CHAPTER XX.. The Epicurean Ethics Continued: Special Points.

THE EPICUREAN ETHICS CONTINUED: SPECIAL POINTS.

The general principles already laid down determine likewise the character of particular points in the moral science of the Epicureans. Epicurus, it is true, never developed his moral views to a systematic theory of moral actions and states, however much his pupils, particularly in later times, busied themselves with morality and special points in a system of morals. Moreover, his fragmentary statements and precepts are very imperfectly recorded. Still, all that is known corresponds with the notion which we must form in accordance with those general views. All the practical rules given by Epicurus aim at conducting man to happiness by controlling passions and desires. The wise man is easily satisfied. He sees that little is necessary for supplying the wants of nature, and for emancipating from pain; that imaginary wealth knows no limit, whereas the riches required by nature may be easily acquired; that the most simple nourishment affords as much enjoyment as the most luxurious, and is at the same time far more conducive to health; that therefore the restriction of wants rather than the increase of possessions makes really rich; and that he who is not satisfied with little will never be satisfied at all. He therefore can like Epicurus live upon bread and water, and at the same time think himself as happy as Zeus. He eschews passions which disturb peace of mind and the repose of life; considering it foolish to throw away the present in order to obtain an uncertain future, or to sacrifice life itself for the means of life, seeing he can only once enjoy it. He therefore neither gives way to passionate love, nor to forbidden acts of profligacy. Fame he does not covet; and for the opinions of men he cares only so far as to wish not to be despised, since being despised would expose him to danger. Injuries he can bear with calmness. He cares not what may happen to him after death; nor envies any one the possessions which he does not himself value.

It has been already seen how Epicurus thought to rise above pains, and to emancipate himself from the fear of the Gods and death. And it has been further noticed that he thinks to secure by means of his principles the same independence and happiness which the Stoics aspired to by means of theirs. But whilst the Stoics hoped to attain this independence by crushing the senses, Epicurus was content to restrain and regulate them. Desires he would not have uprooted, but he would have them brought into proper proportion to the collective end and condition of life, into the equilibrium necessary for perfect repose of mind. Hence, notwithstanding his own simplicity, Epicurus is far from disapproving, under all circumstances, of a fuller enjoyment of life. The wise man will not live as a Cynic or a beggar. Care for business he will not neglect; only he will not trouble himself too much about it, and will prefer the business of education to any and every other. Nor will he despise the attractions of art, although he is satisfied when obliged to do without them. In short, his self-sufficiency will not consist in using little, but in needing little; and it is this freedom from wants which adds flavour to his more luxurious enjoyments. His attitude to death is the same. Not fearing death, rather seeking it when he has no other mode of escaping unendurable suffering, he will resort to suicide if necessary, but the cases will be rare, because he has learnt to be happy under all bodily pains. The Stoic’s recommendation of suicide finds no favour with him.

However self-sufficing the wise man may be, still Epicurus will not separate him from connection with others. Not, indeed, that he believed with the Stoics in the natural relationship of all rational beings. Yet even he could form no idea of human life except in connection with human society. He does not, however, assign the same value to all forms of social life. Civil society and the state have for him the least attraction. Civil society is only an external association for the purpose of protection. Justice reposes originally on a contract entered into for purposes of mutual security. Laws are made for the sake of the wise, not to prevent their committing, but to prevent their suffering injustice. Law and justice are not, therefore, binding for their own sake, but for the general good; nor is injustice to be condemned for its own sake, but only because the offender can never be free from fear of discovery and punishment. There is not, therefore, any such thing as universal, unchangeable justice. The claims of justice only extend to a limited number of beings and nations—those, in fact, which are able and willing to enter into the social compact. And the particular applications of justice which constitute positive right differ in different cases, and change with circumstances. What is felt to be conducive to mutual security must pass for justice, and whenever a law is seen to be inexpedient it is no longer binding. The wise man will therefore only enter into political life in case and in as far as this is necessary for his own safety. Sovereign power is a good, inasmuch as it protects from harm. He who pursues it, without thereby attaining this object, acts most foolishly. Since private individuals live as a rule much more quietly and safely than statesmen, it was natural that the Epicureans should be averse to public affairs; public life, after all, is a hindrance to what is the real end-in-chief—wisdom and happiness. Their watchword is Λάθε βιώσας. To them the golden mean seemed by far the most desirable lot in life. They only advise citizens to take part in public affairs when special circumstances render it necessary, or when an individual has such a restless nature that he cannot be content with the quiet of private life. Otherwise they are too deeply convinced of the impossibility of pleasing the masses to wish even to make the attempt. For the same reason they appear to have been partisans of monarchy. The stern and unflinching moral teaching of the Stoics had found its political expression in the unbending republican spirit, so often encountered at Rome. Naturally the soft and timid spirit of the Epicureans took shelter under a monarchical constitution. Of their political principles one thing at least is known, that they did not consider it degrading for a wise man to pay court to princes, and under all circumstances they recommended unconditional obedience to the powers that be.

