CHAPTER XXI.. The Epicurean System As a Whole; Its Position in History.

THE EPICUREAN SYSTEM AS A WHOLE; ITS POSITION IN HISTORY.

It has often been urged against the Epicurean philosophy, that it is deficient both in coherence and consistency. Nor is this objection without foundation. If we come to the study of it, looking for a complete scientific groundwork, or a strictly logical development, we shall certainly be disappointed. It is not difficult to show in what contradictions Epicurus was involved; in professing to trust the senses wholly and entirely, and yet going beyond the senses to the hidden causes of things; in despising logical forms and laws, and at the same time building up his whole system on deductions; in holding that all sensations are true, but yet maintaining that a portion of the realities which they represent as belonging to things is only relative. Nor were these the only inconsistencies. At one time only natural causes and laws are acknowledged, and any such thing as free will and imagination is ignored; at another, by the doctrine of the swerving aside of atoms and of the human will, unexplained caprice is elevated to the rank of law. Pleasures and pains are all referred to bodily sensations, and yet mental states are called higher and more important; nay, more, even from a basis of selfishness rules and precepts of humanity, justice, love, faithfulness, and devotion are deduced. It ought not, however, to be forgotten that the Stoics, to whom the claim of clear and consistent thought cannot be denied, were involved in similar difficulties. They, like the Epicureans, built up a rational system on a basis of the senses. They, too, constructed an ideal theory of morals on a material groundwork of metaphysics. They, too, declared that universal law is the only active power, whilst they maintained that reality belongs only to the world of matter. They, too, deduced a strict theory of virtue from the principle of self-preservation; not to mention the inconsistent attitude which they assumed towards the popular religion. To deny to the Stoics a unity and connectedness of system, because of these scientific defects and inconsistencies, would be felt to be doing them an injustice. And can Epicureanism be fairly condemned, when its faults are essentially of the same kind (though a little more obvious) as those of the Stoics, without a single extenuating circumstance which can be urged on its behalf?

The strongest argument in favour of Epicureanism is that the development of the system does not pretend to rest upon an intellectual platform. Epicurus sought in philosophy a path to happiness, a school of practical wisdom. For him knowledge has only a secondary value, because it contributes to this end; indeed, both the tone and the results of his intellectual activity were determined by a reference to this end. In the case of the Stoics, however, it has been already seen that the comparative subordination of Logic and Natural Science to Moral Science, the going back to the older view of nature, the vindication of the truth of the senses and of the reality of matter, grew out of their peculiarly one-sided view of the scope of philosophy. In the case of Epicurus the same results appear, and all the more markedly, since Epicurus did not, like the Stoics, look for happiness in subordination to a universal law, but in individual gratification or pleasure. For him the recognition of a universal law had not the same importance as for the Stoics; and consequently Epicurus did not feel the same need of a scientific method as they had done. He could therefore more exclusively content himself with the impressions of the senses, and regard them as the only unfailing source of knowledge. No necessity compelled him to advance from pure materialism to a view of matter in which it is described as possessing a soul, and made to be the bearer of reason. In fact, the more exclusively everything was referred by him to mechanical causes, the more easily could he regard the individual as independent of all superhuman forces in his pursuit of happiness, and left entirely to himself and his natural powers. No system in ancient times has so consistently carried out the mechanical view of nature as that of the Atomists. None, therefore, afforded such a strong metaphysical support to the Epicurean views of the absolute worth of the individual. It was as natural for Epicurus to build on the teaching of Democritus as for the Stoics to build on that of Heraclitus. But Epicurus, influenced probably more by practical than by scientific considerations, allowed himself, by his theory of the swerving aside of atoms, to destroy the consistency of the theory of Democritus.

