Ethics

Chapter Ix. May Be Found More Detailed in Analysis Than Is Necessary for

the beginner. In Part II., Chapters XI.-XII. may be omitted without losing the thread of the argument. In Part III., any one of the specific topics--viz., the political state, the economic order, the family--may be considered apart from the others. Some teachers may prefer to take Parts in their entirety. In this case, any two may be chosen.

As to the respective shares of the work for which the authors are severally responsible, while each has contributed suggestions and criticisms to the work of the other in sufficient degree to make the book throughout a joint work, Part I. has been written by Mr. Tufts,

Part Ii. by Mr. Dewey, and in Part Iii., Chapters Xx. and Xxi. Are by

Mr. Dewey, Chapters XXII.-XXVI. by Mr. Tufts.

It need scarcely be said that no attempt has been made in the bibliographies to be exhaustive. When the dates of publication of the work cited are given, the plan has been in general to give, in the case of current literature, the date of the latest edition, and in the case of some classical treatises the date of original publication.

In conclusion, the authors desire to express their indebtedness to their colleagues and friends Dr. Wright, Mr. Talbert, and Mr. Eastman, who have aided in the reading of the proof and with other suggestions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION 1

Sec. 1. Definition and Method:--Ethical and moral, specific problem, 1; importance of genetic study, 3. Sec. 2. Criterion of the moral:--The moral in cross section, the "what" and the "how," 5; the moral as growth, 8. Sec. 3. Divisions of the treatment, 13.

PART I. The Beginnings and Growth of Morality

THE BEGINNINGS AND GROWTH OF MORALITY

II. EARLY GROUP LIFE 17

Sec. 1. Typical facts of group life:--Primitive unity and solidarity, 17. Sec. 2. Kinship and household groups:--The kinship group, 21; the family or household group, 23. Sec. 3. Kinship and family groups as economic and industrial units:--The land and the group, 24; movable goods, 25. Sec. 4. Kinship and family groups as political bodies:--Their control over the individual, 26; rights and responsibility, 27. Sec. 5. The kinship or household as a religious unit:--Totem groups, 30; ancestral religion, 31. Sec. 6. Age and sex groups, 32. Sec. 7. Moral significance of the group, 34.

III. THE RATIONALIZING AND SOCIALIZING AGENCIES IN EARLY SOCIETY 37

Sec. 1. Three levels of conduct:--Conduct as instinctive and governed by primal needs, regulated by society's standards, and by personal standards, 37. Sec. 2. Rationalizing agencies: Work, 40; arts and crafts, 41; war, 42. Sec. 3. Socializing agencies:--Cooperation, 42; art, 45. Sec. 4. Family life as idealizing and socializing agency, 47. Sec. 5. Moral interpretation of this first level, 49.

IV. GROUP MORALITY--CUSTOMS OR MORES 51

Sec. 1. Meaning, authority, and origin of customs, 51. Sec. 2. Means of enforcing custom:--Public approval, taboos, rituals, force, 54. Sec. 3. Conditions which render group control conscious:--Educational customs, 57; law and justice, 59; danger or crisis, 64. Sec. 4. Values and defects of customary morality:--Standards, motives, content, organization of character, 68.

V. FROM CUSTOM TO CONSCIENCE; FROM GROUP MORALITY TO PERSONAL MORALITY 73

Sec. 1. Contrast and collision, 73. Sec. 2. Sociological agencies in the transition:--Economic forces, 76; science and the arts, 78; military forces, 80; religious forces, 81. Sec. 3. Psychological agencies:--Sex, 81; private property, 83; struggles for mastery and liberty, 84; honor and esteem, 85. Sec. 4. Positive reconstruction, 89.

VI. THE HEBREW MORAL DEVELOPMENT 91

Sec. 1. General character and determining principles:--The Hebrew and the Greek, 91; Political and economic factors, 92. Sec. 2. Religious agencies:--Covenant, 94; personal law-giver, 95; cultus, 97; prophets, 99; the kingdom, 100. Sec. 3. Moral conceptions attained:--Righteousness and sin, 102; responsibility, 104; purity of motive, 105; the ideal of "life," 107; the social ideal, 108.

VII. THE MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GREEKS 111

Sec. 1. The fundamental notes:--Convention versus nature, 111; measure, 112; good and just, 113. Sec. 2. Intellectual forces of individualism:--The scientific spirit, 114. Sec. 3. Commercial and political individualism:--Class interests, 119; why obey laws? 122. Sec. 4. Individualism and ethical theory:--The question formulated, 124; individualistic theories, 126. Sec. 5. The deeper view of nature and the good, of the individual and the social order:--Aristotle on the natural, 127; Plato's ideal state, 129; passion or reason, 131; eudaemonism and the mean, 134; man and the cosmos, 135. Sec. 6. The conception of the ideal:--Contrast with the actual, 136; ethical significance, 138. Sec. 7. The conception of the self, of character and responsibility:--The poets, 138; Plato and the Stoics, 140.

