CHAPTER XXIII.. The New Academy.

THE NEW ACADEMY.

Plato’s School was the first to put Scepticism on a firm footing, and to cultivate it as a system. It has been already remarked that after the time of Xenocrates this School gradually deserted speculative enquiries, and limited itself to Ethics. To this new tendency it consistently adhered, when, shortly after the beginning of the third century before Christ,

it took a fresh lease of life. Instead, however, of simply ignoring theoretical knowledge, as it had hitherto done, it assumed towards knowledge an attitude of opposition, hoping to arrive at security and happiness in life by being persuaded of the impossibility of knowledge. How far this result was due to the example set by Pyrrho it is impossible to establish authoritatively. But it is not in itself probable that the learned originator of this line of thought in the Academy should have ignored the views of a philosopher whose work had been carried on at Elis in his own lifetime, and whose most distinguished pupil, a personal acquaintance of his own, was then working at Athens as a prolific writer. The whole tone and character, moreover, of the Scepticism of the New Academy betrays everywhere the presence of Stoic influences. By the confidence of its assertions it provokes contradiction and doubt, without its being necessary to seek an explanation by improbable conjectures as to the personal relations of Arcesilaus and Zeno.

This connection of the New Academy with Stoicism can be proved in the case of its first founder, Arcesilaus. The doubts of this philosopher are directed not only to knowledge derived from the senses, but to rational knowledge as well. The principal object of his attack was, however, the Stoic theory of irresistible impressions; and in overthrowing that theory Arcesilaus, it would seem, believed he had exploded every possibility of rational knowledge; for the Stoic appeal to the senses he regarded as the only possible form of a theory of knowledge, and the theories of Plato and Aristotle he ignored altogether. Indeed, no peculiar arguments against knowledge are referred to him. The old sceptical arguments of Plato and Socrates, of Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, are repeated, all of which apply only to the knowledge of the senses, and not to rational knowledge. Nevertheless, Arcesilaus aimed at overthrowing the latter along with the former. The opinion that he only used doubt to prepare for or to conceal genuine Platonism, is opposed to all credible authorities. It appears, however, established that he deemed it unnecessary to refute the theory of a knowledge existing independently of the senses.

The Stoic arguments in favour of irresistible impressions Arcesilaus met by asserting that an intermediate something between knowledge and opinion, a kind of conviction common to the wise and the unwise, such as the Stoic κατάληψις, is inconceivable; the wise man’s conviction is always knowledge, that of the fool is always opinion. Going then farther into the idea of φαντασία καταληπτική, he endeavoured to show that it contained an internal contradiction; for to conceive (κατάληψις) is to approve (συγκατάθεσις), and approval never applies to sensation, but only to thoughts and general ideas. Lastly, if the Stoics regarded force of conviction as the distinctive mark of a true or irresistible conception, and as belonging to it in distinction from every other, the Sceptic rejoined that such conceptions do not exist, and that no true conception is of such a nature, but that a false one may be equally irresistible. If no certainty of perception is possible, no knowledge is possible. And since the wise man—for on this point Arcesilaus agrees with the Stoics—must only consider knowledge, and not opinion, nothing remains for him but to abstain from all and every statement, and to despair of any certain conviction. It is therefore impossible to know anything, nor can we even know for certain that we do not know anything. It was quite in accordance with this theory for Arcesilaus to lay down no definite view in his lectures, but only to refute the views of others. Even his disparaging remarks on dialectic, supposing them to be genuine, are not at variance with this conduct. He might consider the arguments of the Stoics and the sophisms of the Megarians as useless, whilst, at the same time, he was convinced that no real knowledge could be attained by any other means. He might even have inferred from their sterility, that thought leads to truth quite as little as the senses. There is no real difference between the result at which he arrived and that of Pyrrho.

If opponents asserted that by denying knowledge all possibility of action is denied, Arcesilaus declined to accede to this statement. No firm conviction is, as he maintained, necessary for a decision of the will; for an action to come about a perception influences the will immediately, leaving the question as to its truth entirely out of sight. In order to act sensibly

we need no knowledge; for this purpose probability is quite enough; any one can follow probability, even though he is conscious of the uncertainty of all knowledge. Thus probability is the highest standard for practical life. We are but scantily informed how Arcesilaus applied this principle to the sphere of morals, but a few of his utterances are on record. All bear witness to the beautiful spirit of moderation in the moral theory of the Academy, which was otherwise exemplified in his own life.

Comparing with the theory of Arcesilaus that which was propounded by Carneades a century later, the same leading features are found to be underlying; but the points have been more carefully worked out, and the theory placed on a wider footing. Of the immediate followers of Arcesilaus it can only be stated that they clung to their teacher. It may be presumed that they did little in the way of expansion, since the ancients are silent as to their labours; Carneades is only mentioned as the continuer of the Academic Scepticism. The importance of Carneades is therefore very great, whence he is in consequence called the founder of the third or New Academy; and it is justly great, witness the admiration which his talents called forth among cotemporaries and posterity, and the flourishing condition in which he left his School. Himself a pupil of Chrysippus, and resembling him in tone of mind, Carneades expanded not only the negative side of the Sceptical theory in all directions with an acuteness entitling him to the first place among the ancient Sceptics, but he was also the first to investigate the positive side of Scepticism, the doctrine of probability, and to determine the degrees and conditions of probability. By his labours in both ways he brought the philosophy of Scepticism to its greatest scientific perfection.

As regards the negative side of these investigations, or the refutation of dogmatism, the attacks of Carneades were directed partly against the formal possibility of knowledge, and partly against the chief actual results of the knowledge of his day. In both respects he had mainly to do with the Stoics, though he did not confine himself to them.

To prove the impossibility of knowledge in general, he appeals sometimes to experience. There is no kind of conviction which does not sometimes deceive us; consequently there is none which guarantees its own truth. Going then further into the nature of our notions, he argues, that since notions consist in the change produced on the soul by impressions from without, they must, to be true, not only furnish information as to themselves, but also as to the objects producing them. Now, this is by no means always the case, many notions avowedly giving a false impression of things. Hence the note of truth cannot reside in an impression as such, but only in a true impression. It is, however, impossible to distinguish with certainty a true impression from one that is false. For independently of dreams, visions, and the fancies of madmen, in short, of all the unfounded chimeras which force themselves on our notice under the guise of truth, it is still undeniable that many false notions closely resemble true ones. The transition, too, from truth to falsehood is so gradual, the interval between the two is occupied by intermediate links so innumerable, and gradations so slight, that they imperceptibly pass one into the other, and it becomes impossible to draw a boundary line between the two opposite spheres. Not content with proving this assertion in regard to impressions of the senses, Carneades went on to prove it with regard to general notions based on experience and intellectual conceptions. He showed that it is impossible for us to distinguish objects so much alike as one egg is to another; that at a certain distance the painted surface seems raised, and a square tower seems round; that an oar in the water seems broken, and the neck-plumage of a pigeon assumes different colours in the sun; that objects on the shore seem to be moving as we sail by, and so forth; in all these cases the same strength of conviction belongs to the false as to the true impressions. He showed further that this applies equally to purely intellectual ideas; that many logical difficulties cannot be solved; that no absolute distinction can be drawn between much and little, in short between all differences in quantity; and that it is the most natural course in all such cases to follow Chrysippus, and to avoid the dangerous inferences which may be drawn by withholding judgment. Arguing from these facts, Carneades concluded at first in regard to impressions of the senses, that there is no such thing as φαντασία καταληπτικὴ in the Stoic sense of the term, in other words, that no perception contains in itself characteristics, by virtue of which its truth may be inferred with certainty. This fact being granted, the possibility is in his opinion precluded of there residing in the understanding a standard for the distinction of truth from falsehood. The understanding—and this belief was shared by his opponents—must derive its material from the senses. Logic tests the formal accuracy of combinations of thought, but gives no insight into their import. Direct proofs of the uncertainty of intellectual convictions are not therefore needed. The same result may also be attained in a more personal way, by raising the question, how individuals obtain their knowledge. He can only be said to know a thing who has formed an opinion respecting it. In the mean time, until he has decided in favour of some definite opinion, he has still no knowledge. And what dependence can be placed on the judgment of one who has no knowledge?

In these formal enquiries into the possibility of knowledge, Carneades had chiefly to deal with the Stoics, with whom he holds a common ground in his appeal to the senses. The Stoics were also his chief opponents in his polemic against the material results of the dogmatic philosophy. Natural science having throughout the period of the post-Aristotelian philosophy been subordinated to ethics, ethics likewise engaged more attention at the hands of Carneades than science. In as far as he studied Natural science, he appears to have been entirely opposed to the Stoic treatment of the subject, and to this circumstance we owe it, that better information is forthcoming regarding his scientific, or rather his theological, investigations than regarding his moral views. The Stoic theories of God and of final causes afforded ample scope for the exercise of his ingenuity, and from the ground he occupied it was not difficult for him to expose the weak points of that theory. The Stoics had appealed in support of the belief in God to the consensus gentium. How close at hand was the answer, that the universality of this belief was neither proved to exist, nor as a matter of fact did it exist, but that in no case could the opinion of an ignorant multitude decide anything. The Stoics thought to find a proof of divine providence in the manner in which portents and prophecies come true. To expose this delusion, no very expanded criticism of divination was necessary. Going beyond this, Carneades proceeded to call in question the cardinal point of the Stoic system—the belief in God, the doctrine of the soul and reason of the universe, and of the presence of design in its arrangements. How, he asks, is the presence of design manifested? Whence all the things which cause destruction and danger to men if it be true that God has made the world for the sake of man? If reason is praised as the highest gift of God, is it not manifest that the majority of men only use it to make themselves worse than brutes? In bestowing such a gift God must have been taking but little care of this majority. Even if we attribute to man direct blame for the misuse of reason, still, why has God bestowed on him a reason which can be so much abused? The Stoics themselves say that a wise man can nowhere be found. They admit, too, that folly is the greatest misfortune. How, then, can they speak of the care bestowed by God on men, when, on their own confession, the whole of mankind is sunk in the deepest misery? But allowing that the Gods could not bestow virtue and wisdom upon all, they could, at least, have taken care that it should go well with the good. Instead of this, the experience of hundreds of cases shows that the upright man comes to a miserable end; that crime succeeds; and that the criminal can enjoy the fruits of his misdeeds undisturbed. Where, then, is the agency of Providence? The facts being entirely different from what the Stoics suppose, what becomes of their inferences? Allowing the presence of design in the world, and granting that the world is as beautiful and good as possible, why is it inconceivable that nature should have formed the world according to natural laws without the intervention of God? Admitting, too, the connection of parts in the universe, why should not this connection be the result simply of natural forces, without a soul of the universe or a deity? Who can pretend to be so intimately acquainted with the powers of nature, as to be able to prove the impossibility of this assumption? Zeno argued that rational things are better than things irrational, that the world is the best possible, and must therefore be rational. Man, says Socrates, can only derive his soul from the world; therefore the world must have a soul. But what, replies the Academician, is there to show that reason is best for the world, if it be the best for us? or that there must be a soul in nature for nature to produce a soul? What man is not able to produce, that, argues Chrysippus, must have been produced by a higher being—by deity. But to this inference the same objection was raised by the Academicians as to the former one, viz. that it confounds two different points of view. There may, indeed, be a Being higher than man. But why must there needs be a rational man-like Being? Why a God? Why not nature herself? Nor did the argument seem to an Academician more conclusive, that as every house is destined to be inhabited, so, too, the world must be intended for the habitation of God. To this there was the obvious reply: If the world were a house, it might be so; but the very point at issue is whether it is a house constructed for a definite purpose, or whether it is simply an undesigned result of natural forces.

Not content with attacking the conclusiveness of the arguments upon which the Stoics built their belief in a God, the scepticism of the Academy sought to demonstrate that the idea of God itself is an untenable one. The line of argument which Carneades struck out for this purpose is essentially the same as that used in modern times to deny the personality of God. The ordinary view of God regards Him as an infinite, but, at the same time, as a separate Being, possessing the qualities and living the life of an individual. To this view Carneades objected, on the ground that the first assertion contradicts the second; and argues that it is impossible to apply the characteristics of personal existence to God without limiting His infinite nature. Whatever view we may take of God, we must regard Him as a living Being; and every living being is composite, having parts and passions, and is therefore destructible. Moreover, every living being has a sense-nature. Far, therefore, from refusing such a nature to God, Carneades attributed to Him, in the interest of omniscience, other organs of sense than the five we possess. Now, everything capable of impressions through the senses is also liable to change, sensation, according to the definition of Chrysippus, being nothing more than a change of soul. Every such being must therefore be capable of pleasure and pain, without which sensation is inconceivable. Whatever is capable of change is liable to destruction; whatever is susceptible to pain is also liable to deterioration, pain being caused by deterioration, and is also liable to destruction. As the capacity for sensation, so too the desire for what is in harmony with nature, and the dislike of what is opposed to nature, belong to the conditions of life. Whatever has the power of destroying any being is opposed to the nature of that being, everything that lives being exposed to annihilation. Advancing from the conception of a living being to that of a rational being, all virtues would have to be attributed to God as well as bliss. But how, asks Carneades, can any virtue be ascribed to God? Every virtue supposes an imperfection, in overcoming which it consists. He only is continent who might possibly be incontinent, and persevering who might be indulgent. To be brave, a man must be exposed to danger; to be magnanimous, he must be exposed to misfortunes. A being not feeling attraction for pleasure, nor aversion for pain and difficulties, dangers and misfortunes, would not be capable of virtue. Just as little could we predicate prudence of a being not susceptible of pleasure and pain; prudence consisting in knowing what is good, bad, and morally indifferent. But how can there be any such knowledge where there is no susceptibility to pleasure or pain? Or how can a being be conceived of capable of feeling pleasure, but incapable of feeling pain, since pleasure can only be known by contrast with pain, and the possibility of increasing life always supposes the possibility of lessening it? Nor is it otherwise with intelligence (εὐβουλία). He only is intelligent who always discovers what will subserve his purpose. If, however, he must discover it, it cannot have been previously known to him. Hence intelligence can only belong to a being who is ignorant about much. Such a being can never feel sure that sooner or later something will not cause his ruin. He will therefore be exposed to fear. A being susceptible of pleasure and exposed to pain, a being who has to contend with dangers and difficulties, and who feels pain and fear, must inevitably, so thought Carneades, be finite and destructible. If, therefore, we cannot conceive of God except in this form, we cannot conceive of Him at all, our conception being self-destructive.

There is yet another reason, according to Carneades, why God cannot have any virtue; because virtue is above its possessor, and there can be nothing above God. Moreover, what is the position of God in regard to speech? It was easy to show the absurdity of attributing speech to Him, but to call him speechless (ἄφωνος) seemed also to be opposed to the general belief. Quite independently, however, of details, the inconceivableness of God appears, so soon as the question is raised, whether the deity is limited or unlimited, material or immaterial. God cannot be unlimited; for what is unlimited is necessarily immovable because it has no place, and soulless because by virtue of its boundlessness it cannot form a whole permeated by a soul; but God we ordinarily think of both as moving and as endowed with a soul. Nor can God be limited; for all that is limited is incomplete. Moreover, God cannot be immaterial, for Carneades, like the Stoics, held that what is immaterial possesses neither soul, feeling, nor activity. Neither can he be material, all composite bodies being liable to change and destruction, and simple bodies, fire, water, and the like, possessing neither life nor reason. If, then, all the forms under which we think of God are impossible, His existence cannot be asserted.

Easier work lay before the Sceptics in criticising polytheistic views of religion and their defence by the Stoics. Among the arguments employed by Carneades to overthrow them, certain chain-arguments are prominent, by means of which he endeavoured to show that the popular belief has no distinctive marks for the spheres of God and man. If Zeus is a God, he argues, his brother Poseidon must likewise be one, and if he is one, the rivers and streams must also be Gods. If Helios is a God, the appearance of Helios above the earth, or day, must be a God; and, consequently, month, year, morning, midday, evening, must all be Gods. Polytheism is here refuted by establishing an essential similarity between what is accepted as God and what is avowedly not a God. It may readily be supposed that this was not the only proof of the acuteness of Carneades’ reasoning.

Divination, to which the Stoics attached especial importance, was vigorously assailed. Carneades proved that no peculiar range of subjects belonged thereto, but that in all cases which admit professional judgment experts pass a better judgment than diviners. To know accidental events beforehand is impossible; it is useless to know those that are necessary and unavoidable, nay, more, it would even be harmful. No causal connection can be conceived of between a prophecy and the ensuing realisation. If the Stoics met him by pointing to fulfilled prophecies, he replied that the coincidence was accidental, at the same time declaring many such stories to be without doubt false.

Connected probably with these attacks on divination was the defence by Carneades of the freedom of the will. The Stoic fatalism he refuted by an appeal to the fact that our decision is free; and since the Stoics appealed in support of their view to the law of causality, he likewise attacked this law. In so doing his intention was not to assert anything positive respecting the nature of the human will, but only to attack the Stoic assertion, and if for his own part he adhered to the old Academic doctrine of a free will, he still regarded that doctrine as only probable.

Less information exists as to the arguments by which Carneades sought to assail the current principles of morality. Nevertheless, enough is known to indicate the course taken by his Scepticism in relation thereto. In the second of the celebrated speeches which he delivered at Rome in the year 156 B.C., he denied that there is such a thing as natural right: all laws are only positive civil institutions devised by men for the sake of safety and advantage, and for the protection of the weak; and hence he is regarded as foolish who prefers justice to interest, which after all is the only unconditional end. In support of these statements he appealed to the fact that laws change with circumstances, and are different in different countries. He pointed to the example of great nations, such as the Romans, all of whom attained to greatness by unrighteous means. He impressed into his service the many casuistical questions raised by the Stoics, expressing the opinion that in all these cases it is better to commit the injury which brings advantage—for instance, to murder another to save one’s own life—than to postpone advantage to right, and hence inferred that intelligence is a state of irreconcileable opposition to justice.

This free criticism of dogmatic views could not fail to bring Carneades to the same result as his predecessors. Knowledge is absolutely impossible. A man of sense will look at everything from all sides and invariably withhold judgment, thus guarding himself against error. And to this conviction he clings so persistently that he altogether refuses to listen to the objection that the wise man must be at least convinced of the impossibility of any firm conviction. The earlier Sceptics, far from attributing on this ground an equal value to all notions, had not dispensed with reasons for actions and

thoughts. This point was now taken up by Carneades, who, in attempting to establish the conditions and degrees of probability, hoped to obtain a clue to the kind of conviction which might be still permitted in his system. However much we may despair of knowledge, some stimulus and groundwork for action is needed. Certain things must therefore be assumed, from which the pursuit of happiness must start. To these so much weight must be attached that they are allowed to decide our conduct, but we must be on our guard against considering them to be true, or to be something really known and conceived. Nor must we forget that even the nature of true ideas is similar to that of false ones, and that the truth of ideas can never be known with certainty. Hence we should withhold all assent, not allowing any ideas to be true, but only to have the appearance of truth (ἀληθῆ φαίνεσθαι) or probability (ἔμφασις, πιθανότης). In every notion two things need to be considered, the relation to the object represented which makes it either true or false, and the relation to the subject who has the notion, which makes it seem either true or false. The former relation is, for the reasons already quoted, quite beyond the compass of our judgment; the latter, the relation of a notion to ourselves, falls within the sphere of consciousness. So long as a notion seemingly true is cloudy and indistinct, like an object contemplated from a distance, it makes no great impression on us. When, on the contrary, the appearance of truth is strong, it produces in us a belief strong enough to determine us to action, although it does not come up to the impregnable certainty of knowledge.

Belief, however, like probability, is of several degrees. The lowest degree of probability arises when a notion produces by itself an impression of truth, without being taken in connection with other notions. The next higher degree is when that impression is confirmed by the agreement of all notions which are related to it. The third and highest degree is when an investigation of all these notions results in producing the same corroboration for all. In the first case a notion is called probable (πιθανή); in the second probable and undisputed (πιθανὴ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος); in the third probable, undisputed, and tested (πιθανὴ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος καὶ περιωδευμένη). Within each one of these three classes different gradations of probability are again possible. The distinguishing marks, which must be considered in the investigation of probability, appear to have been investigated by Carneades in the spirit of the Aristotelian logic. In proportion to the greater or less practical importance of a question, or to the accuracy of investigation which the circumstances allow, we must adhere to one or the other degree of probability. Although no one of them is of such a nature as to exclude the possibility of error, this circumstance need not deprive us of certainty in respect to actions, provided we have once convinced ourselves that the absolute certainty of our practical premisses is not possible. Just as little should we hesitate to affirm or deny anything in that conditional way which is alone possible after what has been stated. Assent will be given to no notion in the sense of its being absolutely true, but to many notions in the sense that we consider them highly probable.

Among questions about which the greatest possible certainty is felt to be desirable, Carneades, true to his whole position, gave a prominent place to principles of morals; life and action being the principal things with which the theory of probability has to do. We hear, therefore, that he thoroughly discussed the fundamental questions of Ethics, the question as to the highest Good. On this subject he distinguished six, or relatively four, different views. If the primary object of desire can in general only consist of those things which correspond with our nature, and which consequently call our emotions into exercise, the object of desire must be either pleasure, or absence of pain, or conformity with nature. In each of these three cases two opposite results are possible: either the highest Good may consist in the attainment of a purpose, or else in the activity which aims at its attainment. The latter is the view of the Stoics only, and arises from regarding natural activity or virtue as the highest Good. Hence the six possible views are practically reduced to four, which taken by themselves, or else in combination, include all existing views respecting the highest Good. But so ambiguously did Carneades express himself as to his particular preference of any one view, that even Clitomachus declared he was ignorant as to his real opinion. It was only tentatively and for the purpose of refuting the Stoics, that he propounded the statement that the highest Good consists in the enjoyment of such things as afford satisfaction to the primary impulses of nature. Nevertheless, the matter has often been placed in such a light as though Carneades had propounded this statement on his own account; and the statement itself has been quoted to prove that he considered the satisfaction of natural impulses apart from virtue as an end in itself. It is also asserted that he approximated to the view of Callipho, which does not appear to have been essentially different from that of the older Academy. The same leaning to the older Academy and its doctrine of moderation appears in other recorded parts of the Ethics of Carneades. The pain caused by misfortune he wished to lessen by thinking beforehand of its possibility; and after the destruction of Carthage he deliberately asserted before Clitomachus that the wise man would never allow himself to be disturbed, not even by the downfall of his country.

Putting all these statements together, we obtain a view not unworthy of Carneades, and certainly quite in harmony with his position. That philosopher could not, consistently with his sceptical principles, allow scientific certainty to any of the various opinions respecting the nature and aim of moral action; and in this point he attacked the Stoics with steady home-thrusts. Their inconsistency in calling the choice of what is natural the highest business of morality, and yet not allowing to that which is according to nature a place among goods, was so trenchantly exposed by him that Antipater is said to have been brought to admit that not the objects to which choice is directed, but the actual choice itself is a good. He even asserted that the Stoic theory of Goods only differed in words from that of the Peripatetics; to this assertion he was probably led by the fact that the Stoic morality appeals to nature only, or perhaps by the theory therewith connected of things to be desired and things to be eschewed. If there were any difference between the two, Stoicism, he thought, ignored the real wants of nature. The Stoics, for instance, called a good name a thing indifferent; Carneades, however, drove them so much into a corner because of this statement that they ever after (so Cicero assures us) qualified their assertion, attributing to a good name at least a secondary value among things to be desired (προηγμένα). Chrysippus, again, thought to find some consolation for the ills of life in the reflection that no man is free from them. Carneades was, however, of opinion that this thought could only afford consolation to a lover of ill; it being rather a matter for sorrow that all should be exposed to so hard a fate. Believing, too, that man’s happiness does not depend on any theory of ethics, he could avow without hesitation that all other views of morality do not go beyond probability; and thus the statement of Clitomachus, as far as it refers to a definite decision as to the highest good, is without doubt correct. But just as the denial of knowledge does not, according to the view of Carneades, exclude conviction in general on grounds of probability, no more does it in the province of ethics. Here, then, is the intermediate position which was attributed to him—a position not only suggested by the traditions of the Academic School, but remaining as a last resource to the sceptical destroyer of systems so opposite as Stoicism and the theory of pleasure. The inconsistency of at one time identifying the satisfaction of natural instincts with virtue, and at another time distinguishing it from virtue, which is attributed to Carneades, is an inconsistency for which probably Cicero is alone responsible. The real meaning of Carneades can only be that virtue consists in an activity directed towards the possession of what is according to nature, and hence that it cannot as the highest Good be separated from accordance with nature. For the same reason, virtue supplies all that is requisite for happiness. Hence, when it is stated that, notwithstanding his scepticism on moral subjects, Carneades was a thoroughly upright man, we have not only no reason to doubt this statement as to his personal character, but we can even discern that it was a practical and legitimate consequence of his philosophy. It may appear to us inconsistent to build on a foundation of absolute doubt the certainty of practical conduct; nevertheless, it is an inconsistency deeply rooted in all the scepticism of post-Aristotelian times. That scepticism Carneades brought to completeness, and in logically developing his theory, even its scientific defects came to light.

For the same reason we may also give credit to the statement that Carneades, like the later Sceptics, notwithstanding his severe criticisms on the popular and philosophic theology of his age, never intended to deny the existence of divine agencies. On this point he acted like a true Sceptic. He expressed doubts as to whether anything could be known about God, but for practical purposes he accepted the belief in God as an opinion more or less probable and useful.

Taking all things into account, the philosophic importance of Carneades and the School of which he was the head cannot be estimated at so low a value as would be the case were the New Academy merely credited with entertaining shallow doubts, and Carneades’ theory of probabilities deduced from rhetorical rather than from philosophical considerations. For the last assertion there is no ground whatever; Carneades distinctly avowed that a conviction resting on probabilities seemed indispensable for practical needs and actions. On this point he is wholly in accord with all the forms of Scepticism, not only with the New Academy, but also with Pyrrho and the later Sceptics. He differs from them in the degree of accuracy with which he investigates the varieties and conditions of probability; but a question of degree can least of all be urged against a philosopher. Nor should doubts be called shallow which the ancients even in later times could only very inadequately dissipate, and which throw light on several of the deepest problems of life by the critical investigations they occasioned. No doubt, in the despair of attaining to knowledge at all, and in the attempt to reduce everything to opinion more or less certain, indications may be seen of the exhaustion of the intellect, and of the extinction of philosophic originality. Nevertheless it must never be forgotten that the scepticism of the New Academy was not only in harmony with the course naturally taken by Greek philosophy as a whole, but that it was pursued with an acuteness and a scientific vigour leaving no doubt that it was a really important link in the chain of philosophic development.

In Carneades this Scepticism attained its highest growth. The successor of Carneades, Clitomachus, is known as the literary exponent of the views taught by Carneades. At the same time we hear of his being accurately acquainted with the teaching of the Peripatetics and Stoics; and although it was no doubt his first aim to refute the dogmatism of these Schools, it would appear that Clitomachus entered into the connection of their doctrines more fully than is usually the case with opponents. As to his fellow-pupil, Charmidas (or Charmadas), one wholly unimportant utterance is our only guide for determining his views. For ascertaining the philosophy of the other pupils of Carneades, nothing but the scantiest fragments have been preserved. The statement of Polybius that the Academic School degenerated into empty subtleties, and thereby became an object of contempt, may deserve no great amount of belief; but it does seem probable that the School made no important advance on the path marked out by himself and Arcesilaus. It did not even continue true to that path for very long. Not a generation after the death of its most celebrated teacher, and even among his own pupils, that eclecticism began to appear, the general and simultaneous spread of which ushered in a new period in the history of the post-Aristotelian philosophy.

NOTES

Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen. Part I. 96.

Conf. Arist. Metaph. I. 2, 282 b, 19.

For the life of Zeno, Diogenes is the chief authority, who appears to be indebted for his information chiefly to Antigonus of Carystus, who lived about 250 B.C. In proof of this, compare the account of Diogenes with the extracts given by Athenæus (viii. 345, d; xiii. 563, e; 565, d; 603, e; 607, e; and, in particular, ii. 55, f) from Antigonus’ life of Zeno. Of modern authorities, consult Wagenmann, in Pauly’s Realencyclop.

Diog. vii. 1. Suid. Ζήνων. Plut. Plac. i. 3, 29. Pausan. ii. 8, 4. He is called by others Demeas.

Citium, which the ancients unanimously call the native city of Zeno, was, according to Diog. vii. 1, a πόλισμα Ἑλληνικὸν Φοίνικας ἐποίκους ἐσχηκὸς, i.e. Phœnician immigrants had settled there by the side of the old Greek population, whence its inhabitants are sometimes called ‘e Phœnicia profecti’ (Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56), and Zeno is himself called a Phœnician (Diog. vii. 3; 15; 25; 30; ii. 114. Suid. Ζήν. Athen. xiii. 563, e. Cic. l.c.). A continuous connection between Citium and Phœnicia is implied in Diog. vii. 6; οἱ ἐν Σιδῶνι Κιτιεῖς.

The details are differently given by Diog. 2–5; 31; Plut. Inimic. Util. 2, p. 87; and Sen. Tranq. An. 14, 3. Most accounts say that he came to Athens for trading purposes, and accidentally became acquainted with Crates and philosophy after being shipwrecked. According to other accounts, he remained at Athens, after disposing of his merchandise, and devoted himself to philosophy. Demetrius of Magnesia (Themist. Or. xxiii. 295, D) further relates that he had already occupied himself with philosophy at home, and repaired to Athens to study it more fully—a view which seems most likely, because the least sensational.

The dates in Zeno’s life are very uncertain. He is said to have been thirty when he first came to Athens (Diog. 2). Persæus, however (Ibid. 28), his pupil and countryman, says twenty-two. These statements are of little use, since the date of his coming to Athens is unknown. If it is true that after reading with Crates he was for ten years a pupil of Xenocrates, who died 314 B.C. (Timocrates in Diog. 2), he must have come to Athens not later than 328 B.C. But this fact may be doubted. For his whole line of thought resembles that of Crates and Stilpo. How then can he have been for ten years a pupil in the Academy, and in addition have enjoyed Polemo’s teaching? Altogether he is said to have frequented the schools of different philosophers for twenty years before opening his own (Diog. 4). According to Apollon. in Diog. 28, he presided over his own school for fifty-eight years, which is hardly reconcileable with the above data, even if he attained the age of ninety-eight (Diog. 28; Lucian, Macrob. 19). According to Persæus (Diog. 28), he only attained the age of seventy-two (Clinton, Fast. Hell. II. 368 capriciously suggests 92), and was altogether only fifty years in Athens. On the other hand, in his own letter to Antigonus (Diog. 9), he distinctly calls himself an octogenarian, but the genuineness of this letter, borrowed by Diogenes from Apollonius the Tyrian about 50 B.C., may perhaps be doubted. The year of Zeno’s death is likewise unknown. His relations to Antigonus Gonatas prove at least that he was not dead before the beginning of his reign in 278 B.C., and probably not till long afterwards. It would appear from the calculation of his age, that his death did not take place till 260 B.C. He may, then, have lived circa 350 to 260 B.C.; but these dates are quite uncertain.

Diog. vii. 2; vi. 105.

Diog. 3: ἐντεῦθεν ἤκουσε τοῦ Κράτητος, ἄλλως μὲν εὔτονος πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, αἰδήμων δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν κυνικὴν ἀναισχυντίαν.

Conf., besides what immediately follows, Diog. 25 and 15: ἦν δὲ ζητητικὸς καὶ περὶ πάντων ἀκριβολογούμενος.

Diog. vii. 2; 4; 16; 20; 24; ii. 114; 120. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 9; 6, 6. Polemo is called his teacher by Cic. Fin. iv. 16, 45; Acad. i. 9, 35. Strabo, xiii. 1. 67, p. 614. On Xenocrates compare p. 37, 1. How ready he was to learn from others is proved by the saying in Diog. 25; Plut. Fragm. in Hesiod. ix. T. V. 511. W.

Diog. 5, according to whom he gave instruction walking to and fro, like Aristotle, but never to more than two or three at a time (Diog. 14). It is not probable that he gave any formal lectures.

Which, however, must be judged by the standard of that time and of Greek customs. Conf. Diog. 13; and the quotations in Athen. xiii. 607, e; 563, e, from Antigonus of Carystus.

See Musonius in Stob. Serm. 17, 43. His outward circumstances also appear to have been very simple. According to one account (Diog. 13), he brought to Athens the fabulous sum of 1000 talents, and put it out to interest. Themist. Or. xxi., p. 252, says that he forgave a debtor his debt. He is said to have paid a logician 200 drachmas, instead of the 100 which he asked for (Diog. 25). Nor is there any mention of a Cynical life or of poverty. But, according to Diog. 5, Plut. and Sen., he had lost his property almost entirely. According to Sen. Consol. ad Helv. 12, 5 (contradicted by Diog. 23), he owned no slave. Had he been well to do, he would hardly have accepted the presents of Antigonus. That Zeno was unmarried appears from Diog. 13.

Conf. Diog. 13; 16; 24; 26; Athen. in the passage quoted p. 36, 2; Suid.; Clem. Strom. 413, A. It is mentioned as a peculiarity of Zeno, that he avoided all noise and popular display (Diog. 14); that, though generally grave, he relaxed over his wine, and that too much; that he could not tolerate many words, and was very fond of epigrams. See Diog. 16; 20; 24; Athen. l.c. Stob. Serm. 34; 10; 36; 19; 23. He is said to have carried his parsimoniousness too far. In this respect he was a thorough Phœnician (Diog. 16). The presents of Antigonus he never sought, and broke with an acquaintance who asked for his interest with the king. Still he did not despise them, without abating from his dignity. The loss of his property he bore with the greatest composure (Diog. 3; Plut. and Sen.).

Antigonus (conf. Athen. xiii. 603, e; Arrian, Diss. Epict. ii. 13, 14; Simpl. in Epict. Enchir. 283, c; Æl. V. H. ix. 26) was fond of his society, attended his lectures, and wished to have him at court—but Zeno declined the offer, sending two of his pupils instead. The Athenians, to whom, according to Ælian’s untrustworthy account V. H. vii. 14, he had rendered political services, honoured him with a public panegyric, a golden crown, a statue, and burial in the Ceramicus. That the keys of the city were left in his keeping is not probable. The offer of Athenian citizenship he declined (Plut. Sto. Rep. 4, 1, p. 1034). Nor did his countrymen in Citium fail to show their appreciation (Diog. 6; Plin. H. N. xxxiv. 19, 32) of him, and Zeno always insisted on being a Citian (Diog. 12; Plut. l.c.).

He himself (Diog. vii. 18) compares the λόγοι ἀπηρτισμένοι of the ἀσόλοικοι to the elegant Alexandrian coins, which, instead of being better, were often lighter than those of Athens. He is charged in particular with using words in a wrong sense, and with inventing new words, whence Cic. Tusc. v. 11, 34, calls him ‘ignobilis verborum opifex,’ and Chrysippus, in a treatise περὶ τοῦ κυρίως κεχρῆσθαι Ζήνωνα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, disparages this καινοτομεῖν ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι (Galen. Diff. Puls. III. 1., vol. viii. 642, K.). He is also charged with maintaining that nothing ought to be concealed, but that even the most indelicate things should be called by their proper names. He is further charged with having propounded no new system, but with having appropriated the thoughts of his predecessors, and having concealed his plagiarism by the use of new terms. In Diog. vii. 25, Polemo says: κλέπτων τὰ δόγματα Φοινικῶς μεταμφιεννύς; and Cicero frequently repeats the charge (Fin. v. 25, 74; iii. 2, 5; iv. 2, 3; 3, 7; 26; 72; v. 8, 22; 29, 88. Acad. ii. 5, 15. Legg. 1, 13, 38; 20; 53. Tusc. ii. 12, 29).

Diog. 28, 1. The statement that he was ἄνοσος must be taken with some limitation, according to Diog. vii. 162; Stob. Floril. 17, 43.

Diog. 28; 31. Lucian, Macrob. 19. Lactant. Inst. iii. 18. Stob. Floril. 7, 45. Suid.

The list of them in Diog. 4, to which additions are made Diog. 34; 39; 134. The Διατριβαὶ (Diog. 34; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 205; 245; Math. xi. 90) may perhaps be identical with the Ἀπομνημονεύματα Κράτητος (Diog. 4), the Τέχνη ἐρωτικὴ (Diog. 34) with Τέχνη (Diog. 4). An exposition of Hesiod, which had been inferred to exist, from Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36, Krische, Forsch. 367, rightly identifies with the treatise περὶ τοῦ ὅλου, and this with the treatise περὶ τῆς φύσεως (Stob. Ecl. i. 178). Other authorities are given by Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii. 580.

This appears at least probable from Diog. 4: ἕως μὲν οὖν τινὸς ἤκουσε τοῦ Κράτητος· ὅτε καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν αὐτοῦ γράψαντος, τινὲς ἔλεγον παίζοντες ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ κυνὸς οὐρᾶς αὐτὴν γεγραφέναι.

Mohnike, Cleanthes d. Sto.: Greifsw. 1814. Cleanthis Hymn. in Jovem, ed. Sturz, ed. nov. cur. Merzdorf.: Lips. 1835.

Strabo, xiii. 1, 57, p. 610. Diog. vii. 168. Ælian, Hist. Anim. vi. 50. How Clemens, Protrept. 47, A, comes to call him Πισαδεὺς, it is hard to say, nor is it of any moment. Mohnike, p. 67, offers conjectures. Mohnike also rightly maintains, p. 77, that Cleanthes ὁ Ποντικὸς in Diog. ix. 15 must be the same as this Cleanthes, and Cobet strikes out the words ὁ Ποντικὸς after Κλεάνθης.

According to Antisthenes (the Rhodian), in Diog. l.c., Cleanthes was a pugilist, who came to Athens with four drachmæ, and entered the school of Zeno (according to Hesych. v. Suid., that of Crates, which is impossible for chronological reasons. Conversely, Valer. Max. viii. 7, ext. 11, makes him a pupil of Chrysippus, confounding the relations of pupil and teacher, as we have met with elsewhere), in which he studied for nineteen years (Diog. 176), gaining a maintenance by working as a labourer (Diog. 168; 174; Plut. Vit. Ær. Al. 7, 5, p. 830; Sen. Ep. 44, 3; Krische, Forsch.). A public maintenance, which was offered him, Zeno induced him to refuse, and, in other ways, tried his power of will by the severest tests. It is, therefore, all the more improbable that Antigonus gave him 3000 minæ (Diog. 169). On the simplicity of his life, his constant application, his adherence to Zeno, &c., see Diog. 168; 170; 37; Plut. De Audi. 18, p. 47; Cic. Tusc. ii. 25, 60. He also refused to become an Athenian citizen (Plut. Sto. Rep. 4, p. 1034). He died of self-imposed starvation (Diog. 176; Lucian, Macrob. 19; Stob. Floril. 7, 54). His age is stated by Diog. 176, at eighty; by Lucian and Valer. Max. viii. 7, ext. 11, at ninety-nine. Diog. 174, gives a list of his somewhat numerous writings, mostly on moral subjects, which is supplemented by Fabric. Bibl. iii. 551, Harl. and Mohnike, p. 90. Cleanthes was held in great esteem in the Stoic School, even in the time of Chrysippus (Diog. vii. 179; 182; Cic. Acad. ii. 41, 126). At a later time, the Roman Senate erected a statue to him at Assos (Simpl. in Epict. Enchir. c. 53, 329, b).

Aristo, son of Miltiades, a Chian, discussed most fully by Krische, Forsch. 405, known as the Siren, because of his persuasive powers, and also as the Baldhead, was a pupil of Zeno (Diog. 37; 160; Cic. N. D. i. 14, 37; Acad. ii. 42, 130; Sen. Ep. 94, 2), but is said, during Zeno’s illness, to have joined Polemo (Diocl. in Diog. 162). Although it may be objected that his teaching does not diverge in the direction of Platonism, but rather in the opposite direction, still Polemo’s contempt (Diog. iv. 18) for dialectic may at one time have had its attractions for him. It is a better established fact that his attitude towards pleasure was less indifferent than it ought to have been, according to his principles (Eratos and Apollophanes in Athen. vii. 281, c); but the charge of flattery towards his fellow-pupil Persæus appears not to be substantiated (Athen. vi. 251, c). His letters show that he was on intimate terms with Cleanthes (Themist. Or. xxi. p. 255, b). His loquacity is said to have been displeasing to Zeno (Diog. vii. 18). He appeared as a teacher in the Cynosarges, Antisthenes’ old locality (Diog. 161), thus claiming descent from Cynicism. Of his numerous pupils (Diog. 182; Plut. C. Princ. Philos. i. 4. p. 776), two are mentioned by Diogenes, 161; Miltiades and Diphilus. Athenæus names two more: Apollophanes, and the celebrated Alexandrian sage, Eratosthenes, both of whom wrote an ‘Aristo.’ The latter is also named by Strabo, i. 2, 2, p. 15, Suid. Ἐρατοσθ. Apollophanes, whilst adopting Aristo’s views of virtue in Diog. vii. 92, did not otherwise adopt his ethics. His natural science is mentioned by Diog. vii. 140, his psychology by Tertull. De An. 14. Since Eratosthenes was born 276 B.C., Aristo must have been alive in 250 B.C., which agrees with his being called a cotemporary and opponent of Arcesilaus (Strabo, l.c.; Diog. vii. 162; iv. 40, and 33). According to Diog. vii. 164, he died of sunstroke. Not only had his School disappeared in the time of Strabo and Cicero (Cic. Legg. i. 13, 38; Fin. ii. 11, 35; v. 8, 23; Tusc. v. 30, 85; Off. i. 2, 6; Strabo, l.c.), but no traces of it are found beyond the first generation. The writings enumerated by Diog. vii. 163, with the single exception of the letter to Cleanthes, are said to have been attributed by Panætius and Sosicrates to the Peripatetic; but Krische’s remarks, p. 408, particularly after Sauppe’s demurrer (Philodemi de Vit. Lib. X. Weimar, 1853, p. 7), raise a partial doubt as to the accuracy of this statement. The fragments, at least, of Ὁμοιώματα preserved by Stobæus seem to belong to a Stoic. Perhaps from the Ὅμοια come the statements in Sen. Ep. 36, 3; 115, 8; Plut. De Aud. 8, p. 42; De Sanit. 20, p. 133; De Exil. 5, p. 600; Præc. Ger. Reip. 9, 4, p. 804; Aqua an Ign. Util. 12, 2, p. 958.

Herillus’s native place was Carthage (Diog. vii. 37; 165). If Χαλχηδόνιος is read by Cobet in the last passage, we have again the same confusion between Καλχηδὼν and Καρχηδὼν, which made Xenocrates a Καρχηδόνιος. He came as a boy under Zeno (Diog. 166; Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 129). Diog. l.c. enumerates the writings of Herillus, calling them, however, ὀλιγόστιχα μὲν δυνάμεως δὲ μεστά. Cic. De Orat. iii. 17. 62, speaks of a School bearing his name, but no pupil belonging to it is known.

Citium was his birthplace. His father’s name was Demetrius (Diog. 6; 36), and his own nickname Dorotheus (Suid. Περσ.). According to Diog. 36; Sotion and Nicias in Athen. iv. 162, d; Gell. ii. 18, 8; Orig. C. Cels. iii. 483, d; he was first a slave of Zeno’s, which agrees with his being a pupil and inmate of his house (Diog. 36; 13; Cic. N. D. i. 15, 38; Athen. xiii. 607, e; Pausan. ii. 8, 4). It is less probable that he was presented by Antigonus to Zeno as a copyist (Diog. 36). He subsequently lived at the court of Antigonus (Athen. vi. 251, c; xiii. 607, a; Themist. Or. xxxii., p. 358), whose son Halcyoneus (Ælian, V. H. iii. 17, says falsely himself) he is said to have instructed (Diog. 36), and with whom he stood in high favour (Plut. Arat. 18; Athen. vi. 251, c). He, however, allowed the Macedonian garrison in Corinth to be surprised by Aratus, in 243 B.C., and, according to Pausan. ii. 8, 4; vii. 8, 1, perished on that occasion. The contrary is asserted by Plut. Arat. 23, and Athen. iv. 162, c. In his teaching and manner of life, he appears to have taken a very easy view of the Stoic principles (Diog. 13; 36; Athen. iv. 162, b; xiii. 607, a). It is therefore probable that he did not agree with Aristo’s Cynicism (Diog. vii. 162), and his pupil Hermagoras wrote against the Cynics (Suid. Ἑρμαγ.). Political reasons were at the bottom of Menedemus’ hatred for him (Diog. ii. 143). Otherwise, he appears as a genuine Stoic (Diog. vii. 120; Cic. N. D. i. 15, 38; Minuc. Felix Octav. 21, 3; Philodem. De Mus., Vol. Herc. i. col. 14). Compare p. 39, 2. The treatises mentioned by Diog. 36 are chiefly ethical and political. In addition to these, there was a treatise on Ethics (Diog. 28); the συμποτικὰ ὑπομνήματα, or συμποτικοὶ διάλογοι, from which Athen. (iv. 162, b; xiii. 607, a) gives some extracts; and the Ἱστορία (in Suid.). Whether Cicero’s statement is taken from a treatise omitted by Diogenes, or from that περὶ ἀσεβείας, it is hard to say.

According to the sketch of his life in Buhle (Arat. Opp. i. 3), Aratus was a pupil of Persæus at Athens, in company with whom he repaired to Antigonus in Macedonia, which can only mean that he was, together with Persæus, a pupil of Zeno. Another writer in Buhle (ii. 445) calls him so, mentioning one of his letters addressed to Zeno. Other accounts (Ibid. ii. 431; 442; 446) describe him as a pupil of Dionysius of Heraclea, or of Timon and Menedemus. A memorial of his Stoicism is the introduction to his ‘Phænomena,’ a poem resembling the hymn of Cleanthes. Asclepiades (Vita in Buhle, ii. 429), in calling him a native of Tarsus, is only preferring a better-known Cilician town to one less known.

Hence his name ὁ Μεταθέμενος. On his writings, consult Diog. vii. 166; 37; 23; v. 92; Athen. vii. 281, d; x. 437, e; Cic. Acad. ii. 22, 71; Tusc. ii. 25, 60; Fin. v. 31, 94. Previously to Zeno, he is said to have studied under Heraclides ὁ Ποντικὸς, Alexinus, and Menedemus.

Diog. 177; Plut. Cleomen. 2; 11; Athen. viii. 354, e. Sphærus’ presence in Egypt seems to belong to the time before he became connected with Cleomenes. He was a pupil of Cleanthes (Diog. vii. 185; Athen. l.c.) when he went to Egypt, and resided there at the court of Ptolemy for several years. He had left Egypt by 221 B.C., but was then himself no longer a member of the Stoic School at Athens. It is possible that Sphærus may first have come to Cleomenes on a commission from the Egyptian king. In that case, the Ptolemy referred to must have been either Ptolemy Euergetes or Ptolemy Philadelphus—certainly not Philopator, as Diog. 177 says. If, however, the view is taken that it was Ptolemy Philopator, it may be supposed that Sphærus repaired to Egypt with Cleomenes in 221 B.C. Sphærus’ numerous writings (Diog. 178: Λακωνικὴ πολιτεία also in Athen. iv. 141, 6) refer to all parts of philosophy, and to some of the older philosophers. According to Cic. Tusc. iv. 24, 53, his definitions were in great esteem in the Stoic School.

Athenodorus, a native of Soli (Diog. vii. 38; 100); Callippus of Corinth (Diog. 38); Philonides of Thebes, who went with Persæus to Antigonus (Diog. 9; 38); Posidonius of Alexandria (Diog. 38); Zeno of Sidon, a pupil of Diodorus Cronus, who joined Zeno (Diog. 38; 16; Suid.).

Baguet, De Chrysippo. Annal. Lovan. vol. iv. Lovan. 1822.

Εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος οὐκ ἂν ἦν στοά (Diog. 183). Cic. Acad. ii. 24, 75: Chrysippum, qui fulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum, Athen. viii. 335, b.: Χρύσιππον τὸν τῆς στοᾶς ἡγεμόνα. See Baguet, p. 16.

It is recorded (Diog. 179) that he was brought up in early life as a racer, which is an exceedingly suspicious statement, (confer D, 168); and that his paternal property was confiscated (Hecato in Diog. 181). Subsequently, his domestic establishment was scanty, consisting of one old servant (Diog. 185; 181; 183); but whether this was the result of Stoicism or of poverty is not known. The Floril. Monac. (in Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 289) 262 calls him λιτὸς, ἔχων χρήματα πολλά.

According to Apollodorus in Diog. 184, he died c. 205 B.C., in his 73rd year, which would make 281 to 276 the year of his birth. According to Lucian, Macrob. 20, he attained the age of 81, and, according to Valer. Max. viii. 7 ext. 10, completed the 39th book of his logic in his eightieth year.

This is the view of Diog. 179; Plut. De Exil. 14, p. 605; Strabo, xiii. 1. 57, p. 610; xiv. 4, 8, p. 671, and most writers. Alexander Polyhistor, however, in Diog. and Suid. Ζήν. call him a native of Tarsus; and since his father Apollonius migrated from Tarsus to Soli (Strabo, p. 671), it is possible that Chrysippus may have been born in Tarsus.

On this point all authorities are agreed. When and how he came to Athens is not recorded. He subsequently obtained the rights of citizenship there (Plut. Sto. Rep. 4, 2, p. 1034).

Diog. 179. This statement cannot be tested by chronology. Authorities, however, do not look promising.

Diog. Pro. 15. Strabo, xiii. 1, 57, 610.

Diog. vii. 183. It is possible, as Ritter, iii. 524, supposes, that he was for some time doubtful about Stoicism, whilst he was under the influence of the Academic Scepticism, and that during this time he wrote the treatise against συνήθεια. This is possible, but not probable. But that he should have separated from Cleanthes, and have set up a school in the Lyceum in opposition to him, is unlikely, and does not follow from the words of Diog. 179; 185.

Diog. 184; iv. 62. Cic. Acad. ii. 27, 87. Plut. Sto. Rep. p. 10, 3, 1036. These passages refer particularly to Chrysippus’ six books κατὰ τῆς συνηθείας. On the other hand, his pupil Aristocreon, in Plut. l.c. 2, 5, commends him as being τῶν Ἀκαδημιακῶν στραγγαλίδων κοπίδα. (Conf. Plut. Comm. Not. i. 4, p. 1059).

When a learner, he is said to have used these words to Cleanthes: ‘Give me the principles; the proofs I can find myself.’ Subsequently it was said of him: ‘If the Gods have any logic, it is that of Chrysippus’ (Diog. 179). See Cic. N. D. i. 15, 30, where the Epicurean calls him Stoicorum somniorum vaferrimus interpres: ii. 6, 16; iii. 10, 25: Divin. i. 3, 6: Chrysippus acerrimo vir ingenio. Senec. Benefic. i. 3, 8; 4, 1, complains of his captiousness. Dionys. Hal. Comp. Verb. 68, calls him the most practical logician, but the most careless writer. Krische, Forsch. i. 445.

Diog. 180. Athen. xiii. 565, a. Damasc. V. Isid. 36. Cic. Tusc. i. 45, 108.

Diog. 179; 183.

Diog. 185, mentions it as deserving of especial notice, that he refused the invitation of Ptolemy to court, and dedicated none of his numerous writings to a prince.

Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 143. Diog. 179. Plut. Sto. Rep. 4, 1, p. 1034. According to the latter passage, Antipater had written a special treatise περὶ τῆς Κλεάνθους καὶ Χρυσίππου διαφορᾶς.

Quid enim est a Chrysippo prætermissum in Stoicis? Cic. Fin. i. 2, 6.

According to Diog. 180, there were not fewer than 750. Conf. Valer. Max. viii. 7, ext. 10; Lucian, Hermotim. 48.

This appeared to the Epicureans disparaging to the honour of their master. Hence the charge that Chrysippus had written against Epicurus in rivalry (Diog. x. 26, and the criticism of Apollodorus in Diog. vii. 181).

Baguet, pp. 114–357, discusses the subject very fully, but omits several fragments. As to his logical treatises, of which alone there were 311 (Diog. 198), see Nicolai, De logicis Chrysippi libris: Quedlinb. 1859. Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 404. Petersen (Philosoph. Chrysip. Fundamenta: Hamburg, 1827, 321) attempts a systematic arrangement of all the known books.

See Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 50; Dionys. Hal. See above 46, 3; Diog. vii. 180; x. 27. Galen, Differ. Puls. ii. 10; vol. viii. 631 K; Hippocr. et Plat. Plac. ii. 2; iii. 2; vol. v. 213, 295, 308, 312, 314, and Baguet, 26. See also Plut. Sto. Rep. 28, 2; and Bergk, Commentat. de Chrys. lib. περὶ ἀποφατικῶν: Cassel, 1841.

The circumstances of his death are related differently in Diog. 184; but both stories are untrustworthy. The story of the ass is also told in Lucian, Macrob. 25 of Philemon; the other version in Diog. iv. 44; 61 of Arcesilaus and Lacydes. On the statue of Chrysippus in the Ceramicus see Diog. vii. 182; Cic. Fin. i. 11, 39; Pausan. i. 17, 2; Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 5.

In Stob. Floril. 40, 8, mention is made of the honourable position enjoyed by the Athenian Chremonides, who had been banished from his country. The banishment of Chremonides being placed in the year 263 B.C., Teles’ treatise περὶ φυγῆς must have been written between 260 and 250 B.C. This is further proved by the fact that there is no reference in the fragments preserved to persons or circumstances later than this date. The philosophers to whom reference is made are the Cynics Diogenes, Crates, Metrocles, Stilpo, Bio the Borysthenite, Zeno, and Cleanthes (95, 21), the latter being called ὁ Ἄσσιος.

Floril. 5, 67; 40, 8; 91, 33; 93, 31; 98, 72; 108, 82 and 83.

According to Suid., he was born c. 275 B.C., and died in his 80th year.

See p. 41, 2.

Conf. Diog. 54: ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὐτόν ... κριτήριά φησιν εἶναι αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν. That he was junior to Aratus appears by his commentary on Aratus’ poem. See Appendix to Geminus, Elem. Astron. (Petavii Doctr. Temp. III. 147). The Vita Arati (Von Buhle’s Aratus, vol. ii. 443), probably confounding him with the Peripatetic Boëthus, calls him a native of Sidon.

We shall have occasion to prove this in speaking of his views of a criterion, and of his denial of a conflagration and destruction of the world. Nevertheless, he is frequently appealed to as an authority among the Stoics. Philo, Incorruptib. M. 947, C, classes him among ἄνδρες ἐν τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς δόγμασιν ἰσχυκότες.

This follows from the great importance of Chrysippus, and the esteem in which he was held from the very first, and is confirmed by the number of persons to whom he wrote treatises. See the list from Diog. 189 in Fabric. Bibl. iii. 549. It is, however, ambiguous whether πρὸς means to or against.

Aristocreon, the nephew of Chrysippus, is the only pupil who can be definitely mentioned by name. See Diog. vii. 185; Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 5, p. 1033.

What is known of this philosopher is limited to the statements in Diog. 35; Suid. Ζήν. Διοσκ.; Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 13, 7; Arius Didymus, Ibid. xv. 17, 2; that he was a native of Tarsus (in Suid. τινὲς say of Sidon, evidently confounding him with the Zeno mentioned p. 44, 3); that he was the son of Dioscorides, the pupil and follower of Chrysippus; that he left many pupils, but few writings; and that he doubted a conflagration of the world.