Family life is said to have been deprecated by Epicurus equally with civil life. Stated thus baldly, this is an exaggeration. It appears, however, to be established, that Epicurus believed it to be generally better for the wise man to forego marriage and the rearing of children, since he would thereby save himself many disturbances. It is also quite credible that he declared the love of children towards parents to be no inborn feeling. This view is, after all, only a legitimate consequence of his materialism; but it did not oblige him to give up parental love altogether. Nay, it is asserted of him that he was anything but a stranger to family affections.

The highest form of social life was considered by Epicurus to be friendship—a view which is peculiar in a system that regarded the individual as the atom of society. Such a system naturally attributes more value to a connection with others freely entered upon and based on individual character and personal inclination, than to one in which a man finds himself placed without any choice, as a member of a society founded on nature or history. The basis, however, on which the Epicurean friendship rests is very superficial; regard is mainly had to its advantages, and in some degree to the natural effects of common enjoyments; but it is also treated in such a way, that its scientific imperfection has no influence on its moral importance. Only one section of the School, and that not the most consistent, maintained that friendship is pursued in the first instance for the sake of its own use and pleasure, but that it subsequently becomes an unselfish love. The assumption that among the wise there exists a tacit agreement requiring them to love one another as much as they love themselves, is clearly only a lame shift. Still, the Epicureans were of opinion that a grounding of friendship on motives of utility was not inconsistent with holding it in the highest esteem. Friendly connection with others affords so pleasant a feeling of security, that it entails the most enjoyable consequences; and since this connection can only exist when friends love one another as themselves, it follows that self-love and the love of a friend must be equally strong.

Even this inference sounds forced, nor does it fully state the grounds on which Epicurus’s view of the value of friendship reposes. That view, in fact, was anterior to all the necessary props of the system. What Epicurus requires is primarily enjoyment. The first conditions of such enjoyment, however, are inward repose of mind, and the removal of fear of disturbances. But Epicurus was far too effeminate and dependent on externals to trust his own powers to satisfy these conditions. He needed the support of others, not only to obtain their help in necessity and trouble, and to console himself for the uncertainty of the future, but still more, to make sure of himself and his principles by having the approval of others, and thus obtaining an inward satisfaction which he could not otherwise have had. Thus, the approval of friends is to him the pledge of the truth of his convictions. In sympathy with friends his mind first attains to a strength by which it is able to rise above the changing circumstances of life. General ideas are for him too abstract, too unreal. A philosopher who considers individual beings as alone real, and perceptions as absolutely true, cannot feel quite happy and sure of his ground, unless he finds others to go with him. The enjoyment which he seeks is the enjoyment of his own cultivated personality; and wherever this standard prevails, particular value is attached to the personal relations of society, and to friendship.

Hence Epicurus uses language on the value and necessity of friendship which goes far beyond the grounds on which he bases it. Friendship is unconditionally the highest of earthly goods. It is far more important in whose company we eat and drink, than what we eat and drink. In case of emergency, the wise man will not shrink from suffering the greatest pains, even death, for his friend.

It is well known that the conduct of Epicurus and his followers was in harmony with these professions. The Epicurean friendship is hardly less celebrated than the Pythagorean. There may be an offensive mawkishness and a tendency to mutual admiration apparent in the relations of Epicurus to his friends, but of the sincerity of his feelings there can be no doubt. One single expression referring to the property of friends, is enough to prove what a high view Epicurus held of friendship; and there is evidence to show that he aimed at a higher improvement of his associates.

In other respects Epicurus bore the reputation of being a kind, benevolent, and genial companion. His teaching bears the same impress. It meets the inexorable sternness of the Stoics by insisting on compassion and forgiveness, and supersedes its own egotism by the maxim that it is more blessed to give than to receive. The number of such maxims on record is, no doubt, limited; nevertheless, the whole tone of the Epicurean School is a pledge of the humane and generous character of its moral teaching. To this trait that School owes its chief importance in history. By its theory of utility it undoubtedly did much harm, partly exposing, partly helping forward, the moral decline of the classic nations. Still, by drawing man away from the outer world within himself, by teaching him to seek happiness in the beautiful type of a cultivated mind content with itself, it contributed quite as much as Stoicism, though after a gentler fashion, to the development and the extension of a more independent and more universal morality.