VIII. THE MODERN PERIOD 142

Sec. 1. The mediaeval ideals:--Groups and class ideals, 143; the church ideal, 145. Sec. 2. Main lines of modern development, 147. Sec. 3. The old and new in the beginnings of individualism, 149. Sec. 4. Individualism in the progress of liberty and democracy:--Rights, 151. Sec. 5. Individualism as affected by the development of industry, commerce, and art:--Increasing power and interests, 153; distribution of goods, 157; industrial revolution raises new problems, 159. Sec. 6. The individual and the development of intelligence:--The Renaissance, 163; the Enlightenment, 165; the present significance of scientific method, 167.

IX. A GENERAL COMPARISON OF CUSTOMARY AND REFLECTIVE MORALITY 171

Sec. 1. Elements of agreement and continuity:--Regime of custom, 172; persistence of group morality, 173; origin of ethical terms, 175. Sec. 2. Elements of contrast:--Differentiation of the moral, 177; observing versus reflecting, 178; the higher law, 181; deepening of meaning, 182. Sec. 3. Opposition between individual and social aims and standards:--Withdrawal from the social order, 184; individual emancipation, 186. Sec. 4. Effects upon the individual character:--Increased possibilities of evil as well as of good, 187. Sec. 5. Moral differentiation and the social order:--Effects on the family, 193; on industry and government, 194; on religion, 195; general relation of religion to morality, 197.

PART II. Theory of the Moral Life

THEORY OF THE MORAL LIFE

X. THE MORAL SITUATION 201

Distinguishing marks of the moral situation, 201; Traits of voluntary activity, 202; The good and bad in non-voluntary behavior, 203; Indifferent voluntary conduct, 205; The moral is introduced when ends have conflicting values, 207; Selection then depends upon, and influences, the nature of the self, 209.

XI. PROBLEMS OF MORAL THEORY 212

Theory grows from practical problems, 212; Three typical problems of reflective practice, 213; Corresponding problems of theory, 214; Their historical sequence, 215; Growth of individualism, 220; The two types of individualism, 221.

XII. TYPES OF MORAL THEORY 224

Sec. 1. Typical divisions of theories:--Teleological and jural, 224; individual and institutional, 225; empirical and intuitional, 226. Sec. 2. Division of voluntary activity into Inner and Outer:--The "how" and the "what," 227; attitude and consequences, 228; different types of each theory, 229; bearing of each theory upon problems of knowledge and of control, 231. Sec. 3. General interpretation of these theories:--Ordinary view of disposition and of consequences, 232; advantages claimed for emphasis upon consequences, 234; for emphasis upon disposition or attitude, 236; necessity of reconciliation of these theories, 237.

XIII. CONDUCT AND CHARACTER 240

Problem of their relation, 240. Sec. 1. The good will of Kant:--Emphasis upon motive, 241; motive with or without consequences, 242; necessity of effort, 243; overt action required to prove motive, 245. Sec. 2. The "Intention" of the Utilitarians:--Emphasis upon consequences, 246; distinction of intention from motive, 247; they are really identical, 248; motive as blind and as intelligent, 249; practical importance of insistence upon consequences, 251; foresight of consequences depends upon motive, 252. Sec. 3. Conduct and character:--The nature of disposition, 254; partial and complete intention, 256; complexity of motives, 257. Sec. 4. Morality of acts and of agents:--Subjective and objective morality, 259; the doer and his deed, 260; summary, 261.

XIV. HAPPINESS AND CONDUCT: THE GOOD AND DESIRE 263

Residence and nature of goodness, 263; happiness as the good, 264; love of happiness as the evil, 265; ambiguity in conception of happiness, 266. Sec. 1. The Object of Desire:--Is it pleasure? 269; desire presupposes instinctive appetites, 270; and objects of thought, 271; happiness and desire, 272; need for standard, 274. Sec. 2. The Conception of Happiness as a Standard:--Utilitarian method, 275; Difficulty of measuring pleasure, 276; character determines the value of a pleasure, 277; Mill's introduction of quality of pleasure, 279. Sec. 3. The constitution of happiness:--Pleasures depend upon objects, 281; they are qualitative, 282; they vary with disposition, 283; happiness as the moral good, 284.

XV. HAPPINESS AND SOCIAL ENDS 286

Utilitarianism aims at social welfare, 286; value as a theory of social reform, 287; its aim conflicts with its hedonistic theory of motive, 289; Bentham's method of reconciling personal and general happiness, 291; Mill's method, 293; sympathy and the social self, 298; the distinctively moral interest, 300; equation of virtue and happiness, 301; moral democracy, 303.

XVI. THE PLACE OF REASON IN THE MORAL LIFE: MORAL KNOWLEDGE 306

Sec. 1. Problem of reason and desire:--Nature of a reasonable act, 306; theories about moral knowledge, 307. Sec. 2. Kant's theory of practical reason:--Traits of morality, 309; reason as a priori and formal, 310; true meaning of generalization, 313; the general and the social, 314. Sec. 3. Moral sense intuitionalism:--Function of reason, 317; habit and sense, 319; invalid intuitions, 321; deliberation and intuition, 322; the good man's judgment, 324. Sec. 4. The place of general rules:--Their value, 325; casuistry, 326; and its dangers, 327; secondary ends of utilitarianism, 329; empirical rules and customs, 330; distinction of rules and principles, 333; sympathy and reasonableness, 334.

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