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CHAPTER XXXII. The Respect for Other Men's Honour and Self-Regarding

The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas · Edward Westermarck — chapter 76 of 98 · ~4,374 words · public domain

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THE RESPECT FOR OTHER MEN'S HONOUR AND SELF-REGARDING PRIDE--POLITENESS

THERE are many acts, forbearances, and omissions, the offensiveness of which mainly or exclusively springs from men's desire to be respected by their fellow-men and their dislike of being looked down upon. Foremost among these are attacks upon people's honour and good name. A man's honour may be defined as the moral worth he possesses in the eyes of the society of which he is a member, and it behoves other persons to acknowledge this worth and, especially, not to detract from it by imputing to him, on insufficient grounds, such behaviour as is generally considered degrading.

The censure to which he is subject or the contempt in which he is held may no doubt affect his welfare in various ways, but it is chiefly painful as a violation of his personal dignity. Hence the duty of respecting a man's honour is on the whole contained in the more comprehensive obligation of showing deference, in words and deeds, for his feeling of self-regarding pride.

This feeling, or at least the germ of it, is found already in some of the lower animals. Among "high-life" dogs, says Professor Romanes, "wounded sensibilities and loss of esteem are capable of producing much keener suffering than is mere physical pain." A reproachful word or look from any of his friends made a {138} Skye terrier miserable for a whole day; and another terrier, who when in good humour used to perform various tricks, was never so pleased as when his joke was duly appreciated, whereas "nothing displeased him so much as being laughed at when he did not intend to be ridiculous." Monkeys also, according to Dr. Brehm, are "very sensitive to every kind of treatment they may receive, to love and dislike, to encouraging praise and chilling blame, to pleasant flattery and wounding ridicule, to caresses and chastisement."

Among the savage races of men, as among civilised peoples, self-regarding pride is universal, and in many of them it is a very conspicuous trait of character. The Veddah of Ceylon, says Mr. Nevill, "is proud in the extreme, and considers himself no man's inferior. Hence he is keenly sensitive to ridicule, contempt, and even patronage. There is nothing he dreads more than being laughed at as a savage, because he dislikes clothes and cultivation." Australian aborigines are described as "extravagantly proud," as "vain and fond of approbation." In Fiji "anything like a slight deeply offends a native, and is not soon forgotten." The Negroes of Sierra Leone "possess a great share of pride, and are easily affected by an insult: they cannot hear even a harsh expression, or a raised tone of voice, without shewing that {139} they feel it." The Araucanians, inhabiting parts of Chili, "are naturally fond of honourable distinction, and there is nothing they can endure with less patience than contempt or inattention." The North American Indians, says Perrot, "ont généralement touts beaucoup de vaine gloire dans leurs actions bonnes ou mauvaises. . . . L'ambition est en un mot une des plus fortes passions qui les anime." The Indian of British Columbia, for instance, "watches that he may receive his proper share of honour at festivals; he cannot endure to be ridiculed for even the slightest mistake; he carefully guards all his actions, and looks for due honour to be paid to him by friends, strangers, and subordinates. This peculiarity appears most clearly in great festivals." Thus, in numerous instances, "persons who have been hoarding up property for ten, fifteen, or twenty years (at the same time almost starving themselves for want of clothing), have given it all away to make a show for a few hours, and to be thought of consequence." Speaking of the Eskimo about Behring Strait, Mr. Nelson observes, "As with all savages, the Eskimo are extremely sensitive to ridicule and are very quick to take offence at real or seeming slights." Among the Atkha Aleuts it has happened that men have committed suicide from disappointment at the failure of an undertaking, fearing that they would become the laughing-stock of the village. Among many other savages shame or wounded pride is not uncommonly a cause of suicide. The Hos of Chota Nagpore have a saying that for a wife who has been reproved by her husband {140}"nothing remains but the water at the bottom of the well"; and in New Zealand native women sometimes killed themselves because they had been rebuked for negligence in cooking or for want of care towards a child.

