress among the Greeks, but it never became one of their national virtues. Yet in the Greek literature deceit is frequently condemned as a vice, and truthfulness praised as a virtue. Achilles expresses his horror of lying. "Not to tell a lie," was one of the maxims of Solon. Pindar strongly censures a character like that of Odysseus, and ends up his eulogy on Psaumis by the assurance that he never would contaminate his speech with a lie. According to Pythagoras, men become like gods when they speak the truth. According to Plato, the habit of lying makes the soul ugly; "truth is the beginning of every good thing, both to gods and men." Yet a distinction should be made between different kinds of untruth. Though the many are too fond of saying that at proper times and places falsehood may often be right, it must be admitted that a lie is in certain cases useful and not hateful, as in dealing with enemies, or when those whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some harm. Moreover, the rulers of the State are allowed to lie for the public good, just as physicians make use of medicines; and they will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for this purpose. On the other hand, if the ruler catches anybody besides himself lying in the {96} State, lie will punish him for introducing a practice "which is equally subversive and destructive of ships or State." Next to him who takes a false oath, he who tells a falsehood in the presence of his superiors--elders, parents, or rulers--is most hateful to the gods.

Not without reason did the Romans of the republican age contrast their own fides with the mendacity of the Greeks and the perfidy of the Phnicians. "The goddess of faith (of human and social faith)," says Gibbon, "was worshipped, not only in her temples, but in the lives of the Romans; and if that nation was deficient in the more amiable qualities of benevolence and generosity, they astonished the Greeks by their sincere and simple performance of the most burdensome engagements." Their annals are adorned with signal examples of uprightness, which, though to a great extent fictitious, yet bear testimony to the estimation in which that quality was held. The Greeks had no Regulus who "chose to deliver himself up to a cruel death rather than to falsify his word to the enemy." The basest forms of falsehood were severely punished by law. According to the Twelve Tables, any one who had slandered or libelled another by imputing to him a wrongful or immoral act, was to be scourged to death, and capital punishment was also inflicted on false witnesses and corrupt judges. However, already before the end of the Republic dishonesty, perjuries, and forgeries became common in Rome.

The ancient Scandinavians considered it disgraceful for a man to tell a lie, to break a promise, or to commit a treacherous act. To kill or rob openly was a pardonable offence, if an offence at all; but he who did it secretly was a nithinger, a "hateful man," unless indeed he afterwards {97} openly declared his deed. In the Irish Senchus Mór it is said that not only false witness, but lying in general, deprives the guilty person of "half his honour-price up to the third time"; and, according to the commentary to the Book of Aicill, the double of his own full honour-price is due from each person who commits the crime of secret murder.

In the Old Testament there are recorded, from the patriarchal age, some cases of lying, which, far from being condemned, in no way prevented the liar being a special object of divine favour. It must be admitted, however, that undue importance has been attached to some of these acts of falsehood, which were committed among foreigners with a view to escaping an impending danger. For instance, when Isaac, dwelling in Gerar, said of his wife that she was his sister, for fear lest the men of the place should kill him, he did a thing which few conscientious men under similar circumstances would hesitate to do. As for Jacob's long course of double-dealing with his father-in-law, who was equally greedy and unscrupulous, it should be remembered that they were natives of different lands. Again, when Jacob, at the instigation of his mother, grossly deceived his own blind father, the intriguers, as has been pointed out, manifestly felt that the blessing extorted from Isaac ought to descend upon Jacob rather than upon Esau, and inasmuch as the word of the father was held to carry with it divine validity and potency, the securing of it by fair means or foul was deemed an urgent necessity. It is obvious that the ancient Hebrews did not condemn deceit as wrong in the abstract, and that they were very unscrupulous in the use of means. Whenever {98} David was threatened by any danger, he immediately employed a falsehood which served his turn; though not incapable of generosity, he deceived enemies and friends indifferently, and there is probably no record of treachery and lying consistently pursued which surpasses in baseness his affair with his faithful servant Uriah the Hittite. It is true that his conduct towards Uriah was condemned; "the thing that David had done displeased the Lord." But it is significant that Yahveh himself occasionally had recourse to deceit for the purpose of carrying out his plans. In order to ruin Ahab he commissioned a lying spirit to deceive his prophets; and once he threatened to use deception as a means of taking revenge upon idolaters. But to bear false witness against a neighbour was strictly prohibited; the false witness should suffer the punishment which he was minded to bring upon the person whom he calumniated. In Ecclesiasticus lying is severely censured:--"A lie is a foul blot in a man, yet it is continually in the mouth of the untaught. A thief is better than a man that is accustomed to lie: but they both shall have destruction to heritage. The disposition of a liar is dishonourable, and his shame is ever with him." "Lying lips are abomination to the Lord: but they that deal truly are his delight." According to the Talmud, "four shall not enter Paradise: the scoffer, the liar, the hypocrite, and the slanderer." Only for the sake of peace, and especially domestic peace, may a man tell a lie without sinning; but he who changes his word commits as heavy a sin as he who worships idols. The duty of truthfulness was particularly emphasised by the Essenes. He who entered their sect had to pledge himself always to love {99} truth and strive to reclaim all liars. "They are eminent for fidelity," says Josephus. "Whatsoever they say also is firmer than an oath; but swearing is avoided by them, and they esteem it worse than perjury; for they say that he who cannot be believed without [swearing by] God is already condemned."

