PART IV.. The Sceptics—Pyrrho and the Older Academy.

THE SCEPTICS—PYRRHO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.

CHAPTER XXII.

PYRRHO.

Stoicism and Epicureanism are alike in one respect: they commence the pursuit of happiness with definite dogmatic statements. The Sceptic Schools, however, attempt to reach the same end by denying every dogmatic position. Varied as the paths may be, the result is in all cases the same; happiness is made to consist in the exaltation of the mind above all external objects, in the withdrawal of man within his own thinking self. Moving in the same sphere

as the cotemporary dogmatic systems, the post-Aristotelian Scepticism takes a practical view of the business of philosophy, and estimates the value of theoretical enquiries by their influence on the state and happiness of man. It moreover agrees with cotemporary systems in its ethical view of life; the object at which it aims is the same as that at which those systems aim, viz. repose of mind, and imperturbability. It differs from them, none the less; for the Epicureans and Stoics made mental repose to depend on a knowledge of the world and its laws, whereas the Sceptics are of opinion that it can only be obtained by despairing of all knowledge. Hence, with the former morality depends on a positive conviction as to the highest Good; with the latter, morality consists in indifference to all that appears as Good to men. Important as this difference may be, it must not therefore be forgotten that Scepticism generally revolves in the same sphere as Stoicism and Epicureanism, and that in renouncing all claim to knowledge, and all interest in the external world, it is only pushing to extremes that withdrawal of man into himself which we have seen to be the common feature of these Schools. Not only, therefore, do these three lines of thought belong to one and the same epoch, but such is their internal connection that they may be regarded as three branches of a common stock.

More than one point of departure was offered to Scepticism by the earlier philosophy. The Megarian criticism and the Cynic teaching had taken up a position subversive of all connection of ideas, and of all knowledge. Pyrrho, too, had received from the School of Democritus an impulse to doubt. In particular, the development of the Platonic and Aristotelian speculations by those who were not able to follow them, had made men mistrustful of all speculation, until they at last doubted the possibility of all knowledge. Not seldom do Sceptical theories follow times of great philosophical originality. A stronger impulse was given in the sequel by the Stoic and Epicurean systems. Related to Scepticism by their practical tone, it was natural that these systems should afford fuel to Scepticism. At the same time the unsatisfactory groundwork upon which they were built, and the contrast between their moral and physical teaching, promoted destructive criticism. If, according to the Stoics and Epicureans, the particular and the universal elements in the personal soul, the isolation of the individual as an independent atom, and his being merged in a pantheistic universe, are contrasted without being reconciled; among the Sceptics this contrast has given place to neutrality. Neither the Stoic nor the Epicurean theory can claim our adherence; neither the unconditional value of pleasure, nor yet the unconditional value of virtue; neither the truth of the senses nor the truth of rational knowledge; neither the Atomist’s view of nature, nor the Pantheistic view as it found expression in Heraclitus. The only thing which remains certain amid universal uncertainty is abstract personality content with itself, personality forming at once the starting-point and the goal of the two contending systems.

The important back-influence of Stoicism and Epicureanism upon Scepticism may be best gathered from the fact that Scepticism only attained a wide extension and a more comprehensive basis in the New Academy after the appearance of those systems. Before that time its leading features had been indeed laid down by Pyrrho, but they had never been developed into a permanent School of Scepticism, nor given rise to an expanded theory of doubt.

Pyrrho was a native of Elis, and may therefore have early made the acquaintance of the Elean and Megarian criticism—that criticism, in fact, which was the precursor of subsequent Scepticism. It can, however, hardly be true that Bryso was his instructor. To Anaxarchus, a follower of Democritus, he attached himself, and accompanied that philosopher with Alexander’s army as far as India. Perhaps, however, he is less indebted to Anaxarchus for the sceptical than for the ethical parts of his teaching. At a later period he resided in his native city, honoured by his fellow-citizens, but in poor circumstances, which he bore with his characteristic repose of mind. He died, it would appear, at an advanced age, between 275 and 270 B.C., leaving no writings behind. Even the ancients, therefore, only knew his teaching by that of his pupils, among whom Timon of Phlius was the most distinguished. Besides Timon several other of his pupils are known by name. His School, however, was short-lived. Soon after Timon it seems to have become extinct. Those who were disposed to be sceptical now joined the New Academy, towards whose founder even Timon made no secret of his grudge.