It is hardly necessary to notice here how the distinctive features of the Epicurean morals were developed out of their theory of happiness, in contrast to the Stoic teaching. The happiness of Epicurus, however, does not depend upon sensual gratification as such, but upon repose of mind and cheerfulness of disposition. His theory of morals, therefore, notwithstanding its foundation in pleasure, bears a nobler character, which is seen in its language as to the wise man’s relations to the pains and passions of the body, to poverty and riches, to life and death, quite as much as in the mild humanity and the warm and hearty appreciation of friendship by the Epicurean School. The rationalising spirit of that School was undoubtedly opposed to any religious belief which supposed an intervention of God in the course of the world, or the world’s influence on man for weal or woe; but its appeal to the senses without criticism placed no objection in the way of admitting divine beings, from whom no such intervention need be feared. Nay, more, this belief seemed the most natural ground for explaining the popular belief in Gods. It satisfied an inborn and apparently keenly felt want by supplying an appropriate object of devotion, and a standard by which to test the accuracy of moral ideas. Hence, notwithstanding scientific defects and contradictions, the whole system of Epicurus bears a definite stamp. All the essential parts of that system are subservient to one and the same end. The consistent working out of a scientific view of nature is looked for in vain; but there is no lack of consistency arising from an undeniable reference of the individual to a definite and practical standard.

Looking to the wider historical relations of the Epicurean system, the first point which calls for remark is the relation of that system to Stoicism. The contrast between the two Schools is obvious; attention having been already drawn to it on all the more important points. It is likewise well known that a constant rivalry existed between the two Schools during their whole careers, that the Stoics looked down on the Epicureans, and circulated many calumnies with respect to their morals. For these statements proofs may be found in the preceding pages. Nevertheless, the two Schools are related in so many respects, that they can only be regarded as parallel links connected in one chain, their differences being varieties where the same main tendency

exists. Both agree in the general character of their philosophy. In both practical considerations prevail over speculation. Both treat natural science and logic as sciences subsidiary to ethics—natural science especially in view of its bearing on religion. Both attach more importance to natural science than to logic. If the Epicurean neglect of scientific rules forms a contrast to the care which the Stoics devoted thereto, both Schools are at least agreed in one thing—in displaying greater independence in investigating the question as to a test of truth. By both this standard was placed in the senses; and to all appearances both were led to take this view by the same cause; appeals to the senses being a consequence of their purely practical way of looking at things. Both, moreover, employed against scepticism the same practical postulate—the argument that knowledge must be possible, or no certainty of action would be possible. They even agree in not being content with the phenomena supplied by the senses as such, although Epicurus as little approved of the Stoic theory of irresistible impressions as he did of their logical analysis of the forms of thought. With such appeals to the senses how could there be any other result than materialism both in the Stoic and Epicurean systems? But it is strange that the materialism in both Schools should be based on the same definition of reality, corresponding with their practical way of looking at things.

In the unfolding and detailed exposition of their materialistic views the systems diverge, more widely, perhaps, than the philosophers themselves, whose leading they professed to follow. These divergencies appear particularly on the subject of nature, the Stoics regarding nature as a system of design, the Epicureans explaining it as a mechanical product. Whilst the Stoics adhered to fatalism, and saw God everywhere, the Epicureans held the theory of atoms, and the theory of necessity. Whilst the Stoics were speculatively orthodox, the Epicureans were irreligious freethinkers. Both meet again in that branch of natural science which is most important in respect of morals—the part dealing with man. Both hold that the soul is a fiery atmospheric substance. Even the proof for this view, derived from the mutual influence of body and soul, is common to both. Both distinguish between the higher and the lower parts of the soul, and thus even the Epicureans in their psychology allow a belief in the superiority of reason to the senses, and in the divine origin of the soul.

The arena of the warmest dispute between the two Schools is, however, ethics. Yet, even on this ground, they are more nearly related than appears at first sight. No greater contrast appears to be possible than that between the Epicurean theory of pleasure and the Stoic theory of virtue; and true it is that the two theories are diametrically opposite. Nevertheless, not only are both aiming at one and the same end—the happiness of mankind—but the conditions of happiness are also laid down by both in the same spirit. According to Zeno virtue, according to Epicurus pleasure, is the highest and only good; but the former in making virtue consist essentially in withdrawal from the senses or insensibility; the latter in seeking pleasure in repose of mind or imperturbability, are expressing the same belief. Man can only find unconditional and enduring satisfaction, when by means of knowledge he attains to a condition of mind at rest with itself, and also to an independence of external attractions and misfortunes. The same unlimited appeal to personal truth is the common groundwork of both systems. Both have expanded this idea under the same form—that of the ideal wise man—for the most part with the same features. The wise man of Epicurus is, as we have seen, superior to pain and want; he enjoys an excellence which cannot be lost; and he lives among men a very God in intelligence and happiness. Thus, when worked out into details, the difference in the estimate of pleasure and virtue by the Stoics and Epicureans seems to vanish. Neither the Stoic can separate happiness from virtue, nor the Epicurean separate virtue from happiness.