"Speak every man truth with his neighbour," was from early times regarded as one of the most imperative of Christian maxims. According to St. Augustine, a lie is not permissible even when told with a view to saving the life of a neighbour; "since by lying eternal life is lost, never for any man's temporal life must a lie be told." Yet all lies are not equally sinful; the degree of sinfulness depends on the mind of the liar and on the nature of the subject on which the lie is told. This became the authorised doctrine of the Church. Thomas Aquinas says that, although lying is always sinful, it is not a mortal sin if the end intended be not contrary to charity, "as appears in a jocose lie, that is intended to create some slight amusement, and in an officious lie, in which is intended even the advantage of our neighbour." Yet from early times we meet within the Christian Church a much less rigorous doctrine, which soon came to exercise a more powerful influence on the practice and feelings of men than did St. Augustine's uncompromising love of truth. The Greek Fathers maintained that an untruth is not a lie when there is a "just cause" {100} for it; and as a just cause they regarded not only self-defence, but also zeal for God's honour. This zeal, together with an indiscriminate devotion to the Church, led to those "pious frauds," those innumerable falsifications of documents, inventions of legends, and forgeries of every description, which made the Catholic Church a veritable seat of lying, and most seriously impaired the sense of truth in the minds of Christians. By a fiction, Papacy, as a divine institution, was traced back to the age of the Apostles, and in virtue of another fiction Constantine was alleged to have abdicated his imperial authority in Italy in favour of the successor of St. Peter. The Bishop of Rome assumed the privilege of disengaging men from their oaths and promises. An oath which was contrary to the good of the Church was declared not to be binding. The theory was laid down that, as faith was not to be kept with a tyrant, pirate, or robber, who kills the body, it was still less to be kept with an heretic, who kills the soul. Private protestations were thought sufficient to relieve men in conscience from being bound by a solemn treaty or from the duty of speaking the truth; and an equivocation, or play upon words in which one sense is taken by the speaker and another sense intended by him for the hearer, was in some cases held permissible. According to Alfonso de' Liguori--who lived in the eighteenth century and was beatified in the nineteenth, and whose writings were declared by high authority not to contain a word that could be justly found fault with,-- {101} there are three sorts of equivocation which may be employed for a good reason, even with the addition of a solemn oath. We are allowed to use ambiguously words having two senses, as the word volo, which means both to "wish" and to "fly"; sentences bearing two main meanings, as "This book is Peter's," which may mean either that the book belongs to Peter or that Peter is the author of it; words having two senses, one more common than the other or one literal and the other metaphorical--for instance, if a man is asked about something which it is in his interest to conceal, he may answer, "No, I say," that is "I say the word 'no'" As for mental restrictions, again, such as are "purely mental," and on that account cannot in any manner be discovered by other persons, are not permissible; but we may, for a good reason, make use of a "non-pure mental restriction," which, in the nature of things, is discoverable, although it is not discovered by the person with whom we are dealing. Thus it would be wrong secretly to insert the word "no" in an affirmative oath without any external sign; but it would not be wrong to insert it in a whispering voice or under the cover of a cough. The "good reason" for which equivocations and non-pure mental restrictions may be employed is defined as "any honest object, such as keeping our goods spiritual or temporal." In support of this casuistry it is uniformly said by Catholic apologists that each man has a right to act upon the defensive, that he has a right to keep guard over the knowledge which he possesses in the same way as he may defend his goods; and as for there being any deceit in the matter--why, soldiers use stratagems in war, and opponents use feints in fencing.

