Mahan on Naval Warfare

PART I. Naval Principles

NAVAL PRINCIPLES 1. THE VALUE OF HISTORICAL STUDY 3

2. “THEORETICAL” versus “PRACTICAL” TRAINING 8

A Historical Instance 8

What is Practical? 10

3. ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER 16

4. DEFINITION OF TERMS: STRATEGY, TACTICS, LOGISTICS 49

5. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 50

Central Position, Interior Lines, Communications 50

Concentration 60

6. STRATEGIC POSITIONS 68

I. Situation 69

II. Military Strength 70

III. Resources 74

7. STRATEGIC LINES 75

Communications 75

Importance of Sea Communications 76

8. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 79

9. THE VALUE OF THE DEFENSIVE 87

10. COMMERCE-DESTROYING AND BLOCKADE 91

Command of the Sea Decisive 98

11. STRATEGIC FEATURES OF THE GULF OF MEXICO AND THE CARIBBEAN 100

12. PRINCIPLES OF NAVAL ADMINISTRATION 113

Opposing Elements 113

The British System 118

The United States System 122

13. THE MILITARY RULE OF OBEDIENCE 125

14. PREPAREDNESS FOR NAVAL WAR 128

PART II. Sea Power in History

SEA POWER IN HISTORY 15. A NATION EXHAUSTED BY ISOLATION 137

France under Louis XIV 137

16. THE GROWTH OF BRITISH SEA POWER 141

England after the Peace of Utrecht, 1715 141

17. RESULTS OF THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR 147

18. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FORMALISM IN NAVAL TACTICS 155

19. THE NEW TACTICS 159

Rodney and De Guichen, April 17, 1780 159

20. SEA POWER IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 164

Graves and De Grasse off the Chesapeake 164

21. THE FRENCH NAVY DEMORALIZED BY THE REVOLUTION 171

22. HOWE’S VICTORY OF JUNE 1, 1794 175

23. NELSON’S STRATEGY AT COPENHAGEN 184

24. ENGLAND’S FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE 191

25. THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR 196

“The Nelson Touch” 200

The Battle 208

Commerce Warfare after Trafalgar 223

26. GENERAL STRATEGY OF THE WAR OF 1812 229

Results of the Northern Campaign 235

27. LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN 241

The Possibilities of a “Fleet in Being” 241

28. THE SANTIAGO BLOCKADE 250

29. “FLEET IN BEING” AND “FORTRESS FLEET” 256

The Port Arthur Squadron in the Russo-Japanese War 256

Divided Forces 269

30. ROZHESTVENSKY AT TSUSHIMA 276

PART III. Naval and National Policies

NAVAL AND NATIONAL POLICIES 31. EXPANSION AND OVER-SEA BASES 285

The Annexation of Hawaii 285

32. APPLICATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE 288

Anglo-American Community of Interests 288

33. CHANGES IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 296

34. OUR INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC 299

35. THE GERMAN STATE AND ITS MENACE 302

The Bulwark of British Sea Power 306

36. ADVANTAGES OF INSULAR POSITION 309

Great Britain and the Continental Powers 309

37. BEARING OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS ON NAVAL POLICY AND STRATEGY 317

38. SEIZURE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA 328

39. THE MORAL ASPECT OF WAR 342

40. THE PRACTICAL ASPECT OF WAR 348

41. MOTIVES FOR NAVAL POWER 355

APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGICAL OUTLINE 359

ACADEMIC HONORS 360

PUBLISHED WORKS 361

UNCOLLECTED ESSAYS 362

REFERENCES 362

INDEX 365

LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS

PAGE DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING THE VALUE OF THE CENTRAL POSITION 54 GULF OF MEXICO AND CARIBBEAN SEA 101 RODNEY AND GUICHEN, APRIL 17, 1780 161 GRAVES AND DE GRASSE, SEPTEMBER 5, 1781 167 THE BALTIC AND ITS APPROACHES Facing page 185 NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN Facing page 197 THE ATTACK AT TRAFALGAR 214 SCENE OF NAVAL WAR, JAPAN AND RUSSIA 278

PART I. Naval Principles

NAVAL PRINCIPLES

MAHAN

ON NAVAL WARFARE

I. THE VALUE OF HISTORICAL STUDY

The history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war. The profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which governed its growth and prosperity were detected. To secure to one’s own people a disproportionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence. The clash of interests, the angry feelings roused by conflicting attempts thus to appropriate the larger share, if not the whole, of the advantages of commerce, and of distant unsettled commercial regions, led to wars. On the other hand, wars arising from other causes have been greatly modified in their conduct and issue by the control of the sea. Therefore the history of sea power, while embracing in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great upon the sea or by the sea, is largely a military history; and it is in this aspect that it will be mainly, though not exclusively, regarded in the following pages.

A study of the military history of the past, such as this, is enjoined by great military leaders as essential to correct ideas and to the skillful conduct of war in the future. Napoleon names among the campaigns to be studied by the aspiring soldier, those of Alexander, Hannibal, and Cæsar, to whom gunpowder was unknown; and there is a substantial agreement among professional writers that, while many of the conditions of war vary from age to age with the progress of weapons, there are certain teachings in the school of history which remain constant, and being, therefore, of universal application, can be elevated to the rank of general principles. For the same reason the study of the sea history of the past will be found instructive, by its illustration of the general principles of maritime war, notwithstanding the great changes that have been brought about in naval weapons by the scientific advances of the past half-century, and by the introduction of steam as the motive power. [The pages omitted point out lessons to be drawn from galley and sailing-ship warfare.—EDITOR.]

Before hostile armies or fleets are brought into contact (a word which perhaps better than any other indicates the dividing line between tactics and strategy), there are a number of questions to be decided, covering the whole plan of operations throughout the theater of war. Among these are the proper function of the navy in the war; its true objective; the point or points upon which it should be concentrated; the establishment of depots of coal and supplies; the maintenance of communications between these depots and the home base; the military value of commerce-destroying as a decisive or a secondary operation of war; the system upon which commerce-destroying can be most efficiently conducted, whether by scattered cruisers or by holding in force some vital center through which commercial shipping must pass. All these are strategic questions, and upon all these history has a great deal to say. There has been of late a valuable discussion in English naval circles as to the comparative merits of the policies of two great English admirals, Lord Howe and Lord St. Vincent, in the disposition of the English navy when at war with France. The question is purely strategic, and is not of mere historical interest; it is of vital importance now, and the principles upon which its decision rests are the same now as then. St. Vincent’s policy saved England from invasion, and in the hands of Nelson and his brother admirals led straight up to Trafalgar.

It is then particularly in the field of naval strategy that the teachings of the past have a value which is in no degree lessened. They are there useful not only as illustrative of principles, but also as precedents, owing to the comparative permanence of the conditions. This is less obviously true as to tactics, when the fleets come into collision at the point to which strategic considerations have brought them. The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting,—in the handling and disposition of troops or ships on the battlefield. Hence arises a tendency on the part of many connected with maritime matters to think that no advantage is to be gained from the study of former experiences; that time so used is wasted. This view, though natural, not only leaves wholly out of sight those broad strategic considerations which lead nations to put fleets afloat, which direct the sphere of their action, and so have modified and will continue to modify the history of the world, but is one-sided and narrow even as to tactics. The battles of the past succeeded or failed according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of war; and the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day. He will observe also that changes of tactics have not only taken place after changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change, by careful study of the powers and limitations of the new ship or weapon, and by a consequent adaptation of the method of using it to the qualities it possesses, which will constitute its tactics. History shows that it is vain to hope that military men generally will be at the pains to do this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great advantage,—a lesson in itself of no mean value.

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