According to Diog. vi. 81; Lucian, Macrob. 20, he was a native of Seleucia on the Tigris; but he is sometimes called a native of Babylon (Diog. vii. 39; 55; Cic. N. D. i. 15, 41; Divin. i. 3, 6; Plut. De Exil. 14, p. 605). Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6, calls him a pupil of Chrysippus; and Acad. ii. 30, 98, the instructor of Carneades in dialectic. Plut. Alex. Virt. 5, p. 328, calls him a pupil of Zeno (of Tarsus). Zeno, he says, Διογένη τὸν Βαβυλώνιον ἔπεισε φιλοσοφεῖν. Diog. vii. 71, mentions a διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη of his; and, vii. 55 and 57, a τέχνη περὶ φωνῆς. Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6, speaks of a treatise on divination. Athen. iv. 168, e, of a treatise περὶ εὐγενείας, xii. 526. d, of a work περὶ νόμων—the same work probably which, according to Cic. Legg. iii. 5, 14, was written ‘a Dione Stoico.’ Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51, calls him ‘magnus et gravis Stoicus;’ Seneca, De Ira, iii. 38, 1, mentions a trait showing great presence of mind. Diogenes was, without doubt, aged in 156 B.C. (Cic. De Senec. 7, 23). According to Lucian, he attained the age of 88, and may therefore have died 150 B.C.

It was often supposed, on the strength of Cic. N. D. i. 15, 41, Divin. i. 3, 6, that Diogenes was the immediate successor of Chrysippus. The words, however, consequens or subsequens, by no means necessarily imply it. On the authority of Arius, Eusebius, and Suidas, it would seem that Zeno was the successor of Chrysippus, and that Diogenes followed Zeno.

Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51, only calls him his pupil; but it is clear that he taught in Athens from Plut. Ti. Gracch. c. 8, as Zumpt, Ueber die philos. Schulen in Athen. Abh. d. Berl. Acad. 1842, Hist. phil. kl. p. 103, already remarks; and Plut. Tranq. An. 9, p. 469, seems to imply that he continued to live at Athens after leaving Cilicia. The same fact is conveyed by the mention of Diogenists and Panætiasts at Athens (Athen. v. c. 2, p. 186, a); by the charge brought against Antipater (Plut. Garrul. c. 23, p. 514; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 6; Cic. Acad ii. 6, 17, and the fragment from Acad. Post. I. in Non. p. 65), that he never ventured to dispute with Carneades; and by Diog. iv. 65; Stob. Floril. 119, 19. According to these two authorities, he voluntarily put an end to his own life. In Acad. ii. 47, 143, Cicero calls him and Archedemus ‘duo vel principes dialecticorum, opiniosissimi homines.’ It appears from Off. iii. 12, 51, where he is also called ‘homo acutissimus,’ that he pronounced a severer judgment on several moral questions than Diogenes. Sen. Ep. 92, 5, reckons him among the magnos Stoicæ sectæ auctores. Epictet. Diss. iii. 21, 7, speaks of the φορὰ Ἀντιπάτρου καὶ Ἀρχεδήμου. See Van Lynden, De Panætio, 33; and Fabric. Biblioth. iii. 538 for his numerous lost treatises.

Cic. l.c.; Strabo xiv. 4, 14, p. 674, Epictet. l.c.; Diog. vii. 55. It does not follow that they were cotemporaries, but only that their writings and philosophy were the same. We have otherwise no accurate information as to the date of Archedemus. Passages where he is mentioned may be found in Fabric. Bibl. III. 540. He also appears to be meant in Simpl. De Cœlo, Schol. in Arist. 505, a, 45. In Diog. 134, he appears to be placed between Chrysippus and Posidonius. In Plut. De Exil. 14, 605, he follows Antipater. According to this authority he established a school in Babylon, and because he came there from Athens, Plutarch appears to have considered him an Athenian.

Apollodorus of Athens, the compiler of the Βιβλιοθήκη, a well-known grammarian, is also mentioned as a pupil of Diogenes (Scymnus, Chius Perieges. v. 20). His chronicle, dedicated to Attalus II., Philadelphus of Pergamum (158–138 B.C.), and probably drawn up 144 B.C., would seem to corroborate this assertion. Panætius, whose pupil he is elsewhere called (Suid. Ἀπολλόδ.), was himself a pupil of Diogenes’ successor, Antipater (Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6), and can hardly have been older than Apollodorus.

Another grammarian belonging to the School of Diogenes is Zenodotus (Diog. vii. 30), supposing him to be identical with the Alexandrian Zenodotus (Suid. Ζηνόδ.). A third is perhaps the celebrated Aristarchus, whom Scymnus calls a fellow-disciple of Apollodorus. A fourth, Crates of Mallos, called by Strabo, xiv. 5, 16, p. 676, the instructor of Panætius, by Suid. a Stoic philosopher, who in Varro, Lat. ix. 1, appeals to Chrysippus against Aristarchus.

Antipater’s pupils are Heraclides of Tarsus (Diog. vii. 121); Sosigenes (Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142); C. Blossius of Cumæ (Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8, 17 and 20; Val. Max. iv. 7, 1; Cic. Læl. 11, 37). Eudromus, mentioned by Diog. vii. 39, appears to belong to the time between Chrysippus and Panætius. Between Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes, Diog. vii. 84, names a certain Apollodorus, the author, probably, of the fragments in Stob. Ecl. i. 408 and 520. Possibly, however, he may be identical with the Apollodorus mentioned by Cic. N. D. i. 34, 93, and consequently a cotemporary of Zeno. In Diog. vii. 39, he is called Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Ἔφιλλος, instead of which Cobet reads Ἀπολλόδωρος καὶ Σύλλος. Apollodorus the Athenian, mentioned by Diog. vii. 181, is without doubt the Epicurean, known to us also from Diog. x. 2 and 25. Krische, Forsch. 26, thinks even that the passages in Cicero refer to him.

The age of Diogenes of Ptolemais (Diog. vii. 41), of Œnopides mentioned by Stob. Ecl. i. 58; Macrob. Sat. i. 17, together with Diogenes and Cleanthes, and of Nicostratus, mentioned by Philodemus περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς Tab. I. 2 and perhaps by Artemidorus Oneirocrit. I. 2 Sch. is quite unknown. Nicostratus, however, must have written before the middle of the first century before Christ. He is probably distinct from the Nicostratus who wrote on the Aristotelian categories in an adverse spirit, and is referred to by Simpl. in Categ. Schol. in Arist. 40, a; 24, b, 16; 41, b, 27; 47, b, 23; 49, b, 43; 72, b, 6; 74, b, 4; 81, b, 12; 83, a, 37; 84, a, 28; 86, b, 20; 87, b, 30; 88, b, 3 and 11; 89, a, 1; 91, a, 25; b, 21. For this Nicostratus used the treatise of a certain Roman Lucius, whereas Roman treatises on the Categories can hardly have existed before the time of Philodemus, a cotemporary of Cicero. However, both Lucius and Nicostratus appear to have been Stoics.

Already Simpl. in Cat. Schol. in Arist. 49, a, 16, says: παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς, ὧν ἐφ’ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐπιλέλοιπεν.

Plut. Plac. Pro. 2: οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωϊκοὶ ἔφασαν, τὴν μὲν σοφίαν εἶναι θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην· τὴν δὲ φιλοσοφίαν ἄσκησιν τέχνης ἐπιτηδείου· ἐπιτήδειον δ’ εἶναι μίαν καὶ ἀνωτάτω τὴν ἀρετήν· ἀρετὰς δὲ τὰς γενικωτάτας τρεῖς, φυσικὴν, ἠθικὴν, λογικὴν, κ.τ.λ. See also Diog. vii. 92.

In Seneca, Ep. 89, 4, wisdom is the highest good for the human mind, and philosophy is a striving after wisdom: wisdom is defined to be the knowledge of things human and divine; philosophy to be studium virtutis, or studium corrigendæ mentis. This striving after virtue cannot be distinguished from virtue itself: Philosophia studium virtutis est, sed per ipsam virtutem. Seneca further observes (Fr. 17, in Lactant. Inst. iii. 15): Philosophia nihil aliud est quam recta vivendi ratio, vel honeste vivendi scientia, vel ars rectæ vitæ agendæ. Non errabimus, si dixerimus philosophiam esse legem bene honesteque vivendi, et qui dixerit illam regulam vitæ, suum illi [nomen] reddidit. Plut. see previous note.

See Diog. vii. 46: αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀρετὴν ἐν εἴδει περιέχουσαν ἀρετὰς, κ.τ.λ.

Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 6: δεῖ γὰρ τούτοις [sc. τοῖς φυσικοῖς] συνάψαι τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, οὐκ οὔσης ἄλλης ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν ἀμείνονος οὐδ’ ἀναφορᾶς, οὐδ’ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκεν τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας παραληπτῆς οὔσης ἢ πρὸς τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν διάστασιν.

Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 3, 2: ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσι φιλοσόφοις ἐπιβάλλειν μάλιστα τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίον ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, οὗτοί μοι δοκοῦσι διαμαρτάνειν ὑπονοοῦντες διαγωγῆς τινος ἕνεκεν δεῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τούτῳ παραπλησίου, καὶ τὸν ὅλον βίον οὕτω πως διελκύσαι· τοῦτο δ’ ἔστιν, ἂν σαφῶς θεωρηθῇ, ἡδέως. Διαγωγὴ had, it is true, been treated by Aristotle, whose school is here referred to, as an end in itself; but Aristotle had carefully distinguished διαγωγὴ from ἡδονή.

p. 19.

Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 129: Herillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo dissenserit, et quam non multum a Platone. Fin. ii. 13, 43: Herillus autem ad scientiam omnia revocans unum quoddam bonum vidit. iv. 14, 36: In determining the highest good, the Stoics act as one-sidedly, as if ipsius animi, ut fecit Herillus, cognitionem amplexarentur, actionem relinquerent. v. 25, 73: Sæpe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto mirabiliter est laudata per se ipsa rerum scientia. Hoc uno captus Herillus scientiam summum bonum esse defendit, nec rem ullam aliam per se expetendam. Diog. vii. 165: Ἥριλλος ... τέλος εἶπε τὴν ἐπιστήμην. Ibid. vii. 37. With less accuracy, it is asserted by Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 918, that we are raised to the society of the gods, κατὰ Ἥριλλον, ἐπιστήμῃ.

Sen. Ep. 89, 8: Nam nec philosophia sine virtute est nec sine philosophia virtus. Ibid. 53, 8: We all lie in the slumber of error: sola autem nos philosophia excitabit ... illi te totum dedica.

Lact. Inst. vii. 7: Ad virtutem capessendam nasci homines, Ariston disseruit. See Stob. Ecl. 4, 111.

Plut. De Audiendo, c. 8, p. 42: οὔτε γὰρ βαλανείου, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίστων, οὔτε λόγου μὴ καθαίροντος ὄφελός ἐστιν.

Stob. Floril. 82, 15. Diog. vii. 161.

Stob. Floril. 82, 11.

Ibid. 7.

Diog. vii. 162: μάλιστα δὲ προσεῖχε Στωϊκῷ δόγματι τῷ τὸν σόφον ἀδόξαστον εἶναι.

See Diog. vii. 163.

Aristo (in the Ὁμοιώματα) in Stob. Floril. 82, 16: ὁ ἐλλέβορος ὁλοσχερέστερος μὲν ληφθεὶς καθαίρει, εἰς δὲ πάνυ σμικρὰ τριφθεὶς πνίγει· οὕτω καὶ ἡ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λεπτολογία.

Stob. l.c. 4, 110.

See following note and Cic. Acad. ii. 39, 123: Aristo Chius, qui nihil istorum (sc. physicorum) sciri putat posse.

Diog. vii. 160: τόν σε φυσικὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν λογικὸν ἀνῄρει, λέγων τὸν μὲν εἶναι ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, τὸν δ’ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, μόνον δὲ τὸν ἠθικὸν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Stob. Floril. 80, 7: Ἀρίστων ἔφη τῶν ζητουμένων παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τὰ μὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὰ δὲ μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὰ δ’ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς. πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ, μὴ πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ τὰ διαλεκτικά· μὴ γὰρ συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν βίου· ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς δὲ τὰ φυσικά· ἀδύνατα γὰρ ἐγνῶσθαι καὶ οὐδὲ παρέχειν χρείαν. Minuc. Fel. Octav. 13, and Lactant. Ins. iii. 20, attribute this utterance to Socrates. According to Cic. De Nat. De. I. 14, 37, Aristo expressed doubts about the existence of a God.

Sext. Math. vii. 13: καὶ Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος οὐ μόνον, ὥς φασι, παρῃτεῖτο τήν τε φυσικὴν καὶ λογικὴν θεωρίαν διὰ τὸ ἀνωφελὲς καὶ πρὸς κακοῦ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ τόπου τινὰς συμπεριέγραψε καθάπερ τόν τε παραινετικὸν καὶ τὸν ὑποθετικὸν τόπον· τούτους γὰρ εἰς τίτθας ἂν καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς πίπτειν·—(almost a literal translation is given of these words by Seneca, Ep. 89, 13)—ἀρκεῖσθαι δὲ πρὸς τὸ μακαρίως βιῶναι τὸν οἰκειοῦντα μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν λόγον, ἀπαλλοτριοῦντα δὲ κακίας, κατατρέχοντα δὲ τῶν μεταξὺ τούτων, περὶ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ πτοηθέντες κακοδαιμονοῦσιν. Seneca, Ep. 94, 1: Eam partem philosophiæ, quæ dat propria cuique personæ præcepta ... quidam solam receperunt ... sed Ariston Stoicus e contrario hanc partem levem existimat et quæ non descendat in pectus usque; at illam habentem præcepta [? ad vitam beatam] plurimum ait proficere ipsa decreta philosophiæ constitutionemque summi boni, quam qui bene intellexit ac didicit, quid in quaque re faciendum sit, sibi ipse præcepit. This is then further expanded following Aristo.

Seneca, § 12, asks for whom should such exhortations be necessary—for him who has right views of good and evil, or for him who has them not? Qui non habet, nihil a te adjuvabitur; aures ejus contraria monitionibus tuis fama possedit; qui habet exactum judicium de fugiendis petendisque, scit, quid sibi faciendum sit, etiam te tacente; tota ergo pars ista philosophiæ submoveri potest. In § 17, he continues: A madman must be cured, and not exhorted; nor is there any difference between general madness and the madness which is treated medically.

Diog. vii. 39.

Logical treatises, those περὶ λέξεων, λύσεις καὶ ἔλεγχοι, περὶ λόγου—and if there were a rhetoric (see p. 40, 3) the τέχνη—physical treatises, those περὶ ὅλου and περὶ οὐσίας. Diog. 4, 39.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 8, 2: ἔλυε δὲ σοφίσματα καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν, ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην, ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς μαθητάς. That he occasionally not only solved but propounded sophisms is proved by the fallacy quoted Ibid. i. Conf. Diog. vii. 25

See above p. 36.

According to Diog. 32, he declared at the beginning of his Polity the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία to be useless—a testimony worth very little; for it is a moot point, in what sense Zeno made this statement. Perhaps he was only anxious to exclude those studies from the narrower sphere of philosophy (as Sen. Ep. 88). Perhaps his Polity was nearer Cynicism than any other of his writings.

Proofs will be given later.

The Catalogue in Diog. 174, περὶ λόγου 3 B. (Mohnike Cleanth. 102, believes this work was a treatise on life according to reason. The title is against this view, and it is also improbable, inasmuch as treatises by Sphærus and Chrysippus bearing the same title, are exclusively logical), mentions logical treatises περὶ λόγου, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, περὶ ἰδίων, περὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, περὶ διαλεκτικῆς, περὶ κατηγορημάτων. To these may be added, from Athen. 467, d; 471, b, the rhetorical treatises περὶ τρόπων and περὶ μεταλήψεως. Of greater importance were the physical and theological treatises: περὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήνωνος φυσιολογίας (2 B.); τῶν Ἡρακλείτου ἐξηγήσεις (4 B.); πρὸς Δημόκριτον, περὶ θεῶν, περὶ μαντικῆς (Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6); περὶ γιγάντων (in Plut. De Flum. 5, 3); and the μυθικὰ (Athen. xiii. 572, e), which is probably identical with the ἀρχαιολογία of Diogenes.

Diog. 41.

Diog. vii. 178, mentions (1) logical and rhetorical writings: περὶ τῶν Ἐρετρικῶν φιλοσόφων, περὶ ὁμοίων, περὶ ὅρων, περὶ ἕξεως, περὶ τῶν ἀντιλεγομένων (3 B.), περὶ λόγου, τέχνη διαλεκτική (2 B.), περὶ κατηγορημάτων, περὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν; (2) treatises on science: περὶ κόσμου (2 B.), περὶ στοιχείων, περὶ σπέρματος, περὶ τύχης, περὶ ἐλαχίστων, πρὸς τὰς ἀτόμους καὶ τὰ εἴδωλα, περὶ αἰσθητηρίων, περὶ Ἡρακλείτου (5 B.), περὶ μαντικῆς. That Sphærus’ definitions were particularly valued, has been already seen, 44, 2.

Chrys. in the 3rd B., περὶ θεῶν (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 4); οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εὑρεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδ’ ἄλλην γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ δεῖ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μέλλομέν τι ἐρεῖν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. The same writer, in φυσικαὶ θέσεις (Ibid. 5): οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλως οὐδ’ οἰκειότερον ἐπελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐδ’ ἐπὶ εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου διοικήσεως. Further details above p. 47, 2.

Sext. Math. vii. 17; Diog. 40.

The chief divisions of the logic of the Stoics (Diog. 42, 46) are considered important for special purposes. The doctrine περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων is of use, helping us to truth, by making us examine our notions; ὁρικὸν, because it leads to the knowledge of things by means of conceptions; διαλεκτικὴ (which includes the whole of formal logic), because it produces ἀπροπτωσία (= ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ), ἀνεικαιότης (= ἰσχυρὸς λόγος πρὸς τὸ εἰκὸς, ὥστε μὴ ἐνδιδόναι αὐτῷ), ἀνελεγξία (= ἰσχὺς ἐν λόγῳ, ὥστε μὴ ἀπάγεσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἀντικείμενον), ἀματαιότης (= ἕξις ἀναφέρουσα τὰς φαντασίας ἐπὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον). Its value is therefore chiefly negative, as a preservative from error. See Seneca, Ep. 89, 9: Proprietates verborum exigit et structuram et argumentationes, ne pro vero falsa subrepant. Sext. Math. vii. 23: ὀχυρωτικὸν δὲ εἶναι τῆς διανοίας τὸν διαλεκτικὸν τόπον; Pyrrh. ii. 247: ἐπὶ τὴν τέχνην τὴν διαλεκτικήν φασιν ὡρμηκέναι οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ (the Stoics), οὐχ ἁπλῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ γνῶναί τι ἐκ τίνος συνάγεται, ἀλλὰ προηγουμένως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δι’ ἀποδεικτικῶν λόγων τὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ κρίνειν ἐπίστασθαι.

This may be seen in Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 134–203, 229; Math. viii. 300; as well as from the catalogue of the writings of Chrysippus in Diogenes.

The only part which is censured by Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 10, 1) is the sceptical logic, which leaves contradictions unsolved: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐποχὴν ἄγουσι περὶ πάντων ἐπιβάλλει, φησὶ, τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ συνεργόν ἐστι πρὸς ὃ βούλονται· τοῖς δ’ ἐπιστήμην ἐνεργαζομένοις, καθ’ ἣν ὁμολογουμένως βιωσόμεθα τὰ ἐναντία στοιχειοῦν.

Cic. Parad. Proœm.: Cato autem perfectus mea sententia Stoicus ... in ea est hæresi, quæ nullum sequitur florem orationis neque dilatat argumentum: minutis interrogatiunculis, quasi punctis, quod proposuit efficit. Cic. Fin. iv. 3, 7: Pungunt quasi aculeis interrogatiunculis angustis, quibus etiam qui assentiuntur nihil commutantur animo. See also Diog. vii. 18, 20.

In Sextus Empiricus, Διαλεκτικοὶ is their ordinary name. It is also found in Plut. Qu. Plat. x. 1, 2, p. 1008. Cic. Top. 2, 6; Fin. iv. 3, 6.

After the example of the Megarians, the Stoics were in the habit of putting their arguments in the form of questions. Hence the terms λόγον ἐρωτᾶν (Diog. vii. 186), interrogatio (Sen. Ep. 82, 9; 85, 1; 87, 11), interrogatiuncula (Cic.), which are employed even when the arguments were not in this form.

See p. 48, 1.

Called μέρη, according to Diog. 39 also τόποι, εἴδη, γένη.

Diog. 39: τριμερῆ φασιν εἶναι τὸν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μέν τι φυσικὸν, τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν, τὸ δὲ λογικόν. οὕτω δὲ πρῶτος διεῖλε Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐν τῷ περὶ λόγου καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ αʹ περὶ λόγου καὶ ἐν τῇ αʹ τῶν φυσικῶν, καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Ἔφιλλος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν εἰς τὰ δόγματα εἰσαγωγῶν, καὶ Εὔδρομος ἐν τῇ ἠθικῇ στοιχειώσει, καὶ Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος, καὶ Ποσειδώνιος. Sext. Math. vii. 16. Sen. Ep. 89, 9; 14. The six divisions enumerated by Cleanthes (Diog. 41)—Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology (Diog. 41) may be easily reduced to three.

According to Diog. 40, the first place was assigned to Logic, the second to Science, the third to Ethics, by Zeno, Chrysippus, Archedemus, Eudemus, and others. The same order, but inverted, is found in Diogenes of Ptolemais, and in Seneca, Ep. 89, 9. The latter, however, observes (Nat. Qu. Prol. 1) that the difference between that part of philosophy which treats about God, and that which treats about man, is as great as the difference between philosophy and other departments, or even as between God and man. On the other hand, Apollodorus places Ethics in the middle, as also Cleanthes does, and likewise Panætius and Posidonius, if it is certain that they began with science. This appears, however, only to have reference to their order in discussion (see Sext. Math. vii. 22, probably on the authority of Posidonius). A few (Diog. 40) asserted that the parts could be so little separated, that they must be always treated together. The statement of Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 1), that Logic must come first, and be followed by Ethics and Science, so that the theological part may form the conclusion, only refers to the order in which they ought to be taught.

In Diog. 39; Sext. Math. vii. 17; Philo, Mut. Nom. p. 1055, E. Hösch. (589 M); De Agricul. 189, D (302), philosophy is compared to an orchard, Logic represents the fence, Science the trees. Ethics the fruit; so that Ethics are the end and object of the whole. Philosophy is also compared to a fortified town, in which the walls are represented by Logic, but in which the position of the other two is not clear; to an egg, Logic being the shell, and, according to Sextus, Science being the white and Ethics the yolk, but the reverse according to Diogenes. Dissatisfied with this comparison, Posidonius preferred to compare philosophy to a living creature, in which Logic constitutes the bones and muscles, Science the flesh and blood, and Ethics the soul. But Diogenes has another version of this simile, according to which Science represents the soul; and Ritter iii. 432, considers the version of Diogenes to be the older of the two.

See Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 13.

Diog. 41: τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος φασὶν ἔνιοι εἰς δύο διαιρεῖσθαι ἐπιστήμας, εἰς ῥητορικὴν καὶ διαλεκτικήν ... τήν τε ῥητορικὴν ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ εὖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐν διεξόδῳ λόγων καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν τοῦ ὀρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει λόγων. Sen. Ep. 89, 17: Superest ut rationalem partem philosophiæ dividam: omnis oratio aut continua est aut inter respondentem et interrogantem discissa; hanc διαλεκτικὴν, illam ῥητορικὴν placuit vocari. Cic. Fin. ii. 6, 17; Orat. 32, 113. Quintil. Inst. ii. 20, 7. According to these passages, Rhetoric was by Zeno compared to the palm of the hand, and Dialectic to the fist: quod latius loquerentur rhetores, dialectici autem compressius. The Stoics agree with Aristotle in calling rhetoric ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ (Sop. in Hermog. v. 15, Walz.). See Prantl, Gesch. der Log. i. 413.

Diog. 41: Some divide logic into rhetoric and dialectic: τινὲς δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ὁρικὸν εἶδος, τὸ περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων· ἔνιοι δὲ τὸ ὁρικὸν περιαιροῦσι. (We have no reason to read as Ménage does περιδιαιροῦσι, or to conjecture, as Meibom and Nicolai, De Log. Chrys., Lib. 23, do, παραδιαιροῦσι.) According to this passage, ὁρικὸν must be identical with the doctrine of a criterium. In a subsequent passage, however, the two are distinguished; the doctrine of a criterium is said to be useful for the discovery of truth: καὶ τὸ ὁρικὸν δὲ ὁμοίως πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας· διὰ γὰρ τῶν εὐνοιῶν τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνεται. We may therefore suppose that in the passage first quoted the words should be τὸ ὁρικὸν εἶδος καὶ τὸ περὶ κανόνων, κ.τ.λ. In this case, we may understand by ὁρικὸν not only the theory of definition—a theory to which Aristotle devoted a separate section at the end of his Analytics (Anal. Post. ii.)—but besides a theoretical disquisition on the formation of definitions, a collection of definitions of various objects. Such collections are found in the treatises of Chrysippus (Diog. 199, 189): περὶ τῶν ὅρων ζʹ. ὅρων διαλεκτικῶν στʹ. ὅρων τῶν κατὰ γένος ζʹ. ὅρων τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας αβʹ. ὅρων τῶν τοῦ ἀστείου βʹ. ὅρων τῶν τοῦ φαύλου βʹ. ὅρων τῶν ἀναμέσων βʹ; besides the further treatises περὶ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῖς ὅροις ἀντιλεγομένων ζʹ. Πιθανὰ εἰς τοὺς ὅρους βʹ. The treatise περὶ εἰδῶν καὶ γενῶν βʹ may also be included here; perhaps also that περὶ τῶν κατηγορημάτων πρὸς Μητρόδωρον ιʹ. πρὸς Πάσυλον περὶ κατηγορημάτων δʹ, Diog. 191.

No description of their system can dispense with this fundamental enquiry, which had been already instituted by Zeno. It appears, however, to have been treated by several writers as a branch of dialectic. Diog. 43 says that the branch of dialectic which treats of σημαινόμενα may be divided εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν τόπον καὶ τῶν ἐκ τούτων ὑφισταμένων λεκτῶν. (See Nicolai p. 23.) Compare with this the words of Diocles, in Diog. 49: ἀρέσκει τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως προτάττειν λόγον, καθότι τὸ κριτήριον ᾧ ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν πραγμάτων γινώσκεται, κατὰ γένος φαντασία ἐστὶ καὶ καθότι ὁ περὶ συγκαταθέσεως καὶ ὁ περὶ καταλήψεως καὶ νοήσεως λόγος προάγων τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας συνίσταται. According to this passage, the branch of dialectic which treated of φαντασία included the theory of knowledge. Diog. 53, Petersen’s conjecture is singular (Phil. Chrys. Fund. p. 25) that the theory of knowledge may have been understood by Chrysippus under the name rhetoric.

Our information on this head is very small. In the words: ῥητορικὴ verba curat et sensus et ordinem, a division of rhetoric is implied by Seneca, which differs in little, except in the position of the chief parts, from that of Aristotle. A fourth part is added to the three others by Diog. 43—on Delivery—εἶναι δ’ αὐτῆς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἴς τε τὴν εὕρεσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν φράσιν, καὶ εἰς τάξιν καὶ εἰς τὴν ὑπόκρισιν. Diogenes also claims for the Stoics the Aristotelian distinction between three ways of speaking—συμβουλευτικὸς, δικανικὸς, ἐγκωμιαστικός—and four parts in a speech: προοίμιον, διήγησις, τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιδίκους, ἐπίλογος. Definitions of διήγησις and παράδειγμα are given from Zeno by the anonymous author in Spengel, Rhet. Gr. i. 434, 23; 447, 11. The same author (Ibid. 454, 4) says that, according to Chrysippus, the ἐπίλογος must be μονομερής. The Stoic definition of rhetoric has been already given, p. 70, 1. Another—τέχνη περὶ κόσμου καὶ εἰρημένου λόγου τάξιν—is attributed to Chrysippus by Plut. Sto. Rep. 28, 1. Cic. Fin. iv. 3, 7, observes, in reference to the Stoic rhetoric, and in particular to that of Chrysippus, that such was its nature that si quis obmutescere concupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat—that it dealt in nothing but words, being withal scanty in expressions, and confined to subtleties. This neglect of the truly rhetorical element appears already in the quotations from Plut. Sto. Rep. 28, 2. We have not the slightest reason to complain, as Prantl does, p. 413, of the purely rhetorical value of dialectic with the Stoics.

See p. 70, 1, Alex. Aphr. Top. 3: οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὁριζόμενοι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ εὖ λέγειν ὁρίζονται, τὸ δὲ εὖ λέγειν ἐν τῷ ἀληθῆ καὶ προσήκοντα λέγειν εἶναι τιθέμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ ἴδιον ἡγούμενοι τοῦ φιλοσόφου, κατὰ τῆς τελεωτάτης φιλοσοφίας φέρουσιν αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μόνος ὁ φιλόσοφος κατ’ αὐτοὺς διαλεκτικός. Aristotle had used the term dialectic in another sense, but with Plato it expressed the mode of procedure peculiar to a philosopher.

See Anon. Prolegg. ad Hermog. Rhet. Gr. vii. 8, W.: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τὸ εὖ λέγειν ἔλεγον τὸ ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

Diog. 42: ὅθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν [τὴν διαλεκτικὴν] ὁρίζονται, ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. (The same, p. 62, quoted from Posidonius, and in Sext. Math. xi. 187, and Suid. Διαλεκτική.) οὐδετέρων being probably used, because dialectic deals not only with judgments, but with conceptions and interrogations. Conf. Diog. 68.

This is the meaning of the Stoic distinction between λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικὸς, a distinction subsequently employed by Philo and the Fathers, and really identical with that of Aristotle (Anal. Post i. 10, 76 b, 24): οὐ πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. On this distinction see Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 72, p. 142: διπλοῦς ὁ λόγος· τούτων δ’ οἱ φιλόσοφοι (the Stoics are meant) τὸν μὲν ἐνδιάθετον καλοῦσι, τὸν δὲ προφορικόν. ὁ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἔνδον λογισμῶν ἐστιν ἐξάγγελος, ὁ δ’ ὑπὸ τοῖς στέρνοις καθεῖρκται. φασὶ δὲ τούτῳ χρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ θεῖον. Sext. Math. viii. 275 (conf. Pyrrh. i. 76): οἱ δὲ Δογματικοὶ ... φασὶν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος οὐχὶ τῷ προφορικῷ λόγῳ διαφέρει τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ... ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ. The Stoics alone can be meant by the νεώτεροι in Theo. Smyrn. Mus. c. 18, who are contrasted with the Peripatetics for using the terms λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός. They are also referred to by Plut. C. Prin. Phil. 2, 1, p. 777: τὸ δὲ λέγειν, ὅτι δύο λόγοι εἰσὶν, ὁ μὲν ἐνδιάθετος, ἡγεμόνος Ἑρμοῦ δῶρον, ὁ δ’ ἐν προφορᾷ, διάκτορος καὶ ὀργανικὸς ἕωλόν ἐστι. The double form of Hermes is explained by Heraclitus as referring to the twofold λόγος—Ἑρμῆς Χθόνιος represents λόγον ἐνδιάθετον, and the heavenly Hermes (διάκτορος) represents the προφορικόν. The distinction passed from the Stoics to others, like Plut. Solert. An. 19, 1, p. 973; Galen, Protrept. i. 1.

Diog. 43: τὴν διαλεκτικὴν διαιρεῖσθαι εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν σημαινομένων καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπον. Ibid. 62: τυγχάνει δ’ αὕτη, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππός φησι, περὶ σημαίνοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα. Seneca l.c.: διαλεκτικὴ in duas partes dividitur, in verba et significationes, i.e. in res, quæ dicuntur, et vocabula, quibus dicuntur. The distinction between τὸ σημαῖνον and τὸ σημαινόμενον, to which τὸ τυγχάνον (the real object) must be added as a third, will be hereafter discussed in another place. A much narrower conception of dialectic, and more nearly approaching to that of the Peripatetics, is to be found in the definition given by Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 213. The division there given is also found in the Platonist Alcinous, Isag. c. 3, as Fabricius has pointed out. It appears, therefore, not to belong to the Stoic School, but, at most, to a few of its later members.

Seneca continues: Ingens deinde sequitur utriusque divisio, without, however, giving it.

There is much which is open to doubt in Petersen’s attempt (Phil. Chrys. Fund. 221) to settle these divisions. At the very beginning, his reference of the words in Sext. Math. viii. 11 to the parts of logic is unhappy. Nicolai (De Logic. Chrys. Lib. 21) has acted with greater caution, but even much of what he says is doubtful.

Diog. 55.

Diog. 44: εἶναι δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἴδιον τόπον καὶ τὸν προειρημένον περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς, ἐν ᾧ δείκνυται ἡ ἐγγράμματος φωνὴ καὶ τίνα τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, καὶ περὶ σολοικισμοῦ καὶ βαρβαρισμοῦ καὶ ποιημάτων καὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμμελοῦς φωνῆς καὶ περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ περὶ ὅρων κατά τινας καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ λέξεων. The theory of the determination and division of conceptions occupies such an important place in the section περὶ φωνῆς, that we might feel disposed to suppose some mistake in the authority. Still, from the later authorities, pp. 60–62, it is seen that by many it is usually so represented.

Further particulars may be obtained in Schmidt’s Stoicorum Grammatica (Halle, 1839); Lersch, Sprachphilosophie der Alten; Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft, i. 265–363; Nicolai, De Log. Chrys. Lib. 31. This part of dialectic began with enquiries into the voice and speech. Voice is defined to be sound and speech, to be air in motion, or something hearable—ἀὴρ πεπληγμένος ἢ τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς; the human voice as ἔναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διάνοιας ἐκπεμπομένη, is distinguished from the sounds of other animals, which are ἀὴρ ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς πεπληγμένος (Diog. 55; Simpl. Phys. 97; Sext. Math. vi. 39; Gell. N. A. vi. 15, 6). That the voice is something material is proved in various ways (Diog. 55; Plut. Plac. iv. 20, 2; Galen, Hist. Phil. 27). The voice, in as far as it is ἔναρθρος, or composed of letters, is called λέξις; in as far as it expresses certain notions, it is λόγος (Diog. 56; Sext. Math. i. 155). A peculiar national mode of expression (λέξις κεχαραγμένη ἐθνικῶς τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῶς ἢ λέξις ποταπὴ) was called διάλεκτος (Diog. 56). The elements of λέξις are the 24 letters, divided into 7 φωνήεντα, 6 ἄφωνα, and 11 semivowels (Diog. 57); the λόγος has 5 parts, called στοιχεῖα by Chrysippus—ὄνομα, προσηγορία, ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον—to which Antipater added the μεσότης, or adverb (Diog. 57; Galen, De Hippocrat. et Plat. viii. 3; Lersch, ii. 28; Steinthal, 291). Words were not formed by caprice, but certain peculiarities of things have been imitated in the chief sounds of which they are composed. These peculiarities can therefore be discovered by etymological analysis (Orig. c. Cels. i. 24; Augustin. Dialect. c. 6; Opp. T. I. Ap. 17, c.). (Chrysippus, however, observes (in Varro, L. Lat. ix. 1) that the same things bear different names, and vice versâ, and (in Gell. N. A. xi. 12, 1) that every word has several meanings.) See Simpl. Cat. 8, ζ. Five advantages and two disadvantages of speech are enumerated Diog. 59; Sext. Math. i. 210; and poetry (Diog. 60), various kinds of amphibolia (Diog. 62; Galen, De Soph. P. Dict. c. 4), the formation of conceptions, and division, are treated of.

Diog. vii. 54.

The statements of Zeno and Cleanthes, for instance, in reference to φαντασία, prove that these Stoics deduced their theory of knowledge from general principles respecting notions. They therefore started from the data supplied by the senses. A passage in Zeno, explaining the relations of various forms of knowledge, shows that even Zeno required progress to be from perception to conception and knowledge, and that he distinguished these states only by the varying strength of conviction which they produced.

Plut. Plac. iv. 12. Diog. vii. 50. Nemes. Nat. Hom. 76. Φαντασία is πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἑαυτό τε καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός, in the same way, it is added, that light shows other things as well as itself; φανταστὸν is τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν φαντασίαν, and therefore πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν δύνηται κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν. Φαντασία is distinguished from φανταστικόν, because no φανταστὸν corresponds to φανταστικόν· it is διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς, πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπ’ οὐδενὸς φανταστοῦ γινόμενον· and the object of such an empty perception is a φάντασμα. Compare also Sext. Math. vii. 241: διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς is called φαντασία τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν. Impressions wholly unfounded, which give the impression of being actual perceptions, are called by Diog. 51, ἐμφάσεις αἱ ὡσανεὶ ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων γινόμεναι. In a wider sense, φαντασία means any kind of notion.

Plut. Plac. iv. 11: οἱ Στωϊκοί φασιν· ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ χάρτης (χάρτην as Galen, H. Phil. 24, vol. xix. reads), ἐνεργῶν εἰς ἀπογραφήν. εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται· πρῶτος δὲ ὁ τῆς ἀπογραφῆς τρόπος ὁ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. See p. 79, 2. Orig. c. Cels. vii. 37, 720, b, says that they taught αἰσθήσει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰ καταλαμβανόμενα καὶ πᾶσαν κατάληψιν ἠρτῆσθαι τῶν αἰσθήσεων.

Plut. Comm. Not. 47: φαντασία τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ. The same in Diog. vii. 45 and 50. That this was also the view of Diogenes appears from what follows.

Sext. Math. vii. 228: Κλεάνθης μὲν γὰρ ἤκουσε τὴν τύπωσιν κατὰ εἰσοχήν τε καὶ ἐξοχὴν ὥσπερ καὶ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων γινομένην τοῦ κηροῦ τύπωσιν. Conf. Ibid. vii. 372; viii. 400.

Sext. vii. 229, continues: Χρύσιππος δὲ ἄτοπον ἡγεῖτο τὸ τοιοῦτον·—according to this view, it would be necessary for the soul to receive at once many different forms, if it had to retain different notions at the same time—αὐτὸς οὖν τὴν τύπωσιν εἰρῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὑπενόει ἀντὶ τῆς ἑτεροιώσεως, ὥστε εἶναι τοιοῦτον τὸν λόγον· φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ψυχῆς. Objection had, however, been raised to this definition, on the ground that not every change of the soul gives rise to a perception, and therefore the Stoics had defined a perception more accurately: φαντασία ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ ὡς ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ, which was equivalent to saying φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ· or else in Zeno’s definition of φαντασία as τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ they had taken ψυχὴ in a restricted sense for τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, which really comes to the same thing. Even this definition had, however, been found too wide, and hence ἑτεροίωσις was limited to change in feeling (ἑτεροίωσις κατὰ πεῖσιν). But the definition is still too wide, as Sextus already remarked; for a perception is not the only feeling of change in the soul. A more accurate definition has already been quoted, 77, 1. The statements in Sext. Math. vii. 372; viii. 400; Diog. vii. 45 and 50; Alex. Aphro. De Anim. 135, b; Boëth. De Interpret, ii. 292 (Schol. in Arist. 100), are in agreement with the above remarks.

Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 19, 2: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητά ἐστι τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ, καὶ τούτοις ἐκποιεῖ λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ πάθη ἐστὶν αἰσθητὰ σὺν τοῖς εἴδεσιν, οἷον λύπη καὶ φόβος καὶ τὸ παραπλήσια, ἀλλὰ καὶ κλοπῆς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἔστιν αἰσθέσθαι· καὶ καθόλου ἀφροσύνης καὶ δειλίας καὶ ἄλλων οὐκ ὀλίγων κακιῶν· οὐδὲ μόνον χαρᾶς καὶ εὐεργεσιῶν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν κατορθώσεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν. This passage must not be understood to mean that the conceptions of good and evil, as such, are objects of sensation (Ritter, iii. 558). The only objects of that kind are individual moral states and activities. The general conceptions derived from them are, according to the Stoic theory of knowledge, only obtained by a process of abstraction.

Plut. Plac. iv. 11, 2: αἰσθανόμενοι γάρ τινος οἷον λευκοῦ ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ μνήμην ἔχουσιν, ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλαὶ μνήμαι γένωντα τότε φασὶν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν.

Diog. vii. 52: ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἰσθήσει μὲν, ὡς λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων καὶ τραχέων καὶ λείων· λόγῳ δὲ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους· τῶν γὰρ νοουμένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ περίπτωσιν (immediate contact) ἐνοήθη, τὰ δὲ καθ’ ὁμοιότητα, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετάθεσιν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ σύνθεσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἐναντίωσιν ... νοεῖται δὲ καὶ κατὰ μετάβασιν (transition from the sensuous to the super-sensuous) τινὰ, ὡς τὰ λεκτὰ καὶ ὁ τόπος. Cic. Acad. i. 11, 42: Comprehensio [= κατάληψις] facta sensibus et vera illi [Zenoni] et fidelis videbatur: non quod omnia, quæ essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret, quodque natura quasi normam scientiæ et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur. Ibid. Fin. iii. 10, 33: Cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu (experience) aliquid cognitum sit, aut conjunctione, aut similitudine, aut collatione rationis: hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni notitia facta est. Sext. (Math. iii. 40; ix. 393) also agrees with the Stoic doctrine of the origin of conceptions, in saying that all our ideas arise either κατ’ ἐμπέλασιν τῶν ἐναργῶν or κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν (cf. Diog. vii. 53), and in the latter case either by comparison, or actual combination, or analogy.

Diog. l.c. Compare the passage quoted from Seneca, 81, 2.

Plut. Plac. iv. 11: τῶν δ’ ἐννοιῶν αἱ μὲν φυσικαὶ γίνονται κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους (according to the context, this must mean by memory and experience, but perhaps the author of the Placita has been careless in his extracts here) καὶ ἀνεπιτεχνήτως· αἱ δ’ ἤδη δι’ ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας· αὗται μὲν οὖν ἔννοιαι καλοῦνται μόναι, ἐκεῖναι δὲ καὶ προλήψεις. Diog. vii. 51: [τῶν φαντασιῶν] αἱ μέν εἰσι τεχνικαὶ, αἱ δὲ ἄτεχνοι.

Plut. Plac. iv. 11: ὁ δὲ λόγος καθ’ ὃν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικοὶ ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα (the first seven years of life). Comm. Not. 3, 1, says that to the Stoics belonged τὸ παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας καὶ τὰς προλήψεις τὰς κοινὰς φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀφ’ ὧν μάλιστα τὴν αἵρεσιν ... καὶ μόνην ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει λέγουσιν. Sen. Epist. 117, 6: multum dare solemus præsumtioni (πρόληψις) omnium hominum; apud nos argumentum veritatis est, aliquid omnibus videri. Frequent instances will occur of appeals to communes notitiæ and consensus gentium.

Diog. vii. 53: φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν. 54: ἔστι δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. In the same strain Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 17) speaks of ἔμφυτοι προλήψεις of good and evil. In Plut. Frag. De Anim. vii. 6, T. V. 487 Wytt., the question is asked, How is it possible to learn what is not already known? The Stoics reply, By means of φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι.

Compare Cic. Fin. iii. 10: hoc quarto [collatione rationis] boni notitia facta est; cum enim ab iis rebus, quæ sunt secundum naturam, adscendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notitiam boni pervenit. Similarly Sen. Ep. 120, 4, replying to the question, Quomodo ad nos prima boni honestique notitia pervenerit? observes, Hoc nos natura docere non potuit: semina nobis scientiæ dedit, scientiam non dedit ... nobis videtur observatio collegisse [speciem virtutis], et rerum sæpe factarum inter se collatio: per analogiam nostri intellectum et honestum et bonum judicant. The notion of mental health and strength has grown out of corresponding bodily notions; the contemplation of virtuous actions and persons has given rise to the conception of moral perfection, the good points being improved upon, and defects being passed over, the experience of certain faults which resemble virtues serving to make the distinction plainer. Even belief in a God was produced, according to Diog. vii. 52, by ἀπόδειξις. See p. 80, 1. Conf. Stob. Ecl. i. 792: οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ λέγουσι μὲν εὐθὺς ἐμφύεσθαι τὸν λόγον, ὕστερον δὲ συναθροίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ φαντασιῶν περὶ δεκατέσσαρα ἔτη.

Stob. Ecl. ii. 128: εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τοιούτων, οἷον ἡ τῶν κατὰ μέρος λογικὴ ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ ὑπάρχουσα· ἄλλην δὲ σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τεχνικῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔχον τὸ βέβαιον ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἀρεταί· ἄλλην δὲ (knowledge in a relative sense) ἕξιν φαντασιῶν δεκτικὴν ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου, ἥντινά φασιν ἐν τόνῳ καὶ δυνάμει (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) κεῖσθαι. Diog. vii. 47: αὐτήν τε τὴν ἐπιστήμην φασὶν ἢ κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ ἢ ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. (This explanation, which Herillus used according to Diog. vii. 165, certainly belongs to Zeno.) οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας τὸν σοφὸν ἄπτωτον ἔσεσθαι ἐν λόγῳ.

See p. 80, 4.

This was the object of Plutarch’s treatise περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν. In the same way, the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in Euseb. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 10) throws it in the teeth of Chrysippus that, whilst appealing to generally received opinions, he is always going contrary to them, and that he considers all men, with one or two exceptions, to be fools and madmen.

Diog. 52: ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἰσθήσει μὲν λευκῶν, κ.τ.λ. λόγῳ δὲ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.

Sext. Math. viii. 10: οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς λέγουσι μὲν τῶν τε αἰσθητῶν τινα καὶ τῶν νοητῶν ἀληθῆ, οὐκ ἐξ εὐθείας δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἀναφορὰν τὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ παρακείμενα τούτοις νοητά.

Sext. l.c. continues: ἀληθὲς γάρ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς τὸ ὑπάρχον καὶ ἀντικείμενόν τινι, καὶ ψεῦδος τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον καὶ μὴ (this μὴ is obviously redundant as appears from Math. viii. 85, 88; xi. 220, where the same definition is given without the μὴ) ἀντικείμενόν τινι, ὅπερ ἀσώματον ἀξίωμα καθεστὼς νοητὸν εἶναι· every sentence containing an assertion or negative, and therefore being opposed to every other. Ibid. viii. 70: ἠξίουν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ κοινῶς ἐν λεκτῷ τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος· λεκτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν φασὶ τὸ κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον· λογικὴν δὲ εἶναι φαντασίαν καθ’ ἣν τὸ φαντασθὲν ἔστι λόγῳ παραστῆσαι. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ἐλλιπῆ καλοῦσι τὰ δὲ αὐτοτελῆ (conceptions and propositions; conf. Diog. vii. 63) ... προσαγορεύουσι δέ τινα τῶν αὐτοτελῶν καὶ ἀξιώματα, ἅπερ λέγοντες ἤτοι ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα. Ibid. 74; Diog. vii. 65: ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστιν, ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος (see Cic. Tusc. I. 7, 14) ἢ πρᾶγμα (better λεκτὸν as Gell. N. A. xvi, 8, 4 reads) αὐτοτελὲς ἀποφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῴ· ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππός φησιν ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅροις. Aristotle had already observed that the distinction between false and true first appears in judgment. See Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 156, 2; 157, 1.

Sext. Math. vii. 93; ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος, ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου. Conf. Plato, Rep. vi. 508, B.

See Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 231.

Ibid. ii. a, 211.

Diog. 61: ἐννόημα (object of thought) δέ ἐστι φάντασμα διανοίας. οὔτε τί ὂν οὔτε ποιὸν, ὡσανεὶ δὲ τί ὂν καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιόν. Stob. Ecl. i. 332: τὰ ἐννοήματά φησι μήτι τινὰ εἶναι μήτι ποιὰ, ὡσανεὶ δὲ τινὰ καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιὰ φαντάσματα ψυχῆς· ταῦτα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἰδέας προσαγορεύεσθαι ... ταῦτα [ταύτας] δὲ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ φιλόσοφοι φασὶν ἀνυπάρκτους εἶναι, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐννοημάτων μετέχειν ἡμᾶς, τῶν δὲ πτώσεων, ἃς δὴ προσηγορίας καλοῦσι, τυγχάνειν. Although defended by Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. I. 420, 63, the last words as they stand do not appear capable of any passable meaning and are most probably corrupt. Plut. Plac. i. 10, 4: οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωϊκοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ἰδέας ἔφασαν. Simpl. Categ. 26, e: Χρύσιππος ἀπορεῖ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας, εἰ τόδε τι ῥηθήσεται. συμπαραληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὴν συνήθειαν τῶν Στωϊκῶν περὶ τῶν γενικῶν ποιῶν πῶς αἱ πτώσεις κατ’ αὐτοὺς προφέρονται καὶ πῶς οὔτινα τὰ κοινὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς λέγεται. Syrian. on Met. p. 59. (In Petersen’s Philos. Chrys. Fund. 80): ὡς ἄρα τὰ εἴδη ... οὔτε πρὸς τὴν ῥῆσιν τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων συνηθείας παρήγετο, ὡς Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀρχέδημος καὶ οἱ πλείους τῶν Στωϊκῶν ὕστερον ᾠήθησαν ... οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ νοήματά εἰσι παρ’ αὐτοῖς αἱ ἰδέαι, ὡς Κλεάνθης ὕστερον εἴρηκε. Prantl, l.c. takes objection to what Stobæus and Plutarch here say; yet this view is not that the Stoics regarded their conception of the ἐννόημα as identical with Plato’s conception of ideas, but that they asserted that these ideas were only ἐννοήματα—an assertion which had also been made by Antisthenes. Compare what is said on p. 92 respecting the unreality of the λεκτόν, likewise what Sext. Math. vii. 246, quotes, as belonging to the Stoics: οὔτε δὲ ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς εἰσιν αἱ γενικαὶ [φαντασίαι]· ὧν γὰρ τὰ εἴδη τοῖα ἢ τοῖα τούτων τὰ γένη οὔτε τοῖα οὔτε τοῖα· if mankind be divided into Greeks and barbarians, the γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος will be neither one nor the other. The further therefore a conception is removed from individual limitations, the further it is removed from truth.

Diog. vii. 54: ἔστι δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. Exc. e Joan. Damasc. (Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 236), Nr. 34: Χρύσιππος τὸ μὲν γενικὸν ἡδὺ νοητὸν, τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν καὶ προσπίπτον ἤδη (Petersen, 83 without cause suggests ἡδὺ) αἰσθητόν.

See p. 82, 1.

Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 145.

Stob. Ecl. ii. 128: Knowledge is defined to be ἕξις φαντασιῶν δεκτικὴ ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου, ἥντινά φασιν ἐν τόνῳ καὶ δυνάμει κεῖσθαι.

Here may be noted the objection mentioned by Sext. Math. viii. 463; Pyrrh. ii. 186: The Sceptics cannot deny the possibility of arguing without proving their assertion and thereby practically admitting the possibility. Also another one urged by Antipater against Carneades (Cic. Acad. ii. 9, 28; 34, 109): He who asserts that nothing can be known with certainty must, at least, believe that he can with certainty know this. The replies of the Sceptics to these objections, and the way they turned them in their own favour, will be found in Sext. Math. l.c. and vii. 433.

Chrysippus opposed Arcesilaus, with such success, according to the view of the Stoic School, that Carneades was refuted by anticipation; and it was considered a special favour of Providence that the labours of Chrysippus had occupied an intermediate place between two of the most important Sceptics. Plut. Sto. Rep. i. 4, p. 1059. Diog. 198 mentions a treatise against Arcesilaus.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 10 (see p. 66, 1); Ibid. 47, 12: καὶ μὴν ἔν γε τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς ἀγῶσιν ὁ πλεῖστος αὐτῷ τε Χρυσίππῳ καὶ Ἀντιπάτρῳ πόνος γέγονε περὶ τοῦ μήτε πράττειν μήτε ὁρμᾶν ἀσυγκαταθέτως, ἀλλὰ πλάσματα λέγειν καὶ κενὰς ὑποθέσεις τοῦς ἀξιοῦντας οἰκείας φαντασίας γενομένης εὐθὺς ὁρμᾶν μὴ εἴξαντας μηδὲ συγκατατιθεμένους. Ibid. adv. Col. 26, 3, p. 1122: τὴν δὲ περὶ πάντων ἐποχὴν οὐδ’ οἱ πολλὰ πραγματευσάμενοι καὶ κατατείναντες εἰς τοῦτο συγγράμματα καὶ λόγους ἐκίνησαν· ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς αὐτῆς τελευτῶντες ὥσπερ Γοργόνα τὴν ἀπραξίαν ἐπάγοντες ἀπηγόρευσαν. Epict. (Arrian. Diss. i. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a Sceptic by saying: οὐκ ἄγω σχολὴν πρὸς ταῦτα. Following also the Stoic line, Cic. Acad. ii. 10–12, makes Antiochus argue that Scepticism makes all action impossible.

In Sext. Math. vii. 244, ἀληθεῖς φαντασίαι are, first of all, literally explained to be φαντασίαι, ὧν ἔστιν ἀληθῆ κατηγορίαν ποιήσασθαι· then, under the head of true φαντασίαι, the καταληπτικαὶ and οὐ καταληπτικαὶ are distinguished, i.e., notions which are accompanied by a clear impression of being true, and such as are not; and, in conclusion, φαντασία καταληπτικὴ is defined: ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος. This definition is afterwards more fully explained. The same explanation is given Ibid. 402 and 426; viii. 85; Pyrrh. ii. 4; iii. 242; Augustin. c. Acad. ii. 5, 11; Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 18. Diog. vii. 46: τῆς δὲ φαντασίας τὴν μὲν καταληπτικὴν τὴν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον· καταληπτικὴν μὲν, ἣν κριτήριον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων φασὶ, τὴν γινομένην ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὕπαρχον ἐναπεσφραγισμένην καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην· ἀκατάληπτον δὲ τὴν μὴ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν, μὴ κατ’ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον, τὴν μὴ τρανῆ μηδὲ ἔκτυπον. Ibid. 50.