The little which is known of Pyrrho’s teaching may be summed up in the three following statements: We can know nothing as to the nature of things: Hence the right attitude towards them is to withhold judgment: The necessary result of suspending judgment is imperturbability. He who will live happily—for happiness is the starting-point with the Sceptics—must, according to Timon, take these things into consideration: What is the nature of things? What ought our attitude to things to be? What is the gain resulting from these relations? To the first of these three questions Pyrrho can only reply by saying that things are altogether inaccessible to knowledge, and that whatever property may be attributed to a thing, with equal justice the opposite may be predicated. In support of this statement Pyrrho appears to have argued that neither the senses nor reason furnish certain knowledge. The senses do not show things as they are, but only as they appear to be. Rational knowledge, even where it seems to be most certain, in the sphere of morals, does not depend upon real knowledge, but only upon tradition and habit. Against every statement the opposite may be advanced with equal justice. If, however, neither the senses nor reason alone can furnish trustworthy testimony, no more can the two combined, and thus the third way is barred, by which we might possibly have advanced to knowledge. How many more of the arguments quoted by the later Sceptics belong to Pyrrho it is impossible to say. The short duration and diffusion of Pyrrho’s School renders it probable that with him Scepticism was not far advanced. The same result appears to follow from its further development in the Academy. The ten τρόποι, or aspects under which sceptical objections were grouped, cannot with certainty be attributed to any one before Ænesidemus. Portions of the arguments used at a later day may be borrowed from Pyrrho and his pupils, but it is impossible to discriminate these portions with certainty.

Thus, if knowledge of things proves to be a failure, there only remains as possible an attitude of pure Scepticism; and therein is contained the answer to the second question. We know nothing whatever of the real nature of things, and hence can neither believe nor assert anything as to their nature. We cannot say of anything that it is or is not; but we must abstain from every opinion, allowing that of all which appears to us to be true, the opposite may with equal justice be true. Accordingly, all our statements (as the Cyrenaics taught) only express individual opinions, and not absolute realities. We cannot deny that things appear to be of this or the other kind; but we can never say that they are so. Even the assertion that things are of this or the other kind is not an assertion, but a confession by the individual of his state of mind. Hence, too, the universal rule of indecision cannot be taken as an established principle, but only as a confession, and, therefore, as only problematical. It must, however, remain a matter of doubt how far the captious turns of expression by which the Sceptics thought to parry the attacks of their opponents come from Pyrrho’s School. The greater part, it is clear, came into use in the struggle with the Dogmatists, and are not older than the development of the Stoic theory of knowledge by Chrysippus, and the criticism of Carneades to which it gave rise. In this despairing of anything like certain conviction consists ἀφασία, ἀκαταληψία, or ἐποχὴ, the withholding of judgment or state of indecision which Pyrrho and Timon regard as the only true attitude in speculation, and from which the whole School derived its distinctive name.

From this state of indecision, Timon, in reply to the third question, argues that mental imperturbability or ἀταραξία proceeds, which can alone conduct to true happiness. Men are disturbed by views and prejudices which mislead them into the efforts of passion. Only the Sceptic who has suspended all judgment is in a condition to regard things with absolute calmness, unruffled by passion or desire. He knows that it is a fond delusion to suppose that one external condition is preferable to another. In reality only the tone of mind or virtue possesses value. Thus, by withdrawing within himself, man reaches happiness, which is the goal of all philosophy. Absolute inactivity being, however, impossible, the Sceptic will act on probabilities, and hence follow custom; but at the same time he will be conscious that such conduct does not rest on a basis of firm conviction. The province of uncertain opinion includes all positive judgments respecting good and evil. Only in this conditional form will Timon allow of goodness and divine goodness as standards of conduct. The real object of Scepticism is, therefore, a purely negative one—indifference. It cannot even be proved that Pyrrho’s School so far accommodated itself to life, as to make moderation rather than indifference the regulating principle for unavoidable actions and desires. In this direction the School seems to have done but little.