But, whilst recommending a living for society, both systems take no real interest in social life. The recognition of a natural society amongst mankind, of certain positive relations to state and family, above all, a clear enunciation of a citizenship of the world, characterise the Stoics. The pursuit of friendship, and the gentle humanity of their ethics, characterise the Epicureans. Together with these peculiarities one common feature cannot be ignored. Both have renounced the political character of the old propriety of conduct, and diverting their attention from public life, seek to find a basis for universal morality in the simple relation of man to man.

The united weight of all these points of resemblance is sufficient to warrant the assertion that, notwithstanding their differences, the Stoics and Epicureans stand on the same footing, and that the sharpness of the contrast between them is owing to their laying hold of opposite sides of one and the same principle. Abstract personality, and self-consciousness developed into a generic idea, is for both the highest aim. Compared with it not only the state of the senses, but the scientific knowledge of things, and the realisation of moral ideas in a commonwealth, are of minor importance. In this self-consciousness happiness consists. To implant it in man is the object of philosophy, and knowledge is only of value when and in as far as it ministers to this end. The point of difference between the two Schools is their view of the conditions under which that certainty of consciousness is attained. The Stoics hope to attain it by the entire subordination of the individual to universal law. The Epicureans, on the other hand, are of opinion that man can only then be content in himself when he is restrained by nothing external to himself. The first condition of happiness consists in liberating individual life from all dependence on others, and all disturbing causes. The former, therefore, make virtue, the latter make personal well-being or pleasure, the highest good. By the Epicureans, however, pleasure is usually conceived as of a purely negative character, as being freedom from pain, and is referred to the whole of human life. Hence it is always made to depend on the moderation of desires, on indifference to outward ills, and the state of the senses, on intelligence and actions conformable with intelligence, in short, on virtue and wisdom. Hence, too, the Epicureans arrive by a roundabout course at the same result as the Stoics—the conviction that happiness can only be the lot of those who are altogether independent of external things, and enjoy perfect inward harmony.

Towards the older philosophy Epicureanism bears nearly the same relation as Stoicism. True it is that Epicurus and his School would not recognise their obligation to either one or other of their predecessors. But far from disproving the influence of previous systems on his own, this conduct only shows the personal vanity of Epicurus. Epicureanism, like Stoicism, starts with the object of bringing down science from metaphysical speculation to the simpler form of a practical science of life. Both systems of philosophy, therefore, turn away from Plato and Aristotle, whose labours they notably neglect, to Socrates and those Socratic Schools which, without more extensive meddling with science, are content with ethics. Circumstances, however, led Epicurus to follow Aristippus as Zeno had followed Antisthenes. Not only in morals did Epicurus derive his principle of pleasure from the Cyrenaics; he likewise derived from them his theory of knowledge, that the sense-impressions are the only source of ideas, and that every feeling is true in itself. Nor can he altogether deny that feelings only furnish direct information respecting our personal states, and respecting the relative properties of things. With the Cyrenaics, too, he taught that true pleasure can only be secured by philosophic intelligence, and that this intelligence aims, before all things, at liberating the mind from passion, fear, and superstition. At the same time, he is by no means prepared to follow the Cyrenaics unreservedly. His theory of morals differs, as has already been seen, from the Cyrenaic theory in this important particular, that not sensual and individual pleasure, but mental repose and the whole state of the mind is regarded as the ultimate end, and the highest good in life. It was thus impossible for him to be content, as the Cyrenaics were, with feelings only, with individual and personal impressions. He could not help requiring conviction which reposed on a real knowledge of things, since only on such conviction can an equable and certain tone of mind depend.