Sext. Math. viii. 397: ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὡς ἔστι παρ’ αὐτῶν ἀκούειν, καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις, ἥτις διπλοῦν ἔοικεν εἶναι πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ μέν τι ἔχειν ἀκούσιον, τὸ δὲ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ κρίσει κείμενον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φαντασιωθῆναι ἀβούλητον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ πάσχοντι ἔκειτο ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῷ φαντασιοῦντι τὸ οὑτωσὶ διατεθῆναι ... τὸ δὲ συγκαταθέσθαι τούτῳ τῷ κινήματι ἔκειτο ἐπὶ τῷ παραδεχομένῳ τὴν φαντασίαν. Diog. vii. 51; Cic. Acad. i. 14, 40: ad hæc quæ visa sunt, et quasi accepta sensibus assensionem adjungit animorum: quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam. Ibid. ii. 12, 37; De Fato, 19, 43, Chrysippus affirms: visum objectum imprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem sed assensio nostra erit in potestate. Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 1: τὴν γὰρ φαντασίαν βουλόμενος [ὁ Χρύσιππος] οὐκ οὖσαν αὐτοτελῆ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως αἰτίαν ἀποδεικνύειν εἴρηκεν ὅτι· βλάψουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ ψευδεῖς φαντασίας ἐμποιοῦντες, ἂν αἱ φαντασίαι ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, κ.τ.λ. Id. 13: αὖθις δέ φησι Χρύσιππος, καὶ τὸν θεὸν ψευδεῖς ἐμποιεῖν φαντασίας καὶ τὸν σοφὸν ... ἡμᾶς δὲ φαύλους ὄντας συγκατατίθεσθαι ταῖς τοιαύταις φαντασίαις. Id. Fragm. De An. 2: οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ τρέπει ἑαυτὴν εἰς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων κατάληψιν καὶ ἀπάτην, κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς. Epictet. in Gell. N. A. xix. 1, 15: visa animi, quas φαντασίας philosophi appellant ... non voluntatis sunt neque arbitrariæ, sed vi quadam sua inferunt sese hominibus noscitandæ; probationes autem, quas συγκαταθέσεις vocant, quibus eadem visa noscuntur ac dijudicantur voluntariæ sunt fiuntque hominum arbitratu: the difference between a wise man and a fool consists in συγκατατίθεσθαι and προσεπιδοξάζειν. The freedom of approbation must, of course, be so understood in harmony with Stoic doctrine of the freedom of the will.

On the difference between the conception of εὔλογον and that of καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, the latter alone being unerring, see Athen. viii. 354, e; Diog. vii. 177.

Compare besides p. 87, 2, Cic. Acad. i. 11, 41: visis (= φαντασίαις) non omnibus adjungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quæ propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum, quæ viderentur: id autem visum, cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehensibile (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία). Ibid. ii. 12, 38: ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere ... non potest objectam rem perspicuam non approbare. Conf. Fin. v. 26, 76: percipiendi vis ita definitur a Stoicis, ut negent quidquam posse percipi nisi tale rerum, quale falsum esse non possit. Diog. vii. 54; Sext. Math. vii. 227: κριτήριον τοίνον φασὶν ἀληθείας εἶναι οἱ ἄνδρες οὗτοι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. It was a departure from the older Stoic teaching, to refuse, as the later Stoics did, to allow a conceptional notion to be considered a test of truth, except with the proviso that no contrary proof could be adduced against its truth. Sext. 253: ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν Στωϊκῶν κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν καταληπτικὴν ταύτην φαντασίαν· οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι προσετίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἔνστημα, since cases could be imagined in which a faulty view presented itself with the full force of truth. This was equivalent to overthrowing the whole doctrine of a criterion; for how could it be known in any particular case that there was not a negative instance? But it is quite in harmony with the Stoic teaching for a later Stoic (Ibid. 257) to say of conceptional perception: αὕτη γὰρ ἐναργὴς οὖσα καὶ πληκτικὴ μονονουχὶ τῶν τριχῶν, φασι, λαμβάνεται κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ἄλλου μηδενὸς δεομένη εἰς τὸ τοιαύτῃ προσπίπτειν, κ.τ.λ. Hence Simpl. Phys. 20, b: ἀνῄρουν τὰ ἄλλα ... πλὴν τὰ ἐναργῆ.

Diog. vii. 54: κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τυγχάνειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τουτέστι τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δωδεκάτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Βοηθὸς κριτήρια πλείονα ἀπολείπει, νοῦν καὶ αἴσθησιν καὶ ὄρεξιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην (this looks like an approximation to the teaching of the Peripatetics); ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ λόγου κριτήριά φησιν εἶναι αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν ... ἄλλοι δέ τινες τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων Στωϊκῶν τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κριτήριον ἀπολείπουσιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ περὶ κριτηρίου φησίν. See above p. 76.

See above p. 82, 1.

See above p. 89, 2, and Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 101: neque eos (the Academicians) contra sensus aliter dicimus, ac Stoici, qui multa falsa esse dicunt, longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur. Chrysippus had enquired into the truth of the perceptions of the senses, and of the notions derived from them, in his treatise περὶ συνηθείας, without, however, satisfactorily answering the objections which he quoted against the theory. See p. 46, 2.

See p. 60.

See p. 73, 3.

See Sext. Math. viii. 11: οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τρία φάμενοι συζυγεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τό τε σημαινόμενον καὶ τὸ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον. ὧν σημαῖνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν φωνὴν ... σημαινόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς δηλούμενον ... τυγχάνον δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον ... τούτων δὲ δύο μὲν εἶναι σώματα, καθάπερ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ἓν δὲ ἀσώματον, ὥσπερ τὸ σημαινόμενον πρᾶγμα καὶ λεκτόν. Sen. Ep. 117, 13, giving it expressly as the teaching of the Stoics, not as his own: Sunt, inquit, naturæ corporum ... has deinde sequuntur motus animorum enuntiativi corporum—for instance, I see Cato walk—corpus est, quod video.... Dico deinde: Cato ambulat. Non corpus est, inquit, quod nunc loquor, sed enuntiativum quiddam de corpore, quod alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii edoctum. Compare also on the λεκτόν Sext. Math. viii. 70 (above p. 83, 2); Pyrrh. iii. 52. Various arguments are used by the Stoics to prove that the voice as opposed to utterance (λεκτὸν) is material, as has been said. p. 74, 5. Illustrative of the distinction between utterance and the process of thought is the assertion (in Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 81) that certainty as being a definite condition of the soul is material, but that truth itself is not material: λέγεται διαφέρειν τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ ἀληθὲς τριχῶς, οὐσίᾳ, συστάσει, δυνάμει· οὐσίᾳ μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἀσώματόν ἐστιν, ἀξίωμα γάρ ἐστι καὶ λεκτὸν, ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια σῶμα, ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικὴ, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη πὼς ἔχον ἡγεμονικόν (Id. Math. vii. 38, a similar statement is expressly attributed to a Stoic); likewise a similar statement which Sen. Ep. 117, discusses, and at length declares to be a mere quibble, but not till after a lengthy refutation: sapientiam bonum esse, sapere bonum non esse. The statement rests on the assertion that nothing can be a good which does not make itself felt, and nothing can make itself felt which is not material; wisdom is material, because it is mens perfecta, but sapere is incorporale et accidens alteri, i.e. sapientiæ. Accordingly, λεκτὸν (as Ammon. De Inter. 15, b, remarks) is a μέσον τοῦ τε νοήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος· if, however, νόημα be taken to express the thought itself, and not the process of thinking, it becomes identical with λεκτόν. Conf. Simpl. Cat. 3, α, Basil.: τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα καὶ λεκτὰ τὰ νοήματά ἐστιν, ὡς καὶ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἐδόκει. In Plut. Plac. iv. 11, 4, a definition of νόημα or ἐννόημα is given similar to that of λεκτὸν in Sext. Math. viii. 70: φάντασμα διανοίας λογικοῦ ζῴου. See above p. 84, 4. The statement, however, of Philop. Anal. Pr. lx. a, Schol. in Ar. 170, a, 2, cannot be true, that the Stoics called things τυγχάνοντα, thoughts ἐκφορικὰ, and sounds λεκτά, whereas ἐκφορικὸν may be used of thoughts in the same sense as λεκτόν.

See p. 84, 4. This question was raised in the Stoic School itself. Sextus at least, not hesitating to attack the Stoic teaching from this side (Math. viii. 262), speaks of an ἀνήνυτος μάχη in reference to the ὕπαρξις of λεκτὰ, and he remarks (viii. 258): ὁρῶμεν δὲ ὡς εἰσί τινες οἱ ἀνῃρηκότες τὴν ὕπαρξιν τῶν λεκτῶν, καὶ οὐχ οἱ ἑτερόδοξοι μόνον, οἷον οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Βασιλείδην, οἷς ἔδοξε μηδὲν εἶναι ἀσώματον. Probably the question was first raised by later Stoics, when pressed by their opponents. Basilides was the teacher of Marcus Aurelius. Otherwise the existence of λεκτὰ was spoken of as quite natural.

Sext. Math. viii. 70, see above p. 83, 2: τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ἐλλιπῆ καλοῦσι τὰ δὲ αὐτοτελῆ. Various kinds of propositions are then enumerated as being αὐτοτελῆ. Following the same authority, (Diocles? see Diog. 48) Diog. 63, says: φασὶ δὲ τὸ λεκτὸν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν λογικὴν ὑφιστάμενον. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν λέγουσιν εἶναι αὐτοτελῆ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, τὰ δὲ ἐλλιπῆ. ἐλλιπῆ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὰ ἀναπάρτιστον ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφορὰν, οἷον Γράφει· ἐπιζητοῦμεν γὰρ, Τίς; αὐτοτελῆ δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπηρτισμένην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφορὰν, οἷον Γράφει Σωκράτης. Prantl in saying, p. 438, that the Stoics divide judgments (ἀξιώματα) into complete and incomplete, is inaccurate. Only λεκτὰ are so divided, but λεκτὸν has a wider meaning than that of a logical judgment. ἀξιώματα are only one form of λεκτὰ αὐτοτελῆ.

Plut. Qu. Plat. x. 1, 2, p. 1008. A judgment (πρότασις or ἀξίωμα) ἐξ ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος συνέστηκεν, ὧν τὸ μὲν πτῶσιν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ, τὸ δὲ κατηγόρημα καλοῦσιν. The terms πτῶσις and κατηγόρημα belonging to the Stoic terminology, the Stoics must be meant by οἱ διαλεκτικοί. In the first class of words they distinguish ὄνομα and προσηγορία, limiting ὄνομα to proper names, and understanding by προσηγορία all general terms, whether substantives or adjectives (Diog. 58; Bekker’s Anecd. ii. 842). According to Stob. Ecl. i. 332, πτῶσις was only used to express προσηγορία. Diog. 192, mentions two books of Chrysippus περὶ τῶν προσηγορικῶν. For the meaning of κατηγόρημα or ῥῆμα, the verb, consult Diog. 58 and 64; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14; Cic. Tusc. iv. 9, 21; Porphyr. in Ammon. De Inter. 37, a. According to Apollon. De Construct. i. 8, ῥῆμα was used in strict accuracy only for the infinitive, other forms being called κατηγορήματα.

The distinction between ὄνομα and κατηγόρημα was somewhat bluntly referred to this logical and metaphysical antithesis by the Stoics, as may be seen in Stob. Ecl. i. 336: αἴτιον δ’ ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι’ ὃ, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον συμβεβηκός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον κατηγόρημα.... Ποσειδώνιος ... τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὂν καὶ σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον οὔτε ὂν οὔτε σῶμα, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ κατηγόρημα. Hence for the latter the names σύμβαμα and παρασύμβαμα. See following note.

In nouns the cases were distinguished, the nominative, according to Ammon. l.c. being called ὄνομα, and the other five cases πτώσεις· a statement, however, which does not agree with the common use of those terms. In Diog. 65, the cases (γενικὴ, δοτικὴ, αἰτιατικὴ) are called πλάγιαι πτώσεις. Chrysippus wrote a distinct treatise on the five cases, Diog. 192. Similar were the divisions of the κατηγόρημα. According to Diog. 65, the Stoics distinguished between transitive verbs (ὀρθὰ), such as ὁρᾷ, διαλέγεται· passive verbs (ὕπτια), such as ὁρῶμαι· neuter verbs (οὐδέτερα), such as φρονεῖν, περιπατεῖν· and verbs which, with a passive form, do not express a passive relation (ἀντιπεπονθότα), κείρεσθαι, πείθεσθαι, &c. Consult on this point Philo, De Cherub. 121, c; Orig. C. Cels. vi. 57. On the ὀρθὰ and ὕπτια, also Dionys. Thrax, § 15, p. 886, Bekk.; Simpl. Categ. 79, α, ζ; Diog. 191; and respecting all three divisions, Lersch, ii. 196; Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachw. i. 294. They also distinguished between σύμβαμα and παρασύμβαμα—a verb, when used with a nominative, being called σύμβαμα or κατηγόρημα, and παρασύμβαμα when used with an oblique case; περιπατεῖ is a σύμβαμα, μεταμέλει a παρασύμβαμα, περιπατεῖ requiring a nominative (Σωκράτης), μεταμέλει requiring a dative (Σωκράτει). If an oblique case is necessary to complete a sentence, besides the subject, the verb is called ἔλαττον ἢ σύμβαμα or ἔλαττον ἢ κατηγόρημα, as in the sentence Πλάτων φιλεῖ, φιλεῖ is so called; for these words only make a complete sentence by the addition of an object thus: Πλάτων φιλεῖ Δίωνα. If this is necessary with a παρασύμβαμα, it is called ἔλαττον ἢ παρασύμβαμα· such, for instance, is the word μέλει, for to complete the sentence it is not enough to say Σωκράτει μέλει, but the object must be added, as in the sentence: Σωκράτει μεταμέλει Ἀλκιβιάδους. This difference is explained by Porphyr. in Ammon. l.c., 36, b, whom Lersch, ii. 31, misunderstands and then blames. See Diog. 64 where the text is evidently corrupt. Without great temerity we might substitute for the meaningless οἷον τὸ διὰ πέτρας πλεῖν—τὰ δὲ παρασυμβάματα, which at least gives a better meaning than the proposals of R. Schmidt, Sto. Gramm. 66, 91, and Lersch, l.c. 33. Apollon. De Const. iii. 32, p. 299, Bekk.; Suid. σύμβαμα (very inaccurate); Priscian, xviii. p. 1118, who, in his equally inaccurate account, has ἀσυμβάματα. The example which Lucian, Vit. Auct. 21 employs to ridicule the Stoic hair-splitting anent σύμβαμα and παρασύμβαμα proves, of course, nothing.

There is nothing whatever on record which serves to show the position held by the categories. By several, definition and division were treated of most improperly under the head of language.

According to Diog. 60, Bekker, Anecd. ii. 647, ὅρος was defined by Chrysippus as ἰδίου (which must be read in Diog. in place of καὶ) ἀπόδοσις· by Antipater as λόγος κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν (Anecd. ἀνάγκην) ἀπαρτιζόντως ἐκφερόμενος, i.e. a proposition in which the subject and the collective predicates may be interchanged. Ὁρισμὸς gives in detail what ὄνομα gives collectively (Simpl. Categ. 16, β). An imperfect ὅρος is called ὑπογραφή. Instead of the Aristotelian τί ἦν εἶναι, the Stoics were content with the τί ἦν of Antisthenes (Alex. Top. 24, m). Like Prodicus, they laid great stress on distinguishing accurately the conceptions of words of similar meaning, χαρὰ, τέρψις, ἡδονὴ, εὐφροσύνη (Alex. Top. 96). The relation of γένος to εἶδος is also explained: γένος is defined to be the summing up of many thoughts (ἀναφαιρέτων ἐννοημάτων· which might mean thoughts which, as integral parts of a conception, cannot be separated from it; only this explanation would not agree with what follows, according to which one would more likely think of the different species included in the genus. Prantl p. 422 suggests ἀναφορητῶν, which, however, requires explanation); εἶδος as τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ γένους περιεχόμενον (Diog. 60). γενικώτατον is ὃ γένος ὂν γένος οὐκ ἔχει· εἰδικώτατον ὃ εἶδος ὂν εἶδος οὐκ ἔχει (Diog. 61; conf. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 138). As to διαίρεσις, ὑποδιαίρεσις, and ἀντιδιαίρεσις (division into contradictories) nothing new is stated; but μερισμὸς has a special notice (Diog. 61). Lastly, if Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 213 (the previous definition of dialectic is found, as was stated on p. 73, 3, in Alcinous Isag. 3, and he also mentions c. 5 three of the four kinds of division, giving two others instead of the fourth) refers to the Stoics, four kinds of division are enumerated. The reference of the 8 διαιρέσεις mentioned by Prantl, p. 423, on the authority of Bekker’s Anecd. ii. 679 to a Stoic source is much more doubtful. There is little that is new in the Stoic discussion of Opposition, and the same may be said of what Simpl. (Categ. 100, β and δ; 101, ε; 102, β) quotes from Chrysippus (περὶ τῶν κατὰ στέρησιν λεγομένων) on the subject of στέρησις and ἕξις. Conf. Diog. vii. 190.

Petersen, Philos. Chrysipp. Fund. pp. 36–144, is invaluable for its careful collection of authorities, but in its attempt to construct the Stoic system on the categories it indulges in many capricious combinations. Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. i. 217; Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, i. 426. Our authorities for the knowledge of the Stoic doctrine of the categories are besides a few notices in other writers principally Simplicius, on the Categories, and Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 25–30.

The Stoics attack the Aristotelian categories for being too numerous, and endeavour to show that they do not include every kind of expression (as if, rejoined Simplicius, Categ. 5, α, this were the point at all). Compare Simpl. Categ. 5, α; 15, δ; 16, δ, who quotes these as objections raised by Athenodorus and Cornutus, the former of whom lived in the time of Augustus, the latter in the reign of Nero. Observations of these writers on some of the Aristotelian categories are given, Ibid. 47, ζ, 91, α.

That this was intended by Aristotle to be the position of the categories appears by the way in which he introduced them; and also by his observations (Phys. v. 2) on the various kinds of motion—which are based entirely on the view that the categories are coordinate.

It will thus be understood how the ancients could at one time speak of ὂν, at another of τί, as being the highest conception of the Stoics. The former is found in Diog. 61: γενικώτατον δέ ἐστιν ὃ γένος ὂν γένος οὐκ ἔχει, οἷον τὸ ὄν. Sen. Ep. 58, 8: Nunc autem genus illud primum quærimus, ex quo ceteræ species suspensæ sunt, a quo nascitur omnis divisio, quo universa comprehensa sunt; after noticing the distinction between what is material and what is immaterial, he proceeds: quid ergo erit, ex quo hæc deducantur? illud ... quod est [τὸ ὂν] ... quod est aut corporale est aut incorporale. Hoc ergo genus est primum et antiquissimum et, ut ita dicam, generale [τὸ γενικώτατον]. It is, however, more usual to find τί. Thus Plotin. Enn. vi. 1, 25: κοινὸν τὶ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἓν γένος λαμβάνουσι. Alex. Aphrod. Top. 155; Schol. 278, b, 20: οὕτω δεικνύοις ἂν ὅτι μὴ καλῶς τὸ τὶ οἱ ἀπὸ στοᾶς γένος τοῦ ὄντος (τὶ as the genus, of which ὂν is a species) τίθενται· εἰ γὰρ τὶ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὂν ... ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοι νομοθετήσαντες αὐτοῖς τὸ ὂν κατὰ σωμάτων μόνων λέγεσθαι διαφεύγοιεν ἂν τὸ ἠπορημένον· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ τὶ γενικώτερον αὐτοῦ φασιν εἶναι κατηγορούμενον οὐ κατὰ σωμάτων μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσωμάτων. Schol. in Arist. 34, b, 11. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 86: τὸ τὶ, ὅπερ φασὶν εἶναι πάντων γενικώτατον. Math. x. 234: The Stoics affirm τῶν τινῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα. Sen. l.c. 13: Stoici volunt superponere huic etiamnunc aliud genus magis principale ... primum genus Stoicis quibusdam videtur quid, for in rerum, inquiunt, natura quædam sunt, quædam non sunt: examples of the latter are centaurs, giants, and similar notions of unreal things. Ritter, iii. 566, remarks, with justice, that the older teaching must have placed the conception of Being at the head; otherwise the objection could not have been raised, that what has not being is thus made an object of thought. Probably the change was made by Chrysippus, although it is not definitely proved by Stob. Ecl. i. 390. Petersen confuses the two views, in thinking (p. 146) that the Stoics divided Something into Being and Not Being, and subdivided Being again into what is material and what is not material. In other respects, too, he confounds the Stoic teaching with the consequences, whereby Plotinus l.c. and Plut. Comm. Not. 30, sought to refute it.

See previous note and p. 92, 2.

The Stoics appear to have regarded them as γενικώτατα or πρῶτα γένη, rather than as categories. Conf. Simpl. Categ. 16, δ (in other places as 51, β; 79, β, he is speaking for himself and not of the Stoic categories); Marc. Aurel. vi. 14; κατηγορία did not suit them so well because of their use of κατηγόρημα. See p. 95, 1.

Simpl. 16, δ: οἱ δέ γε Στωϊκοὶ εἰς ἐλάττονα συστέλλειν ἐξιοῦσι τὸν τῶν πρώτων γενῶν ἀριθμόν ... ποιοῦνται γὰρ τὴν τομὴν εἰς τέσσαρα· εἰς ὑποκείμενα καὶ ποιὰ καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα καὶ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα. Plot. En. vi. 1, 25; Plut. Comm. Not. 44, 6. p. 1083.

Instead of ὑποκείμενον, the Aristotelian category of being, οὐσία, was substituted by some, not only without the School, but also by Posidonius, who in Stob. Ecl. i. 434 distinguishes οὐσία and ποιὸς the change of the one and the other. Similarly his fellow-disciple Mnesarchus.

Porphyr. in Simpl. 12, δ: ἥ τε γὰρ ἄποιος ὕλη ... πρῶτόν ἐστι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σημαινόμενον. Plot. 588, B: ὑποκείμενα μὲν γὰρ πρῶτα τάξαντες καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἄλλων προτάξαντες. Galen, Qu. Qual. S. Incorp. 6, xix. 478: λέγουσι μόνην τὴν πρώτην ὕλην ἀΐδιον τὴν ἄποιον. Compare following note. It would seem to follow, as a matter of course, from the Stoic belief in immaterial properties, see p. 106, 4, that the Stoics also believed in immaterial substances (Petersen, 60); but as such a view would be at variance with their belief that reality only belongs to material things, and is nowhere mentioned by any authority, although obviously inviting the criticism of opponents, it is safer to suppose that they never went so far as to state the belief in words.

Simpl. 44, δ: ἔοικε Στωϊκῇ τινι συνηθείᾳ συνεπέσθαι, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι νομίζων, τὰς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ διαφορὰς ἀνυποστάτους ἡγούμενος. Diog. 150. Stob. Ecl. i. 322 (see below 101, 2) and 324: ἔφησε δὲ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον εἶναι, καθ’ ὅσον οὐδὲν ἀποτεταγμένον ἴδιον ἔχει σχῆμα οὐδὲ ποιότητα κατ’ αὐτήν [καθ’ αὑτὴν]· ἀεὶ δ’ ἔν τινι σχήματι καὶ ποιότητι εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ὕλης, τὴν οὖσαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἐπινοίᾳ μόνον. Simpl. Phys. 50: τὸ ἄποιον σῶμα τὴν πρωτίστην ὕλην εἶναί φασιν. Further particulars on matter hereafter.

Porphyr. in Simpl. Cat. 12, δ: διττόν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐ μόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους. Dexipp. See following note.

Diog. 150: οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην. So thought Zeno and Chrysippus: ὕλη δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἧς ὁτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται. καλεῖται δὲ διχῶς οὐσία τε καὶ ὕλη, ἥ τε τῶν πάντων καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρος. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὅλων οὔτε πλείων οὔτε ἐλάττων γίνεται, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ πλείων καὶ ἐλάττων. Stob. Ecl. i. 322: (Ζήνωνος·) οὐσίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν ἀΐδιον καὶ οὔτε πλείω γιγνομένην οὔτε ἐλάττω, τὰ δὲ μέρη ταύτης οὐκ ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ διαμένειν, ἀλλὰ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ συγχεῖσθαι. The same was held by Chrysippus, according to Stob. Ecl. i. 432, who says: Posidonius held that there were four varieties of change, those κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν (water to air), κατὰ σύγχυσιν (chemical combination), and κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν, the latter also called τὴν ἐξ ὅλων μεταβολήν. τούτων δὲ τὴν κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν γίγνεσθαι (the elements, according to the Stoics, changing into each other) τὰς δὲ ἄλλας τρεῖς περὶ τοὺς ποιοὺς λεγομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας γιγνομένους. ἀκολούθως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις συνβαίνειν. τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν οὔτ’ αὔξεσθαι οὔτε μειοῦσθαι ... ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν (which may be understood, not of individual properties, but of individually determined things) οἷον Δίωνος καὶ Θέωνος, καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ μειώσεις γίγνεσθαι. (These words are explained by Prantl, 432, thus: qualitative determination admits increase or decrease of intensity; but the use of the terms αὔξησις and μείωσις, and indeed the whole context no less than the passage quoted from Diogenes, prove that they refer rather to the increase or diminution of substance in the individual thing.) διὸ καὶ παραμένειν τὴν ἑκάστου ποιότητα ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τῆς ἀναιρέσεως.... ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν δύο μὲν εἶναί φασι τὰ δεκτικὰ μόρια (individual things have two component parts, which are capable of change), τὸ μέν τι κατὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν τὸ δέ τι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποίου. τὸ γὰρ [ἰδίως ποιὸν] ὡς πολλάκις λέγομεν τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι. Porphyr. See previous note. Dexipp. in Cat. 31, 15, Speng.: ὡς ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον διττὸν, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους, ἓν μὲν τὸ λεγόμενον πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον, ὡς ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη ... δεύτερον δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ ποιὸν ὃ κοινῶς ἢ ἰδίως ὑφίσταται, ὑποκείμενον γὰρ καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης. Plut. Comm. Not. 44, 4, p. 1083 (the Stoics assert) ὡς δύο ἡμῶν ἕκαστός ἐστιν ὑποκείμενα, τὸ μὲν οὐσία, τὸ δὲ [ποιόν]. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ῥεῖ καὶ φέρεται, μήτ’ αὐξόμενον μήτε μειούμενον, μήτε ὅλως οἷόν ἐστι διαμένον, τὸ δὲ διαμένει καὶ αὐξάνεται καὶ μειοῦται καὶ πάντα πάσχει τἀναντία θἀτέρῳ συμπεφυκὸς καὶ συνηρμοσμένον καὶ συγκεχυμένον, καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῇ αἰσθήσει μηδαμοῦ παρέχον ἅψασθαι. The latter is the individual thing itself, the former the material thereof, in reference to which Plutarch had just said: τὰ λήμματα συγχωροῦσιν οὗτοι, τὰς [μὲν] ἐν μέρει πάσας οὐσίας ῥεῖν καὶ φέρεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἐξ αὑτῶν μεθείσας, τὰ δὲ ποθὲν ἐπιόντα προσδεχομένας· οἷς δὲ πρόσεισι καὶ ἄπεισιν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ πλήθεσιν, ταῦτα μὴ διαμένειν, ἀλλ’ ἕτερα γίγνεσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις προσόδοις, ἐξαλλαγὴν τῆς οὐσίας λαμβανούσης. That it should be said of this perpetually changing material μήτ’ αὐξόμενον μήτε μειούμενον may appear strange; but the meaning is this: it can only be said of an individual thing that it increases and diminishes in so far as it remains one and the same subject, an ἰδίως ποιὸν during the change; but the material itself, which is ever changing, cannot be regarded as the one identical subject of increase and diminution. This idea is expanded by Alex. Aphro. Quæst. Nat. I. 5.

ποιὸν or ποιότης, and also ποιὸς (sc. λόγος). According to Simpl. 55. α, many Stoics assign a threefold meaning to ποιόν. The first, which is also the most extensive meaning, includes every kind of quality, whether essential or accidental—the πὼς ἔχον as well as the ποιόν. In the second meaning ποιὸν is used to express permanent qualities, including those which are derivative and non-essential—the σχέσεις. In the third and narrowest sense it expresses τοὺς ἀπαρτίζοντας (κατὰ τὴν ἐκφορὰν) καὶ ἐμμόνως ὄντας κατὰ διαφορὰν ποιοὺς, i.e. those qualities which faithfully represent essential attributes in their distinctive features. The substantive ποιότης is only used in the last sense.

Simpl. 57, ε (the passage is fully discussed by Petersen, 85, and Trendelenburg, 223): οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ποιότητος τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων λέγουσι διαφορὰν εἶναι οὐσίας οὐκ ἀποδιαληπτὴν (separable, i.e., from matter) καθ’ ἑαυτὴν, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἓν νόημα καὶ ἰδιότητα [sc. μίαν] ἀπολήγουσαν οὔτε χρόνῳ οὔτε ἰσχύϊ εἰδοποιουμένην, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐξ αὐτῆς τοιουτότητι, καθ’ ἢν ποιοῦ ὑφίσταται γένεσις. In place of ἓν νόημα Petersen, 85, with the approval of Trendelenburg and Prantl (438, 96), reads ἐννόημα. To me, Brandis Schol. 69, a, 32, appears to retain it with reason, the meaning being that ποιότης constitutes no independent unity, but only a unity of conception. Non-essential qualities are by the Stoics excluded from the category of ποιὸν, and reckoned under that of πὼς ἔχον.

The same distinction between what is essential and what is not essential is indicated in the terms ἕξις and σχέσις· ποιότητες, or essential properties, being called essential forms (ἕξεις or ἑκτά); non-essential qualities being called features or varieties (σχέσεις). See Simpl. 54, γ; 55, ε. In determining essential attributes, these, according to Simpl. 61, β (Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 43), are essential, not when they happen to be permanent, but when they spring from the nature of the object to which they belong: τὰς μὲν γὰρ σχέσεις ταῖς ἐπικτήτοις καταστάσεσι χαρακτηρίζεσθαι τὰς δὲ ἕξεις ταῖς ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἐνεργείαις. A more limited meaning, that of local position, is given to σχέσις in Stob. Ecl. i. 410.

The distinction between ἕνωσις and συναφὴ also belongs here. That, the oneness of which depends on an essential quality, is ἡνωμένον· everything else is either συνημμένον or ἐκ διεστώτων. Sext. Math. ix. 78 (also in vii. 102): τῶν τε σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἡνωμένα τὰ δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων· ἡνωμένα μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἕξεως κρατούμενα, καθάπερ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα· συνάφεια applies to chains, houses, ships, &c.; combination ἐκ διεστώτων to flocks and armies. Seneca, Ep. 102, 6, Nat. Qu. ii. 2, says the same. Conf. Alex. De Mixt. 143: ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸ ἓν σῶμα ὑπὸ μιᾶς ὥς φασιν ἕξεως συνελέσθαι [l. συνέχεσθαι]. Simpl. 55, ε: τὰς γὰρ ποιότητας ἑκτὰ λέγοντες οὗτοι [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν ἡνωμένων μόνων ἑκτὰ ἀπολείπουσιν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ συναφὴν, οἷον νεὼς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ διάστασιν, οἷον στρατοῦ, μηδὲν εἶναι ἑκτὸν μηδὲ εὑρίσκεσθαι πνευματικόν τι ἓν ἐπ’ αὐτῶν μηδὲ ἕνα λόγον ἔχον ὥστε ἐπί τινα ὑπόστασιν ἐλθεῖν μιᾶς ἕξεως.

Those ἕξεις which admit of no increase or diminution (ἐπίτασις, and ἄνεσις) are called διαθέσεις or permanent forms. Virtues, for instance, which, according to the Stoics, always exist in a perfect form where they exist at all, are διαθέσεις, but arts are only ἕξεις. Simpl. Categ. 61, β; 72, δ; 73, β; Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28; 76, a, 12, 24; Stob. Ecl. ii. 98 and 128. Conf. Petersen 91. A different view was taken by Aristotle of the relations of these expressions.

Syrian. on Arist. Metaph. 21, p. 90 in Petersen: καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τοὺς κοινοὺς ποιοὺς πρὸ τῶν ἰδίων ποιῶν ἀποτίθενται. Stob. Ecl. i. 434; see above p. 101, 2. Simpl. De An. 61, a, explains ἰδίως ποιὸς by ἀτομωθὲν εἶδος. Diog. vii. 138; Plut. C. Not. 36. 3.

Besides the passages already quoted in note 2 on p. 101, from Plutarch and Stobæus, see Sext. Pyrrh. i. 57: τὰ κιρνάμενα (the intermingling materials,—the question here is the possibility of mingling) ἐξ οὐσίας καὶ ποιοτήτων συγκεῖσθαί φασιν. Porphyry in Simpl. Categ. 12, δ disputes this view himself. The Stoics, therefore, clearly distinguish ἕξις, or essential form, from the subject to which it belongs; and Philo must have been following the Stoics when he said (Nom. Mutat. 1063, D): ἕξεις γὰρ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰς ποιῶν ἀμείνους, ὡς μουσικὴ μουσικοῦ, κ.τ.λ. They also distinguish between a thing and its οὐσία. Stob. Ecl. i. 436: μὴ εἶναί τε τοὐτὸν τό τι ποιὸν ἰδίως καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐξ ἧς ἔστι τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι γε μήδ’ ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ μόνον οὐ ταὐτὸν, διὰ τὸ καὶ μέρος εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχειν τόπον, τὰ δ’ ἕτερα τινῶν λεγόμενα δεῖν καὶ τόπῳ κεχωρίσθαι καὶ μήδ’ ἐν μέρει θεωρεῖσθαι. Conf. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 170; Math. ix. 336: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ οὔτε ἕτερον τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος οὔτε τὸ αὐτό φασιν ὑπάρχειν· and Seneca, Ep. 313, 4. Mnesarchus, a fellow disciple of Posidonius, accordingly compares the relation of an individual thing to its οὐσία with that of a statue to the material of which it is composed. Since the ἰδίως ποιὸς distinguishes a thing from every other, there follows as a matter of course, what is asserted circumstantially and in detail by Chrysippus (in Philo, Incorrupt. M. 951, B), ὅτι δύο εἰδοποιοὺς [= ἰδίως ποιοὺς] ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἀμήχανον συστῆναι.

L.c. 222.

This may be seen from the passages quoted in note 2 on the previous page.

Plut. St. Rep. 43, 4, p. 1054: τὴν ὕλην ἀργὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἀκίνητον ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ἀποφαίνουσι, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας πνεύματα οὔσας καὶ τόνους ἀερώδεις οἷς ἂν ἐγγένωνται μέρεσι τῆς ὕλης εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα καὶ σχηματίζειν. It is a carrying out of the Stoic teaching (as Simpl. 57, ε, remarks) for Plotinus to reduce ποιότης to the class-conception of δύναμις (Enn. vi. 1, 10, 574, β). But the Stoic definition of δύναμις (quoted by Simpl. 58, α—ἡ πλειόνων ἐποιστικὴ συμπτωμάτων, with the additional words καὶ κατακρατοῦσα τῶν ἐνεργειῶν—does not directly refer to ποιότης. Ποιότης may also be connected with the λόγος σπερματικός. See Plotin. i. 29, 593, A: εἰ δὲ τὰ ποιὰ ὕλην ποιὰν λέγοιεν, πρῶτον μὲν οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῖς ἔνυλοι ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν ὕλῃ γενόμενοι σύνθετόν τι ποιήσουσιν ... οὐκ ἄρα αὐτοὶ εἴδη οὐδὲ λόγοι. Diog. vii. 148: ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις [= ποιότης] ἐξ αὐτῆς κινουμένη, κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς, κ.τ.λ.

Plut. Ibid. § 2: (Χρύσιππος) ἐν τοῖς ἕξεων οὐδὲν ἄλλο τὰς ἕξεις πλὴν ἀέρας εἶναί φησιν· ὑπὸ τούτων γὰρ συνέχεται τὰ σώματα, καὶ τοῦ ποιὸν ἕκαστον εἶναι αἴτιος ὁ συνέχων ἀήρ ἐστιν, ὃν σκληρότητα μὲν ἐν σιδήρῳ, πυκνότητα δ’ ἐν λίθῳ, λευκότητα δ’ ἐν ἀργύρῳ καλοῦσιν. Simpl. 69. γ: ἡ τῶν Στωϊκῶν δόξα λεγόντων, σώματα εἶναι τὰ σχήματα ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα ποιά. Ibid. 67, ε; 56, δ: πῶς δὲ καὶ πνευματικὴ ἡ οὐσία ἔσται τῶν σωματικῶν ποιοτήτων αὐτοῦ τοῦ πνεύματος συνθέτου ὄντος, κ.τ.λ.

Alex. Aphr. De An. 143, b: πῶς δὲ σωζόντων ἐστὶ τὴν περὶ κράσεως κοινὴν πρόληψιν τὸ λέγειν καὶ τὴν ἕξιν τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν μεμίχθαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ τὸ φῶς τῷ ἀέρι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι. Ibid. 144, α, the saying is quoted against the Stoics: μεμίχθαι τῇ ὕλῃ τὸν θεόν.

Plut. C. Not. 36, 3: λέγουσιν οὗτοι καὶ πλάττουσιν ἐπὶ μιᾶς οὐσίας δύο ἰδίως γενέσθαι ποίους (this follows from their hypothesis, but it is distinctly denied by Chrysippus in thesis. See p. 104, 2) καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἕνα ποιὸν ἰδίως ἔχουσαν ἐπιόντος ἑτέρου δέχεσθαι καὶ διαφυλάττειν ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρους.

Simpl. 70, ε: καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ ποιότητας ποιοτήτων ποιοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν (? ἑκτῶν) ποιοῦντες ἑκτὰς ἕξεις [l. ἑκτὰ καὶ ἕξεις or ἕξεις only]. The context shows that the meaning of these words is that given above. The conception of a property is compounded of several attributes, and, therefore, a property of several subordinate properties. If λευκὸν is a χρῶμα, the διακριτικὸν ὄψεως is the ἕξις, or form of λευκὸν.

This follows of necessity, quite independently of the above-quoted language of Alexander, from the Stoic doctrine of the material nature of properties and of the mingling of materials. For if that intermingling of materials in which each one retains its properties (μῖξις and κρᾶσις in contrast to chemical combination παράθεσις and σύγχυσις) is defined to be the complete interpenetration of one material by another, without passing into a third (Stob. Ecl. i. 376; Alex. De Mixt. 142, a; Plut. C. Not. 37, 2); if, moreover, properties are said to be material; and in all cases when they are combined, each property retains its own peculiarity, and yet is inherent in the subject-matter and in every other property belonging to the same subject-matter; it follows that this relation can only be explained by supposing a mutual interpenetration of properties with each other and with their subject-matter.

The proof of this will be given subsequently. Meantime compare the remarks, p. 92, 2; 94, 1 on the λεκτόν.

Simpl. 56, δ, and 54, β: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ τῶν μὲν σωμάτων σωματικὰς, τῶν δὲ ἀσωμάτων ἀσωμάτους εἶναι λέγουσι τὰς ποιότητας. Only the σωματικαὶ ποιότητες are πνεύματα, see p. 105, 2; incorporeal properties are called ἑκτὰ, to distinguish them from ἕξεις (essential forms). Dexipp. in Cat. 61. 17, Speng.: θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν Στωϊκῶν χωριζόντων τὰς ἕξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ἑκτῶν· ἀσώματα γὰρ μὴ παραδεχόμενοι καθ’ ἑαυτὰ, ὅταν ἐρεσχελεῖν δέον ᾖ ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαλήψεις ἔρχονται. But this use of terms appears not to have been universal among the Stoics (Simpl. Categ. 54, γ), with whom different views prevailed touching the extent of the conception of ἑκτόν. According to this passage it was Antipater who wished to include under ἑκτὰ, the κοινὰ συμπτώματα σωμάτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων.

Conf. Simpl. 57, ε, who after giving the definition of quality, quoted p. 103, 1, continues: ἐν δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μὴ οἷόν τε κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνων λόγον κοινὸν εἶναι σύμπτωμα σωμάτων τε καὶ ἀσωμάτων, οὐκέτι ἔσται γένος ἢ ποιότης, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρως μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἑτέρως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων αὕτη ὑφέστηκε.

Simpl. 44, δ: ὁ δὲ τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὴν κάθισιν μὴ προσποιούμενος (including sc. τοῖς οὖσιν) ἔοικε Στωϊκῇ τινι συνηθείᾳ συνέπεσθαι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι νομίζων, τὰς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ διαφορὰς ἀνυποστάτους ἡγούμενος καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα αὐτὰ ἀποκαλῶν ὡς ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἔχοντα αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πὼς ἔχειν.

Dexipp. in Cat. 41, 20, Speng.: εἰ δέ τις εἰς τὸ πὼς ἔχον συντάττοι τὰς πλείστας κατηγορίας, ὥσπερ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ποιοῦσιν. Plotin. vi. 1, 30, 594, A: πῶς δὲ ἓν τὸ πὼς ἔχον, πολλῆς διαφορᾶς ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσης; πῶς γὰρ τὸ τρίπηχυ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἰς ἓν [γένος θετέον], τοῦ μὲν ποσοῦ τοῦ δὲ ποιοῦ ὄντος; πῶς δὲ τὸ ποτὲ καὶ τὸ ποῦ; πῶς δὲ ὅλως πὼς ἔχοντα τὸ χθὲς καὶ τὸ πέρυσι καὶ τὸ ἐν Λυκείῳ καὶ ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ; καὶ ὅλως πῶς δὲ ὁ χρόνος πὼς ἔχον; ... τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν πῶς πὼς ἔχον ... καὶ ὁ πάσχον οὐ πὼς ἔχον ... ἴσως δ’ ἂν μόνον ἁρμόσει ἐπὶ τοῦ κεῖσθαι τὸ πὼς ἔχον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔχειν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔχειν οὐ πὼς ἔχον ἀλλὰ ἔχον. Simpl. Categ. 94, ε: The Stoics included ἔχειν under πὼς ἔχον. In saying as Simpl. 16, δ, does that the Stoics omitted ποσὸν, time, and place, it must be meant that they did not treat these conceptions as separate categories. What they did with them Simpl. explains l.c. εἰ γὰρ τὸ πὼς ἔχον νομίζουσιν αὐτοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα περιλαμβάνειν. Trendelenburg, 229, with justice, observes that, wherever the species-forming difference lies in ποσὸν as in mathematical conceptions, there ποσὸν comes under ποιόν.

Simpl. 42, ε: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς γένους δύο κατὰ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον ἀριθμοῦνται, τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρός τι τιθέντες, τὰ δ’ ἐν τοῖς πρός τί πως ἔχουσι, καὶ τὰ μὲν πρός τι ἀντιδιαιροῦντες τοῖς καθ’ αὑτὰ, τὰ δὲ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα τοῖς κατὰ διαφοράν. (Ibid. 44, β: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ νομίζουσι πάσης τῆς κατὰ διαφορὰν ἰδιότητος ἀπηλλάχθαι τὰ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα.) Sweet and bitter belong to τὰ πρός τι· to the other class belong δεξιὸς, πατὴρ, &c., κατὰ διαφορὰν δέ φασι τὰ κατά τι εἶδος χαρακτηριζόμενα. Every καθ’ αὑτὸ is also κατὰ διαφορὰν (determined as to quality), and every πρός τί πως ἔχον is also a πρός τι, but not conversely. Conf. 43, β. εἰ δὲ δεῖ σαφέστερον μεταλαβεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα, πρός τι μὲν λέγουσιν ὅσα κατ’ οἰκεῖον χαρακτῆρα διακείμενά πως ἀπονεύει πρὸς ἕτερον (or, according to the definition in Sext. Math. viii. 454: πρός τι ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς ἑτέρῳ νοούμενον), πρός τι δέ πως ἔχοντα ὅσα πέφυκε συμβαίνειν τινὶ καὶ μὴ συμβαίνειν ἄνευ τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ μεταβολῆς καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως μετὰ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἐκτὸς ἀποβλέπειν, ὥστε ὅταν μὲν κατὰ διαφοράν τι διακείμενον πρὸς ἕτερον νεύσῃ, πρός τι μόνον τοῦτο ἔσται, ὡς ἡ ἕξις καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις· ὅταν δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐνοῦσαν διαφορὰν κατὰ ψιλὴν δὲ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν θεωρῆται, πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα ἔσται· ὁ γὰρ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ δεξιὸς ἔξωθεν τινῶν προσδέονται, πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν· διὸ καὶ μηδεμιᾶς γινομένης περὶ αὐτὰ μεταβολῆς γένοιτ’ ἂν οὐκέτι πατὴρ, τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀποθανόντος, ὁ δὲ δεξιὸς τοῦ παρακειμένου μεταστάντος· τὸ δὲ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν οὐκ ἂν ἀλλοῖα γένοιτο εἰ μὴ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ἡ περὶ αὐτὰ δύναμις. In this sense, therefore, πρός τι belongs to ποιὸν, being composed (as Simpl. 43, α, says) of ποιὸν and πρός τι. On the other hand, πρός τί πως ἔχον only expresses, to quote Herbart, an accidental relation. Prantl’s quotation (I. 437, 108) from Simpl. 44, β, we have no special reason to refer to the Stoics.

Trendelenburg, 220, considers that these genera are in so far subordinate to one another, that the previous one continues in the next, but with the addition of a fresh determination; a better name for the second category would be ὑποκείμενα ποιά· for the third, ὑποκείμενα ποιά πως ἔχοντα· for the fourth, ὑποκείμενα ποιὰ πρός τί πως ἔχοντα. In support of this, he refers to Simpl. 43, α: ἕπεται δὲ αὐτοῖς κἀκεῖνο ἄτοπον τὸ σύνθετα ποιεῖν τὰ γένη ἐκ προτέρων τινῶν καὶ δευτέρων ὡς τὸ πρός τι ἐκ ποιοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρός τι. Plut. C. Not. 44, 6: τέτταρά γε ποιοῦσιν ὑποκείμενα περὶ ἕκαστον, μᾶλλον δὲ τέτταρα ἕκαστον ἡμῶν. Plot. Enn. vi. 1, 29, 593, A: ἄτοπος ἡ διαίρεσις ... ἐν θατέρῳ τῶν εἰδῶν τὸ ἕτερον τιθεῖσα, ὥσπερ ἂν [εἴ] τις διαιρῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν λέγοι, τὴν δὲ γραμματικὴν καὶ ἄλλο τι· if ποιὰ are to be ὕλη ποιὰ, they are composed of ὕλη and εἶδος or λόγος. See p. 48, 2.

See p. 103, 1.

See p. 107, 2; Plotin. vi. 1, 30: Why are πὼς ἔχοντα enumerated as a third category, since πάντα περὶ τὴν ὕλην πὼς ἔχοντα; the Stoics would probably say that ποιὰ are περὶ τὴν ὕλην πὼς ἔχοντα, whereas the πὼς ἔχοντα, in the strict sense of the term, are περὶ τὰ ποιά. Yet since the ποιὰ themselves are nothing more than ὕλη πως ἔχουσα, all categories must be ultimately reduced to ὕλη.

Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, i. 440–467.

In Diog. 66; Sext. Math. viii. 70; Ammon. De Interp. 4, a (Schol. in Arist. 93, a; 22, b, 20); Simpl. Cat. 103, α; Boëth. De Interp. 315; Cramer, Anecd. Oxon. iii. 267, conf. I. 104, a distinction is drawn between ἀξίωμα (a judgment), ἐρώτημα (a direct question, requiring Yes or No), πύσμα (an enquiry), προστακτικὸν, ὁρκικὸν, ἀρατικὸν (wishes), εὐκτικὸν (a prayer), ὑποθετικὸν (a supposition), ἐκθετικὸν (as ἐκκείσθω εὐθεῖα γραμμὴ), προσαγορευτικὸν (an address), θαυμαστικὸν, ψεκτικὸν, ἐπαπορητικὸν, ἀφηγηματικὸν (explanatory statements), ὅμοιον ἀξιώματι (a judgment with something appended, as: ὡς Πριαμίδῃσιν ἐμφερὴς ὁ βουκόλος! by Sextus called Πλεῖον ἢ ἀξίωμα). Ammon. in Waitz, Arist. Orig. i. 43, speaks of ten forms of sentences held by the Stoics, mentioning, however, only two, προστακτικὸς and ἐβκτικός (so reads the MS. Waitz suggests ἐφεκτικὸς, more probably it is εὐκτικός). Diog. 191, mentions treatises of Chrysippus on interrogatory and hortatory sentences. On the relation of an oath to ἀξίωμα light is thrown by Simpl. l.c., also by Chrysippus’ distinction between ἀληθορκεῖν and εὐορκεῖν ψευδορκεῖν and ἐπιορκεῖν in Stob. Floril. 28, 15.

Diog. 65: ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστιν ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος. Questions and other similar sentences are neither true nor false (Ibid. 66 and 68). This definition of a judgment is constantly referred to, see p. 83, 2, by Simpl. Cat. 103, α; Cic. Tusc. i. 7, 14; De Fato, 10, 20; Gell. N. A. xvi. 8, 8; Schol. in Arist. 93, b, 35. The purport of the expression λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς, λεκτὸν ἀποφαντὸν (in Diog. 65; Gell. xvi. 8, 4; Ammon. De Interp. 4, a; Schol. in Arist. 93, b, 20) is the same.

Sext. Math. viii. 93: τῶν γὰρ ἀξιωμάτων πρώτην σχεδὸν καὶ κυριωτάτην ἐκφέρουσι διαφορὰν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ καθ’ ἣν τὰ μέν ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἁπλᾶ τὰ δ’ οὐχ ἁπλᾶ. Ibid. 95 and 108. Diog. 68 gives the definitions of both.

Sext. l.c., by whom Diog. must be corrected, see p. 113, 3.

Diog. 69: ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὐχ ἁπλοῖς τὸ συνημμένον καὶ τὸ παρασυνημμένον καὶ τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον καὶ τὸ αἰτιῶδες καὶ τὸ διεζευγμένον καὶ τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ διασαφοῦν τὸ ἧττον. Further details presently respecting the συνημμένον and διεζευγμένον. For the παρασυνημμένον—a conditional sentence, the first part of which is introduced by ἐπειδὴ—see Diog. 71 and 74; for the συμπεπλεγμένον, the characteristic of which is the καὶ and καὶ, see Diog. 72; Sext. Math. viii. 124; Gell. N. A. xvi. 8 and 9; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. 13; Dexipp. in Cat. 27, 3, Speng.; (Schol. in Arist. 44. a, 9—Prantl, 446, says this passage is not quite correct; it only implies that the term συμπλοκὴ was confined to a copulative judgment); for the αἰτιῶδες, which is characterised by a διότι, and therefore is not identical with the παρασυνημμένον, Diog. 72 and 74; for the διασαφοῦν τὸ μᾶλλον and the διασαφοῦν τὸ ἧττον, Diog. 72; conf. Cramer, Anecd. Oxon. i. 188; Apollon. Synt. (Bekker’s Anecd. ii.), 481. These are only some of the principal forms of composite judgments, their number being really indefinite. Chrysippus estimated that a million combinations might be formed with ten sentences. The celebrated mathematician, Hipparchus however, proved that only 103,049 affirmative and 310,952 negative judgments could be formed with that material (Plut. Sto. Rep. 29, 5, p. 1047; Qu. Symp. viii. 9, 3, 11, p. 732).

There is no notice of a division of judgments into general and particular. Instead of that, Sext. (Math. viii. 96) distinguishes ὡρισμένα as οὗτος κάθηται, ἀόριστα as τὶς κάθηται, and μέσα as ἄνθρωπος κάθηται, Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ. When the subject stood in the nominative, ὡρισμένα were called καταγορευτικὰ (Diog. 70); the others κατηγορικά· a καταγορευτικὸν is οὗτος περιπατεῖ· a κατηγορικὸν, Δίων περιπατεῖ.

An affirmative judgment was called καταφατικὸν, a negative ἀποφατικὸν, by Chrysippus in the fragment about to be quoted, and Simpl. Cat. 102, δ, ζ. Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 266, Oud. renders these terms by dedicativa and abdicativa. For the manner in which they expressed negative sentences, see Boëth. De Interp. 373; Schol. in Arist. 120.

Diog. 69 gives an example of ἀρνητικὸν, οὐδεὶς περιπατεῖ· one of particular negation, στερητικὸν—ἀφιλάνθρωπός ἐστιν οὗτος· one of double negation, ὑπεραποφατικὸν—as, οὐχὶ ἡμέρα οὐκ ἐστί.

Sext. Math. viii. 89; Diog. 73: ἀντικείμενα are ὧν τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐστὶν ἀποφατικὸν or (according to the outward treatment of these determinations) ἀποφάσει πλεονάζει—as, It is day, and It is not day. Aristotle called such a contradictory ἀντίφασις, a contrary ἐναντιότης, putting both under the class conception of ἀντικείμενα. The Stoics reserved ἀντικείμενα for contradictories (Simpl. Cat. 102, δ and 102, ζ, a Stoic discussion intended to show that the conception of ἐνάντιον is not applicable to negative sentences and conceptions), which is after all only a difference in terminology. Ἐναντίον they also call μαχόμενον (Apollon. Synt. 484, Bekk.). Otherwise, following Aristotle, they distinguished between ἐναντίον and ἐναντίως ἔχον· ἐναντία are conceptions which are in plain and immediate contrast, such as φρόνησις and ἀφρόνησις· ἐναντίως ἔχοντα are those which are only contrasted by means of the ἐναντία, such as φρόνιμος and ἄφρων (Simpl. Categ. 98, γ). The former, therefore, apply to abstract, the latter to concrete notions. That every negative judgment has an affirmative judgment opposed to it is elaborately proved by a series of quotations from poets, each one of which is four times repeated in the fragment περὶ ἀποφατικῶν first edited by Letronne (Fragments inédits, Paris, 1838), and subsequently emended, explained, and with a great degree of probability referred to Chrysippus by Bergk (De Chrysippi libro περὶ ἀποφατικῶν, Cassel, 1841, Gymn. progr.). In explaining the fragment Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. I. 451 appears to have hit the truth in one point, where Bergk is not satisfied.

Simpl. Categ. 103, β; Cic. De Fato, 16, 37; N. D. i. 25, 70. Further particulars above p. 83, 2; 110, 3.

Viz. that the members of a disjunction, as well as their contradictory opposites, must also be contraries (adversa or pugnantia), and that from the truth of the one the falsehood of the other follows. A disjunction which does not satisfy one or the other of these conditions is false (παραδιεζευγμένον). Gell. N. A. xvi. 8, 12; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 191; Alex. Anal. Pr. 7, b.

Diog. 71; Sext. Math. 109; Galen, De Simpl. Medicamen. ii. 16, vol. xi. 499; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. p. 15. The Stoics distinguish most unnecessarily, but quite in harmony with their ordinary formal punctiliousness, the case in which the leading clause is identical with the inferential clause (εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν) and the case in which it is different (εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶν, φῶς ἔστιν). Conditional sentences of the first kind are called διφορούμενα συνημμένα. Sext. viii. 281; 294; and 466; Pyrrh. ii. 112; conf. viii. 95; Diog. 68. That in all these passages διφορούμενον must be read, and not διαφορούμενον, appears according to Prantl’s (p. 445, 122) very true observation from the remarks of Alex. Top. 7, a; Anal. Pr. 7, b, on διφορούμενοι συλλογισμοί.