Adherence to truth and especially perfect fidelity to a promise were strongly insisted upon by the code of Chivalry. However exacting or absurd the vow might {102} be, a knight was compelled to perform it in all the strictness of the letter. A man frequently promised to grant whatever another should ask, and he would have lost the honour of his knighthood if he had declined from his word. We are told by Lancelot du Lac that when King Artus had given his word to a knight to make him a present of his wife, he would neither listen to the lamentations of the unfortunate woman, nor to any representations which could be made him; he replied that a king must not go from his word, and the queen was accordingly delivered to the knight. The knights taken in war were readily allowed liberty for the time they asked, on their word of honour that they would return of their own accord, whenever it should be required. So great, it is said, was the knight's respect for an oath, a promise, or a vow, that when they lay under any of these restrictions, they appeared everywhere with little chains attached to their arms or habits to show all the world that they were slaves to their word; nor were these chains taken off till their promise had been performed, which sometimes extended to a term of four or five years. It cannot be expected, of course, that reality should have always come up to the ideal. In the thirteenth century the Count of Champagne declared that he confided more in the lowest of his subjects than in his knights. Moreover, the knightly duty of sincerity seems to have gone little beyond the formal fulfilment of an engagement. "The age of Chivalry was an age of chicane, and fraud, and trickery, which were not least conspicuous among the knightly classes." It is significant that the English law of the thirteenth century, though quite willing to admit in vague phrase that no one should be suffered to gain anything by fraud, was inclined to hold that a man has himself to thank if he is misled by deceit, the king's court generally providing no remedy for him who to {103} his disadvantage had trusted the word of a liar. Towards the end of the Middle Ages and later, crimes against the Mint and the offence of counterfeiting seals, usually accompanied by that of forging letters or official documents, were extremely common in England; and false weights, false measures, and false pretences of all kinds were ordinary instruments of commerce.

In modern times, according to Mr. Pike, the Public Records testify a decrease of deception in England. Commercial honesty has improved, and those mean arts to which, during the reigns of the Tudors, even men in the highest positions frequently had recourse, have now, at any rate, descended to a lower grade of society. At present, in the civilised countries of the West, opinion as to what the duty of sincerity implies varies not only in different individuals, but among different classes or groups of people, as also among different nations. Duplicity is held more reprehensible in a gentleman than in a shopkeeper or a peasant. The notion which seems to be common in England, that an advocate is over-scrupulous who refuses to say what he knows to be false if he is instructed to say it, appears strange at least to some foreigners; and in certain countries it is commonly regarded as blamable if a person ostensibly professes a religion in which he does not believe, say, by going to church. The Quakers deem all complimentary modes of speech, for instance in addressing people, to be objectionable as being inconsistent with truth. Certain philosophers have expressed the opinion that veracity is an unconditional duty, which is not to be limited by any expediency, but must be respected in all circumstances. According to Kant, it would be a crime to tell a falsehood to a murderer who asked us whether {104} our friend, of whom he was in pursuit, had taken refuge in our house. Fichte maintains that the defence of so-called necessary lies is "the most wicked argument possible amongst men." Dymond says, "If I may tell a falsehood to a robber in order to save my property, I may commit parricide for the same purpose." But this rigorous view is not shared by common sense, nor by orthodox Protestant theology. Jeremy Taylor asks, "Who will not tell a harmless lie to save the life of his friend, of his child, of himself, of a good and brave man?" Where deception is designed to benefit the person deceived, says Professor Sidgwick, "common sense seems to concede that it may sometimes be right: for example, most persons would not hesitate to speak falsely to an invalid, if this seemed the only way of concealing facts that might produce a dangerous shock: nor do I perceive that any one shrinks from telling fictions to children, on matters upon which it is thought well that they should not know the truth." In the case of grown-up people, however, this principle seems to require the modification made by Hutcheson, that there is no wrong in false speech when the party deceived himself does not consider it an injury to be deceived. Otherwise it might easily be supposed to give support to "pious fraud," which in its crudest form is nowadays generally disapproved of, but which in subtle disguise still has many advocates among religious partisans. It is argued that the most important truths of religion cannot be conveyed into the minds of ordinary men, except by being enclosed, as it were, in a shell of fiction, and that by relating such fictions as if they were facts we are really performing an act of substantial veracity. But this argument seems chiefly to have been invented for the {105} purpose of supporting a dilapidated structure of theological teaching, and can hardly be accepted by any person unprejudiced by religious bias. As a means of self-defence deviation from truth has been justified not only in the case of grosser injuries, but in the case of illegitimate curiosity, as it seems unreasonable that a person should be obliged to supply another with information which he has no right to exact. The obligation of keeping a promise, again, is qualified in various ways. Thoughtful persons would commonly admit that such an obligation is relative to the promisee, and may be annulled by him. A promise to do an immoral act is held not to be binding, because the prior obligation not to do the act is paramount. If, before the time comes to fulfil a promise, circumstances have altered so much that the effects of keeping it are quite different from those which were foreseen when it was made, all would agree that the promisee ought to release the promiser; but if he declines to do so, some would say that the latter is in every case bound by his promise, whilst others would maintain that a considerable alteration of circumstances has removed the obligation. How far promises obtained by force or fraud are binding is a much disputed question. According to Hutcheson, for instance, no regard is due to a promise which has been extorted by unjust violence. Adam Smith, on the other hand, considers that whenever such a promise is violated, though for the most necessary reason, it is always with some degree of dishonour to the person who made it, and that "a brave man ought to die rather than make a promise {106} which he can neither keep without folly nor violate without ignominy."

