CHAPTER XXXI. The Regard for Truth and Good Faith (_concluded_)

THE REGARD FOR TRUTH AND GOOD FAITH (concluded)

Explanation of the moral ideas concerning truthfulness and good faith, pp. 109-131.--When detected a deception implies a conflict between two irreconcilable ideas, which causes pain, p. 109.--Men like to know the truth, p. 109 sq.--The importance of knowing the truth, p. 110.--Deception humiliating, ibid.--A lie or breach of faith held more condemnable in proportion to the magnitude of the harm caused by it, ibid.--The importance of truthfulness and fidelity even in apparently trifling cases, p. 110 sq.--Deceit held permissible or obligatory when promoting the true interest of the person subject to it, p. 111.--The moral valuation of an act of falsehood influenced by its motive, p. 111 sq.--The opinion that no motive can justify an act of falsehood, p. 112.--Why falsehood is held permissible, or praiseworthy, or obligatory, when directed against a stranger, ibid.--Deceit condemned as cowardly, p. 113.--A clever lie admired or approved of, p. 114.--The duties of sincerity and good faith to some extent founded on prudential considerations, pp. 114-124.--Lying attended with supernatural danger, ibid.--A mystic efficacy ascribed to the untrue word, pp. 116-118.--The efficacy of oaths and the methods of charging them with supernatural energy, pp. 118-122.--Oaths containing appeals to supernatural beings, pp. 120-122.--By being frequently appealed to in oaths a god may come to be looked upon as a guardian of veracity and good faith, p. 123.--The influence of oath-taking upon veracity, p. 123 sq.--The influence of education upon the regard for truth, p. 124.--The influence {ix} of habit upon the regard for truth, p. 125.--Natural to speak the truth, p. 125 sq.--Intercourse with strangers destructive to savage veracity, pp. 126-129.--Social incoherence apt to lead to deceitful habits, p. 129.--Social differentiation a cause of deception, p. 129 sq.--Oppression an inducement to falsehood, p. 130 sq.--The duty of informing other persons of the truth, p. 131.--The regard for knowledge, pp. 131-136.