Sext. Math. viii. 112; κοινῶς μὲν γάρ φασιν ἅπαντες οἱ Διαλεκτικοὶ ὑγιὲς εἶναι συνημμένον, ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένῳ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ λῆγον. περὶ δὲ τοῦ πότε ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ πῶς, στασιάζουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαχόμενα τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἐκτίθενται κριτήρια. Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 143: In hoc ipso, quod in elementis dialectici docent, quomodo judicare oporteat, rerum falsumne sit, si quid ita connexum est, ut hoc: Si dies est, lucet; quanta contentio est! aliter Diodoro aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. (The further remarks on the points of difference between Chrysippus and Cleanthes have no reference to hypothetical judgments.) The Philo here alluded to—the same Philo against whom Chrysippus wrote his treatises (Diog. vii. 191 and 194)—is the well-known dialectician and pupil of Diodorus, who declared all conditional sentences to be right in which a false inferential clause is not drawn from a true leading clause. According to this view, conditional sentences would be right, with both clauses true, or both false, or with a false leading clause and true inferential clause (Sext. l.c. viii. 245 and 449; Pyrrh. ii. 110). According to Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 104, the view of Philo appears to have gained acceptance among the Stoics, perhaps through Zeno, for whose connection with Philo see Diog. vii. 16. But, in any case, the meaning appears to have been (Diog. vii. 81), that, in the cases mentioned, conditional sentences may be right, not that they must be right.

Others more appropriately judged of the correctness of conditional sentences by the connection of the clauses, and either required, for a conditional sentence to be right, that the contradictory opposite (ἀντικείμενον) of the inferential clause should be irreconcileable with the leading clause, or that the inferential clause should be potentially (δυνάμει) contained in the leading clause (Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 111). The first of these requirements, which is mentioned by Diog. 73 as the only criterion of the Stoic School, was due to Chrysippus, who accordingly refused to allow sentences in which this was not the case to be expressed hypothetically (Cic. De Fato, 6, 12; 8, 15): it was not right to say, Si quis natus est oriente canicula, is in mari non morietur; but, Non et natus est quis oriente canicula et is in mari morietur.

It may be observed, in connection with the enquiry into the accuracy of conditional sentences, that a true conditional sentence may become false in time. The sentence, If Dion is alive now, he will continue to live, is true at the present moment; but in the last moment of Dion’s life it will cease to be true. Such sentences were called ἀπεριγράφως μεταπίπτοντα, because the time could not be previously fixed when they would become false (Simpl. Phys. 305, a). Chrysippus also wrote on the μεταπίπτοντα, according to Dionys. Comp. Verb. p. 72 Schäfer. Diog. vii. 105, mentions two treatises of his on the subject, but characterises them as spurious.

According to Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 100, Math. viii. 143 and 156, the Stoics distinguished between σημεῖα ὑπομνηστικὰ and σημεῖα ἐνδεικτικά. The definition of the latter was ἐνδεικτικὸν ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ καθηγούμενον (or προκαθηγούμενον) ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος· the ὑγιὲς συνημμένον was a sentence with both the leading and inferential clauses true. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 101; 106; 115; Math. viii. 249.

Diodorus had said that Only what is, or what will be, is possible. The Stoics, and in particular Chrysippus, define δυνατὸν as what is capable of being true (τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθὲς εἶναι), if circumstances do not prevent; ἀδύνατον as ὃ μή ἐστιν ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθὲς εἶναι. From the δυνατὸν they distinguish the οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, which is defined as ὃ καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος οἷόν τε εἶναι τῶν ἐκτὸς μηδὲν ἐναντιουμένων (Plut. Sto. Rep. 46, p. 1055; Diog. 76; Boëth. De Interp. 374, Bas. The same thing is also stated in Alex. Aphr. De Fato, c. 10, p. 30. δυνατὸν εἶναι γενέσθαι τοῦτο δ’ ὑπ’ οὐδενὸς κωλύετα γενέσθαι κἂν μὴ γένηται.) On the other hand, ἀναγκαῖον is, what is both true and incapable of being false, either in itself or owing to other circumstances. Diog. and Boëth. There was probably another definition of οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, as ὃ ψεῦδος οἷόν τε εἶναι τῶν ἐκτὸς μὴ ἐναντιουμένων· so that it might be said (Boëth. 429) that the οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον was partly possible and partly impossible, without contradicting (as Boëth. and Prantl, p. 463, believe) their other statement, that the δυνατὸν was partly necessary and partly not necessary. The conceptions of the Possible and the Not-necessary are thus made to overlap, the former including the Necessary and Not-necessary, the latter the Possible and the Not-possible.

To defend his definition of the Possible against the κυριεύων of Diodorus, Chrysippus denied the statement, δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, without exposing the confusion contained in it between sequence in time and causal relation (Alex. Anal. Pr. 57, b; Philop. Anal. Pr. xlii. b; Schol. in Arist. 163, a; Cic. De Fato, 7, 13; Ep. ad Div. ix. 4). Cleanthes, Antipater, and Panthoides preferred to attack another leading clause of Diodorus, the clause that Every past occurrence must necessarily be true (Epictet. Diss. ii. 19, 2 and 5). The Aristotelian position in reference to a disjunction, that When the disjunction refers to something future, the disjunction itself is true, without either clause being necessarily true, was not accepted by the Stoics (Simpl. Cat. 103, β).

Plut. Sto. Rep. 46, p. 1055, justly insists on this point.

Prantl, pp. 467–496.

Diog. 45; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 194, see above p. 65.

Both were included by the Peripatetics under the term hypothetical. In the same way the Stoics include both among the five ἀναπόδεικτοι. See below p. 119, 2.

Chain-argument seems to have been also treated of in the categorical form. See p. 120, 3.

As shown by Prantl, 468, 171; on Diog. 76; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 135; Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 279, Oud. The latter rightly refers to the fact, that Chrysippus discussed the main forms of hypothetical inference at the very beginning of his doctrine of inference, Sext. Math. viii. 223.

Anal. Pr. 87, b: δι’ ὑποθέσεως δὲ ἄλλης, ὡς εἶπεν (Arist. Anal. Pr. i. 23, 41, a, 37) εἶεν ἂν καὶ οὓς οἱ νεώτεροι συλλογισμοὺς μόνους βούλονται λέγειν· οὗτοι δ’ εἰσὶν οἱ διὰ τροπικοῦ, ὡς φασὶ, καὶ τῆς προλήψεως γινόμενοι, τοῦ τροπικοῦ ἢ συνημμένου (conditional) ὄντος ἢ διεζευγμένου (disjunctive) ἢ συμπεπλεγμένου (a copulative judgment suggesting partly hypothetical judgments like the συμπεπλεγμένον in Sext. Math. viii. 235, partly negative categorical judgments which have the force of hypothetical judgments, such as: it is not at the same time A and B. Conf. Diog. 80. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 158; Matt. viii. 226. Cic. De Fato, vi. 12). By the νεώτεροι, the Stoics must be meant, for the terminology is theirs; and the Peripatetics, to whom it might otherwise apply, always considered the categorical to be the original form of judgment. See Prantl, 468, 172.

Such an inference was called λόγος· when it was expressed in definite terms, for instance, If it is day, it is light. The arrangement of the clauses (which were designated by numbers, and not by letters, as the Peripatetics had done), was called τρόπος· for instance, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον. A conclusion composed of both forms of expression was a λογότροπος· for instance, εἰ ζῇ Πλάτων, ἀναπνεῖ Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. The premisses were called λήμματα (in contrast to ἀξίωμα which expresses a judgment independently of its position in a syllogism); or, more correctly, the major premiss was λῆμμα, the minor πρόσληψις (hence the particles δὲ γε were προσληπτικὸς σύνδεσμος, Apollon. Synt. p. 518, Bekk.). The conclusion was ἐπιφορά, also ἐπιφορικοὶ συνδεσμοί. Ibid. 519. The major premiss in a hypothetical syllogism was called τροπικόν, its two clauses being called, respectively, ἡγούμενον (as by the Peripatetics) and λῆγον (by the Peripatetics ἑπόμενον). Diog. 76; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 135; Math. viii. 301, 227; Alex. l.c. and p. 88, a; 109, a; 7, b; Philop. Anal. Pr. lx. a; Schol. in Arist. 170, a, 2; Ammon. on Anal. Pr. 24, b, 19; Arist. Orig. ed. Waitz, i. 45; Apul. Dog. Plat. iii. 279, Oud.; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. p. 19.

Alex. Anal. Pr. 116, b, after mentioning ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες συλλογισμοὶ, or inferences incomplete in point of form, such as: A = B, B = C, ∴ A = C, which is said to want as its major premiss: Two things which are equal to a third are equal to one another. On these ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες of the Stoics see l.c. 8, a; 22, b; Alex. Top. 10, Ps. Galen, Εἰς. διαλ. 59. He then continues: οὓς ὅτι μὲν μὴ λέγουσι συλλογιστικῶς συνάγειν, ὑγιῶς λέγουσι [οἱ νεώτεροι] ... ὅτι δὲ ἡγοῦνται ὁμοίους αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοῖς κατηγορικοῖς συλλογισμοῖς ... τοῦ παντὸς διαμαρτάνουσιν.

συνακτικοὶ or περαντικοὶ, and ἀσυνακτικοὶ or ἀπέραντοι, or ἀσυλλόγιστοι. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 137; Math. viii. 303 and 428; Diog. 77.

Syllogisms which are conclusive in point of fact, but wanting in precision of form, were called περαντικοί in the narrower sense; those complete also in form, συλλογιστικοί. Diog. 78; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. 58.

An inference is true (ἀληθὴς) when not only the illation is correct (ὑγιὴς), but when the individual propositions, the premisses as well as the conclusion, are materially true. The λόγοι συνακτικοὶ may therefore be divided into true and false. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 138; Math. viii. 310 and 412; Diog. 79.

Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 140 and 135; Math. viii. 305; 313; and 411: True forms of inference are divided into ἀποδεικτικοὶ and οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοὶ. ἀποδεικτικοὶ = οἱ διὰ προδήλων ἄδηλόν τι συνάγοντες· οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοὶ when this is not the case, as in the inference: If it is day, it is light—It is day, ∴ It is light; for the conclusion, It is light, is known as well as it is known that It is day. The ἀποδεικτικοὶ may proceed either ἐφοδευτικῶς from the premisses to the conclusions, or ἐφοδευτικῶς ἅμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς· ἐφοδευτικῶς when the premisses rest upon belief (πίστις and μνήμη); ἐκκαλυπτικῶς when they are based on a scientific necessity.

According to Diog. 79, Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 157, others added other forms of ἀναπόδεικτοι. Cic., in adding a sixth and seventh (Top. 14, 57), must have been following these authorities.

Consult, on these five ἀναπόδεικτοι of Chrysippus (which need not be given here more at length, and are absolutely identical with those of Theophrastus) Diog. 79–81 (on p. 79 we must read συλλογιστικῶν for συλλογισμὼν. See p. 118, 2); Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 156–159; 201; Math. viii. 223–227; Cic. Top. 13; Simpl. Phys. 123, b; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. 17; Prantl, 473, 182; on the πέμπτος ἀναπόδεικτος διὰ πλειόνων Sext. Pyrrh. i. 69; Cleomed. Meteora, pp. 41 and 47; Prantl, p. 475.

Two such cases are distinguished, one in which all three clauses, the other in which the conclusion and minor premiss are identical. The first class are called διφορούμενοι· If it is day, it is day; It is day, ∴ It is day. The second class, ἀδιαφόρως περαίνοντες· It is either day or night; It is day, ∴ It is day. The latter term is, however, applied to both kinds. See Alex. Anal. Pr. 7, a; 53, b; Top. 7; Schol. in Arist. 294, b, 25; Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 96; Prantl, 476, 185.

Cic. Top. 15, 57: ex his modis conclusiones innumerabiles nascuntur. Sext. Math. viii. 228, in which passage it is striking that ἀναπόδεικτοι should be divided into ἁπλοῖ and οὐχ ἁπλοῖ. It has been suggested that ἀποδεικτικῶν should be substituted for ἀναποδείκτων, but it is also possible that the latter word may be used in a narrow as well as in a wider sense.

Diog. 78: συλλογιστικοὶ [λόγοι] μὲν οὖν εἰσιν οἱ ἤτοι ἀναπόδεικτοι ὄντες ἢ ἀναγόμενοι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους κατά τι τῶν θεμάτων ἢ τινά. According to Galen, Hipp. et Plat. ii. 3, p. 224, Chrysippus had taken great pains in resolving the composite forms of inference (Diog. 190 and 194). Antipater suggested still simpler modes.

Sext. 229–243, borrowing the example used by Ænesidemus, but no doubt following the Stoic treatment. Prantl, 479. Such a composite inference is that mentioned by Sextus l.c. 281.

Sext.; Prantl, p. 478.

Alex. on Anal. Pr. i. 25, 42, b, 5, after speaking of the Sorites, continues (p. 94, b): ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ τῶν προτάσεων συνεχείᾳ τό τε συνθετικόν ἐστι θεώρημα ... καὶ οἱ καλούμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν νεωτέρων ἐπιβάλλοντές τε καὶ ἐπιβαλλόμενοι. The συνθετικὸν θεώρημα (or chain-argument), the meaning of which is next investigated, must be a Peripatetic expression. The same meaning must attach to ἐπιβάλλοντές τε καὶ ἐπιβαλλόμενοι, which are to be found ἐν ταῖς συνεχῶς λαμβανομέναις προτάσεσι χωρὶς τῶν συμπερασμάτων· for instance, A is a property of B, B of C, C of D; ∴ A is a property of D. ἐπιβαλλόμενος means the inference, the conclusion of which is omitted; ἐπιβάλλων, the one with the omitted premiss. These inferences may be in either of the three Aristotelian figures κατὰ τὸ παραδεδομένον συνθετικὸν θεώρημα. ὃ οἱ μὲν περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην τῇ χρείᾳ παραμετρήσαντες παρέδοσαν, ἐφ’ ὅσον αὐτὴ ἀπῇτει, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ [στοᾶς] παρ’ ἐκείνων λαβόντες καὶ διελόντες ἐποίησαν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ καλούμενον παρ’ αὐτοῖς δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον θέμα καὶ τέταρτον, ἀμελήσαντες μὲν τοῦ χρησίμου, πᾶν δὲ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν δυνάμενον λέγεσθαι ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ θεωρίᾳ κἂν ἄχρηστος ᾖ, ἐπεξελθόντες τε καὶ ζηλώσαντες. Reference is made to the same thing in Simpl. De Cœlo; Schol. in Arist. 483, b, 26: ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη ἀνάλυσις τοῦ λόγου, ἡ τὸ συμπέρασμα λαμβάνουσα καὶ προσλαμβάνουσα ἄλλην πρότασιν, κατὰ τὸ τρίτον λεγόμενον παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς θέμα περαίνεται, the rule of which is, that when a third proposition can be drawn from the conclusion of an inference and a second proposition, that third proposition can be drawn also from the premisses of the inference and the second proposition. Both these passages appear to have escaped the notice of Prantl in his summing up, otherwise so accurate. Or else the πρῶτον, δεύτερον, τρίτον and τέταρτον θέμα mentioned by Galen, Hipp. et Plat. ii. 3, vol. v. 224; Alex. Anal. Pr. 53, b, would hardly suggest to him the various forms of the ἀναπόδεικτοι instead of the formulæ for the resolution of composite conclusions. The expressions διὰ δύο τροπικῶν, διὰ τριῶν τροπικῶν, and the title of a treatise of Chrysippus περὶ τοῦ διὰ τριῶν (sc. τροπικῶν or λημμάτων conf. p. 117, 3) in Diog. vii. 191; (Galen, l.c.; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 2), appear to refer to such composite inferences.

Called μονολήμματοι συλλογισμοί. Such were ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν· and ἀναπνεῖς, ζῇς ἄρα. See Alex. Top. 6, 274; Anal. Pr. 7, a, 8, a: Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 167; Math. viii. 443; Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 272, Oud.; Prantl, 477, 186.

Compare the remarks of Prantl, 481, on Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 2; Alex. Anal. Pr. 53, b; Galen, l.c.; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. 57. If Posidonius, according to the latter passage, calls analogical conclusions συνακτικοὺς κατὰ δύναμιν ἀξιώματος, and the Stoics also, according to Schol. in Hermog. Rhet. Gr. ed. Walz, vii. 6, 764, spoke of a κατὰ δύναμιν τροπικὸν, we have already met with the same thing, p. 119, 1, where an analogical conclusion was included in the ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες, which, by the addition of an ἀξίωμα, can be changed into regular conclusions. In the doctrine of proof the τόπος παράδοξος was also treated of, according to Procl. in Euclid, 103, being probably suggested by the ethical paradoxes of the Stoics.

Conf. Alex. Anal. Pr. 95, a; Galen. See above p. 120, 3. According to Ps. Galen, l.c. p. 58, Chrysippus wrote these treatises on Συλλογιστικαὶ ἄχρηστοι.

Diog. 186, mentions fallacies due to Chrysippus, which can only have been raised for the purpose of being refuted.

The list of his writings contains a number of treatises on fallacies, among them no less than five on the ψευδόμενος.

Cic. Acad. ii. 29, 93: Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint, anne multa, aliquanto prius, quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere, id est, quod ab iis dicitur ἡσυχάζειν. The same remark is made by Sext. Math. vii. 416; Pyrrh. ii. 253. The same argument was employed against other fallacies (Simpl. Cat. 6, γ). With this λόγος ἡσυχάζων (Diog. 198), Prantl, p. 489, connects ἀργὸς λόγος (Cic. De Fato, 12, 28), regarding the one as the practical application of the other, but apparently without reason. The ἀργὸς λόγος, by means of which the Stoic fatalism was reduced ad absurdum, could not of course commend itself to Chrysippus, nor is it attributed to him.

Prantl, pp. 485–496.

Sext. Math. viii. 367: ἀλλ’ οὐ δεῖ, φασὶ, πάντων ἀπόδειξιν αἰτεῖν, τινὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν, ἐπεὶ οὐ δυνήσεται προβαίνειν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δοθῇ τι πιστὸν ἐξ αὑτοῦ τυγχάνειν. Ibid. 375: ἀλλ’ εἰώθασιν ὑποτυγχάνοντες λέγειν ὅτι πίστις ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐρρῶσθαι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ἀληθὲς εὑρίσκεσθαι ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθεῖσιν ἐπιφερόμενον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τούτοις ἀκολουθοῦν ἐστιν ὑγιὲς, κἀκεῖνα οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτα καθέστηκεν.

Natural Science was divided by the Stoics themselves (Diog. 132): (1) εἰδικῶς into τόποι περὶ σωμάτων καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων καὶ θεῶν καὶ περάτων καὶ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ· (2) γενικῶς into three divisions, περὶ κόσμον, περὶ στοιχείων, and the αἰτιολογικός. The first of these divisions covers ground which is partly peculiar to natural science and is partly shared by the mathematician (astronomy. Posidonius in Simpl. Phys. 64, b, discusses at length the difference between astronomy and natural science); and the third, ground which is shared by both the physician and the mathematician. The precise allotment of the subject into these divisions is not known. At best, it would be a very uncomfortable division.

Soph. 247, D.

Plut. Com. Not. 30, 2, p. 1073: ὄντα γὰρ μόνα τὰ σώματα καλοῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ ὄντος τὸ ποιεῖν τι καὶ πάσχειν. Plac. i. 11, 4: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ πάντα τὰ αἴτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ. iv. 20: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ σῶμα τὴν φωνήν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δρώμενον ἢ καὶ ποιοῦν σῶμα· ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ποιεῖ καὶ δρᾷ ... ἔτι πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν καὶ ἐνοχλοῦν σῶμά ἐστιν ... ἔτι πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον σῶμά ἐστιν. Cic. Acad. i. 11, 39: nullo modo arbitrabatur quidquam effici posse ab ea [natura] quæ expers esset corporis ... nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur (more accurately: in quo efficeretur aliquid. Conf. Ritter, iii. 577) posse esse non corpus. Seneca, see below p. 128, 1; 129, 1; Stob. Ecl. i. 336 (see p. 95, 2) and 338: Χρύσιππος αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει δι’ ὅ. καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὂν καὶ σῶμα, κ.τ.λ. Ποσειδώνιος δὲ οὕτως. αἴτιον δ’ ἐστί τινος δι’ ὃ ἐκεῖνο, ἢ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως, καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὂν καὶ σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον οὔτε ὂν οὔτε σῶμα, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ κατηγόρημα. See p. 95, 1 and 2. Diog. vii. 56: According to Chrysippus, Diogenes (see Simpl. Phys. 97, a), and others, the voice is material, πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν σῶμά ἐστι. Ibid. 150: οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην, ὡς καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ Ζήνων· ὕλη δέ ἐστιν, ἐξ ἧς ὁτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται ... σῶμα δέ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία. Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21: σώματα δὲ πάντα ὑπέθεντο, κ.τ.λ.

As do Ritter, iii. 577, and Schleiermacher, Gesch. der Philos. 129.

Diog. vii. 135: σῶμα δ’ ἐστὶ (φησὶν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ) τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν, κ.τ.λ.

See p. 98. The corporeal nature of deity and the soul will be subsequently discussed.

See p. 105. Sen. Ep. 102, 7, remarks, in reference to the difference of ἡνωμένα· (see p. 103, 1): nullum bonum putamus esse, quod ex distantibus constat: uno enim spiritu unum bonum contineri ac regi debet, unum esse unius boni principale. Hence the objection raised in Plut. Com. Not. 50, 1, p. 1085: τὰς ποιότητας οὐσίας καὶ σώματα ποιοῦσιν, and Ibid. 44, 4, the statement discussed on p. 101, 2.

Philo, Qu. De. S. Immut. p. 298, D (the same in the spurious treatise De Mundo, p. 1154, E): ἡ δὲ [ἕξις = ποιότης] ἐστὶ πνεῦμα ἀντιστρέφον ἐφ’ ἑαυτό. ἄρχεται μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα τείνεσθαι, ψαῦσαν δὲ ἄκρας ἐπιφανείας ἀνακάμπτει πάλιν, ἄχρις ἂν ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀφίκηται τόπον, ἀφ’ οὗ τὸ πρῶτον ὡρμίσθη. ἕξεως ὁ συνεχὴς οὗτος δίαυλος ἄφθαρτος, κ.τ.λ. Qu. Mund. S. Incorr. 960, D [De Mundo, 1169, A]: ἡ δ’ [ἕξις] ἐστὶ πνευματικὸς τόνος. There can be no doubt that Philo is describing the Stoic teaching in these passages.

The same idea is also used to explain the connection between the soul and the body. The unity of the universe is proved by the fact that the Divine Spirit pervades it. Further particulars hereafter. Conf. Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142, a: ἡνῶσθαι μὲν ὑποτίθεται [Χρύσιππος] τὴν σύμπασαν οὐσίαν πνεύματός τινος διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς διήκοντος, ὑφ’ οὗ συνάγεταί τε καὶ συμμένει καὶ σύμπαθές ἐστιν αὑτῷ τὸ πᾶν. (That must be the reading, the next sentence containing τῶν δὲ, κ.τ.λ. Conf. 143, b). Alex. 143, b, carefully denies the statement, that the all-penetrating Breath keeps things together.

Plut. Com. Not. 45. See p. 129, 3. Sen. Ep. 117, 2: Placet nostris, quod bonum est, esse corpus, quia quod bonum est, facit: quidquid facit corpus est ... sapientiam bonum esse dicunt: sequitur, ut necesse sit illam corporalem quoque dicere. Conf. p. 129, 1.

This is the conception of τόνος, upon which the strength of the soul depends, as well as the strength of the body. Cleanthes, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 4, p. 1034: πληγὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστὶ κἂν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένηται πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος. Stob. Ecl. ii. 110: ὥσπερ ἰσχὺς τοῦ σώματος τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν νεύροις, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχὺς τόνος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ κρίνειν καὶ πράττειν καὶ μή. All properties may be classed under the same conception of tension. See p. 127, 5 and Plut. Com. Not. 49, 2, p. 1085: γῆν μὲν γὰρ ἴσασι καὶ ὕδωρ οὔτε αὑτὰ συνέχειν οὔτε ἕτερα, πνευματικῆς δὲ μετοχῇ, καὶ πυρώδους δυνάμεως τὴν ἑνότητα διαφυλάττειν· ἀέρα δὲ καὶ πῦρ αὑτῶν τ’ εἶναι δι’ εὐτονίαν ἐκτατικὰ καὶ τοῖς δυσὶν ἐκείνοις ἐγκεκραμένα τόνον παρέχειν καὶ τὸ μόνιμον καὶ οὐσιῶδες. Ps. Censorin. Fragm. c. 1, p. 75, Jahn: Initia rerum eadem elementa et principia dicuntur. Ea Stoici credunt tenorem atque materiam; tenorem, qui rarescente materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem concrescente rursus a summo referatur ad medium. Here tenor or τόνος is made equivalent to πνεῦμα. Seneca, however, Nat. Qu. ii. 8, conf. vi. 21, endeavours to show that intentio belongs to spiritus more than to any other body.

Sen. Ep. 106, 4: Bonum facit, prodest enim: quod facit corpus est: bonum agitat animum et quodammodo format et continet, quæ propria sunt corporis. Quæ corporis bona sunt, corpora sunt: ergo et quæ animi sunt. Nam et hoc corpus. Bonum hominis necesse est corpus sit, cum ipse sit corporalis.... Si adfectus corpora sunt et morbi animorum et avaritia, crudelitas, indurata vitia ... ergo et malitia et species ejus omnes ... ergo et bona. It is then specially remarked that the Good, i.e. virtue, works upon the body, governing it and representing itself therein. Conf. p. 128, 1.

Sext. Math. vii. 38: τὴν δὲ ἀλήθειαν οἴονταί τινες, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, διαφέρειν τἀληθοῦς κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους ... οὐσία μὲν παρ’ ὅσον ἡ μὲν ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστι τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἀσώματον ὑπῆρχε. καὶ εἰκότως, φασί. τουτὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀξίωμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀξίωμα λεκτὸν, τὸ δὲ λεκτὸν ἀσώματον· ἀνάπαλιν δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστιν παρ’ ὅσον ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικὴ δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν· πᾶσα δὲ ἐπιστήμη πὼς ἔχον ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικὸν ... τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν σῶμα κατὰ τούτους ὑπῆρχε. Similarly Pyrrh. ii. 81. See p. 92, 2.

Plut. Com. Not. 45, 2, p. 1084: ἄτοπον γὰρ εὖ μάλα, τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας, πρὸς δὲ ταύταις τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς μνήμας πάσας, ἔτι δὲ φαντασίας καὶ πάθη καὶ ὁρμὰς καὶ συγκαταθέσεις σώματα ποιουμένους ἐν μηδενὶ φάναι κεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ. ... οἱ δ’ οὐ μόνον τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ζῷα εἶναι λέγουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ πάθη μόνον, ὀργὰς καὶ φθόνους καὶ λύπας καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, οὐδὲ καταλήψεις καὶ φαντασίας καὶ ἀγνοίας οὐδὲ τὰς τέχνας ζῷα, τὴν σκυτοτομικὴν, τὴν χαλκοτυπικήν· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας σώματα καὶ ζῷα ποιοῦσι, τὸν περίπατον ζῷον, τὴν ὄρχησιν, τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, τὴν προσαγόρευσιν, τὴν λοιδορίαν. Plutarch is here speaking as an opponent. Seneca, however (Ep. 106, 5). observes: Non puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint ... tanquam ira, amor, tristitia: si dubitas, vide an vultum nobis mutent:... Quid ergo? tam manifestas corpori notas credis imprimi, nisi a corpore? See p. 129, 1; Stob. Ecl. ii. 114: The Stoics consider virtues to be substantially identical (τὰς αὐτὰς καθ’ ὑπόστασιν) with the leading part of the soul (ἡγεμονικὸν), and consequently to be, like it, σώματα and ζῷα. Seneca, Ep. 113, 1, speaks still more plainly: Desideras tibi scribi a me, quid sentiam de hac quæstione jactata apud nostros: an justitia, an fortitudo, prudentia ceteræque virtutes animalia sint.... Me in alia sententia profiteor esse.... Quæ sint ergo quæ antiquos moverint, dicam. Animum constat animal esse.... Virtus autem nihil aliud est, quam animus quodammodo se habens: ergo animal est. Deinde: virtus agit aliquid: agi autem nihil sine impetu (ὁρμὴ) potest. If it is urged: Each individual will thus consist of an innumerable number of living beings, the reply is that these animalia are only parts of one animal, the soul; they are accordingly not many (multa), but one and the same viewed from different sides: idem est animus et justus et prudens et fortis ad singulas virtutes quodammodo se habens. From the same letter, 23, we gather that Cleanthes explained ambulatio as spiritus a principali usque in pedes permissus, Chrysippus as principale itself.

See p. 92, 2, the extract from Sen. Ep. 117.

Plut. Com. Not. 45, 5, p. 1084: Χρυσίππου μνημονεύοντες ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν φυσικῶν ζητημάτων οὕτω προσάγοντος· οὐχ ἡ μὲν νὺξ σῶμά ἐστιν, ἡ δ’ ἑσπέρα καὶ ὁ ὀρθὸς καὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς νυκτὸς σώματα οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδὲ ἡ μὲν ἡμέρα σῶμά ἐστιν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ νουμηνία σῶμα, καὶ ἡ δεκάτη, καὶ πεντεκαιδεκάτη καὶ ἡ τριακὰς καὶ ὁ μὴν σῶμά ἐστι καὶ τὸ θέρος καὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτός.

Diog. 151: χειμῶνα μὲν εἶναί φασι τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἄερα κατεψυγμένον διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου πρόσω ἄφοδον, ἔαρ δὲ τὴν εὐκρασίαν τοῦ ἀέρος κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς πορείαν, θέρος δὲ τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἀέρα καταθαλπόμενον, κ.τ.λ. Stob. Ecl. i. 260: Chrysippus defines ἔαρ ἔτους ὥραν κεκραμένην ἐκ χειμῶνας ἀπολήγοντος καὶ θέρους ἀρχομένου ... θέρος δὲ ὥραν τὴν μάλιστ’ ἀφ’ ἡλίου διακεκαυμένην· μετόπωρον δὲ ὥραν ἔτους τὴν μετὰ θέρος μὲν πρὸ χειμῶνος δὲ κεκραμένην· χειμῶνα δὲ ὥραν ἔτους τὴν μάλιστα κατεψυγμένην, ἢ τὴν τῷ περὶ γῆν ἀέρι κατεψυγμένην. Ibid.: According to Empedocles and the Stoics, the cause of winter is the preponderance of air, the cause of summer the preponderance of fire. Ibid. 556: μεὶς δ’ ἐστὶ, φησὶ [Χρύσιππος] τὸ φαινόμενον τῆς σελήνης πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἢ σελήνη μέρος ἔχουσα φαινόμενον πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Cleomedes, Meteora, 112, distinguishes four meanings of μήν. In the two first it means something material; in the others, as a definition of time, something immaterial.

Diog. vii. 140; Stob. Ecl. i. 392; Sext. Math. x. 218 and 237; viii. 11; vii. 38; Pyrrh. ii. 81; iii. 52. See p. 92, 2.

See p. 94, 1.

See p. 66, 1.

See p. 93; 132, 1.

See p. 84, 4.

See p. 105, 3.

Let a piece of red-hot iron be taken, every part of which is heavy, hard, hot, &c. Not one of these attributes can be confounded with another, or with the iron itself, but each one runs through the whole iron. Now, if each attribute is due to the presence of some material producing it, there is no avoiding the conclusion that there must exist in the iron, and in each part of it, as many various materials as there are attributes, without any one of them losing its own identity.

Diog. vii. 151: καὶ τὰς κράσεις δὲ διόλου γίνεσθαι, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰς πέλαγος ὀλίγος οἶνος βληθεὶς ἐπὶ πόσον ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται εἶτα συμφθαρήσεται. According to Stob. Ecl. i. 374, the Stoics more accurately distinguish μῖξις, κρᾶσις, παράθεσις, σύγχυσις. Παράθεσις is σωμάτων συναφὴ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιφανείας; for instance, the combination of various kinds of grain. Μῖξις is δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων σωμάτων ἀντιπαρέκτασις δι’ ὅλων, ὑπομενουσῶν τῶν συμφυῶν περὶ αὐτὰ ποιοτήτων; for instance, the union of fire and iron, of soul and body. Such a union is called μῖξις in the case of solid bodies, κρᾶσις in the case of fluids. Σύγχυσις is δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων ποιοτήτων περὶ τὰ σώματα μεταβολὴ εἰς ἑτέρας διαφερούσης τούτων ποιότητος γένεσιν, as in the making up salves and medicines. Very much in the same way according to Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142, a, Chrysippus distinguished three kinds of μῖξις: παράθεσις, or union of substances, in which each retains its οἰκεία οὐσία or ποιότης κατὰ τὴν περιγραφήν; σύγχυσις, in which both substances, as well as attributes, are destroyed (φθείρεσθαι), giving rise to a third body; κρᾶσις = δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων τινων σωμάτων ὅλων δι’ ὅλων ἀντιπαρέκτασιν ἀλλήλοις οὕτως, ὥστε σώζειν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ μίξει τῇ τοιαύτῃ τήν τε οἰκείαν οὐσίαν καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ ποιότητας. Materials thus united can be again separated, but yet are they so united: ὡς μηδὲν μόριον ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὴ μετέχον πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ μίγματι.

For such a union to be possible, (1) it must be possible for one body to penetrate every part of another, without being fused into a homogeneous mass. Hence the expression σῶμα διὰ σώματος ἀντιπαρήκειν, σῶμα σώματος εἶναι τόπον καὶ σῶμα χωρεῖν διὰ σώματος κένον μηδετέρου περιέχοντος ἀλλὰ τοῦ πλήρους εἰς τὸ πλῆρες ἐνδυομένου (Plut. C. Not. 37, 2, p. 1077; Alex. 142, b; Themist. Phys. 37; Simpl. Phys. 123, b; Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21); (2) it must be possible for the smaller body to extend over the whole size of the greater. This is affirmed by Chrysippus: οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν φάμενος, οἴνου σταλαγμὸν ἕνα κεράσαι τὴν θάλατταν, or even εἰς ὅλον τὸν κόσμον διατενεῖν τῇ κράσει τὸν σταλαγμόν (Plut. 10; Alex. 142, b; Diog.). The greater body is said to help the smaller, by giving to it an extension of which it would not otherwise be capable. Nevertheless, the bodies so united need not necessarily occupy more space than was previously occupied by one of them (Alex. 142, b; Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, C. Fic. 860, 14, Cr.). The absurdities which this theory involves were already exposed by Arcesilaus (Plut. 7), and in detail by Alexander, Plutarch, Sextus, and Plotinus, by the latter in a whole treatise (Enn. ii. 7) περὶ τῆς δι’ ὅλων κράτεως.

Πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ λέγεται περὶ κράσεως καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνήνυτοι περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου σκέμματός εἰσι παρὰ τοῖς Δογματικοῖς στάσεις. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 56. See previous note.

According to Alex. 142, a, the following arguments were used by Chrysippus:—(1) The argument from κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι—our notion of κρᾶσις is different from that of σύγχυσις or παράθεσις. (2) Many bodies are capable of extension, whilst retaining their own properties; frankincense, for instance, when burnt, and gold. (3) The soul penetrates every part of the body, without losing its properties. So φύσις does in plants, and ἕξις does in all which it connects. (4) The same holds good of fire in red-hot metal, of fire and air in water and earth, of poisons and perfumes in things with which they are mixed, and of light, which penetrates air.

The first of these arguments clearly does not embody the real reason in the mind of Chrysippus; it might, with equal justice, have been used to prove anything else. Just as little does the second; for the phenomena to which it refers would be equally well explained on the theory of simple intermingling (παράθεσις) or complete (σύγχυσις) mixing. Nor does the fourth argument, taken independently of the theory of the corporeal nature of properties, necessarily lead to the idea of κρᾶσις as distinct from παράθεσις and σύγχυσις. For heat, according to the Peripatetic view, might be regarded as a property of what is hot, light as a definite property of a transparent body (conf. Alex. 143, a), παράθεσις and σύγχυσις sufficing for other things. Even the fact, greatly insisted upon by the Stoics, that things so mixed can be again separated into their component materials (Alex. 143, a; Stob. i. 378), was not conclusive. As long as the knowledge of the actual composition depended on isolated cases and crude experiments, like the one named by Stobæus (into a mixture of wine and water, put an oiled sponge, it will absorb the water and not the wine), and as long as the substantial change of elements, advocated by the Stoics as well as by the Peripatetics, was clung to, it was no difficult matter for an opponent to reply. On the other hand, the relation of the soul to the body, of property to subject-matter, of φύσις to φυτὸν, of God to the world, can hardly be otherwise explained than it was by Chrysippus, if once material existence be assigned to the soul, to φύσις, to ἕξις, and to God. We have, therefore, here the real ground on which this theory of κρᾶσις was based; and Simplicius rightly deduces it herefrom (Phys. 123, b): τὸ δὲ σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι ὡς ἐναργὲς ἄτοπον ἐλάμβανον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὕστερον προσήκαντο ὡς ἀκολουθοῦν ταῖς σφῶν αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεσιν ... σώματα γὰρ λέγειν πάντα δοκοῦντες, καὶ τὰς ποιότητας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ διὰ παντὸς ὁρῶντες τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν χωροῦσαν καὶ τὰς ποιότητας ἐν ταῖς κράσεσι, συνεχώρουν σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν.

See p. 95, 2; 126, 1.

On ἄποιος ὕλη, as the universal ὑποκείμενον or οὐσία κοινὴ, see p. 100. Sext. Math. x. 312: ἐξ ἀποίου μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑνὸς σώματος τὴν τῶν ὅλων ὑπεστήσαντο γένεσιν οἱ Στωϊκοί. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων κατ’ αὐτούς ἐστιν ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη καὶ δι’ ὅλων τρεπτὴ, μεταβαλλούσης τε ταύτης γίνεται τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, πῦρ, κ.τ.λ. Plut. C. Not. 48, 2, p. 1085: ἡ ὕλη καθ’ αὑτὴν ἄλογος οὖσα καὶ ἄποιος. M. Aurel. xii. 30: μία οὐσία κοινὴ, κἂν διείργηται ἰδίως ποιοῖς σώματι μυρίοις. Diog. 137: τὰ δὴ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα εἶναι ὁμοῦ τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην.

See p. 141, 2.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 43. See p. 105, 1.

See p. 105, 1 and 2; 127, 5; 128, 2.

Simpl. Cat. 67, ε (Schol. 74, a, 10): τὸ τοίνυν σχῆμα οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὴν τάσιν παρέχεσθαι λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ τὴν μεταξὺ τῶν σημείων διάστασιν. διὸ καὶ εὐθεῖαν ὁρίζονται γραμμὴν τὴν εἰς ἄκρον τεταμένην.

Simpl. Cat. 68, ε: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ δύναμιν, ἢ μᾶλλον κίνησιν τὴν μανωτικὴν καὶ πυκνωτικὴν τίθενται, τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσω, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω· καὶ τὴν μὲν τοῦ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ποιὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν αἰτίαν. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 2, p. 29: εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν, καθάπερ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, τονικήν τινα εἶναι κίνησιν περὶ τὰ σώματα, εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἅμα καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔξω κινουμένην, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἰς τὸ ἔξω μεγεθῶν καὶ ποιότητων ἀποτελεστικὴν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἑνώσεως καὶ οὐσίας. This remark is confirmed by what is quoted, p. 128, 2 from Censorinus, and by the language of Plutarch (Def. Orac. c. 28. Schl. p. 425), in reference to Chrysippus: πολλάκις εἰρηκὼς, ὅτι ταῖς εἰς τὸ αὑτῆς μέσον ἡ οὐσία καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ αὑτῆς μέσου διοικεῖται καὶ συνέχεται κινήσεσι.

Diog. vii. 134: δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν. τοῦτον γὰρ ὄντα ἀΐδιον διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα. Such is the teaching of Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Archedemus, and Posidonius. Sext. Math. ix. 11: οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς δύο λέγοντες ἀρχὰς, θεὸν καὶ ἄποιον ὕλην, τὸν μὲν θεὸν ποιεῖν ὑπειλήφασι, τὴν δὲ ὕλην πάσχειν τε καὶ τρέπεσθαι. Similarly Alex. Aph. De Mixt. 144; Achill. Tat. Isag. c. 3, 124, E; Plut. Pl. Phil. i. 3, 39; Stob. Ecl. i. 306; 322, according to the passage quoted, p. 101, 2, from Zeno respecting ὕλη: διὰ ταύτης δὲ διαθεῖν τὸν τοῦ παντὸς λόγον ὃν ἔνιοι εἱμαρμένην καλοῦσιν, οἷόνπερ ἐν τῇ γόνῃ τὸ σπέρμα. Sen. Ep. 65, 2: Dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri, duo esse in rerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiant: causam et materiam. Materia jacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat. Causa autem, i.e. ratio, materiam format et quocunque vult versat, ex illa varia opera producit. Esse ergo debet, unde fit aliquid, deinde a quo fiat. Hoc causa est, illud materia. Ibid. 23: Universa ex materia et ex Deo constant ... potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est Deus, quam materia patiens Dei.

Sen. Ep. 65, 11: Nam si, quocumque remoto quid effici non potest, id causam judicant esse faciendi, &c. Sext. Math. ix. 228: εἰ αἴτιόν ἐστιν οὗ παρόντος γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα. This appears to be the most general Stoic definition. That given by Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14—τοῦτο, δι’ ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα—and by him said to express the views of several schools, expresses a narrower conception—the conception of efficient cause, which, however, for a Stoic, is the only essential one.

Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 15, distinguishes between συνεκτικὰ, συναίτια, and σύνεργα αἴτια, all of which are, however, subordinated to the δι’ ὃ, which he is there alone discussing. Seneca l.c. maintains that, according to the definition given above, time, place, and motion ought to be reckoned as causes, since nothing can be produced without these. He allows, however, that a distinction must be made between causa efficiens and causa superveniens. This agrees with what Cicero (De Fato, 18, 41) quotes from Chrysippus relative to causæ perfectæ et principales, and causæ adjuvantes et proximæ, and with the Platonic and Aristotelian distinction of αἴτιον δι’ ὃ and οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ. See Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen. In the same way, Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 4, p. 1056 distinguishes between αἴτια αὐτοτελὴς and προκαταρκτική. Alex. Aph. De Fato, 72, blames the Stoics: σμῆνος γὰρ αἰτίων καταλέγουσι, τὰ μὲν προκαταρκτικὰ, τὰ δὲ συναίτια, τὰ δὲ ἑκτικὰ, τὰ δὲ συνεκτικὰ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλο τι. Conf. Orelli ad locum.

Seneca, l.c., after enumerating the four causes of Aristotle, to which the Platonic idea is added as a fifth, continues: This turba causarum embraces either too much or too little. Sed nos nunc primam et generalem quærimus causam. Hæc simplex esse debet, nam et materia simplex est. Quærimus quæ sit causa, ratio scilicet faciens, id est Deus. Ita enim, quæcumque retulistis, non sunt multæ et singulæ causæ, sed ex una pendent, ex ea, quæ faciet. Conf. Stob. Ecl. i. 336: αἴτιον δ’ ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι’ ὃ ... Χρύσιππος αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει δ’ ὃ ... Ποσειδώνιος δὲ οὕτως· αἴτιον δ’ ἐστί τινος δι’ ὃ ἐκεῖνο, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν ἢ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως.

Cic. N. D. ii. 7, 19, after speaking of the consentiens, conspirans, continuata cognatio rerum (συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων), continues: Hæc ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur. See Sext. Math. ix. 78. The same view is further expanded in Sext. Math. ix. 78. Conf. the quotation on p. 127, 5, from Alexander.

According to the remarks, p. 105 and 126, this requires no proof.

Cic. N. D. ii. 9, 23 (conf. iii. 14, 35), gives it apparently as the view of Cleanthes, who alone is mentioned, 9, 24. All living things, plants, and animals, exist by heat: nam omne quod est calidum et igneum cietur et agitur motu suo. Digestion and circulation are the result of heat: ex quo intelligi debet, eam caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem mundum pertinentem. Moreover: omnes partes mundi ... calore fultæ sustinentur. There must be fire in earth and stones, else it could not be extracted therefrom. Water, especially fresh spring water, is warm, more particularly in winter, and as motion warms us, so the roll of the waves does the sea. From water likewise as it evaporates, air derives its heat.... Jam vero reliqua quarta pars mundi, ea et ipsa tota natura fervida est, et cæteris naturis omnibus salutarem impertit et vitalem calorem. Ex quo concluditur, cum omnes mundi partes sustineantur calore, mundum etiam ipsum simili parique natura in tanta diuturnitate servari: eoque magis quod intelligi debet, calidum illum atque igneum ita in omni fusum esse natura, ut in eo insit procreandi vis, &c.

On the argument, ex consensu gentium, consult Plut. Sto. Rep. 38. 3; Com. Not. 32, 1; Cic. N. D. ii. 2, 5; Seneca, Benef. iv. 4; Sext. Math. ix. 123 and 131, where different varieties of it are given, even a particular one from Zeno.

Sext. Math. ix. 75.

Cic. N. D. iii. 9, 22: Zeno enim ita concludit: quod ratione utitur, melius est, quam id, quod ratione non utitur. Nihil autem mundo melius. Ratione igitur mundus utitur. The same, ibid. ii. 8, 21, and 12, 34. Sext. Math. ix. 104: εἰ τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττόν ἐστι, λογικὸν ἄρα ὁ κόσμος ... τὸ γὰρ νοερὸν τοῦ μὴ νοεροῦ καὶ ἔμψυχον τοῦ μὴ ἐμψύχου κρεῖττόν ἐστιν· οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρεῖττον· νοερὸς ἄρα καὶ ἔμψυχός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος. Likewise Diog. 142, says that Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Posidonius agree that the world is ζῷον καὶ λογικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερόν· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον τοῦ μὴ ζῷον κρεῖττον· οὐδὲν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κρεῖττον· ζῷον ἄρα ὁ κόσμος.

Cic. N. D. ii. 8, 22: Zeno affirms: Nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse sentiens. Mundi autem partes sentientes sunt. Non igitur caret sensu mundus.

Diog. 143: ἔμψυχον δὲ [τὸν κόσμον], ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ἐκεῖθεν οὔσης ἀποσπάσματος. Sext. Math. ix. 101: Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιττιεὺς ἀπὸ Ξενοφῶντος τὴν ἀφορμὴν λαβὼν οὑτωσὶ συνερωτᾷ· τὸ προϊέμενον σπέρμα λογικοῦ καὶ αὐτὸ λογικόν ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ κόσμος προΐεται σπέρμα λογικοῦ, λογικὸν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος. The same proof in Sext. Math. ix. 77 and 84; Cic. l.c. Conf. ibid. ii. 31, 79; 6, 18, where also the passage in Xenophon, Mem. i. 4, 8, quoted by Sext. ix. 94, is referred to.

Cic. l.c. iii. 10, 25: Is [Chrysippus] igitur: si aliquid est, inquit, quod homo efficere non possit, qui id efficit melior est homine. Homo autem hæc, quæ in mundo sunt, efficere non potest. Qui potuit igitur, is præstat homini. Homini autem præstare quis possit, nisi Deus? Est igitur Deus. The same, only a little more fully, ibid. ii. 6, 16. To this argument, another favourite one of the Stoics, based on the fulfilment of prophecy, belongs.

Cleanthes made use of arguments from final causes to prove the existence of God. Of this nature are all the four arguments which he employs in Cic. N. D. ii. 6, but particularly the fourth, based on the regular order and beauty of heaven. A building cannot exist without a builder; no more can the building of the world exist without a ruling spirit. Therewith Cicero connects the above-named argument of Chrysippus. The same writer, N. D. ii. 32–66, gives very fully the physical theological argument for the existence of providence, which is given in a shorter form by Cleomedes, Meteora, 1; Seneca, De Provid. i. 1, 2–4; Nat. Qu. i.; Sext. Math. ix. 111; conf. Ps. Censorin. Fragm. i. 2, p. 75, Jahn; Plut. Plac. i. 6, 8: belief in gods grows out of considering the world and its beauty, an argument also quoted by Sext. Math. ix. 26.

See the expansion of this thought by Cleanthes (in Sext. Math. ix. 88–91) and the Stoics (in Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33). Cicero distinguishes four kinds of beings—Plants, Animals, Men, and that being which is altogether reasonable and perfect deity.

See p. 143, 2; 144, 1–4; 145, 1 and 2.

Sext. Math. ix. 102, expanding Zeno’s argument given, p. 145, 2: πάσης γὰρ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς ἡ καταρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου ἐξαποστελλόμεναι δυνάμεις ὡς ἀπό τινος πηγῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐξαποστέλλονται. Cic. N. D. ii. 29: according to Cleanthes, omnem enim naturam necesse est, quæ non solitaria sit, neque simplex, sed cum alio juncta atque connexa, habere aliquem in se principatum [= ἡγεμονικὸν] ut in homine mentem, &c.... Itaque necesse est illud etiam, in quo sit totius naturæ principatus, esse omnium optimum. See following note.

Cic. Acad. ii. 41, 126: Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis æther videtur summus Deus, mente præditus, qua omnia regantur. N. D. i. 14, 36: (Zeno) æthera Deum dicit. 15, 39: ignem præterea et eum, quem antea dixi, æthera (Chrysippus Deum dicit esse). Diog. vii. 138: οὐρανὸς δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐσχάτη περιφέρεια, ἐν ᾗ πᾶν ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον. Ibid. 139: τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῷον ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικὸν ἔχειν ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, καθά φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ... Χρύσιππος δ’ ... καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ... τὸν οὐρανόν φασι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου. He continues: ὁ μέντοι Χρύσιππος διαφορώτερον πάλιν τὸ καθαρώτερον τοῦ αἰθέρος ἐν ταὐτῷ [= τῷ οὐρανῷ] ὃ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν λέγουσιν, αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχωρηκέναι διὰ τῶν ἐν ἀέρι καὶ διὰ τῶν ζῴων ἁπάντων καὶ φυτῶν, διὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς καθ’ ἕξιν. Arius Didymus, in Eus. Præp. Ev. xv. 15, 4: Χρυσίππῳ δὲ [ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι ἤρεσε] τὸν αἰθέρα τὸν καθαρώτατον καὶ εἰλικρινέστατον, ἅτε πάντων εὐκινητότατον ὄντα καὶ τὴν ὅλην περιάγοντα τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν. Ibid. xv. 20, 2: According to the Stoics, the air surrounding sea and earth is the soul of the world. Cornut. Nat. De. 8: Zeus dwells in heaven, ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖ ἐστι τὸ κυριώτατον μέρος τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῆς. Tertullian (Apol. 47; Ad Nat. ii. 2, 4) inaccurately attributes to the Stoics the belief in a God external to nature.

Cic. Acad. l.c.: Cleanthes ... solem dominari et rerum potiri = κρατεῖν τῶν ὄντων putat. He speaks with less accuracy (Krische, Forsch. 428) in N. D. i. 14, 37: either he considers the original deity; for this does not exclude the other. No doubt he identified αἰθὴρ with calor (see p. 144, 1), believing that it emanated from the sun. Diog. 139: Κλεάνθης δὲ [τὸ ἡγεμονικόν φασι] τὸν ἥλιον. Ar. Didymus, l.c. ἡγεμονικὸν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου Κλεάνθει μὲν ἤρεσε τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι διὰ τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἄστρων ὑπάρχειν καὶ πλεῖστα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων διοίκησιν, κ.τ.λ. Stob. Ecl. i. 452; Ps. Censorin. Fragm. i. 4. According to Epiphan. Exp. Fidei, 1090, C, he called the sun the δᾳδοῦχος to the universe.

Stob. l.c.: Ἀρχίδαμος (leg. with Cod. A Ἀρχέδημος) τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου ἐν γῇ ὑπάρχειν ἀπεφήνατο: the same statement without mentioning the name in Ar. Didymus, l.c. This reminds one somewhat of the Pythagorean doctrine of a central fire, and the view of Speusippus. The resemblance to the Pythagoreans is greater, if Simpl. De Cœlo, Schol. in Ar. 505, a, 45, is correct in saying Archedemus denied with the Pythagoreans that the earth was in the centre of the world.

See p. 141, 2; 143, 1. Aristocles, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 14: στοιχεῖον εἶναί φασι [οἱ Στωϊκοὶ] τῶν ὄντων τὸ πῦρ, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος, τούτου δ’ ἀρχὰς ὕλην καὶ θεὸν, ὡς Πλάτων.

Fuller particulars p. 144, 1; 146. Hippolytus, Refut. Hær. i. 21: Chrysippus and Zeno suppose ἀρχὴν μὲν θεὸν τῶν πάντων, σῶμα ὄντα τὸ καθαρώτατον (æther). Diog. 148: Antipater calls the οὐσία θεοῦ ἀεροειδής. Stob. Ecl. i. 60: Mnesarchus (a pupil of Panætius) defines God to be τὸν κόσμον τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ἐπὶ πνεύματος. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 218: Στωϊκοὶ δὲ [λέγουσι θεὸν] πνεῦμα διῆκον καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰδεχθῶν (the adverse). Alex. Aphr. on Metaph. 995, b, 31 (Schol. in Ar. 607, a, 19): τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔδοξεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ἐν τῇ ὕγῃ εἶναι. Ibid. De Mixt. 144, gives them credit: πνεύματι ὡς διὰ πάντων διήκοντι ἀνάπτειν τό τε εἶναι ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ σώζεσθαι καὶ συμμένειν. Compare the quotations p. 127, 5 and De An. 145: [τὸν νοῦν] καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις εἶναι θεῖον ὄντα, ὡς τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔδοξεν. Lucian, Hermot. 81: ἀκούομεν δὲ αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς καὶ ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάντων πεφοίτηκεν, οἷον ξύλων καὶ λίθων καὶ ζῴων, ἄχρι καὶ τῶν ἀτιμωτάτων. Tertullian, Ad Nation. ii. 4: Zeno makes God penetrate the materia mundialis, as honey does the honeycombs. See p. 105, 3.

Clemens, Strom. v. 591, A: φασὶ γὰρ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν θεὸν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ πνεῦμα κατ’ οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. Ibid. i. 295, C: (οἱ Στωϊκοὶ) σῶμα ὄντα τὸν θεὸν διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης ὕλης πεφοιτηκέναι λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς. Protrept. 44, A: τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, διὰ πάσης ὕλης, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης, τὸ θεῖον διήκειν λέγοντας. Orig. c. Cels. vi. 71: τῶν Στωϊκῶν φασκόντων ὅτι ὁ θεὸς πνεῦμά ἐστι διὰ πάντων διεληλυθὸς καὶ πάντ’ ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιεχόν. Opponents like Origen, l.c. and i. 21, Alexander, De Mixt. l.c., and Plutarch, Com. Not. 48, naturally attack them for their materialistic views.

