Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding

CHAPTER II.. Sources of His Philosophy.

Sources of his Philosophy.

Character of the Epoch into which Leibniz was born 20

The Thought of the Unity of the World 23

The two Agencies which formed Leibniz's Philosophy 24

The Cartesian Influences 26

Rationalistic Method 28

Mechanical Explanation of Nature 30

Application of Mathematics 32

Idea of Evolution 33

Interpretation of these Ideas 35

Idea of Activity or Entelechy 39

Idea of Rationality 40

Idea of Organism 42

CHAPTER III.. The Problem and Its Solution.

The Problem and its Solution.

Unity of Leibniz's Thought 43

Relation of Universal and Individual 44

Descartes' Treatment of this Question 46

Spinoza's Treatment of it 48

Leibniz's Solution 50

All Unity is Spiritual 53

And Active 54

Is a Representative Individual 56

Contrast of Monad and Atom 58

Pre-established Harmony reconciles Universal and Individual 59

Meaning of this Doctrine 62

CHAPTER IV.. Locke and Leibniz.--Innate Ideas.

Locke and Leibniz.--Innate Ideas.

Necessity of Preliminary Account of Leibniz's Philosophy 66

Locke's Empiricism 67

Leibniz's Comments upon Locke 69

The Controversies of Leibniz 72

The Essay on the Human Understanding 73

Locke's Denial of Innate Ideas 75

Depending upon

(1) His Mechanical Conception of Innate Ideas 77

Leibniz undermines this by substituting an Organic Conception 80

And upon

(2) His Mechanical Conception of Consciousness 84

Leibniz refutes this by his Theory of Unconscious Intelligence 85

CHAPTER V.. Sensation and Experience.

Sensation and Experience.

Importance of Doctrine regarding Sensation 87

The Two Elements of Locke's Notion of Sensation 89

Its Relation to the Object producing it: Primary and Secondary Qualities 91

Locke criticized as to his Account

(1) Of the Production of Sensation 92

(2) Of its Function in Knowledge 95

The Meaning of Physical Causation 97

Bearing of this Doctrine upon Relation of Soul and Body 98

Criticism of Locke's Dualism 98

Leibniz's Monism 101

Summary of Discussion 103

Leibniz on the Relation of Sensations to Objects occasioning them 105

Nature of Experience 106

Distinction of Empirical from Rational Knowledge 107

CHAPTER VI.. The Impulses and the Will.

The Impulses and the Will.

The Doctrine of Will depends upon that of Intelligence 109

The Character of Impulse 111

Of Desire 112

Half-Pains and Pleasures 113

The Outcome of Desire 115

Nature of Moral Action 117

Of Freedom 118

(1) Freedom as Contingency 119

Limitation of this Principle 121

(2) Freedom as Spontaneity 123

This Principle is too Broad to be a Moral Principle 125

(3) True Freedom is Rational Action 125

Our Lack of Freedom is due to our Sensuous Nature 128

Innate Practical Principles 129

Moral Science is Demonstrative 130

CHAPTER VII.. Matter and Its Relation to Spirit.

Matter and its Relation to Spirit.

Locke's Account of Matter and Allied Ideas the Foundation of the Philosophy of Nature Characteristic of British Empiricism 132

Space and Matter wholly Distinct Ideas 134

Leibniz gives Matter a Metaphysical Basis 137

Ordinary Misunderstanding of Leibniz's Ideas of Matter 138

Matter is not composed of Monads 139

Matter is the Passive or Conditioned Side of Monads 140

Passivity equals "Confused Representations," i. e. Incomplete Development of Reason 144

Matter is logically Necessary from Leibniz's Principles 145

Bearing of Discussion upon Doctrine of Pre-established Harmony 146

Summary 147

CHAPTER VIII.. Material Phenomena and Their Reality.

Material Phenomena and their Reality.

What is the Connection between Matter as Metaphysical and as Physical? 151

The Latter is the "Image" of the Former 151

Leibniz's Reaction from Cartesian Theory 152

His Objections are (1) Physical and (2) Logical 153

(1) Motion is Source of Physical Qualities of Bodies 155

Hence there are no Atoms 158

Secondary Qualities as well as Primary depend upon Motion 160

(2) What is the Subject to which the Quality of Extension belongs? 161

It is the Monad as Passive 162

Space and Time connect the Spiritual and the Sensible 164

Distinction between Space and Time, and Extension and Duration 166

Space and Time are Relations 167

Leibniz's Controversy with Clarke 168

Leibniz denies that Space and Time are Absolute 170

What is the Reality of Sensible Phenomena? 173

It consists

(1) In their Regularity 174

(2) In their Dependence upon Intelligence and Will 175

Leibniz and Berkeley 177

CHAPTER IX.. Some Fundamental Conceptions.

Some Fundamental Conceptions.

Locke's Account of Substance as Static 179

The Distinction between Reality and Phenomena 180

Leibniz's Conception of Substance as Dynamic 181

His Specific Criticisms upon Locke 182

The Categories of Identity and Difference Locke also explains in a Mechanical Way 183

Leibniz regards them as Internal and as Organic to each other 184

Locke gives a Quantitative Notion of Infinity 188

And hence makes our Idea of it purely Negative 189

Leibniz denies that the True Notion of Infinity is Quantitative 189

He also denies Locke's Account of the Origin of the Indefinite 192

In General, Locke has a Mechanical Idea, Leibniz a Spiritual, of these Categories 193

CHAPTER X.. The Nature and Extent of Knowledge.