Like other injuries, an insult not only affects the feelings of the victim, but arouses sympathetic resentment in outsiders, and is consequently disapproved of as wrong. Among the Maoris, if anybody wantonly tried to hurt another's feelings, it was immediately repressed, and "such a person was spoken of as having had no parents, or, as having been born (laid) by a bird." In the Malay Archipelago, "among some of the tribes, abusive language cannot with impunity be used even to a slave. Blows are still more intolerable, and considered such grievous affronts, that, by law, the person who receives them is considered justified in putting the offender to death." The natives of the Tonga Islands hold no bad moral habit to be more "ridiculous, depraved, and unjust, than publishing the faults of one's acquaintances and friends . . . . ; and as to downright calumny or false accusation, it appears to them more horrible than deliberate murder does to us: for it is better, they think, to assassinate a man's person than to attack his reputation." According to the customary laws of the Fantis in West Africa, "where a person has been found guilty of using slanderous words, he is bound to retract his words publicly, in addition to paying a small fine by way of compensation to the aggrieved party. Words imputing witchcraft, adultery, immoral conduct, crime, and all words which sound to the disreputation of a person of whom they are spoken are actionable."

Among the Aztecs of ancient Mexico he who wilfully calumniated another, thereby seriously injuring his {141} reputation, was condemned to have his lips cut off, and sometimes his ears also; whilst in Tezcuco the slanderer suffered death. In the Chinese penal code a special book is provided for the prevention and punishment of opprobrious and insulting language, as "having naturally a tendency to produce quarrels and affrays." Among Arabs all insulting expressions have their respective fines ascertained in the [k.]ady's court. It is said in the Talmud:--"Let the honour of thy neighbour be to thee like thine own. Rather be thrown into a fiery furnace than bring any one to public shame."

The Roman Law of the Twelve Tables contained provisions against libellers, and throughout the whole history of Roman law an attack upon honour or reputation was deemed a serious crime. As for wrongful prosecution, which may be regarded as an aggravated form of defamation, the law of the later Empire required that any one bringing a criminal charge should bind himself to suffer in case of failure the penalty that he had endeavoured to call down upon his adversary. Among Teutonic peoples defamatory words and libelling were already at an early date punished with a fine. The Salic Law decrees that a person who calls a freeborn man a "fox" or a "hare" or a "dirty fellow," or says that he has thrown away his shield, must pay him three solidi; whilst, according to one text of the same law, it cost 188 solidi (or nearly as much as was paid for the murder of a Frankish freeman) to call a freeborn woman a witch or a harlot, in case the truth of the charge could not be proved. {142} The oldest English laws exacted bót and wíte from persons who attacked others with abusive words. In the thirteenth century, in almost every action before an English local court, the plaintiff claimed compensation not only for the "damage," but also for the "shame" which had been done him. We further find that regular actions for defamation were common in the local courts; whereas in later days the ecclesiastical procedure against defamatory speech seems to have been regarded as the usual, if not the only, engine which could be brought to bear upon cases of libel and slander. In England, as in Rome, there was a strong feeling that men should not make charges which they could not prove: before the Conquest a person might lose his tongue, or have to redeem it with his full wer, if he brought a false and scandalous accusation; and under Edward I. a statute decreed that if the appellee was acquitted his accuser should lie in prison for a year and pay damages by way of recompense for the imprisonment and infamy which he had brought upon the innocent.

The condemnation of an insult is greatly influenced by the status of, or the relations between, the parties concerned. Among the Goajiro Indians of Colombia a poor man may be insulted with impunity, when the same treatment to a rich man would cause certain bloodshed. In Nias an affront is punished with a fine, which varies according to the rank of the parties. The Chinese penal code lays down that a person who is guilty of addressing abusive language to his or her father or mother, or father's parents, or a wife who rails at her husband's parents or grandparents, shall be strangled; and the same punishment is prescribed for a slave who abuses his master. {143} According to the Laws of Manu, a Kshatriya shall be fined one hundred panas for defaming a Brâhmana, a Vaisya shall be fined one hundred and fifty or two hundred panas, and a Sûdra shall suffer corporal punishment; whereas a Brâhmana shall pay only fifty panas for defaming a Kshatriya, twenty-five for defaming a Vaisya, and twelve for defaming a Sûdra. In ancient Teutonic law the fines for insulting behaviour were graduated according to the rank of the person offended. The starting-point of the Roman law was that an injuria--which was pre-eminently an affront to the dignity of the person--could not be done to a slave as such, only to the master through the medium of his slave; and even in later times, in the case of trifling injuries, such as mere verbal insults, the master had no action, unless by leave of the Praetor, or unless the insult were meant for the master himself. These and similar variations spring from the same causes as do corresponding variations in the case of other injuries dealt with above. But there are also special reasons why social superiority or inferiority influences moral opinions concerning offences against persons self-regarding pride. The respect due to a man is closely connected with his station, and in the case of defamation the injury suffered by the loss of honour or reputation is naturally proportionate to the esteem in which the offended party is held. At the same time the harmfulness of an insult also depends upon the reputation of the person who offers it. According to the Gotlands Lag, one of the ancient provincial laws of Sweden, a slave can not only be insulted with impunity, but has himself to pay no fine for insulting another person--obviously because he was too degraded a being to be able to detract from anybody's honour or good name.