Stob. Ecl. i. 58. See following note. Diog. 138 (according to Chrysippus and Posidonius): τὸν δὴ κόσμον οἰκεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν ... εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ καθάπερ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς. ἀλλ’ ἤδη δι’ ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι’ ὧν δὲ ἧττον. More popularly, ibid. 147: θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀθάνατον λογικὸν τέλειον ἢ νοερὸν ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, κακοῦ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτον, προνοητικὸν κόσμου τε καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ, μὴ εἶναι μέντοι ἀνθρωπόμορφον. εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν δημιοῦργον τῶν ὅλων καὶ ὥσπερ πατέρα πάντων κοινῶς τε καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ τὸ διῆκον διὰ πάντων, ὃ πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις προσονομάζεσθαι κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. Phæd. Nat. De. (Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβείας) Col. 1 and Cic. Nat. De. i. 15, 39, quoting from him: According to Chrysippus, Zeus is κοινὴ χύσις, εἱμαρμένη, ἀνάγκη, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. Col. 3: He considered νόμος to be deity. Cic. l.c.: legis perpetuæ et æternæ vim ... Jovem dicit esse. Themist. De An. 72, b: τοῖς ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος ... διὰ πάσης οὐσίας πεφοιτηκέναι τὸν θεὸν τιθεμένοις, καὶ ποῦ μὲν εἶναι νοῦν, ποῦ δὲ ψυχὴν, ποῦ δὲ φύσιν, ποῦ δὲ ἕξιν. Cic. Acad. ii. 37, 119: No Stoic can doubt hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, quæ se et ipsum fabricata sit, et omnia moderetur, moveat, regat. Id. N. D. ii. 22, 58: ipsius vero mundi ... natura non artificiosa solum sed plane artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur, consultrix et provida utilitatum opportunitatumque omnium.... As every nature develops from its stock, sic Natura mundi omnes motus habet voluntarios conatusque et appetitiones, quas ὁρμὰς Græci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic adhibet ut nosmet ipsi, qui animis movemur et sensibus, on which account the mens mundi is called πρόνοια. M. Aurel. iv. 40: ὡς ἓν ζῷον τὸν κόσμον μίαν οὐσίαν καὶ ψυχὴν μίαν ἐπέχον συνεχῶς ἐπινοεῖν· πῶς εἰς αἴσθησιν μίαν τὴν τούτου πάντα ἀναδίδοται καὶ πῶς ὁρμῇ μιᾷ πάντα πράσσει. Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. 72. Tertullian, Apol. 21: Hunc enim (λόγον) Zeno determinat factitatorem, qui cuncta in dispositione formaverit, eundem et fatum vocari et Deum et animum Jovis et necessitatem omnium rerum. Hæc Cleanthes in spiritum congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis affirmat. Similarly Lactant. Inst. iv. 9, 1, 5. Epiphan. Hær. v. 1, p. 12: According to the Stoics, God is νοῦς, residing in the world as its soul, and permeating the μερικαὶ οὐσίαι. Zeus is also spoken of as being the soul of the world by Cornutus, Nat. De. 2; by Plut. Sto. Rep. 39, 2, p. 1052; and by Chrysippus, ibid. 34, 5, p. 1050: ὅτι δ’ ἡ κοινὴ φύσις καὶ ὁ κοινὸς τῆς φύσεως λόγος εἱμαρμένη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ Ζεύς ἐστιν οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀντίποδας λέληθε· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ταῦτα θρυλεῖται ὑπ’ αὐτῶν. Stob. Ecl. i. 178: Ζήνων ... [τὴν εἱμαρμένην] δυνάμιν κινητικὴν τῆς ὕλης κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως, ἥντινα μὴ διαφέρειν πρόνοιαν καὶ φύσιν καλεῖν. Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 2: God cares for man; He is kind, beneficent, and loves men. Zeus is called κόσμος as αἴτιος τοῦ ζῇν, εἱμαρμένη, because εἱρομένῳ λόγῳ διοικεῖ all things, ἀδράστεια, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδράσκειν, πρόνοια, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ χρήσιμον οἰκονομεῖ ἕκαστα. Aristocles (Ibid. xv. 14): Primary fire contains the causes and λόγοι of all things; the unchangeable law and destiny of the world supplies their connection. Sen. Benef. iv. 7, 1: Quid enim aliud est natura, quam Deus et divina ratio toti mundo et partibus ejus inserta?... Hunc eundem et fatum si dixeris non mentieris. (Similarly Frag. 122 in Lact. Inst. ii. 8, 23). Id. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 2: God or Jupiter may be equally well spoken of as Destiny, Providence, Nature, the World. Stob. Ecl. i. 178: Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Στωϊκὸς θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο τὴν εἱμαρμένην. Zeus is called κοινὸς νόμος by Diog. vii. 88; by Cleanthes at the end of his hymn (Stob. Ecl. i. 34); likewise Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36 says of Zeno: Naturalem legem divinam esse censet, eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria. Plut. C. Not. 32, 1; Sto. Rep. 38, 3 and 7 (here following Antipater): God must be conceived of as μακάριος, εὐποιητικὸς, φιλάνθρωπος, κηδεμονικὸς, ὠφέλιμος. Muson. (in Stob. Floril. 117, 8): God is the type of every virtue, μεγαλόφρων, εὐεργετικὸς, φιλάνθρωπος, κ.τ.λ. Sen. Ep. 95, 48: Quæ causa est Dis benefaciendi? Natura. Errat, si quis illos putat nocere nolle: non possunt. Further details respecting the beneficent nature of the Gods in Sen. Benef. i. 9; iv. 3–9 and 26–28; Clement. i. 5, 7; Nat. Qu. v. 18, 13. On the divine omniscience; Ep. 83, 1; V. Beat. 20, 5.

According to Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 75, the Stoics divided the argument as to God’s providential care of the world into three parts. The first part went to establish that if there existed Gods, there must also be a care of the world; for Gods could not exist without having something to do, and to care for the world is the noblest thing that can be done. If, moreover, deity is the highest being, the world must be governed by deity. The same conclusion is arrived at from the wisdom and power of deity, which must always busy itself with what is best and highest. Lastly, it is stated, that inasmuch as the stars, heaven, the universe, and all powers in the world are divine, it is clear that everything must be governed by divine reason. The second part proved that the force and skill of nature produced and sustains all things. All the more reason that a universe so skilfully formed and so harmoniously arranged must be directed by a natura sentiens. And since, in its parts, it could not be more beautiful or adapted to its purpose, it must be true of it more than of any human work of art, that it owes its origin to a forming reason. The third part aims at proving, on physico-theological grounds, quanta sit admirabilitas cœlestium rerum atque terrestrium.

Stob. Ecl. i. 58: Διογένης καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Οἰνοπίδης τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν [θεὸν λέγουσι] ... Ποσειδώνιος πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες, οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφὴν μεταβάλλον δὲ εἰς ὃ βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον πᾶσιν ... Ζήνων ὁ Στωϊκὸς νοῦν κόσμον πύρινον. Ib. 64; Plut. Plac. i. 8, 17: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ νοερὸν (Plut. κοινότερον) θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου (a similar definition of nature is given by Zeno in Cic. Nat. De. ii. 22, 57) ἐμπεριειληφός τε πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, καθ’ οὓς ἅπαντα (Pl. ἕκαστα) καθ’ εἱμαρμένην γίνεται, καὶ πνεῦμα ἐνδιῆκον, δι’ ὅλον τοῦ κόσμου, τὰς δὲ προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνον διὰ τὰς τῆς ὅλης, δι’ ἧς κεχώρηκε μεταλλάξεις. Following the same source, Athenag. Leg. pro Christ. c. 5, Schl.: εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν θεὸς πῦρ τεχνικὸν, κ.τ.λ. (the same down to γίνεται) τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ διήκει δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου· ὁ θεὸς εἷς κατ’ αὐτοὺς, Ζεὺς μὲν κατὰ τὸ ζέον τῆς ὕλης ὀνομαζόμενος, Ἥρα δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον τῆς ὕλης μέρος, δι’ ἧς κεχώρηκε, καλούμενος. The latter passage is explained by Diog. 147, who thus continues: Δία μὲν γάρ φασι δι’ ὃν τὰ πάντα· Ζῆνα δὲ καλοῦσι παρ’ ὅσον τοῦ ζῇν αἴτιός ἐστιν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ζῇν κεχώρηκεν. (This, too, in Stob. Ecl. i. 48.) Ἀθηνᾶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς αἰθέρα διάτασιν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ αὐτοῦ. Ἥραν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἀέρα. καὶ Ἥφαιστον κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ τεχνικὸν πῦρ. καὶ Ποσειδῶνα κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ ὑγρόν. καὶ Δήμητραν κατὰ τὴν εἰς γῆν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας προσηγορίας ἐχόμενοί τινος ὁμοιότητος ἀπέδοσαν. Plut. C. Not. 48, 2, p. 1085: τὸν θεὸν ... σῶμα νοερὸν καὶ νοῦν ἐν ὕλῃ ποιοῦντες. M. Aurel. 5, 32: τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας διήκοντα λόγον, κ.τ.λ. Porphyr. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 16, 1: τὸν δὲ θεὸν ... πῦρ νοερὸν εἰπόντες. Orig. c. Cels. vi. 71: κατὰ μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ... καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ μέχρι ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἐλαχίστων καταβαίνων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ πνεῦμα σωματικόν. The same combination of nature and mind in the conceptions of God is found in the hymn of Cleanthes (in Stob. Ecl. i. 30), Zeus being described as the ἀρχηγὸς φύσεως, who directs the κοινὸς λόγος ὃς διὰ πάντων φοιτᾷ, by means of πῦρ ἀείζωον.

Stob. Ecl. i. 374: Chrysippus teaches εἶναι τὸ ὂν πνεῦμα κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, ἢ πνεῦμα ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω· πνεῦμα δὲ εἴληπται διὰ τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ ἀέρα εἶναι κινούμενον· ἀνάλογον δὲ γίγνεσθαι ἔπειτα [? perhaps: αὐτὸ, or: πυρὸς ἢ] αἰθερὸς, ὥστε καὶ εἰς κοινὸν λόγον πεσεῖν αὐτά. Diog. vii. 137: ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι.

Stob. Ecl. i. 538, on the authority of Zeno; Cic. N. D. ii. 15, 40, on that of Cleanthes. Both state that the difference consists in this: Ordinary (ἄτεχνον) fire consumes things; but the πῦρ τεχνικὸν, which constitutes φύσις and ψυχὴ, preserves things. Heraclitus, too, in making primary fire the basis of things, did not mean flame, but warmth, which may be equally well described as atmospheric substance or as ψυχή.

Seneca, De Benefic. iv. 7, 2: God may also be called fatum: nam cum fatum nihil aliud sit quam series implexa causarum, ille est prima omnium causa, ex qua ceteræ pendent. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 1: Vis illum fatum vocare? Non errabis. Hic est, ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa causarum. The same applies to the name of providence and nature. See p. 162, 2.

Stob. Ecl. i. 178 (Plut. Plac. i. 28, 5): Ποσειδώνιος [τὴν εἱμαρμένην] τρίτην ἀπὸ Διός. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν φύσιν, τρίτην δὲ τὴν εἱμαρμένην. Conf. Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125, where prophecy is deduced, according to Posidonius, (1) a Deo, (2) a fato, (3) a natura. Plut. C. Not. 36, 5, p. 1077: λέγει γοῦν Χρύσιππος, ἐοικέναι τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν κόσμον (instead of which Heine, Stoic. De Fat. Doct. p. 25, apparently without reason, conjectures: καὶ τῷ μὲν σώματι τὸν κόσμον), τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὴν πρόνοιαν· ὅταν οὖν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται μόνον ἄφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἶτα ὁμοῦ γενομένους ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους. To this maxim of Chrysippus, reference is made by Philo, Incorrup. M. 951, B, where, too, πρόνοια is equivalent to ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου.

According to Chrysippus. A different view is taken by Posidonius. With him Zeus stands for the original force, φύσις for its first, and εἱμαρμένη for its second production.

Plut. l.c. Sen. Ep. 9, 16: [Jupiter] resoluto mundo et Diis in unum confusis, paullisper cessante natura, acquiescit sibi, cogitationibus suis traditus.

Compare, besides what has been already quoted, Cic. Acad. i. 11, 39: (Zeno) statuebat ignem esse ipsam naturam. Diog. vii. 156: δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς τὴν μὲν φύσιν εἶναι πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πνεῦμα πυροειδὲς καὶ τεχνοειδές. Stob. Ecl. i. 180: Χρύσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν τοῦ οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικήν; or, according to another definition: εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος, ἢ λόγος, τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων, κ.τ.λ. Instead of λόγος, he also used ἀλήθεια, φύσις, αἰτία, ἀνάγκη, &c.

See p. 143.

Cic. N. D. ii. 11, 30: Atque etiam mundi ille fervor purior, perlucidior mobiliorque multo ob easque causas aptior ad sensus commovendos quam hic noster calor, quo hæc quæ nota nobis sunt, retinentur et vigent. Absurdum igitur est dicere, cum homines bestiæque hoc calore teneantur et propterea moveantur ac sentiant, mundum esse sine sensu, qui integro et puro et libero eodemque acerrimo et mobilissimo ardore teneatur. Conf. Ar. Didymus, in the passage quoted, p. 146, 4, p. 105, 127.

Consol. ad Helviam, 8, 3: Id actum est, mihi crede, ab illo, quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille Deus est potens omnium, sive incorporalis ratio, ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima æquali intentione [= τόνος] diffusus, sive fatum et immutabilis causarum inter se cohærentium series. Conf. p. 153, 1.

Cic. N. D. i. 14: Zeno calls natural law divine, but he also calls the Ether and the all-pervading Reason deity. (We shall come back presently to what he says as to the divinity of the stars.) Cleanthes gives the name of deity to the world, reason, the soul of the world, and ether; Chrysippus to reason, to the soul of the world, to ruling reason, to communis natura, destiny, fire, ether, the universe, and eternal law.

Krische, Forsch. i. 365.

See pp. 153, 2; 153, 4.

Chrysippus. See p. 152, note 1.

Aristocles. See p. 147, note 3.

Mnesarchus, in Stob. i. 60. See p. 148, 1.

Orig. c. Cels. iii. 75, p. 497, A: Στωϊκῶν θεὸν φθαρτὸν εἰσαγόντων καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ λεγόντων σῶμα τρεπτὸν διόλου καὶ ἀλλοιωτὸν καὶ μεταβλητὸν καί ποτε πάντα φθειρόντων καὶ μόνον τὸν θεὸν καταλιπόντων. Ibid. iv. 14: ὁ τῶν Στωϊκῶν θεὸς ὅτε σῶμα τυγχάνων ὅτε μὲν ἡγεμονικὸν ἔχει τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν ὅταν ἡ ἐκπύρωσις ᾖ· ὅτε δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους γίνεται αὐτῆς ὅταν ᾖ διακόσμησις.

Besides the quotations already given from Chrysippus on p. 153, 2, and Cleanthes on p. 155, 1, compare Phædr. Nat. De. (Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβείας), Col. 5: Διογένης δ’ ὁ Βαβυλώνιος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τὸν κόσμον γράφει τῷ Διῒ τὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν, ἢ περιέχειν τὸν Δία καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ψυχήν. Cic. N. De. ii. 17, 45: Nothing corresponds better to the idea of God, quam ut primum hunc mundum, quo nihil fieri excellentius potest, animantem esse et Deum judicem. Ibid. 13, 34: Perfect reason Deo tribuenda, id est mundo. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 3; Vis illum vocare mundum? Non falleris. Ipse enim est hoc quod vides totum, suis partibus inditus et se sustinens et sua. Ibid. Prolog. 13: Quid est Deus? Mens universi. Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum et quod non vides totum. Sic demum magnitudo sua illi redditur, qua nihil majus excogitari potest, si solus est omnia, opus suum et extra et intra tenet. Diog. vii. 148: οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων μέν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν. Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1 and 3: ὅλον δὲ τὸν κόσμον σὺν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσι προσαγορεύουσι θεόν.... διὸ δὴ καὶ Ζεὺς λέγεται ὁ κόσμος. Orig. c. Cels. v. 7: σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι θεὸν Στωϊκοὶ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον. The arguments given, p. 144, for the existence of God are based on the supposition that God is the same as the World. The existence of God is proved by showing the reasonableness of the world. Aratus gives a poet’s description of the Stoic pantheism at the beginning of the Phænomena: Zeus is the being of whom streets and markets, sea and land, are full, whose offspring is man, and who, out of regard for man, has appointed signs in the heavens to regulate the year. The same idea is contained in the well-known lines of Virgil, Georg. iv. 220; Æn. vi. 724. The round figure of the Stoic deity, Sen. Ep. 113, 22; De M. Claud. 8, 1, has also reference to the world as God. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 17, 46.

Stob. Ecl. i. 444: κόσμον δ’ εἶναι φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων· ἢ τὸ ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων σύστημα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων. λέγεται δ’ ἑτέρως κόσμος ὁ θεὸς, καθ’ ὃν ἡ διακόσμησις γίνεται καὶ τελειοῦται. Diog. vii. 137: λέγουσι δὲ κόσμον τριχῶς· αὐτόν τε τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἁπάσης οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιὸν, ὃς δὴ ἄφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος δημιουργὸς ὢν τῆς διακοσμήσεως κατὰ χρόνων τινὰς περιόδους ἀναλίσκων εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ γεννῶν. καὶ αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον εἶναι λέγουσι καὶ τρίτον τὸ συνεστηκὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. καὶ ἔστι κόσμος ἢ (according to the first meaning of the word) ὁ ἰδίως ποιὸς τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας, (universal substance in its definite quality) ἢ (second meaning) ὥς φησι Ποσειδώνιος ... σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων, ἢ (third meaning) σύστημα ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων. Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1: κόσμος is the name for τὸ ἐκ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας ποιὸν, and for τὸ κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν τὴν τοιαύτην καὶ διάταξιν ἔχον. In the former sense, the world is eternal, and the same as God; in the latter, created, and subject to change. Compare also the quotations from the mathematician Diodorus, in Ach. Tat. Isag. c. 6. p. 129, b.

See p. 148. The two ideas blend. Thus Seneca, Nat. Qu. Prol. 13, says God must be the Reason of the world and must also be the universe itself; and he continues: Quid ergo interest, inter naturam Dei et nostram? Nostri melior pars animus est, in illo nulla pars extra animum est. Totus est ratio, &c.

The connection of the two, like the connection between soul and body, and the argument quoted by Tertullian from Zeno on p. 148, 1, is κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων. See p. 135.

Stob. Ecl. i. 60: Βόηθος τὸν αἰθέρα θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο.

Diog. 143: Βόηθος δέ φησιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῷον τὸν κόσμον. The words of Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, C—ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ τοὺς ἀντιδοξοῦντας ὁ θεὸς—imply the same, but these words evidently are not taken from Boëthus.

Diog. 148: Βόηθος δὲ ἐν τῇ περὶ φύσεως οὐσίαν θεοῦ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν· which must be understood in the same sense as the corresponding statements of other Stoics: the ἡγεμονικὸν of the world resides in the purest part of the ether. Yet, inasmuch as the world is no living being, nor is deity the soul of the world, it must, according to the view of Boëthus, act upon it from without. This is expressly stated in Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, B, God is described as the charioteer guiding the world, and παριστάμενος the stars and elements. But this passage, beginning at καὶ μήποτ’ εἰκότως, is evidently Philo’s own expansion of what he has just quoted from Boëthus.

Diog. vii. 136: κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὑτὸν ὄντα [τὸν θεὸν] τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου τοιοῦδε ὑπολιπέσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ ἐνεργὸν αὐτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἑξῆς γένεσιν, κ.τ.λ. Seneca, Nat. Quæst. iii. 13, 1: Fire will consume the world: hunc evanidum considere, et nihil relinqui aliud in rerum natura, igne restincto, quam humorem. In hoc futuri mundi spem latere. Stob. Ecl. i. 372 and 414, 5. See pp. 161, 2; 164, 2.

Stob. i. 370: Ζήνωνα δὲ οὕτως ἀποφαίνεσθαι διαρρήδην· τοιαύτην δεήσει εἶναι ἐν περιόδῳ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διακόσμησιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας. ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς τροπὴ εἰς ὕδωρ δι’ ἀέρος γένηται τὸ μέν τι ὑφίστασθαι καὶ γῆν συνίστασθαι, ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν διαμένειν ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἀτμιζομένου ἀέρα γίνεσθαι, ἐκ τινος δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος πῦρ ἐξάπτειν. Diog. vii. 142: γίνεσθαι δὲ τὸν κόσμον ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς ἡ οὐσία τραπῇ δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὑγρότητα, εἶτα τὸ παχυμερὲς αὐτοῦ συστὰν ἀποτελεσθῇ γῆ τὸ δὲ λεπτομερὲς ἐξαερωθῇ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐπιπλέον λεπτυνθὲν πῦρ ἀπογεννήσῃ; εἶτα κατὰ μίξιν ἐκ τούτων φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα καὶ ἄλλα γένη. Chrys. in Plut. St. Rep. 41, 3, p. 1053: ἡ δὲ πυρὸς μεταβολή ἐστι τοιαύτη· δι’ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ τρέπεται· κἀκ τούτου γῆς ὑφισταμένης ἀὴρ ἐνθυμιᾶται· λεπτυνομένου δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος ὁ αἰθὴρ περιχεῖται κύκλῳ. The same writer observes, in the Scholia on Hesiod’s Theogony, v. 459, ὅτι καθύγρων ὄντων τῶν ὅλων καὶ ὄμβρων καταφερομένων πολλῶν τὴν ἔκκρισιν τούτων Κρόνον ὠνομάσθαι. Conf. Clemens, Strom. v. 599, C, and Stob. i. 312.

Stob. Ecl. i. 442, also affirms that the creation of the universe begins with earth.

Stob. l.c.: Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω πώς φησιν· ἐκφλογισθέντος τοῦ παντὸς συνίζειν τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ πρῶτον, εἶτα τὰ ἐχόμενα ἀποσβέννυσθαι δι’ ὅλου. τοῦ δὲ παντὸς ἐξυγρανθέντος, τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρὸς, ἀντιτυπήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ μέσου, τρέπεσθαι πάλιν εἰς τοὐναντίον (the probable meaning is, that the last remains of the original fire begin a motion in the opposite direction) εἶθ’ οὕτω τρεπόμενον ἄνω φησὶν αὔξεσθαι· καὶ ἄρχεσθαι διακοσμεῖν τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τοιαύτην περίοδον ἀεὶ καὶ διακόσμησιν ποιουμένου τοῦ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσίᾳ τόνου (for this favourite expression of Cleanthes, see p. 127, 5; 128, 2) μὴ παύεσθαι [διακοσμούμενον τὸ ὅλον]. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἑνός τινος τὰ μέρη πάντα φύεται ἐκ σπερμάτων ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μέρη, ὧν καὶ τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις φύεται. καὶ ὥσπερ τινὲς λόγοι τῶν μερῶν εἰς σπέρμα συνιόντες μίγνυνται καὶ αὖθις διακρίνονται γενομένων τῶν μερῶν, οὕτως ἐξ ἑνός τε πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἓν συγκρίνεσθαι, (conf. Heraclit. in vol. i. 467, 1), ὁδῷ καὶ συμφώνως διεξιούσης τῆς περιόδου. A few further details are supplied by Macrob. Sat. i. 17. The myth respecting the birth of Apollo and Artemis is referred to the formation of the sun and moon. Namque post chaos, ubi primum cœpit confusa deformitas in rerum formas et elementa nitescere, terræque adhuc humida substantia in molli atque instabili sede nutaret: convalescente paullatim æthereo calore atque inde seminibus in eam igneis defluentibus (the connection of Zeus, i.e., of Ether, with Leto, the Earth) hæc sidera edita esse creduntur; et solem maxima caloris vi in superna raptum; lunam vero humidiore et velut femineo sexu naturali quodam pressam tepore inferiora tenuisse, tanquam ille magis substantia patris constet, hæc matris. The statement that besides other things plants and animals had their origin in the intermingling of elements (Stob. and Diog.) must be understood in the sense of generatio æquivoca. Lactant. Inst. vii. 4, says the Stoics make men grow like sponges out of the earth, and Sext. Math. ix. 28 says the Stoics speak of the earth-born men of prehistoric ages.

There must always be some remainder of heat or fire, as Cleanthes and Chrysippus avowed, or else there would be no active life-power from which a new creation could emanate. Philo, Incorrupt. M. 964, C, observes that, if the world were entirely consumed by fire at the ἐκπύρωσις, the fire itself would be extinguished, and no new world would be possible. διὸ καί τινες τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ... ἔφασαν, ὅτι μετὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν, ἐπειδὰν ὁ νέος κόσμος μέλλῃ δημιουργεῖσθαι, σύμπαν μὲν τὸ πῦρ οὐ σβέννυται, ποσὴ δέ τις αὐτοῦ μοῖρα ὑπολείπεται.

Chrys. in Plut. l.c. 41, 6: διόλου μὲν γὰρ ὢν ὁ κόσμος πυρώδης εὐθὺς καὶ ψυχή ἐστιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἡγεμονικόν. ὅτε δὲ μεταβαλὼν εἰς τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναπολειφθεῖσαν ψυχὴν τρόπον τινὰ εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν μετέβαλεν ὥστε συνεστάναι ἐκ τούτων, ἄλλον τινὰ ἔσχε λόγον.

Nemes. Nat. Hom. C. 2, p. 72: λέγουσι δὲ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μὲν εἶναι δραστικὰ τὰ δὲ παθητικά· δραστικὰ μὲν ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ, παθητικὰ δὲ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ. Plut. Com. Not. 49, 2. See above p. 127, 5. From this passage a further insight is obtained into two points connected with the Stoic philosophy, which have been already discussed. It can no longer appear strange that the active power, or deity (and likewise the human soul), should at one time be called Fire, at another Air-Current, for both represent equally the acting force; and the statement that properties are atmospheric currents—as, indeed, the whole distinction of subject-matter and property—follows from this view of things.

The Stoics, according to Diog. 141, where, however, there is apparently a lacuna in the text, prove that the world (διακόσμησις, not κόσμος, in the absolute sense, see p. 158, 1) will come to an end, partly because it has come into being, and partly by two not very logical inferences: οὗ τὰ [vulgo οὗ τε τὰ, Cobet: οὗ τά τε] μέρη φθαρτά ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὰ δὲ μέρα τοῦ κόσμου φθαρτὰ, εἰς ἄλληλα γὰρ μεταβάλλει· φθαρτὸς ἄρα ὁ κόσμος· and εἴ τι ἐπιδεκτικόν ἐστι τῆς ἐπὶ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς, φθαρτόν ἐστι· καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἄρα· ἐξαυχμοῦται γὰρ καὶ ἐξυδατοῦται. Conf. Alex. Meteora, 90. In Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 2, p. 1054, Chrysippus asserts that the οὐσία is immortal, but to κόσμος belongs a ὥσπερ ἀφθαρσία.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 39, 2, p. 1052: [Χρύσιππος] ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ προνοίας τὸν Δία, φησὶν, αὔξεσθαι μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὑτὸν ἅπαντα καταναλώσῃ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ θάνατος μέν ἐστι ψυχῆς χωρισμὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴ οὐ χωρίζεται μὲν, αὔξεται δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὑτὴν ἐξαναλώσῃ τὴν ὕλην, οὐ ῥητέον ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν κόσμον. Stob. Ecl. i. 414 (according to Numenius: see Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1): Ζήνωνι καὶ Κλεάνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν οἷον εἰς σπέρμα τὸ πῦρ (Philo, Incorrupt. M. 956, B, expresses himself against this description) καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου τοιαύτην ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν διακόσμησιν οἷα πρότερον ἦν. Seneca, Consol. ad Marciam, gives a graphic description of the end of the world, which recalls the language of the Revelation. Compare, on the subject of ἐκπύρωσις, Diog. vii. 142, 137 (see above p. 158, 1); Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1; Plut. Com. Not. 36 (see p. 153, 2); Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 25, p. 53; Cic. Acad. ii. 37, 119; N. D. ii. 46, 118; Sen. Consol. ad Polyb. i. 2; Alex. Aphr. in Meteor. 90, a. In the last-named passage, it is urged by the Stoics, in support of their view, that even now large tracts of water are dried up or else take the place of dry land. Simpl. Phys. iii. b; De Cœlo; Schol. in Arist. 487, b, 35 and 489, a, 13; Justin. Apol. i. 20; ii. 7; Orig. c. Cels. iii. 75, 497, a; vi. 71. Since at the ἐκπύρωσις everything is resolved into deity, Plut. C. Not. 17, 3, p. 1067, says: ὅταν ἐκπυρώσωσι τὸν κόσμον οὗτοι, κακὸν μὲν οὐδ’ ὁτιοῦν ἀπολείπεται, τὸ δ’ ὅλον φρόνιμόν ἐστι τηνικαῦτα καὶ σοφόν.

Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1: ἀρέσκει δὲ τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης, ἐξαεροῦσθαι πάντα κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰς μεγίστας, εἰς πῦρ αἰθερῶδες ἀναλυομένων πάντων. According to Philo, Incorrupt. M. 954, E, Cleanthes called this fire φλόξ, Chrysippus αὐγή. Respecting ἄνθραξ, φλόξ, αὐγή, see ibid. 953, E. The observations on p. 151 respecting the identity of πῦρ, πνεῦμα, αἰθὴρ apply here.

This is, at least, the import of the general principle (assigned to Chrysippus by Stob. Ecl. i. 314) expressed by Heraclitus, that, in the resolution of earth and water into fire, the same steps intervene, in a retrograde order, as in their generation.

See p. 147, 1.

Plut. Com. Not. 31, 10: ἐπαγωνιζόμενος ὁ Κλεάνθης τῇ ἐκπυρώσει λέγει τὴν σελήνην καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα τὸν ἥλιον ἐξομοιῶσαι [leg. -ειν] πάντα ἑαυτῷ καὶ μεταβαλεῖν εἰς ἑαυτόν.

It is expressly asserted that everything, without exception, is liable to this destiny; neither the soul nor the Gods are exempt. Conf. Sen. Cons. ad Marc. 26, 7: Nos quoque felices animæ et æterna sortitæ (the words are put in the mouth of a dead man) cum Deo visum sit iterum ista moliri, labentibus cunctis, et ipsæ parva ruinæ ingentis accessio, in antiqua elementa vertemur. Chrysippus says of the Gods, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 38, 5: Some of the Gods have come into being and are perishable, others are eternal: Helios and Selene, and other similar deities, have come into being; Zeus is eternal. In Philo, Incorrupt. M. 950, A, Orig. c. Cels. iv. 68, Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420, Com. Not. 31, 5, p. 1075, it is objected that, at the general conflagration, the Gods will melt away, as though they were made of wax or tin. According to Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, Tab. i. 1, Vol. Hercul. vi. 1, even Zeno restricted the happy life of the Gods to certain lengthy periods of time.

Arius, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 19: ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο δὲ προελθὼν ὁ κοινὸς λόγος καὶ κοινὴ φύσις μείζων καὶ πλείων γενομένη τέλος ἀναξηράνασα πάντα καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀναλαβοῦσα ἐν τῇ πάσῃ οὐσίᾳ γίνεται (it occupies the room of the whole substance) ἐπανελθοῦσα εἰς τὸν πρῶτον ῥηθέντα λόγον καὶ εἰς ἀνάστασιν [? κατάστασιν] ἐκείνην τὴν ποιοῦσαν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν μέγιστον, καθ’ ὃν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς μόνης εἰς αὐτὴν πάλιν γίνεται ἡ ἀποκατάστασις (the same in Philop. Gen. et Corr. B. ii. Schl. p. 70), ἐπανελθοῦσα δὲ διὰ τάξιν ἀφ’ οἵας διακοσμεῖν ὡσαύτως ἤρξατο κατὰ λόγον πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν διεξαγωγὴν ποιεῖται. See p. 161. According to Nemes. Nat. Hom. c, 38, p. 147, conf. Censorin. Di. Nat. 18, 11, the ἐκπύρωσις takes place when all the planets have got back to the identical places which they occupied at the beginning of the world, or, in other words, when a periodic year is complete. The length of a periodic year was estimated by Diogenes (Plut. Pl. i. 32, 2; Stob. Ecl. i. 264) at 365 periods, or 365 × 18,000 ordinary years. Plut. De Ei ap. D. 9, g, E, p. 389 mentions the opinion, ὅπερ τρία πρὸς ἓν, τοῦτο τὴν διακόσμησιν χρόνῳ πρὸς τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν εἶναι. Inasmuch as it had been previously said that the duration of κόρος (i.e. ἐκπύρωσις) was longer, and that therefore Apollo, who represents the state of perfect unity, was honoured nine months with the pæan, whilst Dionysus, torn to pieces by the Titans, the emblem of the present world of contraries, was only honoured for three with the dithyramb, some mistake seems to have crept in. Probably we ought either to read ὅπερ πρὸς τρία ἕν, or to transpose the passage from διακόσμησιν to ἐκπύρωσιν.

The belief in changing cycles is a common one in the older Greek philosophy. In particular, the Stoics found it in Heraclitus. The belief, however, that each new world exactly represents the preceding one is first met with among the Pythagoreans, and is closely connected with the theory of the migration of souls and a periodic year. Eudemus, in a passage which has generally been lost sight of in describing Pythagorean teaching, had taught (in Simpl. Phys. 173): εἰ δέ τις πιστεύσειε τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, ὡς πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ ἀριθμῷ κἀγὼ μυθολογήσω τὸ ῥαβδίον ἔχων ὑμῖν καθημένοις οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὁμοίως ἕξει, καὶ τὸν χρόνον εὔλογόν ἐστι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι (in that case the time must be the same as the present time). The Stoics appear to have borrowed this view from the Pythagoreans (unless with other Orphic-Pythagorean views it was known to Heraclitus), and it commended itself to them as being in harmony with their theory of necessity. Hence they taught: μετὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν πάλιν πάντα ταὐτὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γενέσθαι κατ’ ἀριθμὸν, ὡς καὶ τὸν ἰδίως ποιὸν πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναί τε καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐκείνῳ τῷ κόσμῳ (Alex. Anal. Pr. 58, b). τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος, δῆλον, ὡς οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον, καὶ ἡμᾶς μετὰ τὸ τελευτῆσαι πάλιν περιόδων τινῶν εἰλημμένων χρόνον εἰς ὃν νῦν ἐσμεν καταστήσεσθαι σχῆμα (Chrysippus, περὶ Προνοίας, in Lactant. Inst. vii. 23. Conf. Seneca, Ep. 36, 10: Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies). This applies to every fact and to every occurrence in the new world, at the παλιγγενεσία or ἀποκατάστασις (as the return of a former age is called): thus there will be another Socrates, who will marry another Xanthippe, and be accused by another Anytus and Meletus. Hence M. Aurel. vii. 19, xi. 1, deduces his adage, that nothing new happens under the sun. Simpl. Phys. 207, b; Philop. Gen. et Corr. B. ii. Schl. p. 70; Tatian. c. Græc. c, 3, 245, d; Clemens, Strom. v. 549, D; Orig. c. Cels. iv. 68; v. 20 and 23; Nemes. l.c.; Plut. Def. Or. 29, p. 425. Amongst other things, the Stoics raised the question, Whether the Socrates who would appear in the future world would be numerically identical (εἷς ἀριθμῷ) with the present Socrates or not? (Simpl. l.c.)—the answer being, that they could not be numerically identical, since this would involve uninterrupted existence, but that they would be alike without a difference (ἀπαράλλακτοι). Others, however, chiefly among the younger Stoics, appear to have held that there might be noticeable differences between the two. (Orig. v. 20, 592, c.) This remark appears to have given rise to the false notion (Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21; Epiphan. Hær. v. p. 12, b) that the Stoics believed in the transmigration of souls. The remark made by Nemes., that the Gods know the whole course of the present world, from having survived the end of the former one, can only apply to one highest God, who, however, does not require such empirical knowledge. The other deities will not have survived the general conflagration.

Ar. Didym. l.c. continues: τῶν τοιούτων περιόδων ἐξ ἀϊδίου γινομένων ἀκαταπαύστως. οὔτε γὰρ τῆς ἀρχῆς αἰτίαν καὶ [del.] πᾶσιν οἷόν τε γινέσθαι, οὔτε τοῦ διοικοῦντος αὐτά. οὐσίαν τε γὰρ τοῖς γινομένοις ὑφεστάναι δεῖ πεφυκυῖαν ἀναδέχεσθαι τὰς μεταβολὰς πάσας καὶ τὸ δημιουργῆσον ἐξ αὐτῆς, κ.τ.λ. Conf. Philop.: ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἄν τις, ὥς φησιν Ἀλέξανδρος, πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ἡ αὐτὴ ἀεὶ διαμένει, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ, διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν οὐχὶ κατὰ περίοδόν τινα πλείονος χρόνου ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὕλης τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔσται; ὅπερ τινές φασι κατὰ τὴν παλιγγενέσιαν καὶ τὸν μέγαν ἐνιαυτὸν συμβαίνειν, ἐν ᾧ πάντων τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποκατάστασις γίνεται. See M. Aurel. v. 32.

According to Philo (Incorrupt. M. 947, C), besides Posidonius and Panætius, his instructor (Diog. vii. 142; Stob. Ecl. i. 414), Boëthus asserted, in opposition to the ordinary Stoic teaching, the eternity of the world. Philo adds that this was also the view of Diogenes of Seleucia in his later years. Moreover, Zeno of Tarsus, on the authority of Numenius (in Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 19, 2), considered that the destruction of the world by fire could not be proved (φασὶν ἐπισχεῖν περὶ τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως τῶν ὅλων). But these statements are elsewhere contradicted. Diogenes mentions Posidonius as one who held the destruction of the world by fire. The testimony of Diogenes is confirmed by Plut. Pl. Phil. ii. 9, 3 (Stob. Ecl. i. 380; Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 40. See Achill. Tatian, Isag. 131, C), who says that Posidonius only allowed so much empty space outside the world as was necessary for the world to be dissolved in at the ἐκπύρωσις. The difference between his view and the older Stoical view which Bake (Posidon. Rel. 58) deduces from Stob. i. 432, is purely imaginary. Antipater, according to Diogenes, also believed in a future conflagration. Little importance can be attached to the statement in Cic. N. D. ii. 46, 118, respecting Panætius, addubitare dicebant; whereas the words of Stob. are: πιθανωτέραν νομίζει τὴν ἀϊδιότητα τοῦ κόσμου; and those of Diog.: ἄφθαρτον ἀπεφήνατο τὸν κόσμον.

Boëthus emphatically denied the destruction of the world, his chief reasons (in Philo, l.c. 952, C) being the following:—(1) If the world were destroyed, it would be a destruction without a cause, for there is no cause, either within or without, which could produce such an effect. (2) Of the three modes of destruction, those κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατὰ ἀναίρεσιν τῆς ἐπεχούσης ποιότητος (as in the crushing of a statue), κατὰ σύγχυσιν (as in chemical resolution), not one can apply to the world. (3) If the world ceased to exist, the action of God on the world, in fact, His activity would altogether cease. (4) If everything were consumed by fire, the fire must go out for want of fuel. With that, the possibility of a new world is at an end.

The resolution of the world into indefinite vacuum, attributed by Plut. Plac. ii. 9, 2, to the Stoics in general, is no doubt the same as the condensation and expansion of matter. Ritter, iii. 599 and 703, supposes it to be a misapprehension of the real Stoic teaching. How Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 391, and Schleiermacher, Gesch. d. Philos. p. 129, in view of the passages quoted, can absolutely deny that the Stoics held a periodic destruction of the world, is hard to comprehend.

The flood and its causes are fully discussed by Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 27–30. Rain, inroads of the sea, earthquakes, are all supposed to contribute. The chief thing, however, is, that such a destruction has been ordained in the course of the world. It comes cum fatalis dies venerit, cum adfuerit illa necessitas temporum (27, 1), cum Deo visum ordiri meliora, vetera finiri (28, 7); it has been fore-ordained from the beginning (29, 2; 30, 1), and is due, not only to the pressure of the existing waters, but also to their increase, and to a changing of earth into water (29, 4). The object of this flood is to purge away the sins of mankind, ut de integro totæ rudes innoxiæque generentur [res humanæ] nec supersit in deteriora præceptor (29, 5); peracto judicio generis humani exstructisque pariter feris ... antiquus ordo revocabitur. Omne ex integro animal generabitur dabiturque terris, homo inscius scelerum: but this state of innocence will not last long. Seneca (29, 1) appeals to Berosus, according to whom the destruction of the world by fire will take place when all the planets are in the sign of the Crab, its destruction by water when they are in the sign of the Capricorn. Since these signs correspond with the summer and winter turns of the sun, the language of Seneca agrees with that of Censorin. Di. Nat. 18, 11, evidently quoted from Varro, conf. Jahn, p. viii: Cujus anni hiems summa est cataclysmus ... æstas autem ecpyrosis. Conf. Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c, 25, p. 53: When one element gains the supremacy over the others, the course of the world will come to an end, by ἐκπύρωσις, if the element is fire; εἰ δ’ ἄθρουν ὕδωρ ἐκραγείη, κατακλυσμῷ τὸν κόσμον ἀπολεῖσθαι.

For the former view, the language of Heraclitus and Censorinus tells, for the latter that of Seneca.

Diog. vii. 149: καθ’ εἱμαρμένην δέ φασι τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι Χρύσιππος, κ.τ.λ. ἔστι δ’ εἱμαρμένη αἰτία τῶν ὄντων εἰρομένη ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν ὁ κόσμος διεξάγεται. A. Gell. vi. 2, 3: (Chrysippus) in libro περὶ προνοίας quarto εἱμαρμένην esse dicit φυσικήν τινα σύνταξιν τῶν ὅλων ἐξ ἀϊδίου τῶν ἑτέρων τοῖς ἑτέροις ἐπακολουθούντων καὶ μετὰ πολὺ μὲν οὖν ἀπαραβάτου οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης συμπλοκῆς. Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125 (according to Posidonius): Fatum, or εἱμαρμένη, was called ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causa causæ nexa rem ex se gignat. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 36: Quid enim intelligis fatum? existimo necessitatem rerum omnium actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat. De Prov. 5, 8: Irrevocabilis humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium conditor et rector scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. Semper paret, semper jussit.

Conf. p. 152 and Stob. Ecl. i. 180 (Plut. Plac. i. 28), Χρύσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικήν.

Hence Chrysippus’ definition (Plut. and Stob.): εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος ἢ λόγος (Plut. νόμος) τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων· ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γιγνόμενα γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται. Instead of λόγος, Chrysippus also used ἀλήθεια, αἰτία, φύσις, ἀνάγκη. Theodoret. Cur. Gr. Aff. vi. 14, p. 87: Chrysippus assigns the same meaning to εἱμαρμένον and κατηναγκασμένον, explaining εἱμαρμένη to be κίνησις ἀΐδιος συνεχὴς καὶ τεταγμένη; Zeno defines it (as Stob. i. 178, also says) as δύναμις κινητικὴ τῆς ὕλης; also as φύσις or πρόνοια; his successors as λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων, or as εἱρμὸς αἰτίων. (The same in Plut. Plac. i. 28, 4. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 36, p. 143.) Even τύχη, he continues, is explained as a deity (or as Simpl. Phys. 74, b, has it as a θεῖον καὶ δαιμόνιον); but this supposes it to be essentially identical with εἱμαρμένη. Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 34, 8, p. 1050: τῆς γὰρ κοινῆς φύσεως εἰς πάντα διατεινούσης, δεήσει πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν γινόμενον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τῶν μορίων ὁτῳοῦν, κατ’ ἐκείνην γενέσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον, κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ἀκωλύτως· διὰ τὸ μήτ’ ἔξωθεν εἶναι τὸ ἐνστησόμενον τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ μήτε τῶν μερῶν μηδὲν ἔχειν ὅπως κινηθήσεται ἢ σχήσει ἄλλως [ἢ] κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν. Cleanthes, Hymn. (in Stob. Ecl. i. 30) v. 12, 18; M. Aurel. ii. 3. See p. 151, 1.

It has been already demonstrated that all these ideas pass into one another.

Plut. Com. Not. 34, 5, p. 1076: εἰ δὲ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστόν ἐστι τῶν μερῶν ἔχειν ἄλλως ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὴν Διὸς βούλησιν, κ.τ.λ. Conf. Sto. Rep. 34, 2: οὕτω δὲ τῆς τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομίας προαγούσης, ἀναγκαῖον κατὰ ταύτην, ὡς ἄν ποτ’ ἔχωμεν, ἔχειν ἡμᾶς, εἴτε παρὰ φύσιν τὴν ἰδίαν νοσοῦντες, εἴτε πεπηρωμένοι, εἴτε γραμματικοὶ γεγονότες ἢ μουσικοὶ ... κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον τὰ παραπλήσια ἐροῦμεν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡμῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀτεχνιῶν, ὡς ἔφην ... οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλως τῶν κατὰ μέρος γενέσθαι, οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον, ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον. Ibid. 47, 4 and 8. Cleanth. Hymn. v. 15:

οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαῖμον, οὔτε κατ’ αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον οὔτ’ ἐνὶ πόντῳ, πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις.

See the quotations on p. 161, 1; 161, 2; 164, 2; 144, 1; 148; 145, 2, from Diog. vii. 136; Stob. Ecl. i. 372 and 414; Cic. N. D. ii. 10, 28; 22, 58; Sext. Math. ix. 101: M. Aurel. iv. 14: ἐναφανισθήσῃ τῷ γεννήσαντι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπερματικὸν κατὰ μεταβολήν. Ibid. 21: αἱ ψυχαὶ ... εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων σπερματικὸν λόγον ἀναλαμβανόμεναι.

See on p. 151, 1, the definition of deity from Stob.; Plut. Athenag.; M. Aurel. ix. 1: ὥρμησεν [ἡ φύσις] ἐπὶ τήνδε τὴν διακόσμησιν συλλαβοῦσά τινας λόγους τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ δυνάμεις γονίμους ἀφωρίσασα, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. vi. 24: Alexander and his groom ἐλήφθησαν εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοῦ κόσμου σπερματικοὺς λόγους. Diog. vii. 148: ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις ἐξ αὑτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. 157: μέρη δὲ ψυχῆς λέγουσιν ὀκτὼ, τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν σπερματικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ λογιστικόν.

As the primary fire or ether is called the seed of the world (p. 161, 1), so, according to Chrysippus (in Diog. 159), the σπέρμα in the seed of plants and animals is a πνεῦμα κατ’ οὐσίαν.

σπερματικὸς λόγος is also used to express the seed or the egg itself. Thus, in Plut. Quæst. Conviv. ii. 3, 3 and 4, it is defined as λόγος ἐνδεὴς γενέσεως.

See p. 101, 2.

This is particularly manifest, not only in the history of the world, but also in the doctrine of the constant change of the elements.

Heine, Stoicorum de Fato Doctrina (Naumb. 1859), p. 29.

Compare what the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 7) and Stob. (Ecl. i. 180) observe on the derivations of εἱμαρμένη, πεπρωμένη, Χρεὼν (Heine, p. 32, 1, suggests on the strength of Theodoret, Cur. Gr. Affect. vi. 11, p. 87, 4, who transcribes the quotation from Eusebius, τὸν χρόνον κατὰ τὸ χρεών. We ought rather to read, according to Theod. Gaisf., τὸ χρεὼν κατὰ τὸ χρέος), Μοῖραι, Κλωθώ: and the quotations p. 170, 1; 171, 1; also Ps. Arist. De Mundo, c. 7. The argument for Providence, drawn from the consensus gentium in Sen. Benef. iv. 4, follows another tack.

Homeric passages, which he was in the habit of quoting in Eus. l.c. 8, 1.

See Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 76.

The two are generally taken together. Compare the quotations on p. 145, 4.

See p. 83, 2; 110, 3; Aristotle and the Peripatetics thought differently. See Simpl. Cat. 103, β.

Cic. De Fato, 10, 20.

Alex. De Fato, p. 92, Orel.: τὸ δὲ λέγειν εὔλογον εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ ἐσόμενα προειδέναι ... καὶ τοῦτο λαμβάνοντας κατασκευάζειν πειρᾶσθαι δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε γίνεσθαι καὶ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε εὔλογον.

Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 162; De Fato, 3, 5 (unfortunately the previous exposition is wanting); Diogenian (in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 1): Chrysippus proves, by the existence of divination, that all things happen καθ’ εἱμαρμένην; for divination would be impossible, unless things were foreordained. Alex. De Fato, c. 21, p. 96: οἱ δὲ ὑμνοῦντες τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὑτῶν λόγον μόνον σώζεσθαι λέγοντες αὐτὴν καὶ ταύτῃ πίστει τοῦ πάντα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην γίνεσθαι χρώμενοι, κ.τ.λ.

Plut. De Fato, 11, p. 374: κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἐναντίον [λόγον] μάλιστα μὲν καὶ πρῶτον εἶναι δόξειε τὸ μηδὲν ἀναιτίως γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ προηγουμένας αἰτίας· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ φύσει διοικεῖσθαι τόνδε τὸν κόσμον, σύμπνουν καὶ συμπαθῆ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ ὄντα. Then come the considerations confirmatory of that view—divination, the wise man’s acquiescence in the course of the world, the maxim that every judgment is either true or false. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 35, p. 139: εἰ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτίων περιεστηκότων, ὥς φασιν αὐτοὶ, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὰ αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι.

Alex. De Fato, c. 22, p. 72: ὅμοιόν τε εἶναί φασι καὶ ὁμοίως ἀδύνατον τὸ ἀναιτίως τῷ γίνεσθαί τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος.

Alex. l.c. p. 70: φασὶ δὴ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε ἕνα ὄντα ... καὶ ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικούμενον ζωτικῆς τε καὶ λογικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς ἔχειν τὴν τῶν ὄντων διοίκησιν ἀΐδιον κατὰ εἱρμόν τινα καὶ τάξιν προϊοῦσαν; so that everything is connected as cause and effect, ἀλλὰ παντί τε τῷ γινομένῳ ἕτερόν τι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἠρτημένον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀπ’ ἀνάγκης ὡς αἰτίου, καὶ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἔχειν τι πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ᾧ ὡς αἰτίῳ συνήρτηται· μηδὲν γὰρ ἀναιτίως μήτε εἶναι μήτε γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ ἀπολελυμένον τε καὶ κεχωρισμένον τῶν προγεγονότων ἁπάντων· διασπᾶσθαι γὰρ καὶ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μηκέτι τὸν κόσμον ἕνα μένειν ἀεὶ, κατὰ μίαν τάξιν τε καὶ οἰκονομίαν διοικούμενον, εἰ ἀναίτιός τις εἰσάγοιτο κίνησις. See Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125; De Fato, 4, 7; M. Aurel. x. 5.

In Cic. N. D. ii. 65, 164, the Stoic says: Nec vero universo generi hominum solum, sed etiam singulis a Diis immortalibus consuli et provideri solet.

Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 46: Singulis non adest [Jupiter], et tamen vim et causam et manum omnibus dedit. Cic. N. D. 66, 167: Magna Dii curant, parva negligunt. Ibid. iii. 35, 86: At tamen minora Dii negligunt ... ne in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant. Sic enim dicitis.

Cicero uses the following argument to show that the providential care of God extends to individuals:—If the Gods care for all men, they must care for those in our hemisphere, and, consequently, for the cities in our hemisphere, and for the men in each city. The argument may be superfluous, but it serves to show that the care of individuals was the result of God’s care of the whole world. M. Aurel. vi. 44: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐβουλεύσαντο περὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐμοὶ συμβῆναι ὀφειλόντων οἱ θεοὶ, καλῶς ἐβουλεύσαντο ... εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐβουλεύσαντο κατ’ ἰδίαν περὶ ἐμοῦ, περί γε τῶν κοινῶν πάντως ἐβουλεύσαντο, οἷς κατ’ ἐπακολούθησιν καὶ ταῦτα συμβαίνοντα ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ στέργειν ὀφείλω. Similarly, iv. 28. It will be seen that the Stoics consider that the existence of divination, which served as a proof of special providence, was caused by the connection of nature.

As Alex. c. 28, p. 88, fitly observes.

The great majority of the Stoic answers to πολλὰ ζητήματα φυσικά τε καὶ ἠθικὰ καὶ διαλεκτικά, which (according to Plut. De Fato, c. 3) were called forth by the theory of destiny, in all probability belong to him.

See p. 171, 3, Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 23, 2, p. 1045. He assigned as a general reason τὸ γὰρ ἀναίτιον ὅλως ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον. Hence the Stoic definition of τύχη is αἰτία ἀπρονόητος καὶ ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ in Plut. De Fato. c. 7, p. 572; Plac. i. 29, 3 (Stob. Ecl. i. 218); Alex. De Fato, p. 24; Simpl. Phys. 74, 6. See p. 171, 1.

Alex. l.c. The Stoics assert that things are possible which do not take place, if in themselves they can take place, and διὰ τοῦτο φασὶ μηδὲ τὰ γενόμενα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, καίτοι ἀπαραβάτως γινόμενα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι, ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῖς δυνατὸν γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. Cic. Top. 15, 59: Ex hoc genere causarum ex æternitate pendentium fatum a Stoicis nectitur.

Alex. De Fato, c. 10, p. 32; Cic. De Fato, 17, 39); 18, 41, and above, p. 115, 2. Hence Plut. Plac. (similarly Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 39, p. 149): ἃ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι κατ’ ἀνάγκην, ἃ δὲ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τύχην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον, which is evidently more explicit than the language used by Stob. Ecl. i. 176, and the statement of Theodoret on p. 171, 1.

See p. 115, 2. Opponents such as Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 46, and Alex., pointed out how illusory this attempt was. According to the latter, he fell back on the simple result, maintaining that, in the case of things happening καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, there is nothing to prevent the opposite from coming about, so far as the causes which prevent this from happening are unknown to us.

See above, p. 171, 3.

Chrysipp. in Gell. N. A. vii. 2, 6; Alex. De Fato, c. 36, p. 112.

Gell. l.c.; Alex. c. 13; Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 35, p. 138, 140. Alex. c. 33 (on which see Heine, p. 43) gives a long argument, concluding with the words: πᾶν τὸ καθ’ ὁρμὴν γινόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς οὕτως ἐνεργοῦσιν εἶναι. Nemes. appeals to Chrysippus, and also to Philopator, a Stoic of the second century A.D. Of him he remarks, that he has consistently attributed τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν to lifeless objects.