Epicurus, therefore, not only differed from Aristippus with regard to feelings, by referring all feelings to impressions from without, of which he considered them true representations, but he felt himself called upon to oppose the Cyrenaic contempt for theories of nature, just as the Stoics had opposed the Cynic contempt for science. To the physics of Democritus he looked for a scientific basis for his ethics, just as they had looked to the system of Heraclitus. But the closer he clung to Democritus, owing to the weakness of his own interest in nature, the more it becomes apparent that his whole study of nature was subservient to a moral purpose, and hence of a purely relative value. Accordingly, he had not the least hesitation in setting consistency at defiance, by assuming the swerving aside of atoms and the freedom of the will. It is not only altogether improbable that Epicurus was but a second edition of Democritus—for history knows of no such repetitions—but as a matter of fact it is false. Closer observation proves that even when the two philosophers agree in individual statements, the meaning which they attach to these assertions and the whole spirit of their systems are widely divergent. Democritus aims at explaining natural phenomena by natural causes. He wishes, in short, for a science of nature purely for its own sake. Epicurus wishes for a view of nature which shall be able to avert disturbing influences from man’s inner life. Natural science stands with him entirely in the service of ethics. If in point of substance his system is borrowed from another system, yet its whole position and treatment supposes an entirely new view of things. The Socratic introspection, and the Sophistic resolution of natural philosophy into personal rationalising, are its historical antecedents; and it owes its existence to that general dislike for pure theory, which constitutes the common peculiarity of all the post-Aristotelian systems.

Excepting the systems named, Epicureanism, so far as is known, is connected with no other previous system. Even its attack upon those systems appears to have consisted of general dogmatic and superficial statements. Still it must not be forgotten that Epicureanism presupposes the line of thought originated by Socrates, not only as found in the collateral Cyrenaic branch, but as found in the main line of regular development by Plato and Aristotle. The view of Plato and Aristotle, which distinguishes the immaterial essence from the sensible appearance of things, and attributes reality only to the former, is undoubtedly attacked by Epicurus as by Zeno, on metaphysical grounds. Practically, however, he approaches very much nearer to this view in all those points in which his teaching deviates from the Cyrenaic and resembles that of the Stoics.

It has been observed on a former occasion that the indifference to the immediate conditions of the senses, the withdrawal of the mind within itself, the contentment with itself of the thinking subject, which Epicurus no less than the Stoics and cotemporary Sceptics required, is itself a consequence of the idealism of Plato and Aristotle. Even the materialism of the post-Aristotelian systems, it is said, was by no means a going back to the old pre-Socratic philosophy of nature, but a one-sided practical apprehension of that idealism. These systems deny a soul in nature or a soul in man, because they look exclusively to consciousness and to personal activity for independence of the senses. The correctness of this observation may be easily proved from the Epicurean teaching, notwithstanding the severity and harshness of its materialism. Why was it that Epicurus relentlessly banished from nature all immaterial causes and all idea of purpose? And why did he confine himself exclusively to a mechanical explanation of nature? Was it not because he felt afraid that the admission of any other than material causes would imperil the certainty of consciousness; because he feared to lose the firm groundwork of reality by admitting invisible forces, and to expose human life to influences beyond calculation if he allowed anything immaterial? Yet in his view of life, how little does he adhere to present facts, since his wise man is made to enjoy perfect happiness by himself alone, independent of everything external. The same ideal is reproduced in the Epicurean Gods. In their isolated contemplation of themselves, what else do they resemble but the God of Aristotle, who, aloof from all intermeddling with the world, meditates on himself alone? No doubt the independent existence of the thinking mind is held by Aristotle in a clear and dignified manner. By Epicurus it is pourtrayed in a sensuous, and, therefore, a contradictory form. But the connection of the views of both cannot be ignored. There is a similar general relation between the Epicurean philosophy and that of Plato and Aristotle. Little as the former can be compared with the latter in breadth and depth, it must not, therefore, be regarded as an intellectual monstrosity. Epicureanism is a tenable though one-sided expression of a certain stage in the development of the intellect of Greece.