{144} The condemnation of such conduct as is offensive to other persons' self-regarding pride includes condemnation of pride itself, when displayed in an excessive degree; whereas the opposite disposition--modesty--which implies regard for other people's "self-feeling," is praised as a virtue. The Fijians say of a boasting person, "You are like the kaka (parrot); you only speak to shout your own name." On the other hand, among the Tonga Islanders "a modest opinion of oneself is esteemed a great virtue, and is also put in practice." Confucius taught that humility belongs to the characteristics of a superior man. Such a man, he said, is modest in his speech, though he exceeds in his actions; he has dignified ease without pride, whereas the mean man has pride without a dignified ease; he prefers the concealment of his virtue, when it daily becomes more illustrious, whereas the mean man seeks notoriety when he daily goes more and more to ruin. So also humility has a distinguished place in the teachings of Lao-tsze:--"I have three precious things which I hold fast and prize, namely, compassion, economy, and humility"; "He who knows the glory, and at the same time keeps to shame, will be the whole world's valley . . . , eternal virtue will fill him, and he will return home to Taou." In the Book of the Dead the soul of the ancient Egyptian pleads, "I am not swollen with pride." According to Zoroastrianism, the sin of pride has been created by Ahriman. Overbearingness was censured in ancient Scandinavia, Greece, and Rome. During our prosperity, says Cicero, "we ought with great care to {145} avoid pride and arrogance." The Hebrew prophets condemned not only pride but eminence, because an eminent man is apt to be proud. We read in the Talmud:--"He who humiliates himself will be lifted up; he who raises himself up will be humiliated. Whosoever runs after greatness, greatness runs away from him; he who runs from greatness, greatness follows him." Christianity enjoined humility as a cardinal duty in every man. In the Koran it is said, "God loves not him who is proud, and boastful." Pride has thus come to be stigmatised not only as a vice, but as a sin of great magnitude. One reason for this is that it is regarded as even more offensive to the "self-feeling" of a great god or the Supreme Being than it is to that of a man. But pride must also appear as irreligious arrogance to those who maintain that man is by nature altogether corrupt, and that everything good in him is a gift of God.

At the same time, whilst pride is held blamable, humility may also go too far to be approved of, and may even be an object of censure. In early ethics, as we have noticed above, revenge is enjoined as a duty and forgiveness of enemies is despised; and this is the case not only among savages. The device of Chivalry was, "It is better to die than to be avenged by shame"; and side by side with the nominal acceptance of the Christian doctrine of absolute placability the idea still prevails, in many European countries, that an assault upon honour shall be followed by a challenge to mortal combat. Too great humility is regarded as a sign of weakness, cowardice, hypocrisy, or a defective sense of honour. We are not allowed to be indifferent to the estimation in which we are held by our neighbours. Such indifference springs either from a feeble moral constitution and absence of moral shame, or from {146} a depreciation of other people's opinions in comparison with our own, and this is offensive to their amour-propre. Outward humility may thus suggest inward pride and appear arrogant.

A person's "self-feeling" may be violated in innumerable ways, by words and deeds. Almost any deviation from what is usual may arouse a suspicion of arrogance. This largely accounts for the fact mentioned in a previous chapter that habits have a tendency to become true customs, that is, rules of duty. Transgressions of the established forms of social intercourse are particularly apt to be offensive to people's self-regarding pride. Many of these forms originated in a desire to please, but by becoming habitual they at the same time became obligatory. Politeness is a duty rather than a virtue.