Cic. De Fato, 18, 41: In order to avoid necessitas, or to uphold fate, Chrysippus distinguishes causæ principales et perfectæ from causæ adjuvantes, his meaning being that everything happens according to fate, not causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adjuvantibus. Conf. Cic. Top. 15, 59. Although these causes may not be in our power, still it is our will which assents to the impressions received. Œnomaus (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 7, 3, and 10) charges Chrysippus with making a ἡμίδουλον of the will, because he laid so great a stress on its freedom.

Gell. vii. 2, 13: Cic. l.c.

Alex. c. 34, p. 106, puts in the mouth of the Stoics: τὰ μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἐνεργήσει μόνον, τὰ δὲ πράξει τὰ λογικὰ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἁμαρτήσεται, τὰ δὲ κατορθώσει. ταῦτα γὰρ τούτοις κατὰ φύσιν μὲν, ὄντων δὲ καὶ ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ κατορθωμάτων, καὶ τῶν τοιαύτων φύσεων καὶ ποιοτήτων μὴ ἀγνοουμένων, καὶ ἔπαινοι μὲν καὶ ψόγοι καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ κολάσεις.

Alex. c. 26, p. 82.

Alex. c. 32, p. 102.

The arguments usual among the Stoics in after times may, with great probability, be referred to Chrysippus.

Alex. c. 35: λέγουσι γάρ· οὐκ ἔστι τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ πεπρωμένη· (It never happens that there is a εἱμαρμένη but not a πεπρωμένη) οὐδὲ ἔστι πεπρωμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ αἶσα· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν αἶσα, οὐκ [οὐδὲ] ἔστι δὲ νέμεσις· οὐκ ἔστι μὲν νέμεσις, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ νόμος· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν νόμος, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν ποιητέον ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον· ἀλλὰ ἀπαγορεύεται μὲν τὰ ἁμαρτανόμενα, προστάττεται δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι μὲν τοιαύτη ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ κατορθώματα· ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔστιν ἁμαρτήματα καὶ κατορθώματα, ἔστιν ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἔστι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐπαινετὸν, τὸ δὲ αἰσχρὸν ψεκτόν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ ψεκτόν. What is praiseworthy deserves τιμὴ or γέρως ἀξίωσις, and what is blameworthy merits κόλασις or ἐπανόρθωσις.

Alex. c. 37, p. 118: A second argument ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς παλαίστρας is the following:—οὐ πάντα μὲν ἔστι καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἀκώλυτος καὶ ἀπαρεμπόδιστος ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κόσμος· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν κόσμος, οὐκ εἰσὶ δὲ θεοί· (for κόσμος, according to the definitions of Chrysippus, is the whole, including gods and men. See p. 158, 1) εἰ δέ εἰσι θεοὶ, εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ οἱ θεοί· ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, ἔστιν ἀρετή· ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ, ἔστι φρόνησις· ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ποιητέων τε καὶ οὐ ποιητέων· ἀλλὰ ποιητέα μὲν ἔστι τὰ κατορθώματα, οὐ ποιητέα δὲ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, κ.τ.λ. οὐκ ἄρα πάντα μὲν γίνεται καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ γεραίρειν καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν.

Cic. De Fato, 12, 28; Diogenian. (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 16); Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37. Things which were determined by the co-operation of destiny alone Chrysippus called συγκαθειμαρμένα (confatalia). The argument by which he was confuted, which Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 489, erroneously attributes to the Stoics themselves, went by the name of ἀργὸς λόγος (ignava ratio). Besides the ἀργὸς λόγος, Plut. De Fato, c. 11, p. 574, mentions the θερίζων and the λόγος παρὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην as fallacies which could only be refuted on the ground of the freedom of the will. The last-named one, perhaps, turned on the idea (Œnomaus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 7, 12) that man might frustrate destiny if he neglected to do what was necessary to produce the foreordained results. According to Ammon. De Inter. 106, a, Lucian, Vit. Auct. 22, the θερίζων was as follows:—Either you will reap or you will not reap: it is therefore incorrect to say, perhaps you will reap.

Sen. (after Cleanthes, whose verses in Epictet. Man. 52) Ep. 107, 11: Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt. Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21, has put it very plainly: τὸ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην εἶναι πάντη διεβεβαιώσαντο παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι τοιούτῳ, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀχήματος ἐὰν ᾖ ἐξηρτημένος κύων, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται ἕπεσθαι, καὶ ἕλκεται καὶ ἕπεται ἑκὼν ... ἐὰν δὲ μὴ βούληται ἕπεσθαι, πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται, τὸ αὐτὸ δήπου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπρωμένον εἰσελθεῖν. The same idea is expanded by M. Aurel. vi. 42: All must work for the whole, ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ καὶ ὁ μεμφόμενος καὶ ὁ ἀντιβαίνειν πειρώμενος καὶ ἀναιρεῖν τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου ἔχρῃζεν ὁ κόσμος. It is man’s business to take care that he acts a dignified part in the common labour.

After all that has been said, this needs no further confirmation. Conversely, the unity of the forming power is concluded from the unity of the world. See p. 143, 1, 2. Conf. Plut. Def. Orac. 29, p. 425. M. Aurel. vi. 38: πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐπιπέπλεκται καὶ πάντα κατὰ τοῦτο φίλα ἀλλήλοις ἐστί ... τοῦτο δὲ διὰ τὴν τονικὴν κίνησιν καὶ σύμπνοιαν καὶ τὴν ἕνωσιν τῆς οὐσίας. Ibid. vii. 9.

Sext. Math. ix. 78: τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἡνωμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων ... ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἡνωμένον ἐστι σῶμα ἢ ἐκ συναπτομένων, ἢ ἐκ διεστώτων· οὔτε δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων οὔτε ἐκ διεστώτων, ὡς δείκνυμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν συμπαθειῶν· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῆς σελήνης αὐξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις πολλὰ τῶν τε ἐπιγείων ζῴων καὶ θαλασσίων φθίνει τε καὶ αὔξεται, ἀμπώτεις τε καὶ πλημμυρίδες (ebb and flood), περί τινα μέρη τῆς θαλάσσης γίνονται. In the same way, atmospheric changes coincide with the setting and rising of the stars: ἐξ ὧν συμφανὲς, ὅτι ἡνωμένον τι σῶμα καθέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος, ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ διεστώτων οὐ συμπάσχει τὰ μέρη ἀλλήλοις. Diog. vii. 140: ἐν δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν ἀλλ’ ἡνῶσθαι αὐτὸν, τοῦτο γὰρ ἀναγκάζειν τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια σύμπνοιαν καὶ συντονίαν. Ibid. 143: ὅτι θ’ εἷς ἐστι Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ... καὶ Ποσειδώνιος. Alex. De Mixt. 142, a, see p. 127, 5; Cic. N. D. ii. 7, 19; Epictet. Diss. i. 14, 2: οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡνῶσθαι τὰ πάντα; Δοκεῖ, ἔφη· τί δέ; συμπαθεῖν τὰ ἐπίγεια τοῖς οὐρανίοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; Δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Cicero mentions the changes in animals and plants corresponding with the changes of seasons, the phases of the moon, and the greater or less nearness of the sun. M. Aurel. iv. 40. From all these passages we gather what the question really was. It was not only whether other worlds were possible, besides the one which we know from observation, but whether the heavenly bodies visible were in any essential way connected with the earth, so as to form an organic whole (ζῷον, Diog. vii. 143).

The Stoic conception of συμπάθεια was not used to denote the magic connection which it expresses in ordinary parlance, but the natural coincidence between phenomena belonging to the different parts of the world, the consensus, concentus, cognatio, conjunctio, or continuatio naturæ (Cic. N. D. iii. 11, 28; Divin. ii. 15, 34; 69, 142). In this sense, M. Aurel. ix. 9, observes that like is attracted by like; fire is attracted upwards, earth downwards; beasts and men seek out each other’s society; even amongst the highest existences, the stars, there exists a ἕνωσις ἐκ διεστηκότων, a συμπάθεια ἐν διεστῶσι. Even the last remark does not go beyond the conception of a natural connection; nevertheless, it paves the way for the later Neoplatonic idea of sympathy, as no longer a physical connection, but as an influence felt at a distance by virtue of a connection of soul.

M. Aurel. vi. 1: ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία (the matter of the world) εὐπειθὴς καὶ εὐτρεπής· ὁ δὲ ταύτην διοικῶν λόγος οὐδεμίαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰτίαν ἔχει τοῦ κακοποιεῖν· κακίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει, οὐδέ τι κακῶς ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ βλάπτεταί τι ὑπ’ ἐκείνου. πάντα δὲ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον γίνεται καὶ περαίνεται.

Diog. 149: ταύτην δὲ [τὴν φύσιν] καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος στοχάζεσθαι καὶ ἡδονῆς, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δημιουργίας.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 21, 3, p. 1044: εἰπὼν [Χρύσιππος] ὅτι ... φιλοκαλεῖν ... τὴν φύσιν τῇ ποικιλίᾳ χαίρουσαν εἰκός ἐστι, ταῦτα κακὰ λέξιν εἴρηκε· γένοιτο δ’ ἂν μάλιστα τούτου ἔμφασις ἐπὶ τῆς κέρκου τοῦ ταώ. Conf. the Stoic in Cic. Fin. ii. 5, 18: Jam membrorum ... alia videntur propter eorum usum a natura esse donata ... alia autem nullam ob utilitatem, quasi ad quendam ornatum, ut cauda pavoni, plumæ versicolores columbis, viris mammæ atque barba.

M. Aurel. iii. 2: It is there proved by examples, ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἐπιγινόμενα τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἔχει τι εὔχαρι καὶ ἐπαγωγὸν ... σχεδὸν οὐδὲν οὐχὶ καὶ τῶν κατ’ ἐπακολούθησιν συμβαινόντων ἡδέως πως διασυνίστασθαι.

Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 85; Sen. Ep. 113, 16. The latter includes this variety of natural objects among the facts, which must fill us with admiration for the divine artificer.

Plut. Plac. i. 6, 2: καλὸς δὲ ὁ κόσμος· δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τοῦ σχήματος καὶ τοῦ χρώματος καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν κόσμον τῶν ἀστέρων ποικιλίας; the world has the most perfect form, that of a globe, with a sky the most perfect in colour, &c.

See the passages quoted p. 145, 4, particularly Cic. N. D. ii. 32.

Plut. (in Porphyr. De Abstin. iii. 32): ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο νὴ Δία τοῦ Χρυσίππου πιθανὸν ἦν, ὡς ἡμᾶς αὐτῶν καὶ ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοὶ χάριν ἐποιήσαντο, ἡμῶν δὲ τὰ ζῷα, συμπολεμεῖν μὲν ἵππους καὶ συνθηρεύειν κύνας, ἀνδρείας δὲ γυμνάσια παρδάλεις καὶ ἄρκτους καὶ λέοντας, κ.τ.λ. Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 37: Scite enim Chrysippus: ut clypei causa involucrum, vaginam autem gladii, sic præter mundum cetera omnia aliorum causa esse generata, ut eas fruges et fructus, quas terra gignit, animantium causa, animantes autem hominum, ut equum vehendi causa, arandi bovem, venandi et custodiendi canem. Id. Off. i. 7, 22: Placet Stoicis, quæ in terris gignantur ad usum hominum omnia creari.

Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67: Præclare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse hominum causa et Deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suæ. N. D. ii. 53, 133, in describing the Stoic teaching: Why has the universe been made? Not for the sake of plants or animals, but for the sake of rational beings, Gods and men. It is then shown (c. 54–61), by an appeal to the structure of man’s body, and his mental qualities, how God has provided for the wants of man; and the argument concludes with the words, Omnia, quæ sint in hoc mundo, quibus utantur homines, hominum causa facta esse et parata. Just as a city, and what is therein, exists for the use of the inhabitants, so the world is intended for the use of Gods and men. Even the stars quanquam etiam ad mundi cohærentiam pertinent, tamen et spectaculum hominibus præbent. The earth with its plants and animals was created for the service of man. In Orig. c. Cels. iv. 74, p. 559, the Stoics assert that Providence created all things for the sake of rational beings; M. Aurel. v. 16 and 30; Gell. vii. 1, 1. Hence the definition of κόσμος quoted on p. 158, 1.

Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 32, 1, p. 1049) shows how useful fowls are; the horse is intended for riding, the ox for ploughing, the dog for hunting. The pig, Cleanthes thought (Clemens, Strom. vii. 718, B), was made to sustain man, and endowed with a soul, in place of salt, to prevent its corrupting (Cic. N. D. ii, 64, 160; Fin. v. 13, 38; Plut. Qu. Conviv. v. 10, 3 and 6, p. 685; Porphyr. De Abstin. iii. 20); oysters and birds for the same purpose also (Porphyr. l.c.). In the same way, he spoke of the value of mice and bugs, see p. 189, 1. The Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 63, 158, following in the same track, declares that sheep only exist for the purpose of clothing, dogs for guarding and helping man, fishes for eating, and birds of prey for divers uses. Epictet. Diss. ii. 8, 7, in the same spirit, speaks of asses being intended to carry burdens; for this purpose they must be able to walk, and, in order to walk, must possess the power of imagination.

See p. 186, 1.

Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 37: Ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum, nullo modo perfectus, sed est quædam particula perfecti. Sed mundus quoniam omnia complexus est, nec est quidquam, quod non insit in eo, perfectus undique est.

We gather this from the comparatively full accounts of the Stoic theory of the moral government of the world. Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 1, p. 1051, says that Chrysippus wrote several treatises περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν ἐγκλητὸν εἶναι μηδὲ μεμπτὸν κόσμῳ.

See p. 187, 2, and Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 6): τέλεον μὲν ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν, οὐ τέλεα δὲ τὰ κόσμου μέρη τῷ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πως ἔχειν καὶ μὴ καθ’ αὑτὰ εἶναι. Compare also the statement in Plut. Solert. An. c. 2, 9, p. 960, that animals must be irrational, because the irrational must be contrasted with the rational.

Gell. vii. [vi.] 1, 7: Chrysippus in his treatise περὶ προνοίας, discussed, amongst other things, the question, εἰ αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόσοι κατὰ φύσιν γίνονται. Existimat autem non fuisse hoc principale naturæ consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios ... sed cum multa inquit atque magna gigneret pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia quoque simul agnata sunt incommoda iis ipsis, quæ faciebat cohærentia: eaque non per naturam sed per sequelas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod ipse appellat κατὰ παρακολούθησιν.... Proinde morbi quoque et ægritudines partæ sunt dum salus paritur. M. Aurel. vi. 36: All evils are ἐπιγεννήματα τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ καλῶν. Plut. An. Procr. c. 6 and 9, p. 1015: αὐτοὶ δὲ (the Stoics) κακίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν τοσαύτην ... κατ’ ἐπακολούθησιν γεγονέναι λέγουσιν. Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 3, 1.

Sen. Nat. Qu. v. 18, 4 and 13: Non ideo non sunt ista natura bona, si vitio male utentium nocent.... Si beneficia naturæ utentium pravitate perpendimus, nihil non nostro malo accepimus.

Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 21, 4) remarks that bugs do us good service by preventing us from sleeping too long, and mice warn us not to leave things about. He also observes (Ibid. 32, 2) that wars are as useful as colonies, by preventing over-population. See the quotations, p. 185, 4; 186, 2. M. Aurel. viii. 50, makes a similar remark in regard to weeds. In the house of nature all the waste has its uses.

A circumstance which Plut. Com. Not. 19, p. 1067, dexterously uses against the Stoics.

Cleanthes, Hymn. v. 17 (see p. 171, 3); Plut. Sto. Rep. 33, 2: Chrysippus affirms, ὡς τῶν αἰσχρῶν τὸ θεῖον παραίτιον γίνεσθαι οὐκ εὔλογόν ἐστιν, law is innocent of crime, God of impiety. Id. (in Gell. vii. 2, 7): Quanquam ita sit, ut ratione quadam necessaria et principali coacta atque connexa sint fato omnia, ingenia tamen ipsa mentium nostrarum perinde sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et qualitas ... sua sævitate et voluntario impetu in assidua delicta, et in errores se ruunt. Hence Cleanthes continues, in a passage quoted in Greek by Gellius: ὡς τῶν βλαβῶν ἑκάστοις παρ’ αὐτοῖς γινομένων καὶ καθ’ ὁρμὴν αὐτῶν ἁμαρτανόντων τε καὶ βλαπτομένων καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν καὶ πρόθεσιν. In Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 13, p. 1057, Chrysippus says that, even if the Gods make false representations to man, it is man’s fault if he follows those representations. Conf. Epictet. Ench. c. 27: ὥσπερ σκοπὸς πρὸς τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν οὐ τίθεται, οὕτως οὐδὲ κακοῦ φύσις (evil in itself) ἐν κόσμῳ γίνεται. Id. Diss. i. 6, 40. Such observations bear out in some degree the statement of Plut. Plac. ii. 27, 3, that, according to the Stoics, τὰ μὲν εἱμάρθαι, τὰ δὲ ἀνειμάρθαι. See above, p. 179, 3, 4.

Chrysippus felt this. Hence he says (in Gell.): It has been also decreed by destiny that the bad should do wrong.

Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 36, 1: κακίαν δὲ καθόλου ἆραι οὔτε δυνατόν ἐστιν οὔτ’ ἔχει καλῶς ἀρθῆναι. Id. (in Gell. vii. 1, 10): As diseases spring from human nature, sic hercle inquit dum virtus hominibus per consilium naturæ gignitur vitia ibidem per affinitatem contrariam nata sunt.

Chrysippus in Plut. Sto. Rep. 35, 3 (C. Not. 13, 2): γίνεται γὰρ αὐτή πως [ἡ κακία] κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καὶ ἵνα οὕτως εἴπω οὐκ ἀχρήστως γίνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν τἀγαθὸν ἦν. C. Not. 14, 1: As in a comedy, what is absurd contributes to the effect of the whole, οὕτω ψέξειας ἂν αὐτὴν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς τὴν κακίαν· τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις οὐκ ἄχρηστός ἐστιν. Similarly M. Aurel. vi. 42. Gell. viii. 1, 2: (Chrysippus) nihil est prorsus istis, inquit, insubidius, qui opinantur, bona esse potuisse, si non essent ibidem mala: nam cum bona malis contraria sint, utraque necessum est opposita inter se et quasi mutuo adverso quæque fulta nixu (Heraclitus’ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον) consistere: nullum adeo contrarium est sine contrario altero. Without injustice, cowardice, &c., we could not know what justice and valour are. If there were no evil, φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν would be impossible (Plut. C. Not. 16, 2, p. 1066).

Cleanthes, Hymn. 18:

ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖκαι καὶ κοσμεῖν τὰ ἄκοσμα, καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν· ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν ὥσθ’ ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 35, 1: τὸν θεὸν κολάζειν φησὶ τὴν κακίαν καὶ πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ κολάσει τῶν πονηρῶν ... ποτὲ μὲν τὰ δύσχρηστα συμβαίνειν φησὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὐχ ὥσπερ τοῖς φαύλοις κολάσεως χάριν ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ... [τὰ κακὰ] ἀπονέμεται κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον ἤτοι ἐπὶ κολάσει ἢ κατ’ ἄλλην ἔχουσάν πως πρὸς τὰ ὅλα οἰκονομίαν. Id. 15, 2: ταῦτά φησι τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν ὅπως τῶν πονηρῶν κολαζομένων οἱ λοιποὶ παραδείγμασι τούτοις χρώμενοι ἧττον ἐπιχειρῶσι τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν. At the beginning of the same chapter, the ordinary views of divine punishment had been treated with ridicule. Conf. Quæst. Rom. 51, p. 277.

Thus Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 2) in answer to the question, How the misfortune of the virtuous is to be explained, says: πότερον ἀμελουμένων τινῶν καθάπερ ἐν οἰκίαις μείζοσι παραπίπτει τινὰ πίτυρα καὶ ποσοὶ πυροί τινες τῶν ὅλων εὖ οἰκονομουμένων· ἢ διὰ τὸ καθίστασθαι ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων δαιμόνια φαῦλα ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι γίνονται ἐγκλητέαι ἀμέλειαι; Similarly the Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 66: Magna Dii curant, parva negligunt,—hardly satisfactory explanations for any theory of necessity. It is still more unsatisfactory to hear Seneca (Benef. iv. 32) justifying the unmerited good fortune of the wicked as due to the nobility of their ancestors. The reason assigned by Chrysippus (in Plut.)—πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μεμῖχθαι—does not quite harmonise with Plut. C. Not. 34, 2: οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε ὕλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς παρέσχηκεν, ἄποιος γάρ ἐστι καὶ πάσας ὅσας δέχεται διαφορὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ κινοῦντος αὐτὴν καὶ σχηματίζοντος ἔσχεν. Just as little does Seneca’s—Non potest artifex mutare materiam (De Prov. 5, 9)—agree with his lavish encomia on the arrangement and perfection of the world. For, according to the Stoics, matter is ultimately identical with reason and deity. These contradictions do not, however, justify the doubt expressed by Heine, Stoic. de Fato Doct. 46, that Seneca is here not speaking as a Stoic. For Chrysippus says very much the same thing. See p. 190, 1, 2.

M. Aurel. ix. 16: οὐκ ἐν πείσει, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία αὐτοῦ ἐν πείσει, ἀλλὰ ἐνεργείᾳ.

M. Aurel. viii. 35: ὃν τρόπον ἐκείνη [ἡ φύσις] πᾶν τὸ ἐνιστάμενον καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον ἐπιπεριτρέπει καὶ κατατάσσει εἰς τὴν εἱμαρμένην καὶ μέρος ἑαυτῆς ποιεῖ, οὕτως καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον δύναται πᾶν κώλυμα ὅλην ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ ἐφ’ οἷον ἂν καὶ ὥρμησεν.

Seneca’s treatise, De Providentia, is occupied with expanding this thought. In it, the arguments by which the outward misfortunes of good men are harmonised with the divine government of the world are: (1) The wise man cannot really meet with misfortune: he cannot receive at the hands of fortune what he does not, on moral grounds, assign to himself (c. 2, 6). (2) Misfortune, therefore, is an unlooked-for exercise of his powers, a divine instrument of training; a hero in conflict with fortune is a spectaculum Deo dignum (c. 1, 2–4. Conf. Ep. 85, 39). (3) The misfortunes of the righteous show that external conditions are neither a good nor an evil (c. 5). (4) Everything is a natural consequence of natural causes (c. 5). Similar explanations in Epictet. Diss. iii. 17; i. 6, 37; i. 24, 1; Stob. Ed. i. 132; M. Aurel. iv. 49: vii. 68 and 64; x. 33.

Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, col. 8, Vol. Herc. vi. 53: ἰδιωτικῶς ἅπαντος αὐτῷ [θεῷ] δύναμιν ἀναθέντες, ὅταν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐλέγχων πιέζωνται, τότε καταφεύγουσιν ἐπὶ τὸ διὰ τοῦτο φάσκειν τὰ συναπτόμενα (what is suitable) μὴ ποιεῖν, ὅτι οὐ πάντα δύναται.

See above, p. 126; 101, 2; Diog. 135. Conf. Stob. Ecl. i. 410.

In Diog. 150, there is no difference made between Apollodorus and Chrysippus. Stob. Ecl. i. 344; Plut. C. Not. 38, 3, p. 1079; Sext. Math. x. 142. Similarly Aristotle.

Plut. Plac. i. 9, 2: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ μεταβλητὴν καὶ ῥευστὴν ὅλην δι’ ὅλου τὴν ὕλην. Diog. 150. Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 101, 3: Fiunt omnia ex omnibus, ex aqua aër, ex aëre aqua, ignis ex aëre, ex igne aër ... ex aqua terra fit, cur non aqua fiat e terra? ... omnium elementorum in alternum recursus sunt. Similarly Epictet. in Stob. Floril. 108, 60. Conf. p. 101, 2; 198, 3. This is borrowed not only from Heraclitus, but also from Aristotle.

They only called the first kind κίνησις. Aristotle understood by κίνησις every form of change.

Stob. Ecl. i. 404, 408, gives definitions of κίνησις, of φορά, and of μονή, taken from Chrysippus and Apollodorus. Simpl. Categ. 110, β (Schol. in Arist. 92, 6, 30. Respecting the kinds of μεταβολή see the extracts from Posidonius on p. 101, 2) distinguishes between μένειν, ἠρεμεῖν, ἡσυχάζειν, ἀκινητεῖν, but this is rather a matter of language. Simpl. Cat. 78, β, relates that the Stoics differed from the Peripatetics in explaining Motion as an incomplete energy, and discusses their assertion that κινεῖσθαι is a wider, κινεῖν a narrower, idea.

Simpl. Phys. 310, b: οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς κατὰ πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἔλεγον ὑπεῖναι τὴν τοπικὴν, ἢ κατὰ μέγαλα διαστήματα ἢ κατὰ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ ὑφισταμένην.

Simpl. Categ. 78, β (Schol. 78, a, 23): Plotinus and others introduce into the Aristotelian doctrine the Stoic view: τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν εἶναι τὰς κινήσεις.

Simpl. l.c. 77, β; Schol. 77, b, 33. Simplicius himself contradicts this statement. It had, however, been already advanced by Aristotle.

Simpl. l.c. 78, β (Schol. 78, a, 28): The Stoics who, according to p. 84, ε, Schol. 79, a, 16, very fully discussed the categories, made the following διαφοραὶ γενῶν: τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὡς ἡ μάχαιρα τὸ τέμνειν ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας ἔχει κατασκευῆς—τὸ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργεῖν τὴν κίνησιν, ὡς αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἰατρικαὶ δυνάμεις τὴν ποίησιν ὑπεργάζονται; for instance, the seed, in developing into a plant—τὸ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν, or ἀπὸ ἰδίας ὁρμῆς ποιεῖν, one species of which is τὸ ἀπὸ λογικῆς ὁρμῆς—τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖν. It is, in short, the application to a particular case of the distinction which will be subsequently met with of ἕξις, φύσις, ψυχὴ, and ψυχὴ λογική. The celebrated grammatical distinction of ὀρθὰ and ὕπτια mentioned p. 95, 3 is connected with the distinction between ποιεῖν and πάσχειν. Conf. Simpl. p. 79, α, ζ; Schol. 78, b, 17 and 30.

See page 135.

Stob. Ecl. i. 382: Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐντὸς μὲν τοῦ κόσμου μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν ἔξω δ’ αὐτοῦ ἄπειρον (conf. Themist. Phys. 40, b; Plut. Plac. i. 18, 4; ibid. c. 20, beginning οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος). διαφέρειν δὲ κενὸν τόπον χώραν· καὶ τὸ μὲν κενὸν εἶναι ἐρημίαν σώματος, τὸν δὲ τόπον τὸ ἐπεχόμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, τὴν δὲ χώραν τὸ ἐκ μέρους ἐπεχόμενον (Plut. adds, like a half-empty vessel). Stob. i. 390: Chrysippus defined τόπος = τὸ κατεχόμενον δι’ ὅλου ὑπὸ ὄντος, ἢ τὸ οἷον κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ὄντος καὶ δι’ ὅλου κατεχόμενον εἴτε ὑπὸ τινὸς εἴτε ὑπὸ τινῶν. If, however, only one portion of the οἷόν τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ὄντος is really filled, the whole is neither κενὸν nor τόπος, but ἕτερόν τι οὐκ ὠνομασμένον, which may possibly be called χώρα. Hence τόπος corresponds to a full, κενὸν to an empty, χώρα to a half-empty, vessel. Sext. Math. x. 3, Pyrrh. iii. 124, speaks to the same effect. Cleomed. Meteor. p. 2, 4; Simpl. Categ. 91, δ. According to the Stoics, παρυφίσταται τοῖς σώμασιν ὁ τόπος καὶ τὸν ὅρον ἀπ’ αὐτῶν προσλαμβάνει τὸν μέχρι τοσοῦδε, καθόσον συμπληροῦνται [-οῦται] ὑπὸ τῶν σωμάτων.

The Stoic idea of space is so understood by Themist. Phys. 38, b; Simpl. Phys. 133, a.

See previous note and in Diog. 140 (where, however, instead of ἀσώματον δὲ, we should read κενὸν δὲ) definitions of κενόν.

Stob. Ecl. i. 392, quoting Chrysippus.

See p. 131, 2.

Simpl. Categ. 88, ζ. Schol. 80, a, 6: τῶν δὲ Στωϊκῶν Ζήνων μὲν πάσης ἁπλῶς κινήσεως διάστημα τὸν χρόνον εἶπε (conf. Plut. Plat. Quæst. viii. 4, 3) Χρύσιππος δὲ διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως. Conf. Ibid. 89, α, β; Simpl. Phys. 165, a. More full is Stob. Ecl. i. 260: ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος χρόνον εἶναι κινήσεως διάστημα καθ’ ὅ ποτε λέγεται μέτρον τάχους τε καὶ βραδύτητος, ἢ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν διάστημα τῇ τοῦ κόσμου κινήσει. The passages quoted by Stob. Ibid. 250 (Plut. Plac. i. 22, 2), 254, 256, 258, and Diog. 141, from Zeno, Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Posidonius, are in agreement with this. In the same places occur several other observations on Time, which are, however, of no importance, such as that Time as a whole, and likewise the past and the future, are unlimited, the present is limited; the present cannot be accurately determined, it is the boundary between the past and the future (Archedemus in Plut. C. Not. 38, 6, p. 1081), lying partly in the one, partly in the other (Chrysippus, ibid. 38, 8).

Sext. Math. x. 142; Plut. Com. Not. 41, p. 1081; Stob. i. 260.

For the conception of στοιχεῖον, which is also that of Aristotle (Metaph. i. 3, 938, b, 8), and its difference from that of ἀρχὴ, see Diog. 134; 136. The difference, however, is not always observed. Chrysippus (in Stob. Ecl. i. 312) distinguishes three meanings of στοιχεῖον. In one sense, it is fire; in another, the four elements; in the third, any material out of which something is made.

Lassalle, Heraclitus, ii. 84.

See p. 161. As is there stated, primary fire first goes over into water δι’ ἀέρος (i.e. after first going over into air, not passing through air as an already existing medium, as Lassalle, Heracl. ii. 86, inaccurately says), and water goes over into the three other elements. In this process there is, however, a difficulty. Fire is said to derive its origin from water, and yet a portion of primary fire must have existed from the beginning, as the soul of the world. Nor is it correct to say, that actual fire is never obtained from water in the formation of the upper elements (as Lassalle, p. 88, does).

Chrysippus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 312: πρώτης μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἐκ πυρὸς κατὰ σύστασιν εἰς ἀέρα μεταβολῆς, δευτέρας δ’ ἀπὸ τούτου εἰς ὕδωρ, τρίτης δ’ ἔτι μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνισταμένου τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς γῆν, πάλιν δὲ ἀπὸ ταύτης διαλυομένης καὶ διαχεομένης πρώτη μὲν γίγνεται χύσις εἰς ὕδωρ, δεύτερα δὲ ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα, τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἐσχάτη εἰς πῦρ. On account of this constant change, primary matter is called (Ibid. 316, where, however, the text is obviously corrupt, and therefore only partially intelligible) ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἀΐδιος δύναμις ... εἰς αὐτήν τε πάντα καταναλίσκουσα καὶ τὸ [ἐξ] αὑτῆς πάλιν ἀποκαθιστᾶσα τεταγμένως καὶ ὁδῷ. Epictet. in Stob. Floril. 108, 60: Not only mankind and animals are undergoing perpetual changes, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ θεῖα, καὶ νὴ Δί’ αὐτὰ τὰ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τρέπεται καὶ μεταβάλλει· καὶ γῆ τε ὕδωρ γίνεται καὶ ὕδωρ ἀὴρ, οὗτος δὲ πάλιν εἰς αἰθέρα μεταβάλλει· καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς μεταβολῆς ἄνωθεν κάτω. On the flux of things, see also M. Aurel. ii. 3; vii. 19; ix. 19; 28. Cic. N. D. ii. 33, 84: Et cum quatuor sint genera corporum, vicissitudine eorum mundi continuata (= συνεχής; conf. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 2, 2, continuatio est partium inter se non intermissa conjunctio) natura est. Nam ex terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aër, ex aëre æther: deinde retrorsum vicissim ex æthere aër, ex aëre aqua, ex aqua terra infima. Sic naturis his, ex quibus omnia constant, sursum deorsum, ultro citroque commeantibus, mundi partium conjunctio continetur. See p. 194, 3.

Diog. 137: εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν πῦρ τὸ θερμὸν, τὸ δ’ ὕδωρ τὸ ὑγρὸν, τόν τ’ ἀέρα τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν τὸ ξηρόν. Plut. Sto. Rep. 43, 1, p. 1053. The air is, according to Chrysippus, φύσει ζοφερὸς and πρώτως ψυχρός. Id. De Primo Frig. 9, 1; 17, 1, p. 948, 952; Galen, Simpl. Medic. ii. 20, vol. xi. 510. Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 10; i. 4: Aër ... frigidus per se et obscurus ... natura enim aëris gelida est. Conf. Cic. N. D. ii. 10, 26. Of the four properties by the pairing of which elements arise, even Aristotle had attributed one to each element as its distinguishing feature, assigning cold to water, moisture to air.

Thus the upper portion of the air, owing to its proximity to the region of fire and the stars (Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 10), is the warmest, the driest, and the rarest; but yet, owing to the evaporation of the earth and the radiation of heat, warmer than the middle, which in point of dryness and density is between the two, but exceeds both in cold. See p. 146, 4.

Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 314: λέγεσθαι δὲ πῦρ τὸ πυρῶδες πᾶν καὶ ἀέρα τὸ ἀερῶδες καὶ ὁμοίως τὰ λοιπά. Thus Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, E, who is clearly following the Stoics, distinguishes three kinds of fire: ἄνθραξ, φλὸξ, αὐγή. He seems, however, only to refer to terrestrial fire, which, after all, forms only one small portion of fire.

Pp. 128, 2; 148, 2; 151, 1; 163, 2.

This statement must be taken with such modification as the unity of the world renders necessary. If the upper elements were to move altogether away from the centre, the world would go to pieces. Hence the meaning can only be this: that the difference of natural motions can only take place within the enclosure holding the elements together, and so far a natural motion towards the centre can be attributed to all bodies as a distinctive feature, anterior to the contrast between heaviness and lightness. Conf. Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 6, p. 1054: The striving of all the parts of the world is to keep together, not to go asunder. οὕτω δὲ τοῦ ὅλου τεινομένου εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ κινουμένου καὶ τῶν μορίων ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν ἐχόντων ἐκ τῆς τοῦ σώματος φύσεως, πιθανὸν, πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασιν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην κατὰ φύσιν κίνησιν πρὸς τὸ τοῦ κόσμου μέσον, τῷ μὲν κόσμῳ οὑτωσὶ κινουμένῳ πρὸς αὑτὸν, τοῖς δὲ μέρεσιν ὡς ἂν μέρεσιν οὖσιν. Achill. Tat. Isag. 132, A: The Stoics maintain that the world continues in empty space, ἐπεὶ πάντα αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον νένευκε. The same reason is assigned by Cleomedes, Meteor. p. 5.

Stob. Ecl. i. 346 (Plut. Pl. i. 12, 4). Zeno, Ibid. 406: οὐ πάντως δὲ σῶμα βάρος ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἀβαρῆ εἶναι ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ ... φύσει γὰρ ἀνώφοιτα ταῦτ’ εἶναι διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς μετέχειν βάρους. Plut. Sto. Rep. 42, p. 1053: In the treatise περὶ κινήσεως, Chrysippus calls fire ἀβαρὲς and ἀνωφερὲς καὶ τούτῳ παραπλησίως τὸν ἀέρα, τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος τῇ γῇ μᾶλλον προσνεμομένου, τοῦ δ’ ἀέρος, τῷ πυρί. (So too in Ach. Tat. Isag. i. 4 in Pet. Doctr. Temp. iii. 75.) On the other hand, in his Φυσικαὶ τέχναι, he inclines to the view that air in itself is neither heavy nor light, which however can only mean that it is neither absolutely, being heavy compared with fire, and light compared with water and earth.

Diog. 137: ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ ὃ δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι, ἐν ᾧ πρώτην τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν γεννᾶσθαι, εἶτα τὴν τῶν πλανωμένων. μεθ’ ἣν τὸν ἀέρα, εἶτα τὸ ὕδωρ, ὑποστάθμην δὲ πάντων τὴν γῆν, μέσην ἁπάντων οὖσαν. Ibid. 156; see p. 202, 3. To these main masses, all other smaller masses of the same element in different parts of the world are attracted, because all seek to reach their natural place. Conf. M. Aurel. ix. 9.

Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, 2 (totum hoc cœlum, quod igneus æther, mundi summa pars, claudit), and p. 198, 3, where the same thing is called πῦρ by Stobæus, æther by Cicero. See p. 146, 4. The same thing is meant by Zeno, where he says (Stob. Ecl. i. 538, 554, and Cleanthes says the same in Cic. N. D. ii. 15, 40. Ach. Tat. Isag. 133, C) that the stars are made of fire; not, however, of πῦρ ἄτεχνον, but of πῦρ τεχνικὸν, which appears in plants as φύσις, in animals as ψυχή. See p. 201, 5.

In Ach. Tat. Isag. 130, A, he defines οὐρανὸς as αἰθέρος τὸ ἔσχατον, ἐξ οὗ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ πάντα ἐμφανῶς. Similarly Diog. 138; Cleomed. Met. p. 7. Otherwise the term is used in a wider sense.

See p. 146, 4.

Stob. i. 346: τὸ μὲν περίγειον φῶς κατ’ εὐθεῖαν, τὸ δ’ αἰθέριον περιφερῶς κινεῖται. See p. 202, 3. It is only of terrestrial fire that Zeno can (Stob. Ecl. i. 356) say, it moves in a straight line. Cleanthes even attributed to the stars the spherical shape, which on the strength of this passage he attributes to it. See Plut. Plac. ii. 14, 2; Stob. i. 516; Ach. Tat. Isag. 133, B.

They denied it, according to Orig. c. Cels. iv. 56. Cic. Acad. i. 11, 39, says: Zeno dispensed with a quinta natura, being satisfied with four elements: statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quæ quæque gigneret, et mentem atque sensus.

The spherical shape of the earth is a matter of course, and is mentioned by Ach. Tat. Isag. 126, C; Plut. Plac. iii. 10, 1; 9, 3. Cleom. Met. p. 40, gives an elaborate proof of it, for the most part taken from Posidonius.

Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 36, and Diog. 145, also affirm that the earth is in the centre, unmoved. The reason for this fact is stated by Stob. i. 408, to be its weight. Further proofs in Cleomed. Met. p. 47.

Stob. Ecl. i. 446: τοῦ δὲ ... κόσμου τὸ μὲν εἶναι περιφερόμενον περὶ τὸ μέσον, τὶ δ’ ὑπομένον, περιφερόμενον μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, ὑπομένον δὲ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς ὑγρὰ καὶ τὸν ἀέρα. The earth is the natural framework, and, as it were, the skeleton of the world. Around it water has been poured, out of which the more exalted spots project as islands. For what is called continent is also an island: ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸν ἀέρα ἐξῆφθαι καθάπερ ἐξατμισθέντα σφαιρικῶς καὶ περικεχύσθαι, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὸν αἰθέρα ἀραιότατόν τε καὶ εἰλικρινέστατον. It moves in circular form round the world. Then follows what is given in the text as to the stars, next to which comes the stratum of air, then that of water, and lastly, in the centre, the earth. Conf. Achil. Tat. Isag. 126, B, see p. 200, 3. The language of Cleomed. Met. c. 3, p. 6, is somewhat divergent. He places the sun amongst the planets, between Mars and Venus. That Archedemus also refused to allow the earth a place in the centre has been already stated, p. 147, 2. The language of Ach. Tat. Isag. c. 7, 131, B, is ambiguous: As the circumference originates from the centre, so according to the Stoics the outer circle originates from the earth; when compared with the quotations on p. 161, 2; 162, 1.

Stob. i. 356; Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 1; i. 6, 3; Diog. 140; Cleomed. Met. pp. 39 and 46; Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 46. Ibid. on the perfection of this form and its adaptation for motion. Comparing Achil. Tat. Isag. 130, C, Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 1 (Galen. Hist. Phil. c. 11), with the passages on p. 201, note 4, it appears probable that Cleanthes believed in a spherical form of the earth. According to Ach. Tat. Isag. 152, A, who probably has the Stoics in view, the axis of the world consists of a current of air passing through the centre. On the division of the heaven into five parallel circles, and that of the earth into five zones, conf. Diog. 155; Strabo, ii. 2, 3, p. 95.

Stob. i. 392; Simpl. Phys. iii. 6; Diog. 143 and 150.

Diog. 140; Stob. i. 382; Plut. Plac. i. 18, 4; Sext. Math. vii. 214; Theodoret, Cur. Gr. Aff. iv. 14, p. 58; Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 7, observes that motion is possible by means of ἀντιπερίστασις, without supposing the existence of empty space. A number of arguments against the existence of empty space may be found in Cleomed. Met. p. 4.

See p. 168, 1; Cleomed. Met. 2 and 5.

Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 392: The Empty and the Non-Material is unlimited. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μηδὲν οὐδέν ἐστι πέρας, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ μηδενὸς, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ κενόν. The Empty could only be bounded by being filled. To the same effect, Cleomed. p. 6. On the unlimited beyond the world, see Diog. 140 and 143; Stob. i. 260 and 382; Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 1, p. 1054; C. Not. 30, 2, p. 1073; Plac. i. 18, 4; ii. 9, 2; Theodoret, l.c. and p. 196, 2. That Posidonius denied the infinity of the Empty has been already stated, p. 168, 1. Chrysippus, in affirming that the world occupies the centre of space, was therefore contradicting himself, as Plut. Def. Or. 28, p. 425, Sto. Rep. 44, 2, observes.

Achil. Tat. Isag. 126, A; 132, A, see p. 200, 1; Stob. i. 408. According to Stob. i. 442, Plut. C. Not. 30, 2 and 10, p. 1073, Plac. ii. 1, 6; i. 5, 1, Diog. 143, Sext. Math. ix. 332, Ach. Tat. 129, D, the Stoics had various names for the world, according as the Empty was included or excluded in the conception. Including the Empty, it is called τὸ πᾶν; without it, ὅλον (τὸ ὅλον, τὰ ὅλα, frequently occurs with the Stoics). The πᾶν, it was said, is neither material nor immaterial, since it consists of both. Plut. C. Not. l.c.

Diog. 145; Plut. Plac. ii. 14, 1; 22, 3; 27, 1; Stob. i. 516; 540; 554; Ach. Tat. 133, D. Compare the reference to Cleanthes on p. 201, 4, with which, however, the statement in Stob. i. 554, that he considered the moon πιλοειδὴς (ball-like—the MSS. have πηλοειδῆ) does not agree.

According to Cic. N. D. ii. 15, 40, Diog. 144, Stob. Ecl. i. 314; 519; 538; 554; 565, Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 1; 21, 13, p. 921, 935, Plac. ii. 25, 3; 30, 3, Galen, Hist. Phil. 15, Philo, De Somn. 587, B, Achil. Tat. Isag. 124, D; 133, C, and above p. 200, 3; 162, 2, the stars generally consist of fire, or, more accurately, of πῦρ τεχνικὸν, or Ether. The purest fire is in the sun. The moon is a compound of dull fire and air, or, as it is said, is more earth-like, since (as Plin. Hist. Nat. ii. 9, 46, without doubt after Stoic teaching, observes) owing to its proximity to the earth, it takes up earthy particles in vapour. Perhaps it was owing to this fact that it was said to receive its light from the sun (Diog. 145), which, according to Posidonius in Plut. Fac. Lun. 16, 12, p. 929, Cleomed. Met. p. 106, not only illuminates its surface, but penetrates some depth. Cleomed. 100, believes that, besides the light of the sun, it has also a light of its own.

Diog. 145; Stob. i. 532; 538; 554; Floril. 17, 43; Plut. De Is. 41, p. 367; Sto. Rep. 39, 1; Qu. Conv. viii. 8, 2, 4; Plac. ii. 17, 2; 20, 3; 23, 5; Galen, Hist. Phil. 14; Porphyr. Antr. Nymph, c. 11; Cic. N. D. iii. 14, 37; ii. 15, 40; 46, 118; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16. 2; Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 36, p. 74 and 56, p. 117; most of whom affirm that the sun is sustained by vapours from the sea, the moon by those of fresh water, and the other stars by vapours from the earth. The stars are also said to owe their origin to such vapours. Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 3, adds to the passage quoted p. 161, 2: οἱ δ’ ἀστέρες ἐκ θαλάσσης μετὰ τοῦ ἡλίου ἐνάπτονται. Plut. Ibid. 2: ἔμψυχον ἡγεῖται τὸν ἥλιον, πύρινον ὄντα καὶ γεγενημένον ἐκ τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως εἰς πῦρ μεταβαλούσης. Id. C. Not. 46, 2, p. 1084: γεγονέναι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἔμψυχον λέγουσι τοῦ ὑγροῦ μεταβάλλοντος εἰς πῦρ νοερόν.

Stob. i. 532; Cic. l.c.; Macrob. Sat. i. 23, quoting Cleanthes and Macrobius; Plut. Plac. ii. 23, 5. Diogenes of Apollonia had already expressed similar views. Further particulars as to the courses of the stars without anything very peculiar in Stob. i. 448; 538; Plut. Pl. ii. 15, 2; 16, 1; Diog. 144; Cleomed. Meteor. i. 3. Eclipses are also discussed by Diog. 145; Stob. i. 538; 560; Plut. Fac. Lun. 19, 12, p. 932; Plac. ii. 29, 5; Cleomed. pp. 106 and 115, nor is there anything remarkable. Quite in the ordinary way are some observations of Posidonius and Chrysippus given in Stob. i. 518; Achil Tat. Isag. 132, B; 165, C. The information—quoted from Posidonius by Cleomed. Meteor. 51; Procl. in Tim. 277, E; Strabo, ii. 5, 14, p. 119—respecting observations of Canobus have no bearing on our present enquiry.

Stob. i. 554 (Plut. Pl. ii. 26, 1). This statement, however, appears only to be true of the sun, to which, indeed, it is confined by Diog. 144. That the sun is much larger than the earth, Posidonius proved; not only because its light extends over the whole heaven, but also because of the spherical form of the earth’s shadow in eclipses of the moon. Diog. l.c.; Macrob. Somn. i. 20; Heracl. Alleg. Hom. c. 46; Cleomed. Met. ii. 2. According to Cleomed. p. 79, he allowed to it an orbit 10,000 times as large as the circumference of the earth, with a diameter of four million stadia. The Stoic, in Cic. N. D. ii. 40, 103, only calls the moon half that size; and Cleomed. p. 97, probably following Posidonius, calls it considerably smaller than the earth. The other stars, according to Cleomed. p. 96, are some of them as large as, and others larger than, the sun. Posidonius, according to Plin. Hist. N. ii. 23, 85, estimated the moon’s distance from the earth at two million, and the sun’s distance from the moon at 500 million stadia. He estimated the earth’s circumference at 240,000, according to Cleomed.; at 180,000 according to Strabo, ii. 2, 2, p. 95.

Conf. Stob. i. 66; 441; 518; 532; 538; 554; Floril. 17, 43; Plut. Sto. Rep 39, 1; 41, 2; C. Not. 46, 2; Plac. ii. 20, 3; Diog. 145; Phædr. Nat. De. (Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβείας) Col. 3; Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36 and 50; ii. 15, 39 and 42; 16, 43; 21, 54; Acad. ii. 37, 110; Porphyr. l.c.; Achill. Tat. Isag. c. 13, p. 134, A. Hence, in several of these passages, the sun is called after Cleanthes and Chrysippus a νοερὸν ἄναμμα (or ἔξαμμα) ἐκ θαλάσσης.

Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, discusses the point at length. See also the quotations on p. 144, 1, from Cic. N. D. ii. 9, and on p. 151, 1, from Diog. 147.

Diog. vii. 152 and 138, mentions a treatise of his, called μετεωρολογικὴ or μετεωρολογικὴ στοιχείωσις; also, vii. 135, a treatise περὶ μετεώρων, in several books. Alexander, in Simpl. Phys. 64, 6, speaks of an ἐξήγησις μετεωρολογικῶν, which, judging by the title, may be a commentary on Aristotle’s meteorology. Geminus had made an extract from this book, a long portion of which on the relation of astronomy and natural science is there given. Whether these various titles really belong to these different treatises is not clear. Posidonius is probably the author of most of the later statements about the Stoic meteorology. He appears also to be the chief authority for Seneca’s Naturales Quæstiones, in which he is frequently named (i. 5, 10; 13; ii. 26, 4; 54, 1; iv. 3, 2; vi. 21, 2; 24, 6; vii. 20, 2; 4), particularly in his meteorological treatises.

On the Milky Way, which Posidonius, agreeing with Aristotle, looked upon as a collection of fiery vapours, see Stob. i. 576; Plut. Plac. iii. 1, 10; Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 15. On the comets, which are explained in a similar way, Stob. i. 580 (Plac. iii. 2, 8.—Whether the Diogenes mentioned here who looked upon comets as real stars is Diogenes the Stoic, or Diogenes of Apollonia, is not clear. The former is more probable, Boëthus having been just before mentioned); Arrian, in Stob. i. 584; Diog. vii. 152; and, particularly, Sen. Nat. Qu. vii. We learn from the latter that Zeno held (vii. 19–21; 30, 2), with Anaxagoras and Democritus, that comets are formed by several stars uniting; whereas the majority of the Stoics—and, amongst their number, Panætius and Posidonius (further particulars in Schol. in Arat. v. 1091)—considered them passing phenomena. Even Seneca declared for the opinion that they are stars. On the phenomena of light and fire, called πωγωνίαι, δοκοὶ, etc., see Arrian in Stob. i. 584; Sen. Nat. Qu. i. 1, 14; 15, 4. On σέλας, consult Diog. 153; Sen. i. 15; on halo (ἅλως), Sen. i. 2; Alex. Aphr. Meteorol. 116; on the rainbow, Diog. 152; Sen. i. 3–8; on virgæ and parhelia, Sen. i. 9–13; Schol. in Arat. v. 880 (Posidonius); on storms, lightning, thunder, summer lightning, cyclones, and siroccos, Stob. i. 596; 598 (Plac. iii. 3, 4); Arrian, Ibid. 602; Sen. ii. 12–31; 51–58 (c. 54, the view of Posidonius); ii. 1, 3; Diog. 153; on rain, sleet, hail, snow, Diog. 153; Sen. iv. 3–12; on earthquakes, Diog. 154; Plac. iii. 15, 2; Sen. vi. 4–31 (particularly c. 16; 21, 2); also Strabo, ii. 3, 6, p. 102; on winds, Plac. iii. 7, 2; Sen. v. 1–17; Strabo, i. 2, 21, p. 29; iii. 2, 5, p. 144; on waterspouts, Sen. iii. 1–26; the Nile floods, Ibid. iv. 1; Strabo, xvii. 1, 5, p. 790; Cleomed. Meteor, p. 32; on tides, Strabo, i. 3, 12, p. 55; iii. 3, 3, p. 153; 5, 8, p. 73; on seasons, p. 111, 2.

Thus colours are explained as πρῶτοι σχηματισμοὶ τῆς ὕλης (Stob. i. 364; Plac. i. 15, 5); and sounds are spoken of as undulations in the air by Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 5; Diog. 158.

Conf. Bake, Posidonii Rhod. Reliquiæ, pp. 87–184; Müller, Fragm. Hist. Græc. iii. 245.

Sext. Math. ix. 81: τῶν ἡνωμένων (on ἕνωσις see p. 103, 1) σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψιλῆς ἕξεως συνέχεται, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ φύσεως, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς· καὶ ἕξεως μὲν ὡς λίθοι καὶ ξύλα, φύσεως δὲ, καθάπερ τὰ φυτὰ, ψυχῆς δὲ τὰ ζῷα. Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 12, p. 451: καθόλου δὲ τῶν ὄντων αὐτοὶ τέ φασι καὶ δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἕξει διοικεῖται τὰ δὲ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἀλόγῳ ψυχῇ, τὰ δὲ καὶ λόγον ἐχούσῃ καὶ διάνοιαν. Themist. De An. 72, b; M. Aurel. vi. 14; Philo, Qu. De. S. Immut. 298, D; De Mundo, 1154, E; Leg. Alleg. 1091, D; Incorrupt. M. 947, A; Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, C, Bas. 861, Cr. (Otherwise Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33. See p. 146, 1). Respecting the difference of φύσις and ψυχὴ, φύσις is said to consist of a moister, colder, and denser πνεῦμα than ψυχή; but, on this point, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 1; Com. Not. 46, 2; Galen, Hipp. et Plat. v. 3. Vol. v. 521. Qu. Animi Mores, c. 4. Vol. iv. 783. In Diog. 139, ἕξις and νοῦς, as the highest and lowest links in the series, are contrasted. Ibid. 156, there is a definition of φύσις = πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν; and (148) another = ἕξις ἐξ αὑτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὑτῆς ἐν ὡρισμένοις χρόνοις καὶ τοιαῦτα δρῶσα ἀφ’ οἵων ἀπεκρίθη. It hardly need be repeated that the force is one and the same, which at one time appears as ἕξις, at another as φύσις. Conf. Diog. 138; Themist. l.c.; Sext. Math. ix. 84.

The belief that blood circulates in the veins, spiritus in the arteries (Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 15, 1), which was shared by the Peripatetics, deserves to be mentioned here, Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 15, 1; also the explanations of sleep, death, and age in Plut. Plac. v. 23, 4; 30, 5; the assertion that animals are not only deficient in reason (on this point see Plut. Solert. An. 2, 9; 6, 1; 11, 2, pp. 960, 963, 967), but also (according to Chrysippus in Galen, Hippoc. et Plat. iii. 3; v. 1, 6. Vol. v., 309, 429, 431, 476) in emotions (or as Galen also says in θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία), even in man the emotions being connected with the rational soul. Posidonius, however, denied this statement (Galen, p. 476), and Chrysippus believed that animals had a ἡγεμονικόν. (Chalcid. in Tim. p. 148, b.) He even discovered in the scent of dogs traces of an unconscious inference. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 69. See also p. 225, 2.

Cleanthes, in Nemes. Nat. Hom. p. 33, and Tert. De An. c. 5: οὐδὲν ἀσώματον συμπάσχει σώματι οὐδὲ ἀσωμάτῳ σῶμα ἀλλὰ σῶμα σώματι· συμπάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι νοσοῦντι καὶ τεμνομένῳ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ· αἰσχυνομένης γοῦν ἐρυθρὸν γίνεται καὶ φοβουμένης ὠχρόν. σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. Chrysippus in Nemes. p. 34: ὁ θάνατός ἐστι χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος· οὐδὲν δὲ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται σώματος ἀσώματον· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐφάπτεται καὶ χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. The same is said by Tertullian.

Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 2, p. 30.

Diog. 157; Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 36.

Zeno, in Tertull. l.c., and very nearly the same in Chalcid. in Tim. p. 306 Meurs.: Quo digresso animal emoritur: consito autem spiritu digresso animal emoritur: ergo consitus spiritus corpus est, consitus autem spiritus anima est: ergo corpus est anima. Chrysippus in Chalcid. l.c.