The Nature and Extent of Knowledge.

Locke's Definition and Classification of Knowledge 196

Leibniz's Criticism 197

Leibniz, Berkeley, and Kant regarding Knowledge of Objects 198

The Degrees of Knowledge,--Intuitive, Demonstrative, and Sensitive 199

Locke's Contradictory Theories regarding the Origin of Knowledge 202

Locke starts both with the Individual as given to Consciousness and with the Unrelated Sensation 204

Either Theory makes Relations or "Universals" Unreal 205

As to the Extent of Knowledge, that of Identity is Wide, but Trifling 205

That of Real Being includes God, Soul, and Matter, but only as to their Existence 206

And even this at the Expense of contradicting his Definition of Knowledge 206

Knowledge of Co-existence is either Trifling or Impossible 207

Leibniz rests upon Distinction of Contingent and Rational Truth 209

The Former may become the Latter, and is then Demonstrative 210

The Means of this Transformation are Mathematics and Classification 215

There are Two Principles,--One of Contradiction 217

The Other of Sufficient Reason 218

The Latter leads us to God as the Supreme Intelligence and the Final Condition of Contingent Fact 219

The Four Stages of Knowledge 222

CHAPTER XI.. The Theology of Leibniz.

The Theology of Leibniz.

Leibniz's Three Arguments for the Existence of God 224

The Value of the Ontological 225

The Cosmological 226

The Teleological 226

The Attributes of God 227

The Relation of God to the World, his Creating Activity 228

Creation involves Wisdom and Goodness as well as Power 229

The Relation of God to Intelligent Spirits: they form a Moral Community 230

Leibniz as the Founder of Modern German Ethical Systems 231

The End of Morality is Happiness as Self-realization 232

The Three Stages of Natural Right 234

The Basis of Both Leibniz's Ethics and Political Philosophy is Man's Relation to God 236

His Æsthetics have the Same Basis 237

Man's Spirit as Architectonic 238

CHAPTER XII.. Criticism and Conclusion.

Criticism and Conclusion.

Leibniz's Fundamental Contradiction is between his Method and his Subject Matter 240

The Use which Leibniz makes of the Principle of Sufficient Reason reveals this Contradiction 242

The Contradiction is between the Ideas of Formal and of Concrete Unity 243

From this Contradiction flow

(1) The Contradiction in the Notion of Individuality 246

Which becomes purely Negative 247

The Negative he interprets as merely Privative 249

(2) The Contradiction in his Conception of God has the Same Source 250

He really has Three Definitions of God 250

One results in Atomism, another in Pantheism 251

The Third in a Conception of the Organic Harmony of the Infinite and Finite 252

(3) The Contradiction between the Real and the Ideal in the Monads has the Same Source 253

(4) As have also the Contradictions in the Treatment of the Relations of Matter and Spirit 254

(5) And finally, his Original Contradiction leads to a Contradictory Treatment of Knowledge 257

Summary as to the Positive Value of Leibniz 259

The Influence of Leibniz's Philosophy 261

Especially upon Kant 262

Kant claims to be the True Apologist for Leibniz 263

(1) As to the Doctrine of Sufficient Reason and Contradiction 263

Which finds its Kantian Analogue in the Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgment 266

(2) As to the Relation of Monads and Matter 268

Which finds its Kantian Analogue in the Relation of the Sensuous and Supersensuous 268

(3) And finally, as to the Doctrine of Pre-established Harmony 269

Which Kant transforms into Harmony between Understanding and Sense 269

And between the Categories of the Understanding and the Ideas of Reason 270

Conclusion 272

LEIBNIZ'S NEW ESSAYS CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

CHAPTER I.. The Man.

THE MAN.

"He who knows me only by my writings does not know me," said Leibniz. These words--true, indeed, of every writer, but true of Leibniz in a way which gives a peculiar interest and charm to his life--must be our excuse for prefacing what is to be said of his "New Essays concerning the Human Understanding" with a brief biographical sketch.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born in Leipzig June 21, 1646. His father, who died when Leibniz was only six years old, was a professor in the university and a notary of considerable practice. From him the future philosopher seems to have derived his extraordinary industry and love of detail. Such accounts as we have of him show no traces of the wonderful intellectual genius of his son, but only a diligent, plodding, faithful, and religious man, a thoroughly conscientious husband, jurist, and professor. Nor in the lines of physical heredity can we account for the unique career of Leibniz by his mother's endowments. The fact, however, that she was patient in all trial, living in peace with her neighbors, anxious for unity and concord with all people, even with those not well disposed to her, throws great light upon the fundamental trait of Leibniz's ethical nature. As in so many cases, it is the inherited moral characteristics which form the basis of the intellectual nature. The love of unity which was a moral trait in Leibniz's mother became in him the hunger for a harmonious and unified mental world; the father's devotion to detail showed itself as the desire for knowledge as minute and comprehensive as it was inter-related.

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