There is probably no people on earth which does not recognise some rules of politeness. Many savages are conspicuous for their civility. It has been observed that Christian missionaries working among uncivilised races often are in manners much inferior to those they are teaching, and thus lower the native standard of refinement. The Samoans, we are told, "are a nation of gentlemen," and contrast most favourably with the generality of Europeans who come amongst them. On their first intercourse with Europeans, the Maoris "always manifest a degree of politeness which would do honour to a more civilised people"; but by continued intercourse they lose a great part of this characteristic. Among the Fijians "the rules of politeness are minute, and receive scrupulous attention. They affect the language, and are seen in forms of salutation, in attention to strangers, at meals, in dress, and, indeed, influence their manners in-doors and {147} out. None but the very lowest are ill-behaved, and their confusion on committing themselves shows that they are not impudently so." The Malagasy "are a very polite people, and look with contempt upon those who neglect the ordinary usages and salutations"; "even the most ragged and tattered slave possesses a natural dignity and ease of manner, which contrasts favourably with the rude conduct and boorish manners of the lower class at home." Of the Point Barrow Eskimo Mr. Murdoch observes that "many of them show a grace of manner and a natural delicacy and politeness which is quite surprising"; and he mentions the instance of a young Eskimo being so polite in conversing with an American officer that "he would take pains to mispronounce his words in the same way as the latter did, so as not to hurt his feelings by correcting him bluntly." The forms of Kafir politeness "are very strictly adhered to, and are many." Of the Negroes of Fida Bosman wrote, "They are so civil to each other and the inferior so respectful to the superior, that at first I was very much surprised at it." Monrad found the Negroes of Accra surpass many civilised people in politeness. So also in Morocco even country-folks are much more civil in their general behaviour than the large majority of Europeans. "The conversations of the Arabs," says d'Arvieux, "are full of civilities; one never hears anything there that they think rude and unbecoming." Politeness is a characteristic of all the great nations of the East. The Chinese have brought the practice of it "to a pitch of perfection which is not only unknown in Western lands, but, previous to experience, is unthought of and almost unimaginable. The rules of ceremony, we are reminded in the Classics, are three {148} hundred, and the rules of behaviour three thousand." In Europe courtesy was recommended as the most amiable of knightly qualities; and from "the wild and overstrained courtesies of Chivalry" has been derived our present system of manners.

The rules of politeness and good manners refer to all sorts of social intercourse and vary indefinitely in detail. They tell people how to sit or stand in each other's presence, or how to pass through a door; a Zulu would be fined for going out of a hut back first. They prescribe how to behave at a meal; the Indians of British Columbia consider it improper to talk on such an occasion, and it appears that in England also, in the fifteenth century, "people did not hold conversation while eating, but that the talk and mirth began with the liquor." Politeness demands that a person should never interrupt another while speaking; or that he should avoid contradicting a statement; or, not infrequently, that he should rather tell a pleasant untruth than an unpleasant truth. At times it requires the use of certain phrases, words of thanks, flattery, or expressions of self-humiliation. In Chinese there is "a whole vocabulary of words which are indispensable to one who wishes to pose as a 'polite' person, words in which whatever belongs to the speaker is treated with scorn and contempt, and whatever relates to the person addressed is honourable. The 'polite' Chinese will refer to his wife, if driven to the extremity of referring {149} to her at all, as his 'dull thorn,' or in some similar elegant figure of speech."