Cleanthes, in Nemes. l.c. 32: οὐ μόνον ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονεῦσι γινόμεθα, κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, τοῖς πάθεσι, τοῖς ἤθεσι, ταῖς διαθέσεσι· σώματος δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον, οὐχὶ δὲ ἀσώματον· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. The same in Tertullian, l.c.

Chrysippus in Galen, Hipp. et Plat. iii. 1. Vol. v. 287: ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διῆκον. Zeno. Macrob. Somn. i. 14: Zenon [dixit animam] concretum corpori spiritum ... Boëthos (probably the Stoic, not the Peripatetic of the first century, is meant) ex aëre et igne [sc. constare]. Diog. in Galen, ii. 8, p. 282: τὸ κινοῦν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὰς κατὰ προαίρεσιν κινήσεις ψυχική τίς ἐστιν ἀναθυμίασις. Cic. Nat. D. iii. 14, 36; Tusc. i. 9, 19; 18, 42: Zeno considers the soul to be fire; Panætius believes that it is burning air. Diog. L. vii. 156, on the authority of Zeno, Antipater, Posidonius, says that it is πνεῦμα σύμφυτον, πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον. Stob. Ecl. i. 796 (Plut. Plac. iv. 3, 3). Cornut. N. D. p. 8: καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἡμέτεραι ψυχαὶ πῦρ εἰσι. Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 20, 1: Zeno calls the soul αἴσθησιν ἢ ἀναθυμίασιν (should be αἰσθητικὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, conf. § 2 and Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. c. 127: τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ὁρίζονται πνεῦμα συμφυὲς καὶ ἀναθυμίασιν αἰσθητικὴν ἀναπτομένην ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν σώματι ὑγρῶν). Longin. in Eus. Ibid. 21, 1 and 3. Alex. De An. 127. b: οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς πνεῦμα αὐτὴν λέγοντες εἶναι συγκείμενόν πως ἔκ τε πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος. Since, however, every πνεῦμα is not a soul, a soul is stated to be πνεῦμα πὼς ἔχον (Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 4, p. 458, E); and the distinctive quality of the soul-element is its greater warmth and rarity. See Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 2, p. 1052: Chrysippus considers the ψυχὴ to be ἀραιότερον πνεῦμα τῆς φύσεως καὶ λεπτομερέστερον. Similarly, Galen, Qu. An. Mores, c. 4. Vol. iv. 783: The Stoics say that both φύσις and ψυχὴ is πνεῦμα, but that the πνεῦμα is thick and cold in φύσις, dry and warm in ψυχή.

Chrysippus. See previous note. This diffusion is further explained by Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 870 and 874, Themist. De Anim. f. 68, a. Plotin. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, c, as being κρᾶσις, i.e. an intermingling of elements. That the soul forms the bond of union for the body, and not vice versâ, was a point vindicated by the Stoics against the Epicureans. Posid. in Achil. Tat. Isag. c. 13, p. 133, E; Sext. Math. ix. 72.

Galen. Hippocr. et Plat. ii. 8, p. 282, on the authority of Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Diogenes; Longin. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 21, 3; M. Aurel. v. 33; vi. 15; Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. 127.

Zeno described the seed as πνεῦμα μεθ’ ὑγροῦ ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ ἀπόσπασμα ... μῖγμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν (Arius Didymus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 20, 1), or as σύμμιγμα καὶ κέρασμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων (Plut. Coh. Ir. 15). Similarly Chrysip., in Diog. 159. Conf. Tertullian, De An. c. 27. According to Sphærus, in Diog. 159, the seed is formed by separation from all parts of the body and can consequently produce all, as Democritus had already said. Panætius (in Cic. Tusc. i. 31, 79) proves, from the mental similarity, between parents and children, that the soul comes into existence by generation. For the mother’s share in producing the soul, see Ar. Did. l.c. See above p. 127, 5.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 1 and 8, p. 1052; C. Not. 46, 2, p. 1084. De Primo Frig. 2, 5, p. 946: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα λέγουσιν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τῶν βρεφῶν τῇ περιψύξει στομοῦσθαι καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐκ φύσεως γενέσθαι ψυχήν. Similarly, Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, c. Conf. Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. c. 21, p. 40; Tertull. De An. c. 25. Plutarch (Plac. v. 16, 2; 17, 1; 24, 1) draws attention to the inconsistency of saying that the animal soul, which is warmer and rarer than the vegetable soul, has been developed of it there by cooling and condensation.

On this point, the Stoics were not altogether agreed. Some (not all, as Plut. Pl. Phil. iv. 21, 5, asserts) made the brain the seat of the soul, in proof of which they appealed to the story of the birth of Pallas. Sext. Math. ix. 119; Diog. in Phædr. Fragm. De Nat. De. col. 6. Conf. Krische, Forschungen, i. 488, and Chrysipp. in Galen, l.c. iii. 8, p. 349. It appears, however, from Galen, l.c. i. 6, ii. 2 and 5, iii. 1, pp. 185, 214, 241, 287, Tertull. De An. c. 15, that the most distinguished Stoics—Zeno, Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Apollodorus—decided in favour of the heart. The chief proof is, that the voice does not come from the hollow of the skull, but from the breast. Chrysippus was aware of the weakness of this proof, but still did not shrink from using it. Galen, l.c. p. 254, 261. At the same time, he also appealed to the fact (ii. 7, 268; iii. 1, 290, c. 5, 321, c. 7, 335, 343; iv. 1, 362) that, by universal assent, supported by numerous passages from the poets, the motions of the will and the feelings proceed from the heart.

Aristotle had assigned no particular organ of the body to reason.

Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 2. Ibid, c. 21: The Stoics consider the ἡγεμονικὸν to be the highest part of the soul; it begets the φαντασίαι, συγκαταθέσεις, αἰσθήσεις, and ὁρμαὶ, and is by them called λογισμός; from it the seven divisions of the soul reach to the body, like the arms of a cuttle-fish, and are therefore collectively defined as πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοὺ ἡγεμονικοῦ (μέχρις ὀφθαλμῶν, ὤτων, μυκτήρων, γλώττης, ἐπιφανείας, παραστάτων, φάρυγγος γλώττης καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων). Galen, l.c. iii. 1, 287. See p. 215, 2; Diog. 110 and 157; Porphyr. and Iamblich. in Stob. i. 836, 874, and 878; Chalcid. in Tim. 307; Nicomachus, in Iambl. Theol. Arith. p. 50. But there was no universal agreement among the Stoics on this subject. According to Tertull. De An. 14, Zeno only admitted three divisions of the soul, whilst some among the later Stoics enumerated as many as ten; Panætius only held six, and Posidonius went still further away from the view current among the Stoics. The remarks of Stob. i. 828, probably refer to the Peripatetic Aristo.

See p. 73, 2.

Conf. Cleanth. Hymn 4:

ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν ἰῆς μίμημα λαχόντες μοῦνοι, ὅσα ζώει τε καὶ ἕρπει θνήτ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν.

See p. 214, 2 and Chrys. in Galen, l.c. iii. 1, p. 287. Conf. p. 211, 5: ταύτης οὖν [τῆς ψυχῆς] τῶν μερῶν ἑκάστῳ διατεταγμένον [ων] μορίῳ, τὸ διῆκον αὐτῆς εἰς τὴν τραχεῖαν ἀρτηρίαν φωνὴν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὄψιν, κ.τ.λ. καὶ τὸ εἰς ὄρχεις, ἕτερόν τιν’ ἔχον τοιοῦτον λόγον, σπερματικὸν, εἰς ὃ δὲ συμβαίνει πάντα ταῦτα, ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ εἶναι, μέρος ὂν αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 2: τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἀφ’ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπιτέτακται [= ταται] διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων προσφερῶς ταῖς τοῦ πολύποδος πλεκτάναις. Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 102. Alex. Aphr. (De An. 146) therefore denies the Stoical assertion, that the ψυχικὴ δύναμις is only one, and that every activity of the soul is only the action of the πὼς ἔχον ἡγεμονικόν. Conversely Tertullian, De An. 14, speaking quite after the manner of a Stoic, says: Hujusmodi autem non tam partes animæ habebuntur, quam vires et efficaciæ et operæ ... non enim membra sunt substantiæ animalis, sed ingenia (capacities). Iambl. in Stob. i. 874: The powers of the soul bear, according to the Stoics, the same relation to the soul that qualities bear to the substance; their difference is partly owing to the diffusion of the πνεύματα, of which they consist, in different parts of the body, partly to the union of several qualities in one subject-matter, the latter being necessary, for ἡγεμονικὸν to include φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις, ὁρμὴ, and λόγος.

Plut. Virt. Mort. c. 3, p. 441, speaking of Zeno, Aristo, and Chrysippus: νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾷ τινι καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικὸν, διόλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς κατὰ ἕξιν ἢ διάθεσιν μεταβολαῖς κακίαν τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Plac. Phil. iv. 21, 1. Galen, l.c. iv. 1, p. 364: Chrysippus sometimes speaks as if he admitted a distinct δύναμις ἐπιθυμητικὴ or θυμοειδής; at other times, as if he denied it. The latter is clearly his meaning. Ibid. v. 6, 476: ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος οὐθ’ ἕτερον εἶναι νομίζει τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἀφαιρεῖται τὰ πάθη. See p. 209, 1. Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 890; Diog. vii. 159. Orig. c. Cels. v. 47: τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀρνουμένους τὸ τριμερὲς τῆς ψυχῆς. Posidonius (in Galen, l.c. 6, 476) endeavours to prove that Cleanthes held a different view, by a passage in which he contrasts θυμὸς with λόγος—but this is making a rhetorical flourish do duty for a philosophic statement.

Chrys. (in Galen, ii. 2, 215): οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν κατὰ τοῦτο (the primary power in the breast) δεικνύντες αὑτοὺς ἐν τῷ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι.

Cleanthes, v. 4, p. 215, 1. Epictet. Diss. i. 14, 6: αἱ ψυχαὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα. Id. ii. 8, 11. M. Aurel. ii. 4, v. 27, calls the soul μέρος ἀπόρροια, ἀπόσπασμα θεοῦ; and, xii. 26, even calls the human νοῦς θεός. Sen. Ep. 41, 2: Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet ... in unoquoque virorum bonorum, quis Deus incertum est, habitat Deus. Id. Ep. 66, 12. Ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa. Consequently, reason, thought, and virtue are of the same nature in the human soul as in the soul of the universe, as Iambl. in Stob. Ecl. i. 886, states as a Stoic view. From this relationship to God, Posidonius deduces in a well-known simile (see p. 84, 1) the soul’s capacity for studying nature, and Cicero (De Leg. 1. 8, 24) the universality of a belief in God. All souls, as being parts of the divine mind, may be collectively regarded as one soul or reason. Marc. Aurel. ix. 8: εἰς μὲν τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα μία ψυχὴ διῄρηται· εἰς δὲ τὰ λογικὰ μία λογικὴ ψυχὴ μεμέρισται. xii. 30: ἓν φῶς ἡλίου, κἂν διείργηται τοίχοις, ὄρεσιν, ἄλλοις μυρίοις· μία οὐσία κοινὴ, κἂν διείργηται ἰδίως ποιοῖς σώμασι μυρίοις· μία ψυχὴ, κἂν φύσεσι διείργηται μυρίαις καὶ ἰδίαις περιγραφαῖς. This oneness, however, must, as the comparison shows, be understood in the sense of the Stoic realism: the universal soul, in the sense of ethereal substance, is the element of which individual souls consist. See also Marc. Aurel. viii. 54.

In this sense, Sen. Ep. 31, 11, calls the animus rectus, bonus, magnus, a Deus in corpore humano hospitans.

Further particulars, p. 174, 180, 189.

See p. 179.

See p. 88, 1.

Diog. 156; Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 31. 2, p. 1107; Plac. iv. 7, 2; Ar. Didymus, in Eus. Præp. Ev. xv. 20, 3; Sen. Consol. ad Marc. c. 26, 7; Ep. 102, 22; 117, 6; Cic. Tusc. i. 31, 77. Seneca (ad Polyb. 9, 2; Ep. 65, 24; 71, 16; 36, 9, and in Tertull. De An. c. 42; Resurr. Carn. 3. 1) and M. Aurelius (iii. 3; vii. 32; viii. 25, 58) are only speaking κατ’ ἄνθρωπον, in seeming to doubt a future life after death, in order to dispel the fear of death in every case. It is, however, a mistake of Tiedemann (Sto. Phil. ii. 155) to suppose that they, in many passages (Sen. Ep. 71, 102, M. Aur. ii. 17; v. 4, 13), supposed the immediate dissolution of the soul after death. It is, on the contrary, clear, from M. Aurel. iv. 14, 21, that the soul lives some time after death, and is not resolved into the world-soul till the general conflagration. But even this is a variation from the ordinary view of the Stoics. According to Seneca (Consol. ad Marciam) the souls of the good, as in the doctrine of purgatory, undergo a purification, before they are admitted to the ranks of the blessed; and here this purification is no doubt required on physical grounds. When the soul is purified, both in substance and morals, it rises up to the ether, and there, according to M. Aurelius, united to the σπερματικὸς λόγος τῶν ὅλων, it lives, according to the common view, until the end of the world. The ether is also allotted to the blessed, for their residence, by Cic. Tusc. i. 18, 42; Lactant. Inst. vii. 20; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi. 31, 2, p. 1107. The souls, as Cicero remarks, penetrating the thick lower air, mount to heaven, until they reach an atmosphere (the juncti ex anima tenui et ardore solis temperato ignes) congenial with their own nature. Here they naturally stop, and are fed by the same elements as the stars. According to Chrysippus (in Eustath. on Il. xxiii. 65), they there assume the spherical shape of the stars. According to Tertull. De An. 54, conf. Lucan. Phars. ix. 5, their place is under the moon. Zeno, in speaking of the islands of the blest (Lact. Inst. vii. 7, 20), probably only desired to enlist popular opinion in his own favour. The souls of the foolish and bad also last some time after death; only, as being weaker, they do not last until the end of the world (Ar. Did.; Theodoret. Cur. Gr. Affec. v. 23, p. 73); and meantime, as it is distinctly asserted by Sen. Ep. 117, 6, Tertullian, and Lactantius, they are punished in the nether world. Tertullian in placing a portion of the souls of the foolish in the region of the earth, and there allowing them to be instructed by the wise, is probably referring to the purification mentioned by Seneca. For the supposed transmigration of souls see p. 166, 2.

The peculiar notion mentioned by Seneca (Ep. 57, 7) as belonging to the Stoics—animam hominis magno pondere extriti permanere non posse et statim spargi, quia non fuerit illi exitus liber—was not required by their principles, as Seneca already observed. It belongs, in fact, only to individual members of that School.

Conf. Baur, Seneca und Paulus, in Hilgenfeld’s Zeitschrift für wissensch. Theol. i. 2, 221.

Ep. 102, 22: Cum venerit dies ille, qui mixtum hoc divini humanique secernat, corpus hic, ubi inveni, relinquam, ipse me Dis reddam ... per has mortalis vitæ moras illi meliori vitæ longiorique proluditur. As a child in its mother’s womb, sic per hoc spatium, quod ab infantia patet in senectutem, in alium maturescimus partum. All we possess, and the body itself, is only the baggage, which we neither brought into the world, nor can carry away with us. Dies iste, quem tanquam extremum reformidas, æterni natalis est. Ep. 120, 14: The body is breve hospitium, which a noble soul does not fear to lose. Scit enim, quo exiturus sit, qui, unde venerit, meminit. Conf. Ep. 65, 16.

Consol. ad Marc. 24, 3: Imago dumtaxat filii tui periit ... ipse quidem æternus meliorisque nunc status est, despoliatus oneribus alienis et sibi relictus. The body is only a vessel, enveloping the soul in darkness: nititur illo, unde dimissus est; ibi illum æterna requies manet. Ibid. 26, 7: Nos quoque felices animæ et æterna sortitæ. Ibid. 19, 6: Excessit filius tuus terminos intra quos servitur: excepit illum magna et æterna pax. No fear or care, no desire, envy, or compassion disturbs him. Ibid. 26, 5. Consol. ad Polyb. 9, 3, 8: Nunc animus fratris mei velut ex diutino carcere emissus, tandem sui juris et arbitrii, gestit et rerum naturæ spectaculo fruitur ... fruitur nunc aperto et libero cœlo ... et nunc illic libere vagatur omniaque rerum naturæ bona cum summa voluptate perspicit. Ep. 79, 12: Tunc animus noster habebit, quod gratuletur sibi, cum emissus his tenebris ... totum diem admiserit, et cœlo redditus suo fuerit. Ep. 102, 28: Aliquando naturæ tibi arcana retegentur, discutietur ista caligo et lax undique clara percutiet, which Seneca then further expands.

In Consol. ad Marc. 26, 1, Seneca describes how, the time of purification ended, the deceased one inter felices currit animas (the addition: excepit illum cœtus sacer Hanse rightly treats as a gloss) and how his grandfather shows him the hall of heaven. Ibid. 26, 3.

Ep. 26, 4: Velut adpropinquet experimentum et ille laturus sententiam de omnibus annis meis dies ... quo, remotis strophis ac fucis, de me judicaturus sum. Compare the hora decretoria, Ep. 102, 24.

Ep. 102, 29: Hæc cogitatio (that of heaven and a future life) nihil sordidum animo subsidere sinit, nihil humile, nihil crudele. Deos rerum omnium esse testes ait: illis nos adprobari, illis in futurum parari jubet et æternitatem menti proponere.

Ep. 36, 10: Mors ... intermittit vitam, non eripit: veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret. Sed postea diligentius docebo omnia, quæ videntur perire, mutari. Æquo animo debet rediturus exire. The souls cannot return, according to the Stoic teaching, until after the general conflagration, presuming that the same persons will be found in the future world as in the present. See p. 166, 2. As long as the world lasts, the better souls will continue to exist, and only the particles of the body are employed for fresh bodies. Accordingly, the passage just quoted, and also Ep. 71, 13, must refer to the physical side of death, or else to the return of personality after the conflagration of the world.

Besides the definitions of αἴσθησις in Diog. 52, and the remark that impressions are made on the organs of sense, but that the seat of feeling is in the ἡγεμονικόν (Plut. Plac. iv. 23, 1), the following statements may be mentioned: In the process of seeing, the ὁρατικὸν πνεῦμα, coming into the eyes from the ἡγεμονικόν, gives a spherical form to the air before the eye, by virtue of its τονικὴ κίνησις (on τόνος, see p. 128, 2), and, by means of the sphere of air, comes in contact with things; and since by this process rays of light emanate from the eye, darkness must be visible. Diog. 158; Alex. Aph. De Anim. 149; Plut. Plac. iv. 15. The process of hearing is due to the spherical undulations of the air, which communicate their motion to the ear. Diog. 158; Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 5. On the voice, called also φωνᾶεν, see Plut. Plac. iv. 20, 2; 21, 4; Diog. 55, and above p. 214, 2; 74, 6. Disease is caused by changes in the πνεῦμα, Diog. 158; sleep ἐκλυομένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ τόνου περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, Diog. 158; Tertull. De An. 43; and in a similar way, death ἐκλυομένου τοῦ τόνου καὶ παριεμένου Iambl. (in Stob. Ecl. i. 922), who, however, does not mention the Stoics by name. In the case of man, the extinguishing of the power of life is only a liberation of rational souls.

Page 77.

The chief passage in Diog. vii. 84, is as follows: τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε τὸν περὶ ὁρμῆς καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τόπον καὶ τὸν περὶ παθῶν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ τέλους περί τε τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν. καὶ οὕτω δ’ ὑποδιαιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον καὶ Ἀρχέδημον καὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Ταρσέα καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρον καὶ Διογένην καὶ Ἀντίπατρον καὶ Ποσειδώνιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κιττιεὺς Ζήνων καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης ὡς ἂν ἀρχαιότεροι ἀφελέστερον περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διέλαβον. There may be doubts as to the punctuation, and, consequently, as to the sense, of the first sentence; but the form of expression seems to imply that the five first portions contain main divisions, and the six following subdivisions. The ethics of Chrysippus and his followers would therefore fall into the following main divisions: περὶ ὁρμῆς, περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ παθῶν; but it would be hard to assign to these divisions their respective subdivisions. The statement of Epictetus, Diss. iii. 2, agrees in part with this division. He distinguishes in his introduction to virtue three τόποι: ὁ περὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκκλίσεις, called also ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη; ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον; and, lastly, ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀνεξαπατησίαν καὶ ἀνεικαιότητα καὶ ὅλως ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις. The first of these divisions would correspond with the third of Diogenes, the second with his first; but the division περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν does not harmonise with the third of Epictetus (which, according to what follows, rather refers to the critical confirmation of moral principles not specially mentioned by Diogenes), but rather with his first division treating of ὀρέξεις and ἐκκλίσεις. Stobæus again differs from either. In his survey of the Stoic ethics (Ecl. ii. c. 5), he first, p. 90, treats of what is good, evil, and indifferent, of what is desirable and detestable, of the end-in-chief, and of happiness, in this section discussing at length the doctrine of virtue. He then goes on, p. 158, to consider the καθῆκον, the impulses, p. 166, and the emotions (πάθη, as being one kind of impulse), appending thereto, p. 186, a discussion on friendship; and concluding, p. 192 to 242, with a long treatise on ἐνεργήματα (κατορθώματα, ἁμαρτήματα, οὐδέτερα), the greater portion of which is devoted to describing the wise man and the fool. Turning to Sen. Ep. 95, 65, it is stated, on the authority of Posidonius, that not only præceptio, but also suasio, consolatio, and exhortatio, and, moreover, causarum inquisitio (which, however, can hardly have been called etymologia by Posidonius, as Hanse reads but ætiologia) and ethologia, description of moral states, are necessary. In Ep. 89, 14, the parts of moral science are more accurately given as three; the first determining the value of things, the second treating de actionibus, the third de impetu, περὶ ὁρμῆς. Two of these parts coincide indeed with those of Diogenes, but this is not the case with the third, which is only one of the subdivisions in Diogenes (περὶ τῶν πράξεων); and even Seneca’s first part more nearly agrees with one of these (περὶ τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας). Unfortunately, Seneca does not mention his authorities; and, accordingly, we are not sure whether his division is a genuine Stoic division. A similar division will be subsequently met with in the eclectic Academician Eudorus (living under Augustus). None of the divisions quoted agree with the three problems proposed by Cic. Off. ii. 5, 18, or the three sections enumerated by Epict. Enchir. c. 51 (76), in which Petersen (Phil. Chrys. Fund. p. 260) recognises Seneca’s three main divisions of Ethics. In the midst of such contending authorities, it seems impossible to establish the main division of the Stoic Ethics. One thing alone is clear, that they were themselves not agreed on the subject. Petersen’s attempt, l.c. p. 258, appears to me a failure.

Stob. Ecl. ii. 138: τέλος δέ φασιν εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται μὲν, οὐδενὸς δὲ ἕνεκα.

Diog. vii. 85; Cic. Fin. iii. 5; Gell. N. A. xii. 5, 7. That the two latter writers follow one and the same authority appears partly from their literal agreement with each other, and partly from their adopting a uniform method in refuting the Epicurean statement, that the desire for pleasure is the primary impulse. That authority is probably the treatise of Chrysippus περὶ τέλους, since it is distinctly referred to by Diogenes. Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 4, quotes from it: ὡς οἰκειούμεθα πρὸς αὑτοὺς εὐθὺς γενόμενοι καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὰ ἔκγονα ἑαυτῶν. The difference mentioned by Alex. Aphr. De An. 154—that at one time self-love, at another the preservation of one’s own nature, is the impulse—is unimportant.

Diog. vii 85: τὴν δὲ πρώτην ὁρμήν φασι τὸ ζῷον ἴσχειν ἐπὶ τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτὸ, οἰκειούσης αὑτῶ [αὑτῷ] τῆς φύσεως ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τελῶν, πρῶτον οἰκεῖον εἶναι λέγων παντὶ ζῴῳ τὴν αὑτοῦ σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἀλλοτριῶσαι εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοῦ [Cobet incorrectly αὐτὸ] τὸ ζῷον, οὔτε ποιῆσαι ἂν [l. ποιήσασαν sc. τὴν φύσιν] αὐτὸ μήτ’ ἀλλοτριῶσαι μήτ’ οὐκ [must evidently be struck out] οἰκειῶσαι. ἀπολείπεται τοίνυν λέγειν συστησαμένην αὐτὸ οἰκείως πρὸς ἑαυτό· οὕτω γὰρ τά τε βλάπτοντα διωθεῖται καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα προσίεται. Similarly, Cic. l.c. 5, 16. Antisthenes had already reduced the conception of the good to that of οἰκεῖον, without the fuller explanation. Here the Academic theory of life according to nature, which had been enunciated by Polemo, Zeno’s teacher, is combined therewith. Some difficulty was nevertheless caused by the question whether all living creatures possess a consciousness (συνείδησις, sensus) of their own nature; without such a consciousness, natural self-love seemed to the Stoics impossible. They thought, however, that this question (according to Sen. Ep. 121, 5, conf. Cic. l.c.) could be answered in the affirmative without hesitation, and appealed for evidence to the instinctive activities by which children and animals govern their bodily motions, guard themselves from dangers, and pursue what is to their interest, without denying that the ideas which children and animals have of themselves are very indistinct, that they only know their own constitution, but not its true conception (constitutionis finitio, Sen. p. 11). Constitutio, or σύστασις, was defined by the Stoics, Sen., p. 10. as principale animi quodam modo se habens erga corpus.

Cic. Fin. iii. 5, 17; 6, 20.

The terms are here treated as synonymous, without regard to the hair-splitting with which the Stoics distinguished (Stob. Ecl. ii. 136) three meanings of τέλος, between τέλος and σκοπός.

Stob. ii. 134 and 138; Diog. vii. 88; 94; Plut. C. Not. 27, 9; Cic. Fin. iii. 7, 26; 10, 33; Sen. V. Beat. 3, 3; conf. Ep. 118, 8; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 171; Math. xi. 30. In Stob. ii. 78 and 96, formal definitions are given of ἀγαθὸν, τέλος, and εὐδαιμονία. The latter is generally paraphrased by εὔροια βίου, as Zeno had defined it. Various formulæ for the conception of a life according to nature are given by Cleanthes, Antipater, Archedemus, Diogenes, Panætius, Posidonius, and others in Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. 416; Stob. 134; and Diog., all apparently taken from the same source.

Diog. vii. 88: διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῇν· ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατά τε τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινὸς ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διΐ ... εἶναι δ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὔροιαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ’ ἑκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων διοικητοῦ βούλησιν.

Stob. ii. 160 (conf. 158): διττῶς θεωρεῖσθαι τήν τε ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς γιγνομένην ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῷοις. Diog. 86: Plants are moved by nature without impulse, animals by means of impulse. In the case of animals, therefore, τὸ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν is the same as τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὁρμήν. In rational creatures, reason controls impulse; and accordance with nature means accordance with reason. In Galen. Hippoc. et Plat. v. 2, p. 460, Chrysippus says: ἡμᾶς οἰκειοῦσθαι πρὸς μόνον τὸ καλόν. M. Aurel. vii. 11: τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ λόγον. Hence the definition of a virtuous life, or a life according to nature: ζῇν κατ’ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων (Chrysippus, in Stob. 134; Diog. 87; Clem. l.c.; also Diogenes, Antipater, Archedemus, Posidonius); and that of the good: τὸ τέλειον κατὰ φύσιν λογικοῦ ὡς λογικοῦ (Diog. 94).

Sen. Ep. 121, 14: Omne animal primum constitutioni suæ conciliari: hominis autem constitutionem rationalem esse: et ideo conciliari hominem sibi non tanquam animali sed tanquam rationali. Ea enim parte sibi carus est homo, qua homo est. Id. Ep. 92, 1: The body is subservient to the soul, and the irrational part of the soul to the rational part. Hence it follows: In hoc uno positam esse beatam vitam. ut in nobis ratio perfecta sit. Similarly. Ep. 76, 8. M. Aurel. vi. 44: συμφέρει δὲ ἑκάστῳ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κατασκευὴν καὶ φύσιν· ἡ δὲ ἐμὴ φύσις λογικὴ καὶ πολιτική. Conf. viii. 7 and 12.

According to Stob. ii. 132, Diog. vii. 89, the ancient Stoics were not altogether agreed as to the terms in which they would express their theory. Zeno, for instance, is said by Stobæus to have defined τέλος = ὁμολογουμένως ζῇν; Cleanthes first added the words τῇ φύσει, and Chrysippus and his followers augmented the formula by several additions. Diog. 87 attributes the words τῇ φύσει to Zeno, adding, however, 89, that Chrysippus understood by φύσις, τήν τε κοινὴν καὶ ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην, whereas Cleanthes understood τὴν κοίνην μόνην οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους. These differences are, however, not important. The simple expression ὁμολογουμένως ζῇν means, without doubt, ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ, the ζῇν καθ’ ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον (Stob. ii. 132 and 158), the ὁμολογία παντὸς τοῦ βίου (Diog. vii. 89), the vita sibi concors, the concordia animi (Sen. Ep. 89, 15; V. Be. 8, 6), the unum hominem agere, which, according to Sen. Ep. 120, 22, is only found in a wise man—in a word, the even tenour of life and consistency. Nevertheless, this consistency is only possible when individual actions accord with the requirements of the character of the agent. Accordingly, Stob. ii. 158, places ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει by the side of ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ. Cleanthes, therefore, in adding to the expression ὁμολογουμένως the words τῇ φύσει, which, however, according to Diog. 87, Zeno had done before him, was only going back to the next condition of ὁμολογουμένως ζῇν. We can, however, hardly believe with Diogenes that Cleanthes understood by φύσις only nature in general, but not human nature. He may have alluded in express terms to κοινὴ φύσις or κοινὸς νόμος only, with the praise of which his well-known hymn ends, but it cannot have been his intention to exclude human nature, which is only a particular form of nature in general. Chrysippus therefore only expanded, but did not contradict, the teaching of his master.

Diog. vii. 30; 94; 101; Stob. ii. 200; 138; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169; Math. xi. 184; Cic. Tusc. ii. 25, 61; Fin. iv. 16, 45; Acad. i. 10; Parad. 1; Sen. Benef. vii. 2, 1; Ep. 71, 4; 74, 1; 76, 11; 85, 17; 120, 3; 118, 10, where the relation of the conceptions honestum bonum, secundum naturam is specially considered. To prove their position, the Stoics make use of the chain-argument, of which they are generally fond. Thus Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 11): τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἱρετόν· τὸ δ’ αἱρετὸν ἀρεστόν· τὸ δ’ ἀρεστὸν ἐπαινετόν· τὸ δ’ ἐπαινετὸν καλόν. (The same in Cic. Fin. iii. 8, 27, and iv. 18, 50, where I would suggest the reading validius instead of vitiosius.). Again: τὸ ἀγαθὸν χαρτόν· τὸ δὲ χαρτὸν σεμνόν· τὸ δὲ σεμνὸν καλόν (The same somewhat expanded in Cic. Tusc. v. 15, 43.) Stob. ii. 126: πᾶν ἀγαθὸν αἱρετὸν εἶναι, ἀρεστὸν γὰρ καὶ δοκιμαστὸν καὶ ἐπαινετὸν ὑπάρχειν· πᾶν δὲ κακὸν φευκτὸν. Another sorites of the same kind in Sen. Ep. 85, 2.

Stob. ii. 78; 94; Diog. vii. 94 and 98; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169; Math. xi. 22, 25, and 30. According to Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 33, Diogenes reconciled this definition with the definition of the good and the perfect quoted on p. 227, 4, by observing that the useful is a motus aut status natura absoluti.

Sext. l.c. Stob. ii. 188: μηδένα φαῦλον μήτε ὠφελεῖσθαι μήτε ὠφελεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἴσχειν κατ’ ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι κινεῖσθαι κατ’ ἀρετήν. Ibid. ii. 202; Plut. Sto. Rep. 12; Com. Not. 20, 1; Cic. Off. ii. 3, 10; iii. 3, 11; 7, 34.

M. Aurel. ix. 16.

See Diog. 94; Stob. ii. 96; 124; 130; 136; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169; Math. xi. 22; Cic. Fin. iii. 16, 55; Sen. Ep. 66, 5. Good is here defined to be either ὠφέλεια or οὐκ ἕτερον ὠφελείας (inseparably connected with ὠφέλεια, the good in itself, just as the virtuous man is connected with virtue, which is a part of himself. See Sextus l.c. and above p. 104, 2), or, what is the same thing, ἀρετὴ ἢ τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς. (Sext. Math. xi. 184.) A distinction is drawn between three kinds of good: τὸ ὑφ’ οὗ ἢ ἀφ’ οὗ ἔστιν ὠφελεῖσθαι, τὸ καθ’ ὃ συμβαίνει ὠφελεῖσθαι, τὸ οἷόν τε ὠφελεῖν. Under the first head comes virtue, under the second virtuous actions, under the third, besides the two others, virtuous subjects—men, Gods, and demons. A second division of goods (Diog., Sext. iii. 181, Stob.) is into goods of the soul, external goods, the possession of virtuous friends and a virtuous country, and such as are neither (τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι σπουδαῖον καὶ εὐδαίμονα, virtue and happiness considered as the relation of the individual to himself, as his own possessions). Goods of the soul are then divided into διαθέσεις (virtues), ἕξεις (or ἐπιτηδεύματα, as instances of which Stob. ii. 100, 128, quotes μαντικὴ and φιλογεωμετρία, &c.; these are not so unchangeable as peculiarities of character, and are therefore only ἕξεις, p. 103, 1), and those which are neither ἕξεις nor διαθέσεις—actions themselves. A third division of goods (Diog., Cic. l.c., Stob. 80, 100, 114) distinguishes τελικὰ or δι’ αὑτὰ αἱρετὰ (moral actions), ποιητικὰ (friends and the services they render), τελικὰ and ποιητικὰ (virtues themselves); fourthly and fifthly, μικτὰ (as εὐτεκνία and εὐγηρία), and ἁπλᾶ or ἄμικτα (such as science), and the ἀεὶ παρόντα (virtues), and οὐκ ἀεὶ παρόντα (οἷον χαρὰ, περιπάτησις). The corresponding divisions of evil are given by Diogenes and Stobæus. The latter (ii. 126 and 136) enumerates, in addition, the ἀγαθὰ ἐν κινήσει (χαρὰ, &c.) and ἐν σχέσει (εὔτακτος ἡσυχία, &c.), the latter being partially ἐν ἕξει; the ἀγαθὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ (virtues) and πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα (honour, benevolence, friendship); the goods which are necessary for happiness (virtues), and those which are not necessary (χαρὰ, ἐπιτηδεύματα). Seneca’s list is far more limited, although it professes to be more general. He mentions, prima bona, tanquam gaudium, pax, salus patriæ; secunda, in materia infelici expressa, tanquam tormentorum patientia; tertia, tanquam modestus incessus.

Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 33: Ego assentior Diogeni, qui bonum definierit id quod esset natura absolutum [αὐτοτελὲς] ... hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando sed propria vi et sentimus et appellamus bonum. Ut enim mel, etsi dulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione cum aliis, dulce esse sentitur, sic bonum hoc de quo agimus est illud quidem plurimi æstimandum, sed ea æstimatio genere valet non magnitudine, &c.

Sen. Benef. vii. 2, 1: Nec malum esse ullum nisi turpe, nec bonum nisi honestum. Alex. Aph. De Fat. c. 28, p. 88: ἡ μὲν ἀρετή τε καὶ ἡ κακία μόναι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἡ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἡ δὲ κακόν. See p. 229; 233, 1.

Sext. Math. xi. 61, after giving two irrelevant definitions of ἀδιάφορον: κατὰ τρίτον δὲ καὶ τελευταῖον τρόπον φασὶν ἀδιάφορον τὸ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συλλαμβανόμενον. To this category belong external goods, health, &c. ᾧ γὰρ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη ἀδιάφορον· διὰ παντὸς δ’ ἀρετῇ μὲν κακῶς, κακίᾳ δὲ κακῶς, ὑγιείᾳ δὲ καὶ τοῖς περὶ σώματι ποτὲ μὲν εὖ ποτὲ δὲ κακῶς ἔστι χρῆσθαι. Similarly, Pyrrh. iii. 177, and Diog. 102, who defines οὐδέτερα as ὅσα μήτ’ ὠφελεῖ μήτε βλάπτει. Stob. ii. 142: ἀδιάφορον = τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν, καὶ τὸ μήτε αἱρετὸν μήτε φευκτόν. Plut. Sto. Rep. 31, 1: ᾧ γὰρ ἔστιν εὖ χρήσασθαι καὶ κακῶς τοῦτό φασι μήτ’ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μήτε κακόν.

Zeno (in Sen. Ep. 82, 9) proves this of death by a process of reasoning, the accuracy of which he appears to have mistrusted: Nullum malum gloriosum est: mors autem gloriosa est (there is a glorious death): ergo mors non est malum. In general, two considerations are prominent in the Stoic treatment of this subject: that what is according to nature cannot be an evil, and that life taken by itself is not a good. Other arguments, however, for diminishing the fear of death are not despised. See Sen. Ep. 30, 4; 77, 11, 82, 8; Cons. ad. Marc. 19, 3; M. Aurel. ix. 3; viii. 58. And other passages quoted in Baumhauer’s Vet. Philosoph. Doctr. De Morte Voluntaria, p. 211.

Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 15, 4): All virtue is done away with, ἂν ἢ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν, ἀγαθὸν ἀπολίπωμεν. Id. (in Plut. C. Not. 5, 2): ἐν τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν βιοῦν μόνον ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμόνως, τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄντων πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδ’ εἰς τοῦτο συνεργούντων. Similarly, Sto. Rep. 17, 2. Sen. Vit. Be. 4, 3: The only good is honestas, the only evil turpitudo, cetera vilis turba rerum, nec detrahens quicquam beatæ vitæ nec adjiciens. Id. Ep. 66, 14: There is no difference between the wise man’s joy and the firmness with which he endures pains, quantum ad ipsas virtutes, plurimum inter illa, in quibus virtus utraque ostenditur ... virtutem materia non mutat. Ep. 71, 21: Bona ista aut mala non efficit materia, sed virtus. Ep. 85, 39: Tu illum [sapientem] premi putas malis? Utitur. Id. Ep. 44; 120, 3; Plut. C. Not. 4, 1; Sto. Rep. 18, 5; 31, 1; Chrysippus, in Ps. Plut. De Nobil. 12, 2; Diog. 102; Stob. ii. 90; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 181; Alex. Aphr. Top. 43 and 107.

Sext. Math. xi. 61. See above, p. 232, 3. Diog. 103: The good can only do good, and never do harm; οὐ μᾶλλον δ’ ὠφελεῖ ἢ βλάπτει ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια· οὐκ ἄρ’ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε πλοῦτος οὔθ’ ὑγίεια. Again: ᾧ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν· πλούτῳ δὲ καὶ ὑγιείᾳ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, κ.τ.λ. In Sen. Ep. 87, 11, instead of the proposition, that nothing is a good except virtue, the following arguments are given as traditional among the Stoics (interrogationes nostrorum), apparently taken from Posidonius (see p. 31, 35, 38): (1) Quod bonum est, bonos facit: fortuita bonum non faciunt: ergo non sunt bona. (Similarly in M. Aurel. ii. 11, iv. 8: Whatever does no moral harm, does no harm to human life.) (2) Quod contemptissimo cuique contingere ac turpissimo potest, bonum non est; opes autem et lenoni et lanistæ contingunt: ergo, &c. (So, too, Marc. Aurelius, v. 10.) (3) Bonum ex malo non fit: divitiæ fiunt, fiunt autem ex avaritia: ergo, &c. (Conf. Alex. Aphr. Top. 107: τὸ διὰ κακοῦ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν· πλοῦτος δὲ καὶ διὰ πορνοβοσκίας κακοῦ ὄντος γίνεται, κ.τ.λ.) (4) Quod dum consequi volumus in multa mala incidimus, id bonum non est: dum divitias autem consequi volumus, in multa mala incidimus, &c. (5) Quæ neque magnitudinem animo dant nec fiduciam nec securitatem, contra autem insolentiam, tumorem, arrogantiam creant, mala sunt: a fortuitis autem (previously, not only riches but health had been included in this class) in hæc impellimur: ergo non sunt bona. That riches are not a good is proved by Diogenes (in Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 49); that poverty and pain are no evils is proved by the argument, quoted in Sen. Ep. 85, 30: Quod malum est nocet: quod nocet deteriorem facit. Dolor et paupertas deteriorem non faciunt: ergo mala non sunt. The Stoic proposition is also established from a theological point of view. Nature, says M. Aurel. ii. 11, ix. 1, could never have allowed that good and evil should equally fall to the lot of the good and the bad; consequently, what both enjoy equally—life and death, honour and dishonour, pleasure and trouble, riches and poverty—can neither be good nor evil. On the value of fame, see id. iv. 19.

This view is compared with the Academician in Cic. Tusc. v. 13, 39; 18, 51; Sen. Ep. 85, 18; 71, 18; 92, 14. In the last passage, the notion that happiness can be increased by external goods, and is consequently capable of degrees, is refuted by arguments such as 4, 24: Quid potest desiderare is, cui omnia honesta contingunt?... et quid stultius turpiusve, quam bonum rationalis animi ex irrationalibus nectere?... non intenditur virtus, ergo ne beata quidem vita, quæ ex virtute est. Conf. Ep. 72, 7: Cui aliquid accedere potent, id imperfectum est.

Cleanthes expands this notion, in rhetorical language, in Cic. Fin. ii. 21, 69. Conf. Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 2: [Virtus] non est virtus si sequi potest. Primæ partes ejus sunt: ducere debet, imperare, summo loco stare: tu illam jubes signum petere. Id. Vit. Be. 11, 2; 13, 5; 14, 1.

Compare on this subject the words of Chrysippus on p. 233, 1, quoted by Plut. Sto. Rep. 15, and, for their explanation, Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 4: Non indignor, quod post voluptatem ponitur virtus, sed quod omnino cum voluptate conferatur contemptrix ejus et hostis et longissime ab illa resiliens. Id. Vit. Be. 15, 1: Pars honesti non potest esse nisi honestum, nee summum bonum habebit sinceritatem suam, si aliquid in se viderit dissimile meliori. According to Plut. 15, 3; 13, 3, Com. Not. 25, 2, this statement of Chrysippus is at variance with another statement of his, in which he says: If pleasure be declared to be a good, but not the highest good, justice (the Peripatetic view) might perhaps still be safe, since, in comparison with pleasure, it may be regarded as the higher good. Still, this was only a preliminary and tentative concession, which Chrysippus subsequently proved could not be admitted, inasmuch as it was out of harmony with the true conception of the good, and changed the difference in kind (on which see p. 232, 1) between virtue and other things into a simple difference in degree. Plutarch (Sto. Rep. 15, 6), with more reason, blames Chrysippus for asserting against Aristotle that, if pleasure be regarded as the highest good, justice becomes impossible, but not other virtues; for how could a Stoic, of all philosophers, make such a distinction between virtues? Evidently the zeal of controversy has here carried away the philosopher beyond the point at which his own principles would bear him out.

M. Aurel. vi. 15: ὁ μὲν φιλόδοξος ἀλλοτρίαν ἐνέργειαν ἴδιον ἀγαθὸν ὑπολαμβάνει· ὁ δὲ φιλήδονος ἰδίαν πεῖσιν· ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἰδίαν πρᾶξιν. Conf. ix. 16: οὐκ ἐν πείσει, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ πολιτικοῦ ζῴου κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.

Sen. Ep. 92, 6–10; Vit. Beat. 5, 4; 9, 4; Posidonius, in Sen. Ep. 92, 10.

Taking the expression in its strict meaning, it is hardly allowed by the Stoics, when they speak accurately. Understanding by ἡδονὴ an emotion, i.e. something contrary to nature and blameworthy, they assert that the wise man feels delight (χαρὰ, gaudium), but not pleasure (ἡδονὴ, lætitia, voluptas). See Sen. Ep. 59, 2; Diog. 116; Alex. Aphr. Top. 96; the last-named giving definitions of χαρὰ, ἡδονὴ, τέρψις, εὐφροσύνη.

Sen. Ep. 23, 2; 27, 3; 59, 2; 14; 72, 8; Vit. Be. 3, 4; 4, 4; De Ira, ii. 6, 2.

Diog. 94: Virtue is a good; ἐπιγεννήματα δὲ τήν τε χαρὰν καὶ τὴν εὐφροσύνην καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 3: It is a question utrum virtus summi boni causa sit, an ipsa summum bonum. Seneca, of course, says the latter. Conf. De Vit. Be. 4, 5: The wise man takes pleasure in peace of mind and cheerfulness, non ut bonis, sed ut ex bono suo ortis. Ibid. 9, 1: Non, si voluptatem præstatura virtus est, ideo propter hanc petitur ... voluptas non est merces nec causa virtutis, sed accessio, nec quia delectat placet, sed si placet et delectat. The highest good consists only in mental perfection and health, in ipso judicio et habitu optimæ mentis, in the sanitas et libertas animi, which desires nothing but virtue; ipsa pretium sui. Ibid. 15, 2: Ne gaudium quidem, quod ex virtute oritur, quamvis bonum sit, absoluti tamen boni pars est, non magis quam lætitia et tranquillitas ... sunt enim ista bona, sed consequentia summum bonum, non consummantia. Here, too, belongs the statement in Stob. ii. 184, 188 (conf. M. Aurel. vii. 74): πάντα τὸν ὁντινοῦν ὠφελοῦντα ἴσην ὠφέλειαν ἀπολαμβάνειν παρ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, for the reasons stated, p. 230, 1.

Sen. Vit. Be. c. 7 and 10–12; M. Aurel. viii. 10. Among the Stoic arguments against identifying pleasure and pain with good and evil, may be placed the inference in Clem. Strom. iv. 483, C, which bears great similarity to the third argument, quoted on p. 233, 2: If thirst be painful, and it be pleasant to quench thirst, thirst must be the cause of this pleasure: ἀγαθοῦ δὲ ποιητικὸν τὸ κακὸν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, κ.τ.λ.

Diog. 85: ὃ δὲ λέγουσί τινες, πρὸς ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν πρώτην ὁρμὴν τοῖς ζῷοις, ψεῦδος ἀποφαίνουσιν. ἐπιγέννημα γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν, ἡδονὴν εἶναι, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν ἡ φύσις ἐπιζητήσασα τὰ ἐναρμόζοντα τῇ συστάσει ἀπολάβη.

Taking pleasure in its widest sense. In its more restricted sense, they reject ἡδονή, understanding thereby a particular emotion. See p. 236. 2.

Sext. Math. xi. 73: τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φησιν· ὁ δὲ εἰπὼν ‘μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην’ (Antisthenes) κακόν· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδιάφορον καὶ οὐ προηγμένον. ἀλλὰ Κλεάνθης μὲν μήτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν εἶναι μήτε ἀξίαν ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καθάπερ δὲ τὸ κάλλυντρον κατὰ φύσιν μὴ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος κατὰ φύσιν μὲν εἶναι ὡς τὰς ἐν μασχάλῃ τρίχας, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχειν. Παναίτιος δὲ τινὰ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν τινὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν.

Accordingly, it is also defined to be τέχνη εὐδαιμονίας ποιητική. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b.

Diog. 89: τήν τ’ ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην καὶ αὐτὴν δι’ αὑτὴν εἶναι αἱρετὴν, οὐ διά τινα φόβον ἢ ἐλπίδα ἤ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν· ἐν αὐτῇ τ’ εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἅτ’ οὔσῃ [-ης] ψύχῃ [-ης] πεποιημένῃ [-ης] πρὸς ὁμολογίαν παντὸς τοῦ βίου. Sen. De Clem. i. 1, 1: Quamvis enim recte factorum verus fructus sit fecisse, nec ullum virtutum pretium dignum illis extra ipsas sit. Id. Ep. 81, 19. Ep. 94, 19: Æquitatem per se expetendam nec metu nos ad illam cogi nec mercede conduci. Non esse justum cui quicquam in hac virtute placet præter ipsam. Id. Ep. 87, 24: Maximum scelerum supplicium in ipsis est. Benef. iv 12: Quid reddat beneficium? dic tu mihi, quid reddat justitia, &c.; si quicquam præter ipsas, ipsas non expetis. M. Aurel. ix. 42: τί γὰρ πλέον θέλεις εὖ πριήσας ἄνθρωπον; οὐκ ἀρκῇ τούτῳ, ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν σήν τι ἔπραξας, ἀλλὰ τούτου μισθὸν ζητεῖς; When man does good, πεποίηκε πρὸς ὃ κατεσκεύασται καὶ ἔχει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ. Id. vii. 73; viii. 2. See pp. 230, 1; 236, 4.

Diog. vii. 127: αὐτάρκη εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν. Cic. Parad. 2; Sen. Ep. 74, 1: Qui omne bonum honesto circumscripsit, intra se felix est. This αὐτάρκεια is even asserted of individual virtues, by virtue of the connection between them all. Of φρόνησις, for instance, in Sen. Ep. 85, 2. it is said: Qui prudens est, et temperans est. Qui temperans, est et constans. Qui constans est, imperturbatus est. Qui imperturbatus est, sine tristitia est. Qui sine tristitia est, beatus est. Ergo prudens est beatus, et prudentia ad vitam beatam satis est. Similarly in respect of bravery (ibid. 24). This αὐτάρκεια of virtue was naturally a chief point of attack for an opponent. It is assailed by Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, on the ground that neither the things which the Stoics declare to be natural and desirable (προηγμένα), nor, on the other hand, the natural conditions of virtuous action, can be without effect on happiness, and that it will not do to speak of the latter as only negative conditions (ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ). See Plut. C. Not. 4, and 11, 1.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 26; C. Not. 8, 4, where Chrysippus is charged with at one time denying that happiness is augmented by length of time, and at another declaring momentary wisdom and happiness to be worthless. Cic. Fin. iii. 14, 45; Sen. Ep. 74, 27; 93, 6; Benef. v. 17, 6; M. Aurel. xii. 35. The Stoics are, on this point, at variance with Aristotle.

This view is frequently expressed by the Stoics of the Roman period, Seneca, Epictetus, and M. Aurelius. Proofs will be found subsequently.

Tusc. v. 15, 43; 14, 42.

Parad. 2.

De Const. 13, 5; 75, 18: Expectant nos, si ex hac aliquando fæce in illud evadimus sublime et excelsum, tranquillitas animi et expulsis erroribus absoluta libertas. Quæris, quæ sit ista? Non homines timere, non Deos. Nec turpia velle nec nimia. In se ipsum habere maximam potestatem: inæstimabile bonum est, suum fieri.

Ep. 29, 12: Quid ergo ... philosophia præstabit? Scilicet ut malis tibi placere, quam populo, ... ut sine metu Deorum hominumque vivas, ut aut vincas mala aut finias.

See Krische, Forschungen, 368 and 475.

See p. 148, 2.

νόμος, according to the Stoic definition (Stob. Ecl. ii. 190, 204; Floril. 44, 12, and in the fragment of Chrysippus quoted by Marcian in Digest. i. 3, 2, and the Scholiast of Hermogenes in Spengel Συναγ. τεχν. 177, Krische, Forsch. 475) = λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν τῶν ποιητέων, ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ τῶν οὐ ποιητέων. It is therefore σπουδαῖόν τι or ἀστεῖον, something of moral value, imposing duties on man. The ultimate source of this λόγος must be looked for in the λόγος κοινὸς, the divine or world reason. The general law is, according to Diog. vii. 88 (who here, according to the passage quoted from Cic. N. D. i. 15, 40 on p. 148, 2, is apparently following Chrysippus) = ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὦν τῷ Διΐ. It is the ratio summa insita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria (Cic. Legg. i. 6, 18, conf. the quotation from Cic. N. D. i. 14, 30, respecting Zeus, on p. 150). According to Cic. Legg. ii. 4, 8 and 10, it is no human creation sed æternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapientia, the mens omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei, the ratio recta summi Jovis (conf. Fin. iv. 5, II, in the fragment in Lact. Inst. v. 8). It is accordingly, as Chrysippus l.c. says in the words of Pindar (Plato, Gorg. 484, B), πάντων βασιλεὺς θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων.

Cic. Legg. i. 6, 18; ii. 4, 8; 5, 11.

Or as Stob. ii. 184, expresses it, δίκαιον is φύσει καὶ μὴ θέσει.

This is proved by Cic. Legg. i. 12, 33, in a chain-argument clearly borrowed from the Stoics: Quibus ratio a natura data est, iisdem etiam recta ratio data est. Ergo et lex, quæ est recta ratio in jubendo et vetando. Si lex, jus quoque. At omnibus ratio. Jus igitur datum est omnibus. Upon this conception of law is based the Stoic definition of κατόρθωμα as εὐνόμημα, that of ἁμάρτημα as ἀνόμημα.

The good alone, or virtue, is αἱρετόν; evil is φευκτόν. See p. 229, 1; 238, 3, and Stob. Ecl. ii. 202. αἱρετὸν is, however, Ibid. 126, 132, ὃ αἵρεσιν εὔλογον κινεῖ, or, more accurately, τὸ ὁρμῆς αὐτοτελοῦς κινητικόν; and αἱρετὸν is accordingly distinguished from ληπτόν—αἱρετὸν being what is morally good, ληπτὸν being everything which has value, including external goods. The Stoics make a further distinction (according to Stob. ii. 140 and 194) with unnecessary subtlety between αἱρετὸν and αἱρετέον, and similarly between ὀρεκτὸν and ὀρεκτέον, ὑπομενετὸν and ὑπομενετέον, using the first form to express the good in itself (for instance, φρόνησις), the latter to express the possession of the good (for instance, φρονεῖν).

ὁρμὴ is defined by Stob. ii. 160, as φορὰ ψυχῆς ἐπί τι· ἀφορμὴ, which is contrasted therewith in Epict. Enchirid. 2, 2 Diss. iii. 2, 2, 22, 36, as (according to the most probable correction of the text) φορὰ διανοίας ἀπό τινος. See p. 243, 3. A further distinction (connecting herewith what may be otherwise gathered from the statements of Stobæus respecting the Stoic doctrine of impulses) is made between the impulses of reasonable beings and beings devoid of reason. It is only in the case of reasonable beings that it can be said that impulse is called forth by the idea of a thing as something which has to be done (φαντασία ὁρμητικὴ τοῦ καθηκόντος); that every impulse contains an affirmative judgment in itself (συγκατάθεσις), to which has been superadded a κινητικόν· συγκατάθεσις applying to particular propositions (those in which truth and falsehood consist. See p. 110, 3; 83, 2), whereas ὁρμὴ applies to κατηγορήματα (i.e. activities expressed by verbs. See p. 95, 1 and 2), since every impulse and every desire aims at the possession of a good. Ὁρμὴ λογικὴ is defined to be φορὰ διανοίας ἐπί τι τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν, and is also called ὁρμὴ πρακτικὴ (only a rational being being capable of πρᾶξις). If the φορὰ διανοίας refers to something future, the ὁρμὴ becomes an ὄρεξις, for which the text twice reads ὄρουσις. Among the varieties of ὁρμὴ πρακτικὴ, Stob. enumerates πρόθεσις, ἐπιβολὴ, παρασκευὴ, ἐγχείρησις, αἵρεσις, πρόθεσις, βούλησις, θέλησις, the definitions of which he gives, passing then to the doctrine of emotions, these being also a kind of ὁρμή. It appears, therefore, that activities of feeling and will are included in the conception of ὁρμή, as will be subsequently seen more fully in the doctrine of emotions, the conception of which likewise includes both.