In point of veracity and good faith the old distinction between duties which we owe to our fellow-countrymen and such as we owe to foreigners is still preserved in various cases. It is particularly conspicuous in the relations between different states, in peace or war. Stratagems and the employment of deceptive means necessary to procure intelligence respecting the enemy or the country are held allowable in warfare, independently of the question whether the war is defensive or aggressive. Deceit has, in fact, often constituted a great share of the glory of the most celebrated commanders; and particularly in the eighteenth century it was a common opinion that successes gained through a spy are more creditable to the skill of a general than successes in regular battles. Lord Wolseley writes:--"As a nation we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by falsehood; the word spy conveys something as repulsive as slave; we will keep hammering along with the conviction that honesty is the best policy, and that truth always wins in the long run. These pretty little sentences do well for a child's copy-book, but the man who acts upon them in war had better sheathe his sword for ever." At the same time, there are some exceptions to the general rule that deceit is permitted against an enemy. Under the customs of war it has been agreed that particular acts and signs shall have a specific meaning in order that belligerents {107} may carry on certain necessary intercourse, and it is forbidden to employ such acts or signs in deceiving an enemy. Thus information must not be surreptitiously obtained under the shelter of a flag of truce; buildings not used as hospitals must not be marked with an hospital flag; and persons not covered by the provisions of the Geneva Convention must not be protected by its cross. A curious arbitrary rule affects one class of stratagems by forbidding certain permitted means of deception from the moment at which they cease to deceive. It is perfectly legitimate to use the distinctive emblems of an enemy in order to escape from him or to draw his forces into action; but it is held that soldiers clothed in the uniforms of their enemy must put on a conspicuous mark by which they can be recognised before attacking, and that a vessel using the enemy's flag must hoist its own flag before firing with shot or shell. Disobedience to this rule is considered to entail grave dishonour; for "in actual battle enemies are bound to combat loyally, and are not free to ensure victory by putting on a mask of friendship." But, as Mr. Hall observes, it is not easy to see why it is more disloyal to wear a disguise when it is obviously useless, than when it serves its purpose. Finally, it is universally agreed that promises given to the enemy ought to be kept; this was admitted even by Machiavelli and Bynkershoek, who did not in general burden belligerents with particularly heavy duties. But the restrictions which "international law" {108} lays on deceit against enemies do not seem to be taken very seriously. Treaties between nations and promises given by one state to another, either in war or peace, are hardly meant to be kept longer than it is convenient to keep them. And when an excuse for the breach of faith is felt necessary, that excuse itself is generally a lie.