Politeness enjoins the performance of certain ceremonies upon persons who meet or part. The custom of salutation is of world-wide prevalence, though there are certain savages who are said to have no greetings except when they have learnt the practice from the whites. As a ceremony prescribed by public opinion it is an obligatory tribute paid to another person's "self-feeling," whatever be the original nature of the act which has been adopted for the purpose. The form of salutation has sometimes been borrowed from questions springing from curiosity or suspicion. Among the Californian Miwok, when anybody meets a stranger he generally salutes him, "Whence do you come? What are you at?" The Abipones "would think it quite contrary to the laws of good-breeding, were they to meet any one and not ask him where he was going"; and a similar question is also a very common mode of greeting among the Berbers of Southern Morocco. Very frequently a salutation consists of some phrase which is expressive of goodwill. It may be an inquiry about the other person's health or welfare, as the English "How are you?" "How do you do?" Among the Burmese two relatives or friends who meet begin a conversation by the expressions, "Are you well? I am well," if they have been some time separated; whereas those who are daily accustomed to meet say, "Where are you going?" The Moors ask, "What is your news?" or, "Is nothing wrong?" The ordinary salutation of the Zulus is, "I see you, are you well?" after which the snuffbox, the token of friendship, is passed round. Among several tribes of California, again, a person when greeting another {150} simply utters a word which means "friendship." The goodwill is often directly expressed in the form of a wish, like our "Good day!" "Good night!" Among the Hebrews the salutation at meeting or entering another's house seems at first to have consisted most commonly in an inquiry after mutual welfare, but in later times "Health!" or "Peace to thee!" became the current greeting. According to the Laws of Manu, a Brâhmana should be saluted, "May thou be long-lived, O gentle one!" The Greeks said [Greek: chai=re] ("Be joyful!"); the Romans, Salve! ("Be in health!") especially on meeting, and Vale! ("Be well!") on parting. The good wish may have the form of a prayer. The Moors say, "May God give thee peace!" "May God give thee a good night!" and the English "Good-bye" and the French Adieu are prayers curtailed by the progress of time. But there is no foundation for Professor Wundt's assertion that "the words employed in greeting are one and all prayer formulæ in a more or less rudimentary state." A salutation may, finally, be a verbal profession of subjection, as the Swedish "Ödmjukaste tjänare," that is, (I am your) "most humble servant."

Salutations may consist not only in words spoken, but in conventional gestures, either accompanied by some verbal expression or performed silently. They may be tokens of submission or reverence, as cowering, crouching, and bowing. Or they may originally have been signs of disarming or defencelessness, as uncovering some particular portion of the body. Von Jhering suggests that the offering of the hand belongs to the same group of salutations, its object being to indicate that the other person has nothing to fear; but in many cases at least handshaking seems to have the same origin as other ceremonies consisting {151} in bodily contact. Salutatory gestures may express not only absence of evil intentions but positive friendliness; among respectable Moors it is a common mode of greeting that each party places his right hand on his heart to indicate, as Jackson puts it, "that part to be the residence of the friend." Various forms of salutation by contact, such as clasping, embracing, kissing, and sniffing, are obviously direct expressions of affection; and we can hardly doubt that the joining of hands serves a similar object when we find it combined with other tokens of goodwill. Among some of the Australian natives, friends, on meeting after an absence, "will kiss, shake hands, and sometimes cry over one another." In Morocco equals salute each other by joining their hands with a quick motion, separating them immediately, and kissing each his own hand. The Soolimas, again, place the palms of the right hands together, carry them then to the forehead, and from thence to the left side of the chest. But bodily union is also employed as a method of transferring either blessings or conditional curses, and it seems probable that certain salutatory acts have vaguely or distinctly such transference in view. Among the Masai, who spit on each other both when they meet and when they part, spitting "expresses the greatest goodwill and the best of wishes"; and in a previous chapter I have endeavoured to show that the object of certain reception ceremonies is to transfer a conditional curse to the stranger who is received as a guest. On the same principle as underlies these ceremonies, handshaking may be a means of joining in compact, analogous to a common meal and the blood-covenant.

Being an homage rendered to other persons self-regarding {152} pride, the rule of politeness is naturally most exacting in relation to superiors. Many of its forms have, in fact, originated in humble or respectful behaviour towards rulers, masters, or elders, and, often in a modified shape, become common between equals after they have lost their original meaning. It has been noticed that the cruelty of despots always engenders politeness, whereas the freest nations are generally the rudest in manners. Politeness is further in a special degree shown by men to women, not only among ourselves, but even among many savages; in this case courtesy is connected with courtship. Strangers or remote acquaintances, also, have particular claims to be treated with civility, whereas politeness is of little moment in the intercourse of friends; it imitates kindness, and is resorted to where the genuine feeling is wanting. And in the capacity of guest, the stranger is often for the time being flattered with exquisite marks of honour, for reasons which have been stated in another connection.

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