Stob. ii. 116, similarly 108: πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ οἱονεὶ τὸ [l. τὸν] τῶν ἡμιαμβειαίων λόγον ἔχειν κατὰ τὸν Κλεάνθην, ὅθεν ἀτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας εἶναι φαύλους, τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους. Diog. 89, see p. 238, 3: The soul rests on the harmony of life with itself (virtue); extraneous influences corrupt it, ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις ἀφορμὰς δίδωσιν ἀδιαστρόφους. Sen. Ep. 108, 8: Facile est auditorem concitare ad cupiditatem recti: omnibus enim natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutis.

The one point, according to Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 34, which distinguishes man from God is, that God is absolutely rational and by nature good and wise.

Chrysippus (in Galen. De Hippocr. et Plat. iv. 2, vol. v. 368 Kühn): τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀκολουθητικὸν φύσει ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα πρακτικόν· πολλάκις μέντοι καὶ ἄλλως φέρεται ἐπί τινα καὶ ἀπό τινων (for so we must punctuate, the reference being to ὁρμὴ and ἀφορμὴ, according to the definition, p. 242, 2) ἀπειθῶς τῷ λόγῳ ὠθούμενον ἐπὶ πλεῖον, κ.τ.λ. From this, it appears that Chrysippus’ definition of ὁρμὴ (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 6 = τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος προστακτικὸς αὐτῷ τοῦ ποιεῖν) must not be understood (as in Baumhauer’s Vet. Philos. Doct. De morte voluntaria, p. 74) to imply that man has only rational, and no irrational impulses. Chrysippus, in the passage quoted, must either be referring to that impulse which is peculiar to man, and is according to his nature; or else λόγος must be taken in its more extended meaning of notion or idea, for all impulses are based on judgments, see p. 242, 2; and it is clear, from Cic. Fin. iii. 7, 23 (‘as our limbs are given to us for a definite purpose, so ὁρμὴ is given for some definite object, and not for every kind of use’), that ὁρμὴ is not in itself rational, but first becomes rational by the direction given to it by man.

The term emotion is used to express πάθος, although the terms of modern psychology are more or less inadequate to express the ancient ideas, as Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 35, already observed.

Diog. vii. 110: ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις ἢ ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. The same definitions are found in Stob. ii. 36, 166, with this difference, that ἀπειθὴς τῷ αἱροῦντι λόγῳ stands in place of ἄλογος, as in Marc. Aurel. ii. 5. Cic. Tusc. iii. 11, 24; iv. 6, 11; 21, 47; Chrysippus in Galen. De Hipp. et Plat. iv. 2, 4; v. 2, 4, vol. v. 368, 385, 432, 458 Kühn, and Id. in Plut. Virt. Mor. 10, Schl. p. 450; Sen. Ep. 75, 12. A similar definition is attributed to Aristotle by Stob. ii. 36, but it is no longer to be found in his extant writings. If it was in one of the lost books (Heeren suggests in the treatise περὶ παθῶν ὀργῆς Diog. v. 23), was that book genuine?

Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39: Cumque eas perturbationes [πάθη] antiqui naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem assentiebatur . Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat, opinionisque judicio suscipi, et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur esse matrem immoderatam quandam intemperantiam. Fin. iii. 10, 35: Nec vero perturbationes animorum ... vi aliqua naturali moventur. Tusc. iv. 28, 60: Ipsas perturbationes per se esse vitiosas nec habere quidquam aut naturale aut necessarium.

See p. 215, 3; 242, 2.

Chrysippus, in Galen. iii. 7, p. 335; v. 1 and 6, p. 476, and above, p. 215, 3.

Plut. Virt. Mor. 3, p. 441 (the first part of this passage has been already quoted, p. 215, 3, the continuation being) λέγεσθαι δὲ [τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν] ἄλογον, ὅταν τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὁρμῆς ἰσχυρῷ γενομένῳ καὶ κρατήσαντι πρός τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν αἱροῦντα λόγον ἐκφέρηται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος, κ.τ.λ. See below, note 3.

See p. 242, 2.

Diog. vii. 111: δοκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ παθῶν. Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 3, p. 441: τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβόντα. Stob. ii. 168: ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν ἐπὶ δόξας αὐτὰ λέγουσιν εἶναι [instead of which read πάντων ... παθῶν δόξας αἰτίας λέγ. εἶν.], παραλαμβάνεσθαι [add δὲ] τὴν δόξαν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀσθενοῦς ὑπολήψεως. Conf. Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Sed omnes perturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione ... opinationem autem volunt esse imbecillam assensionem. Id. iii. 11, 24: Est ergo causa omnis in opinione, nec vero ægritudinis solum sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum? Fin. iii. 10, 35: Perturbationes autem nulla naturæ vi commoventur; omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac judicia levitatis. Acad. i. 10. See p. 244, 3.

Diog. l.c.

Cic. Tusc. iii. 11, 26; iv. 7, 14. Posidon. (in Galen. iv. 7, p. 416): Chrysippus defined apprehension (ἄση) as δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας.

See p. 242, 1.

Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 15: Sed quæ judicia quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verum illa etiam, quæ efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut ægritudo quasi morsum quendam doloris efficiat: metus recessum quendam animi et fugam: lætitia profusam hilaritatem; libido effrenatam appetentiam. Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iv. 3, p. 377: (Ζήνωνι καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν Στωϊκῶν) οἳ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ [should perhaps be struck out], τὰς ἐπὶ ταύταις ἀλόγους συστολὰς καὶ ταπεινώσεις καὶ δείξεις [both for δείξεις, and for λήξεις in the passage about to be quoted from Plutarch, Thurot, Etudes sur Aristote, p. 249, suggests δέσεις· δήξεις is more probable, confirmed too by Cicero’s morsus doloris] ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ διαχύσεις ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη. Plut. Virt. Mor. 10, p. 449: τὰς ἐπιτάσεις τῶν παθῶν καὶ τὰς σφοδρότητας οὔ φασι γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἁμαρτητικὸν, ἀλλὰ τὰς λήξεις [δήξεις] καὶ τὰς συστολὰς καὶ τὸ ἧττον τῷ ἀλόγῳ δεχομένας. The same results are involved in the definitions of emotion already given, p. 244, 2. In reference to this pathological action of representations, one kind of emotions was defined (Stob. ii. 170; Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14) as δόξα πρόσφατος, or opinio recens boni (or mali) præsentis, πρόσφατον being κινητικὸν συστολῆς ἀλόγου ἢ ὑπάρσεως.

De Hipp. et Plat. v. 1, p. 429): Χρύσιππος μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ παθῶν ἀποδεικνύναι πειρᾶται, κρίσεις κινὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη, Ζήνων δ’ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγιγνομένας αὐταῖς συστολὰς καὶ λύσεις, ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ τὰς πτώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη. Conf. iv. 2, p. 367, and 3, p. 377.

Diog. 111 (see above, p. 245, 3, and the definition quoted on p. 245, 5) confirms the view that, in the passage referred to by Galenus, Chrysippus explained the emotions to be κρίσεις. Elsewhere Galenus asserts (iv. 2, p. 367) that he called λύπη a μείωσις ἐπὶ φευκτῷ δοκοῦντι; ἡδονὴ, an ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν; and charges him (iv. 6, p. 403), quoting passages in support of the charge, with deducing emotions from ἀτονία and ἀσθένεια ψυχῆς. That Chrysippus agreed with Zeno in his definition of emotion, has already been stated (p. 244, 2). No doubt, too, with an eye to Chrysippus, Stobæus also (ii. 166) defines emotion as πτοία (violent mental motion), the words used being πᾶσαν πτοίαν πάθος εἶναι καὶ πάλιν πάθος πτοίαν· and, in Galenus (iv. 5, p. 392), Chrysippus says: οἰκείως δὲ τῷ τῶν παθῶν γένει ἀποδίδοται καὶ ἡ πτοία κατὰ τὸ ἐνσεσοβημένον τοῦτο καὶ φερόμενον εἰκῆ. Chrysippus even repeatedly insists on the difference between emotion and error—error being due to deficient knowledge, emotion to opposition to the claims of reason, to a disturbance of the natural relation of the impulses (τὴν φυσικὴν τῶν ὁρμῶν συμμετρίαν ὑπερβαίνειν). He shows that both Zeno’s definitions come to this (Galen. iv. 2, p. 368, and iv. 4, p. 385; Stob. ii. 170), and elsewhere explains (Plut. Vir. Mor. 10, p. 450) how emotion takes away consideration, and impels to irrational conduct. The quotations on p. 246, 1 from Cicero and Stobæus are an explanation of positions of Chrysippus, of which Chrysippus is himself the source. And were he not directly the source, Galenus (iv. 4, p. 390) observes that the view of Chrysippus on the emotions was generally held in the Stoic School after his time. In designating the emotions κρίσεις, Chrysippus cannot therefore have intended thereby to exclude the emotions of impulse and feeling. All that he meant was, that emotions, as they arise in the individual soul (we should say as conditions of consciousness), are called forth by imagination. This is clear from the fact that the modes in which the pathological character of emotions displays itself are appealed to as evidence. See his words in Galen. iv. 6, p. 409. τῷ [l. τό] τε γὰρ θυμῷ φέρεσθαι καὶ ἐξεστηκέναι καὶ οὐ παρ’ ἑαυτοῖς οὐδ’ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι καὶ πάνθ’ ὅσα τοιαῦτα φανερῶς μαρτυρεῖ τῷ κρίσεις εἶναι τὰ πάθη κἂν τῇ λογικῇ δυνάμει τῆς ψυχῆς συνίστασθαι καθάπερ καὶ τὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα. On the other hand, Zeno never denied the influence of imagination on emotion, as is perfectly clear from the expression of Galenus, quoted pp. 246, 2; 246, 1.

Stob. Ecl. ii. 190 (Floril. 46, 50): The wise man, according to the Stoic teaching, exercises no indulgence; for indulgence would suppose τὸν ἡμαρτηκότα μὴ παρ’ αὑτὸν ἡμαρτηκέναι πάντων ἁμαρτανόντων παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν κακίαν.

Epictet. Diss. i. 18, 1–7; 28, 1–10; ii. 26; M. Aurel. ii. 1; iv. 3; viii. 14; xi. 18; xii. 12.

This motive can be best gathered from the passages in Cicero already quoted, p. 244, 3, and from Sen. De Ira, ii. 2, 1: Anger can do nothing by itself, but only animo adprobante ... nam si invitis nobis nascitur, nunquam rationi succumbet. Omnes enim motus qui non voluntate nostra fiunt invicti et inevitabiles sunt, &c.

See p. 179, 3, 4.

See p. 88, 1.

Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39: Perturbationes voluntarias esse. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Emotions proceed from judgment; itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intelligatur non modo quam vitiosæ, sed etiam quam in nostra sunt potestate, upon which follow the definitions quoted, p. 246, 1.

Cic. Tusc. iv. 9, 22: Omnium autem affectionum fontem esse dicunt intemperantiam (ἀκράτεια), quæ est a tota mente et a recta ratione defectio sic aversa a præscriptione rationis ut nullo modo adpetitiones anima nec regi nec contineri queant.

Stob. Ecl. ii. 170, probably from Chrysippus, of whom similar remarks were quoted, p. 246, 3: πᾶν γὰρ πάθος βιαστικόν ἐστιν, ὡς καὶ πολλάκις ὁρῶντας τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντας ὅτι συμφέρει τόδε οὐ ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῆς σφοδρότητος ἐκφερομένους ... ἀνάγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτὸ ... πάντες δ’ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες ἀποστρέφονται τὸν λόγον, οὐ παραπλησίως δὲ τοῖς ἐξηπατημένοις ἐν ὁτωοῦν, ἀλλ’ ἰδιαζόντως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἠπατημένοι ... διδαχθέντες ... ἀφίστανται τῆς κρίσεως· οἱ δ’ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες, κἂν μάθωσι κἂν μεταδιδαχθῶσιν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅμως οὐκ ἀφίστανται τούτων ἀλλ’ ἄγονται ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ τούτων κρατεῖσθαι τυραννίδος. A different view is taken by Epictet. Diss. i. 28, 8, who à propos of Medea remarks: ἐξηπάτηται· δεῖξον αὐτῇ ἐναργῶς, ὅτι ἐξηπάτηται, καὶ οὐ ποιήσει.

See p. 242, 2. The same idea is expressed in applying the terms αἱρετὸν and φευκτὸν to good and evil (Stob. ii. 126 and 142; see p. 229, 1, and 232, 3).

Stob. ii. 166; Cic. Tusc. iii. 11; iv. 7, 14; 15, 43; Fin. iii. 10, 35.

According to Diog. 110, this distinction was found in the treatise περὶ παθῶν.

In Clem. Strom. ii. 407, A, the words being πρὸς ὅλον τὸ τετράχορδον, ἡδονὴν, λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, πολλῆς δεῖ τῆς ἀσκήσεως καὶ μάχης.

The definition of λύπη or ἄση (Cicero ægritudo) as δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας is explicitly referred to Chrysippus (more at length in Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14: Opinio recens mali præsentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur), as also the definition of φιλαργυρία = ὑπόληψις τοῦ τὸ ἀργύριον καλὸν εἶναι. See p. 254, 4, 5. In like manner μέθη, ἀκολασία, and the other passions, were, according to Diog. 110, defined. To Chrysippus also belong the definitions—quoted Tusc. iv. 7, 14; iii. 11, 25—of ἡδονὴ (lætitia, voluptas gestiens) = opinio recens boni præsentis, in quo efferri rectum videatur; of fear = opinio impendentis mali quod intolerabile esse videatur, agreeing with the προσδοκία κακοῦ of Diog. 112; of desire (cupiditas, libido, ἐπιθυμία) = opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu jam præsens esse atque adesse. It is, however, more common to hear λύπη (Diog. 111; Stob. 172; Cic. Tusc. iii. 11) described as συστολὴ ψυχῆς ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ, more briefly συστολὴ ἄλογος, fear as ἔκκλισις ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ, ἡδονὴ even according to Alex. Aphr. top. 96, as ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρέτῳ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν, two different translations of which are given by Cic. l.c. and Fin. ii. 4, 13, ἐπιθυμία as ὄρεξις ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ, or immoderata appetitio opinati magni boni. The latter definitions appear to belong to Zeno. They were probably appropriated by Chrysippus, and the additions made which are found in Stobæus.

Further particulars may be gathered from Diog. vii. 111; Stob. ii 174. Both include under λύπη subdivisions as ἔλεος, φθόνος, ζῆλος, ζηλοτυπία, ἄχθος, ἀνία, ὀδύνη. Diogenes adds ἐνόχλησις and σύγχυσις; Stobæus πένθος, ἄχος, ἄση. Both include under φόβος, δεῖμα, ὄκνος, αἰσχύνη, ἔκπληξις, θόρυβος, ἀγωνία; Stobæus adds δέος and δεισιδαιμονία. Under ἡδονὴ, Diogenes includes κήλησις, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, τέρψις, διάχυσις; Stobæus, ἐπιχαιρεκακίαι, ἀσμενισμοὶ, γοητεῖαι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Under ἐπιθυμία, Diogenes places σπάνις, μῖσος, φιλονεικία, ὀργὴ, ἔρως, μῆνις, θυμός; Stobæus, ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῆς (θυμὸς, χόλος, μῆνις, κότος, πικρία, κ.τ.λ.), ἔρωτες σφοδροὶ, πόθοι, ἵμεροι, φιληδονίαι, φιλοπλουτίαι, φιλοδοξίαι. Definitions for all these terms—which, without doubt, belong to Chrysippus—may be found in the writers named. Greek lexicographers may obtain many useful hints from Stoic definitions.

Plut. Vir. Mor. 10, p. 449: πᾶν μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἁμαρτία κατ’ αὐτούς ἐστιν καὶ πᾶς ὁ λυπούμενος ἢ φοβούμενος ἢ ἐπιθυμῶν ἁμαρτάνει. The Stoics are therefore anxious to make a marked distinction in the expressions for emotions and the permitted mental affections, between pleasure and joy, see p. 236, 2, fear and precaution (εὐλαβεία), desire and will (βούλησις, Diog. 116; cupere et velle, Sen. Ep. 116, 1), αἰσχύνη and αἰδὼς (Plut. Vit. Pud. c. 2, p. 529).

On this favourite proposition of the Stoics, consult Diog. 115; Stob. ii. 182; Cic. Tusc. iv. 10; whose remarkable agreement with Stobæus seems to point to a common source of information directly or indirectly drawn upon by both; iii. 10, 23; Galen. Hipp. et Plat. v. 2; Sen. Ep. 75, 11. According to these passages, the Stoics distinguish between simple emotions and diseases of the soul. Emotions, in the language of Seneca, are motus animi improbabiles soluti et concitati. If they are frequently repeated and neglected, then inveterata vitia et dura, or diseases, ensue. Disease of the soul is therefore defined as δόξα ἐπιθυμίας ἐῤῥυηκυῖα εἰς ἕξιν καὶ ἐνεσκιῤῥωμένη καθ’ ἣν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὰ μὴ αἱρετὰ σφόδρα αἱρετὰ εἶναι (Stob. translations of the definition in Cicero and Seneca). The opposite of such a δόξα, or a confusion arising from false fear, is an opinio vehemens inhærens atque insita de re non fugienda tanquam fugienda—such as hatred of womankind, hatred of mankind, &c. If the fault is caused by some weakness which prevent our acting up to our better knowledge, the diseased states of the soul are called ἀῤῥωστήματα, ægrotationes (Diog.; Stob.; Cic. Tusc. iv. 13, 29); but this distinction is, of course, very uncertain. The same fault is at one time classed among νόσοι, at another among ἀῤῥωστήματα; and Cicero (11, 24; 13, 29) repeatedly observes that the two can only be distinguished in thought. Moreover, just as there are certain predispositions (ἐνεμπτωσίαι) for bodily diseases, so within the sphere of mind there are εὐκαταφορίαι εἰς πάθος. Diog., Stob., Cic. 12. The distinction between vitia and morbi (Cic. 13) naturally coincides with the distinction between emotions and diseases. The former are caused by conduct at variance with principles, by inconstantia et repugnantia, likewise vitiositas in a habitus in tota vita inconstans; the latter consist in corruptio opinionum. It is not consistent with this view to call κακίαι, διαθέσεις; and νόσοι, as well as ἀῤῥωστήματα and εὐκαταφορίαι, ἕξεις (Stob. ii. 100, on the difference between ἕξις and διάθεσις, see 102, 1); and, accordingly, Heine suggests (De Font. Tuscul. Dis.: Weimar, 1863, p. 18) that, on this point, Cicero may have given inaccurate information. The unwise who are near wisdom are free from disease of the soul, but not from emotions (Sen., Cic.). The points of comparison between diseases of the body and those of the soul were investigated by Chrysippus with excessive care. Posidonius contradicted him, however, in part (Galen, l.c., Cic. 10, 23; 12, 27); but their differences are not of interest to us.

Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque perturbationem animi illi [superiores] ex homine non tollerent ... sed eam contraherent in angustumque deducerent: hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem. Ibid. ii. 43, 135. We shall find subsequently that the mental affections, which cause emotions, are allowed to be unavoidable.

Cic. Tusc. iv. 17, 37.

Cic. Tusc. iii. 10, 22: Omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, magnum est. Nos autem id agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. Ibid. iv. 17, 39: Modum tu adhibes vitio? An vitium nullum est non parere rationi? Ibid. 18, 42: Nihil interest, utrum moderatas perturbationes approbent, an moderatam injustitiam, &c. Qui enim vitiis modum apponit, is partem suscipit vitiorum. Sen. Ep. 85, 5, says that moderation of emotions is equivalent to modice insaniendum, modice ægrotandum. Ep. 116, 1: Ego non video, quomodo salubris esse aut utilis possit ulla mediocritas morbi.

Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 2; particularly with reference to anger, conf. Ep. 85, 10.

Full details are given by Cic. Tusc. iv. 19–26; Off. i. 25, 88; Sen. De Ira, i. 5, 21; ii. 12; particularly with regard to the use of anger.

In the same spirit Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 1; 10, 2, meets the assertion that valour cannot dispense with anger by saying: Nunquam virtus vitio adjuvanda est, se contenta ... absit hoc a virtute malum, ut unquam ratio ad vitia confugiat.

Diog. vii. 117: φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν, διὰ τὸ ἀνέμπτωτον (faultless) εἶναι. From the apathy of the wise man, absence of feeling and severity, which are faults, must be distinguished.

Chrysippus (in Stob. Floril. vii. 21): ἀλγεῖν μὲν τὸν σοφὸν μὴ βασανίζεσθαι δέ· μὴ γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τῇ ψυχῇ. Sen. De Prov. 6, 6; Ep. 85, 29; Cic. Tusc. ii. 12, 29; 25, 61; iii. 11, 25.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 12; Musonius (in Stob. Floril. 19, 16); Sen. De Const. 2; 3; 5; 7; 12. The second title of this treatise is: nec injuriam nec contumeliam accipere sapientem.

See 253, 2 and 3 and Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 19.

Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 20; Sen. De Clem. ii. 5; Diog. vii. 123.

Stob. Ecl. ii. 190; Floril. 46, 60; Sen. l.c. 5, 2; 7; Diog. l.c.; Gell. N. A. xiv. 4, 4.

Ps. Plut. Hom. 134: οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωϊκοὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τίθενται ἐν τῇ ἀπαθείᾳ.

See p. 193. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b. Virtue consists in ἐκλογὴ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν. Diog. vii. 89 (conf. Plut. Aud. Po. c. 6, p. 24): τήν τ’ ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην.

Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque superiores (Aristotle and others) non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut more perfectas: hic omnes in ratione ponebat.

Cic. Tusc. iv. 15, 34: Ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest. Conf. Sen. Ep. 113, 2: Virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens, and the remarks, p. 128, 1; 129, 3.

The proof of this will be found subsequently in the Stoic definitions of various virtues and vices. Compare preliminarily 254, 6 and Diog. vii. 93: εἶναι δ’ ἀγνοίας τὰς κακίας, ὧν αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. Stob. Ecl ii. 108: ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ῥηθείσας ἀρετὰς τελείας εἶναι λέγουσι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ συνεστηκέναι ἐκ θεωρημάτων. It is not opposed to these statements for Stob. ii. 92 and 110, to distinguish other virtues besides those which are τέχναι and ἐπιστῆμαι; nor for Hecato (in Diog. vii. 90) to divide virtues into ἐπιστημονικαὶ καὶ θεωρητικαὶ (σύστασιν ἔχουσαι τῶν θεωρημάτων) and ἀθεώρητοι; for by the latter must be understood not the virtuous actions themselves, but only the states resulting from them—health of soul, strength of will, and the like. On the health of the soul, in its relation to virtue, see Cic. Tusc. iv. 13, 30.

Diog. vii. 91 (following Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and others); Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 144.

See p. 260, 3.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 7; Diog. vii. 161; Galen, vii. 2, p. 595.

See p. 56.

See p. 58, 2. Diog. vii. 165, conf. 37: Ἥριλλος δὲ ὁ Καρχηδόνιος τέλος εἶπε τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἐστὶ ζῇν ἀεὶ πάντα ἀναφέροντα πρὸς τὸ μετ’ ἐπιστήμης ζῇν καὶ μὴ τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ διαβεβλημένον. εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. On the definition, see p. 82, 1.

Cleanthes (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 7): When τόνος, on which see p. 128, 2, is found in the soul in a proper decree, ἰσχὺς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος· ἡ δ’ ἰσχὺς αὕτη καὶ τὸ κράτος ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐπιφανέσιν ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγένηται ἐγκράτειά ἐστι, κ.τ.λ. In the same way, Chrysippus (according to Galen, Hipp. et Plat. iv. 6, p. 403) deduced what is good in our conduct from εὐτονία and ἰσχύς; what is bad, from ἀτονία καὶ ἀσθένεια τῆς ψυχῆς; and (ibid. vii. 1, p. 590) he referred the differences of individual virtues to changes in quality within the soul. By Aristo, p. 220, 1, virtue is defined as health; by Stob. ii. 104, as διάθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφωνος αὐτῇ; by Diog. 89, as διάθεσις ὁμολογουμένη.

Sen. De Otio, i. (28) 4: Stoici nostri dicunt; usque ad ultimum vitæ finem in actu erimus, non desinemus communi bono operam dare, &c. Nos sumus, apud quos usque eo nihil ante mortem otiosum est, ut, si res patitur, non sit ipsa mors otiosa.

This will appear from the definitions of virtue about to follow.

See pp. 59, 1; 56, 2.

See p. 254, 7. Sen. Ep. 65, 6, after describing a great and noble soul, adds: Talis animus virtus est.

Plut. Vir. Mor. 2: Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε, κ.τ.λ. Id. on Zeno, see p. 260, 3, and Cleanthes, p. 236, 3. According to Galenus, Aristo defined the one virtue to be the knowledge of good and evil (Hipp. et Plat. v. 5, p. 468): κάλλιον οὖν Ἀρίστων ὁ Χῖος, οὔτε πολλὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποφηνάμενος, ἀλλὰ μίαν, ἣν ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν εἶναί φησιν. vii. 2, p. 595. νομίσας γοῦν ὁ Ἀρίστων, μίαν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμιν, ᾗ λογιζόμεθα, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔθετο μίαν, ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. The statement that Aristo made health of soul consist in a right view of good and evil agrees with the language of Plutarch. Perhaps Zeno had already defined φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.

Conf. p. 255. 1. Cic. De Off. i. 43, 153: Princepsque omnium virtutum est illa sapientia, quam σοφίαν Græci vocant: prudentiam enim, quam Græci φρόνησιν dicunt, aliam quandam intelligimus: quæ est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia. Illa autem scientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum atque humanarum scientia. A similar definition of wisdom, amplified by the words, nosse divina et humana et horum causas, is found Ibid. ii. 2, 5. Sen. Ep. 85, 5; Plut. Plac. Proœm. 2; Strabo, i. 1, 1. It may probably be referred to Chrysippus; and it was no doubt Chrysippus who settled the distinction between σοφία and φρόνησις, in the Stoic school, although Aristo had preceded him in distinguishing them. Explaining particular virtues as springing from the essence of virtue, with the addition of a differential quality, he needed separate terms to express generic and specific virtue. In Zeno’s definition too, as later writers would have it (Plut. Vir. Mat. 2), to φρόνησις was given the meaning of ἐπιστήμη.

ἀρεταὶ πρῶται. Diog. 92; Stob. ii. 104. In stating that Posidonius counted four—Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater more than four—virtues, Diogenes can only mean that the latter enumerated the subdivisions, whereas Posidonius confined himself to the four main heads of the four cardinal virtues. Besides this division of virtues, another, threefold, division is also met with, see p. 56, 2; 57, 1, that into logical, physical, and ethical virtues. In other words, the whole of philosophy and likewise its parts are brought under the notion of virtue; but it is not stated how this threefold division is to harmonise with the previous fourfold one. A twofold division, made by Panætius and referred to by Seneca (Ep. 94, 45)—that into theoretical and practical virtues—is an approximation to the ethics of the Peripatetics.

The scheme was in vogue before Zeno’s time. See Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 1, and the quotations, p. 260, 3.

ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, or ἑκάστων ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων. Stob. 102. Stobæus adds, that the definition needs to be completed by the words, occurring in the definition of every virtue, φύσει πολιτικοῦ ζῴου. But this is superfluous, for only in the case of such a being can the terms good and evil apply. Diog. 92; Sext. Math. xi. 170 and 246; Cic. l.c.

ἐπιστήμη δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων (Stob. 104); ἐπιστήμη ὧν αἱρετέον καὶ ὧν εὐλαβητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων (Diog.); ἐπιστήμη ὧν χρὴ θαῤῥεῖν ἢ μὴ θαῤῥεῖν (Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 2, 597). Cic. Tusc. iv. 24, 53, conf. v. 14, 41: (Chrysippus) fortitudo est, inquit, scientia perferendarum rerum, vel affectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo, summæ legi parens sine timore. The last-named characteristic appears still more strongly in the definition attributed to the Stoics by Cic. Off. i. 19, 62: Virtus propugnans pro æquitate.

ἐπιστήμη αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. Stob. 102. The definition of φρόνησις in Cicero is the same, word for word. See p. 258, 1; that of valour in Diogenes is not very different. Since all duties refer to ποιητέα and οὐ ποιητέα, the definitions of the remaining virtues must necessarily agree with those of φρόνησις.

ἐπιστήμη ἀπονεμητικὴ τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ, in Stob. Id. p. 104, further enumerates the points of difference between the four virtues: intelligence refers to καθήκοντα, self-control to impulses, valour to ὑπομοναὶ, justice to ἀπονεμήσεις. See also the distinctive peculiarities of the four virtues in Stob. 112. Below, p. 263.

Diog. 93; Stob. 104. The πρῶται κακίαι are: ἀφροσύνη, δειλία, ἀκολασία, ἀδικία. The definition of ἀφροσύνη is ἄγνοια ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. See p. 255, 1.

This follows from the fact that the conception of ἐπιστήμη is the basis in all. See p. 258, 1.

Of Zeno, Plut. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441, says: ὁριζόμενος τὴν φρόνησιν ἐν μὲν ἀπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην· ἐν δ’ αἱρετέοις σωφροσύνην· ἐν δ’ ὑπομενετέοις ἀνδρίαν. The like in regard to justice in Sto. Rep. 7, 2. On the other hand valour is here termed φρόνησις ἐν ἐνεργητέοις. He also says, p. 440, that, according to Aristo, ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιητέα μὲν ἐπισκοποῦσα καὶ μὴ ποιητέα κέκληται φρόνησις· ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ κοσμοῦσα καὶ τὸ μέτρων καὶ τὸ εὔκαιρον ἐν ἡδοναῖς ὁρίζουσα, σωφροσύνη· κοινωνήμασι δὲ καὶ συμβολαίοις ὁμιλοῦσα τοῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους, δικαιοσύνη. Further particulars as to Aristo may be found in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 2, p. 595: Since the soul has only one power, the power of thought, it can only have one virtue, the ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν αἱρεῖσθαί τε δέῃ τἀγαθὰ καὶ φεύγειν τὰ κακὰ, τὴν ἐπιστήμην τήνδε λαλεῖ σωφροσύνην· ὅταν δὲ πράττειν μὲν τἀγαθὰ, μὴ πράττειν δὲ τὰ κακὰ, φρόνησιν· ἀνδρείαν δὲ ὅταν τὰ μὲν θαῤῥῇ, τὰ δὲ φεύγῃ· ὅταν δὲ τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ νέμῃ, δικαιοσύνην· ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, γινώσκουσα μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ χωρὶς τοῦ πράττειν τἀγαθά τε καὶ κακὰ σοφία τ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις ἀφικνουμένη τὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὀνόματα πλείω λαμβάνει τὰ προειρημένα. We know, from Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 4, see p. 256, 3, that, according to Cleanthes, strength of mind, ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐπιφανέσιν ἐμμενετέοις ἐγγένηται, ἐγκράτειά ἐστιν· ὅταν δ’ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομενετέοις, ἀνδρεία· περὶ τὰς ἀξίας δὲ, δικαιοσύνη· περὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις, σωφροσύνη. With him, too, if Plutarch’s account is accurate, ἐγκράτεια, or perseverance, takes the place of φρόνησις. Cic. Tusc. iv. 24, 53, quotes no less than three definitions of bravery given by Sphærus. See p. 259, 3.

Plut. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441, charges him with creating a σμῆνος ἀρετῶν οὐ συνῆθες οὐδὲ γνώριμον, and forming a χαριεντότης, ἐσθλότης, μεγαλότης, καλότης, ἐπιδεξιότης, εὐαπαντησία, εὐτραπελία, after the analogy of πρᾳότης, ἀνδρεία, &c. In Stob. ii. 118, among the Stoic virtues, is found an ἐρωτικὴ as ἐπιστήμη νέων θήρας εὐφυῶν, &c., and a συμποτικὴ as ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πῶς δεῖ ἐξάγεσθαι τὰ συμπόσια καὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ συμπίνειν. An ἐρωτικὴ and συμποτικὴ ἀρετὴ are also mentioned by Philodem. De Mus. col. 15. According to Athen. 162, b (Vol. Herc. i.), Persæus, in his συμποτικοὶ διάλογοι, had discussed συμποτικὴ at length; and since, according to the Stoics (Sen. Ep. 123, 15: Stob. l.c.), none but the wise know how to live aright and how to drink aright, these arts belong to a complete treatment of wisdom.

Stob. 106, includes under φρόνησις, εὐβουλία, εὐλογιστία, ἀγχίνοια, νουνέχεια, εὐμηχανία; under σωφροσύνη, εὐταξία, κοσμιότης, αἰδημοσύνη, ἐγκράτεια; under ἀνδρεία, καρτερία, θαῤῥαλεότης, μεγαλοψυχία, εὐψυχία, φιλοπονία; under δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια (on which Diog. 119), χρηστότης, εὐκοινωνησία, εὐσυναλλαξία. Diog. 126, is slightly different. Stobæus gives the definitions of all these virtues, and Diogenes of some. By Stobæus, they are generally described as ἐπιστῆμαι; by Diogenes, as ἕξεις or διαθέσεις. Otherwise, the definitions are the same. A definition of εὐταξία is given by Cic. Off. i. 40, 142.

Diog. 93; Stob. 104.

Sto. Rep. 7.

Plut. Vir. Mor. 2: Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε· τῷ δὲ πρός τι διαφόρους καὶ πλείονας, ὡς εἴ τις ἐθέλοι τὴν ὅρασιν ἡμῶν λευκῶν μὲν ἀντιλαμβανομένην λευκοθέαν καλεῖν, μελάνων δὲ μελανθέαν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ, κ.τ.λ. See p. 260, 3. καθάπερ τὸ μαχαίριον ἓν μέν ἐστιν, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἄλλο διαιρεῖ· καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ περὶ ὕλας διαφόρους μιᾷ φύσει χρώμενον.

Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 1, p. 590: νομίζει γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος, μίαν οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν ὀνόμασι πλείοσιν ὀνομάζεσθαι κατὰ τὴν πρός τι σχέσιν. Conf. note 5 and Diog. vii. 161: ἀρετάς τ’ οὔτε πολλὰς εἰσῆγεν, ὡς ὁ Ζήνων, οὔτε μίαν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλουμένην, ὡς οἱ Μεγαρικοὶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ [l. κατὰ] τὸ πρός τί πως ἔχειν (scil. πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλουμένην).

See p. 260, 3.

Their distinguishing features fall under the category of ποιὸν, to use Stoic terms, not under that of πρός τί πως ἔχον, as Aristo maintained.

Galenus l.c. continues: ὁ τοίνυν Χρύσιππος δείκνυσιν, οὐκ ἐν τῇ πρός τι σχέσει γενόμενον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀρετῶν τε καὶ κακιῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις οὐσίαις ὑπαλλαττομέναις κατὰ τὰς ποιότητος. Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 3: Χρύσιππος, Ἀρίστωνι μὲν ἐγκαλῶν, ὅτι μιᾶς ἀρετῆς σχέσεις ἔλεγε τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι. Id. Vir. Mor. 2: Χρύσιππος δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἀρετὴν ἰδίᾳ ποιότητι συνίστασθαι νομίζων.

Stob. ii. 110: πάσας δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὅσαι ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι καὶ τέχναι (compare on this additions p. 255, 1) κοινά τε θεωρήματα ἔχειν καὶ τέλος, ὡς εἴρηται (p. 108—the same is more fully set forth by Panætius, p. 112), τὸ αὐτὸ, διὸ καὶ ἀχωρίστους εἶναι· τὸν γὰρ μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, καὶ τὸν κατὰ μίαν πράττοντα κατὰ πάσας πράττειν. Diog. 125: τὰς δ’ ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰ θεωρήματα κοινὰ, as Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Hecato assert. τὸν γὰρ ἐνάρετον θεωρητικόν τ’ εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν ποιητέων. τὰ δὲ ποιητέα καὶ αἱρετέα ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπομενητέα καὶ ἀπονεμητέα, knowledge and action including all the four principal instincts.

Cic. Parad. 3, 1: Una virtus est, consentiens cum ratione et perpetua constantia. Nihil huic addi potent, quo magis virtus sit; nihil demi, ut virtus nomen relinquatur. Conf. Sen. Ep. 66, 9. See p. 267.

Stob. 112 (conf. Diog. 126): διαφέρειν δ’ ἀλλήλων τοῖς κεφαλαίοις. φρονήσεως γὰρ εἶναι κεφάλαια τὸ μὲν θεωρεῖν καὶ πράττειν ὃ ποιητέον προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὸ θεωρεῖν καὶ ἃ δεῖ ἀπονέμειν, χάριν τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως πράττειν ὃ ποιητέον· τῆς δὲ σωφροσύνης ἴδιον κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τὸ παρέχεσθαι τὰς ὁρμὰς εὐσταθεῖς καὶ θεωρεῖν αὐτὰς προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὰ ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως ἐν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι. Similarly of bravery, which has for its basis πᾶν ὃ δεῖ ὑπομένειν; and of justice, which has τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ. Plut. Alex. Virt. 11: The Stoics teach that μία μὲν ἀρετὴ πρωταγωνιστεῖ πράξεως ἑκάστης, παρακαλεῖ δὲ τὰς ἄλλας καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

Stob. 116: φασὶ δὲ καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς· πᾶσαν γὰρ πρᾶξιν τελείαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι. Plut. Sto. Rep. 27, 1, conf. Alex. Virt. l.c.: τὰς ἀρετάς φησι [Χρύσιππος] ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, οὐ μόνον τῷ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τὸν κατὰ μίαν ὁτιοῦν ἐνεργοῦντα κατὰ πάσας ἐνεργεῖν· οὔτ’ ἄνδρα φησὶ τέλειον εἶναι τὸν μὴ πάσας ἔχοντα τὰς ἀρετὰς, οὔτε πρᾶξιν τελείαν, ἥτις οὐ κατὰ πάσας πράττεται τὰς ἀρετάς. If Chrysippus allowed, as Plutarch states, that the brave man does not always act bravely, nor the bad man always like a coward, it was a confession to which he was driven by experience, contrary to Stoic principles.

Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Nec virtutis usum modo [Zeno dicebat] ut superiores (whom the Stoic evidently wrongs), sed ipsum habitum per se esse præclarum. Id. Parad. 3, 1: Nec enim peccata rerum eventu sed vitiis hominum metienda sunt. Sen. Benef. vi. 11, 3: Voluntas est, quæ apud nos ponit officium, which Cleanthes then proceeds to illustrate by a parable of two slaves, one of whom diligently seeks for the man whom he is sent to find but without success, whilst the other taking it easy accidentally comes across him. Ibid. i. 5, 2: A benefaction is only ipsa tribuentis voluntas. 6, 1: Non quid fiat aut quid detur refert, sed qua mente.

Compare also the paradoxical statement—Qui libenter beneficium accepit, reddidit—which Sen. l.c. ii. 31, 1, justifies by saying: Cum omnia ad animum referamus, fecit quisque quantum voluit.

Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 6, 19:

ὅστις ἐπιθυμῶν ἀνέχετ’ αἰσχροῦ πράγματος οὗτος ποιήσει τοῦτ’ ἐὰν καιρὸν λάβῃ.

On the notions of κατόρθωμα and ἁμάρτημα, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 1: τὸ κατόρθωμά φασι νόμου προστάγμα εἶναι, τὸ δ’ ἁμάρτημα νόμου ἀπαγόρευμα. To a bad man, law only gives prohibitions, and not commands: οὐ γὰρ δύνανται κατορθοῦν. Chrysippus, Ibid. 15, 10: πᾶν κατόρθωμα καὶ εὐνόμημα καὶ δικαιοπράγημά ἐστι. Stob. ii. 192: ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἐνεργημάτων φασὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι κατορθώματα, τὰ δ’ ἁμαρτήματα, τὰ δ’ οὐδέτερα (examples of the latter are speaking, giving, &c.) ... πάντα δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα δικαιοπραγήματα εἶναι καὶ εὐνοήματα καὶ εὐτακτήματα, κ.τ.λ. τὰ δὲ ἁμαρτήματα ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀδικήματα καὶ ἀνομήματα καὶ ἀτακτήματα.

It is to this view that the distinction between κατόρθωμα and καθῆκον refers from the one side. A καθῆκον (the conceptions of which will be subsequently more fully discussed) is, in general, any discharge of duty, or rational action; κατόρθωμα only refers to a perfect discharge of duty, or to a virtuous course of conduct. Conf. Stob. 158: τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι. κατορθώματα δ’ εἶναι τὰ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργήματα ... τὸ δὲ καθῆκον τελειωθὲν κατόρθωμα γίνεσθαι. Similarly, 184: A κατόρθωμα is a καθῆκον πάντας ἐπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς. Cic. Fin. iii. 18, 59: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium; erit autem etiam inchoatum; ut, si juste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis (καθήκοντα) ponatur depositum reddere. Off. i. 3, 8: Et medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfectum; the former is called κατόρθωμα, the latter καθῆκον. A virtuous action can only be done by one who has a virtuous intention, i.e. by a wise man. Cic. Fin. iv. 6, 15: If we understand by a life according to nature, what is rational, rectum est, quod κατόρθωμα dicebas, contingitque sapienti soli. Off. iii. 3, 14: Illud autem officium, quod rectum iidem [Stoici] appellant, perfectum atque absolutum est, et, ut iidem dicunt, omnes numeros habet, nec præter sapientem, cadere in quenquam potest. Off. iii. 4, 16: When the Decii and Scipios are called brave, Fabricius and Aristides just, Cato and Lælius wise, the wisdom and virtue of the wise man are not attributed to them in the strict sense of the term: sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientum.

See p. 263, 2.

In Simpl. Categ. 61, β (Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28), the Stoics say: τὰς μὲν ἕξεις ἐπιτείνεσθαι δύνασθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι· τὰς δὲ διαθέσεις ἀνεπιτάτους εἶναι καὶ ἀνέτους. Thus straightness is, for instance, a διάθεσις, and no mere ἕξις. οὑτωσὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διαθέσεις εἶναι, οὐ κατὰ τὸ μόνιμον ἰδίωμα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀνεπίτατον καὶ ἀνεπίδεκτον τοῦ μᾶλλον· τὰς δὲ τέχνας, ἤτοι δυσκινήτους οὔσας ἢ μὴ (add οὐκ) εἶναι διαθέσεις. Conf. p. 103, 1. Ibid. 72, δ (Schol. 76, a, 12): τῶν Στωϊκῶν, οἵτινες διελόμενοι χωρὶς τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων τεχνῶν ταύτας οὔτε ἐπιτείνεσθαι λέγουσιν οὔτε ἀνίεσθαι, τὰς δὲ μέσας τέχνας καὶ ἐπίτασιν καὶ ἄνεσιν δέχεσθαι φασίν. Simpl. (73, α. Schol. 76, a, 24) replies: This would be true, if virtue consisted only in theoretical conviction: such a conviction must be either true or false, and does not admit of more or less truth (for the same line of argument, see p. 267, 1); but it is otherwise where it is a matter for exercise. It may be remarked, in passing, that a further distinction was made between ἀρετὴ and τέχνη—the one being preceded by an ἀξιόλογος προκοπὴ, the other by a simple ἐπιτηδειότης (Simpl. Categ. 62, β; Schol. 71, a, 38). There is also a definition of τέχνη attributed by Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 53 (Jahrb. für Philol. See Supplementb. xiv. 239), to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus; to Zeno in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 241; Math. vii. 109 and 373; more fully in Lucian, Paras. c. 4, Conf. Cic. Acad. ii. 7, 22.

Diog. vii. 127: ἀρέσκει δὲ αὐτοῖς μηδὲν μέσον εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας· τῶν Περιπατητικῶν μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν προκοπήν· ὡς γὰρ δεῖν, φασιν, ἢ ὀρθὸν εἶναι ξύλον ἢ στρεβλὸν, οὕτως ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον· οὔτε δὲ δικαιότερον οὔτε ἀδικώτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. Similarly, Sen. Ep. 71, 18: Quod summum bonum est, supra se gradum non habet ... hoc nec remitti nec intendi posse, non magis, quam regulam, qua rectum probari solet, flectes. Quicquid ex illa mutaveris injuria est recti. Stob. ii. 116: ἀρετῆς δὲ καὶ κακίας οὐδὲν εἶναι μεταξύ.

The much-discussed paradox (Cic. Parad. 3; Fin. iv. 27; Diog. 101 and 120; Stob. 218; Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 1; Sext. Math. vii. 422; Sen. Ep. 66, 5) is this: ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα. It was, according to Diog., supported, on the one hand, by the proposition, πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπ’ ἄκρον εἶναι αἱρετὸν καὶ μήτε ἄνεσιν μήτε ἐπίτασιν δέχεσθαι; on the other hand, by the remark, to which Sext. and Simpl. in Categ., Schol. in Arist. 76, a, 30, refer: If truth and falsehood admit of no difference of degree, the same must be true of the errors of our conduct. A man is not at the mark, no matter whether he is one or a hundred stadia away. Similarly, Stobæus: The Stoics declare all errors to be ἴσα, although not ὅμοια· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐπίσης ψεῦδος συμβέβηκεν· (a statement quoted as Stoical by Alex. in Metaph. p. 258, 3 Bon. 667, a, 19 Brand) every ἁμαρτία is the result of a διάψευσις. It is, however, impossible for κατορθώματα not to be equal to one another, if vices are equal; πάντα γάρ ἐστι τέλεια, διόπερ οὔτ’ ἐλλείπειν οὔθ’ ὑπερέχειν δύναιτ’ ἂν ἀλλήλων. Cicero and Seneca devoted particular attention to this enquiry. The investigations of Cicero in the Paradoxa result in bringing him to the passage quoted p. 263, 2, from which it follows that nothing can be recto rectius, nor bono melius. The equality of faults is a corollary from the equality of virtues; it also follows from the consideration that whatever is forbidden at all is equally forbidden. De Fin.: It is said, all faults are equal, quia nec honesto quidquam honestius nec turpi turpius. Seneca (Ep. 66, 5) raises the question, How, notwithstanding the difference between goods (see p. 230, 3 end), can all be equal in value? and at once replies: Is virtue—or, what is the same thing, a rightly moulded soul—the only primary good? Virtue, indeed, admits of various forms, according to the activities imposed on it, but can neither be increased nor diminished; Decrescere enim summum bonum non potest, nec virtuti ire retro licet. It cannot increase, quando incrementum maximo non est: nihil invenies rectius recto, non magis quam verius vero, quam temperato temperatius. All virtue consists in modo, in certa mensura. Quid accedere perfecto potest? Nihil, aut perfectum non erat, cui accessit: ergo ne virtuti quidem, cui si quid adjici potest, defuit ... ergo virtutes inter se pares sunt et opera virtutis et omnes homines, quibus illæ contigere ... una inducitur humanis virtutibus regula. Una enim est ratio recta simplexque. Nihil est divino divinius, cœlesti cœlestius. Mortalia minuuntur ... crescunt, &c.; divinorum una natura est. Ratio autem nihil aliud est, quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa ... nullum porro inter divina discrimen est: ergo nec inter bona. Ibid. 32: Omnes virtutes rationes sunt: rationes sunt rectæ: si rectæ sunt, et pares sunt. Qualis ratio est, tales et actiones sunt: ergo omnes pares sunt: ceterum magna habebunt discrimina variante materia, etc. On the same ground, Seneca, Ep. 71, defended the equality of all goods and of all good actions, in particular p. 18, where to the quotation given, p. 266, 3, the words are added: Si rectior ipsa [virtus] non potest fieri, nec quæ ab illa quidem fiunt, alia aliis rectiora sunt.

Plut. C. Not. 10, 4: ναὶ, φασίν· ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ὁ πῆχυν ἀπέχων ἐν θαλάττῃ τῆς ἐπιφανείας οὐδὲν ἧττον πνίγεται τοῦ καταδεδυκότος ὀργυίας πεντακοσίας, οὕτως οὐδὲ οἱ πελάζοντες ἀρετῇ τῶν μακρὰν ὄντων ἧττόν εἰσιν ἐν κακίᾳ καὶ καθάπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ τυφλοί εἰσι κἂν ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀναβλέπειν μέλλωσιν, οὕτως οἱ προκόπτοντες ἄχρις οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναλάβωσιν ἀνόητοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ διαμένουσιν. Diog. 127 (see p. 266, 3). Stob. ii. 236: πάντων τε τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἴσων ὄντων καὶ τῶν κατορθωμάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας ἐπίσης πάντας ἄφρονας εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ἴσην ἔχοντας διάθεσιν. Cic. Fin. iii. 14, 48: Consentaneum est his quæ dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem quod appellamus extremum quod ultimum crescere putent posse, iisdem placere, esse alium alio etiam sapientiorem, itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte facere. Quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. Then follow the same comparisons as in Plutarch. Sen. Ep. 66, 10: As all virtues are equal, so are omnes homines quibus illæ contigere. Ep. 79, 8: What is perfect admits of no increase; quicunque fuerint sapientes pares erunt et æquales.

Stob. ii. 198: ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ Στωϊκοῖς φιλοσόφοις, δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις.

Plut. Aud. Poet. 7, p. 25: μήτε τι φαῦλον ἀρετῇ προσεῖναι μήτε κακίᾳ χρηστὸν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντως μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ἁμαρτωλὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀμαθῆ, περὶ πάντα δ’ αὖ κατορθοῦν τὸν ἀστεῖον.

Stob. Ecl. ii. 116; 120; 196; 198; 220; 232; Diog. vii. 117; 125; Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38; ii. 20, 66; Plut. Sto. Rep. 11, 1; Sen. Benef. iv. 26; Sext. Math. vii. 434.

Compare the collection of expressions respecting the wise and unwise in Baumhauer, Vet. Phil. Doct. De Mort. Volunt. p. 169.

Diog. 121; 32; Cic. Acad. ii. 44. 136. Parad. 5: ὅτι μόνος ὁ σοφὸς ἐλεύθερος καὶ πᾶς ἄφρων δοῦλος.

Plut. C. Not. 28, 1; Cic. Acad. l.c.: Sext. Math xi. 170.

Cic. Parad. 6; Acad. l.c.; Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 94, 28; Sext. l.c.; Alex. Aphr. Top. 79.

Sen. Benef. vii. 3, 2; 6, 3; 8, 1.

Cic. Acad. l.c.; Diog. vii. 125.

Cic. l.c.; Diog. vii. 122; Stob. ii. 206; Plut. Arat. 23. On all the points discussed, Plut. C. Not. 3, 2; De Adul. 16, p. 58; Tran. An. 12, p. 472; Ps. Plut. De Nobil. 17, 2; Cic. Fin. iii. 22, 75; Hor. Ep. i. 1, 106; Sat. i. 3, 124.

Plut. Tran. An. 12; Cic. Divin. ii. 63, 129: Stob. ii. 122; conf. Ps. Plut. Vit. Hom. 143.

Stob. ii. 122 and 216; Diog. 119; Sen. Provid. i. 5. Philodemus, περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς (Vol. Hercul. vi. 29), quotes a Stoic saying that the wise are the friends of heaven, and heaven of the wise.

Sen. Ep. 81, 11; Stob. ii. 118.

Sen. Benef. v. 12, 3; Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 1: C. Not. 20, 1; and above, p. 230, 1.

Stob. ii. 196; Plut. Stoic. Abs. Poët. Dic. 1, 4.

Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 13, 2; Com. Not. 33, 2; Stob. ii. 198. Seneca, Prov. i. 5: Bonus ipse tempore tantum a Deo differt. Ibid. 6, 4: Jupiter says to the virtuous: Hoc est, quo Deum antecedatis: ille extra patientiam malorum est, vos supra patientiam. Ep. 73, 11; De Const. 8, 2; Cic. N. D. ii. 61, 153; Epictet. Diss. i. 12, 26; Man. 15; Horat. Ep. i. l. 106.

See p. 239, 1; Sen. Ep. 53, 11: Non multo te Di antecedent ... diutius erunt. At mehercules magni artificis est clusisse totum in exiguo. Tantum sapienti sua, quantum Deo omnis ætas patet. 73, 13: Jupiter quo antecedit virum bonum? Diutius bonus est: sapiens nihilo se minoris æstimat, quod virtutes ejus spatio breviore cluduntur.

πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται. Cic. Parad. 4; Tusc. iii. 5, 10; Diog. vii. 124; Stob. Ecl. ii. 124; Horat. Sat. ii. 3, 43.

The Peripatetic Diogenianus raises the objection (in Eus. Præp. Ev. vi. 8, 10): πῶς οὖν οὐδένα φῂς ἄνθρωπον, ὃς οὐχὶ μαίνεσθαί σοι δοκεῖ κατ’ ἴσον Ὀρέστῃ καὶ Ἀλκμαίωνι, πλὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ; ἕνα δὲ ἢ δύο μόνους φῂς σοφοὺς γεγονέναι. Similarly Plut. Sto. Rep. 31, 5.

Sext. Math. ix. 90 in the argument quoted, p. 146, 1: Man can be the most perfect being, οἷον εὐθέως, ὅτι διὰ κακίας πορεύεται τὸν πάντα χρόνον, εἰ δὲ μή γε, τὸν πλεῖστον· καὶ γὰρ εἴ ποτε περιγένοιτο ἀρετῆς, ὀψὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῖς τοῦ βίου δυσμαῖς περιγίνεται.

This point will be again considered in the next chapter. Compare at present Sext. Math. ix. 133, who says: εἰσὶν ἄρα σοφοί· ὅπερ οὐκ ἤρεσκε τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, μεχρὶ τοῦ νῦν ἀνευρέτου ὄντος κατ’ αὐτοὺς τοῦ σοφοῦ. Alex. Aphrod. De Fat. 28, p. 90: τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων οἱ πλεῖστοι κακοὶ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαθὸς μὲν εἷς ἢ δεύτερος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι μυθεύεται, ὥσπερ τι παράδοξον ζῷον καὶ παρὰ φύσιν, σπανιώτερον τοῦ Φοίνικος ... οἱ δὲ πάντες κακοὶ καὶ ἐπίσης ἀλλήλοις τοιοῦτοι, ὡς μηδὲν διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, μαίνεσθαι δὲ ὁμοίως πάντας. Philodem. De Mus. (Vol. Herc. i.), col. 11, 18: The Stoic cannot take his stand upon the opinion of the majority (consensus gentium), since he has declared it to be profane and impious.

Benef. i. 10, 1–3.

De Ira, iii. 26, 4; Benef. v. 17, 3.

De Clemen. i. 6, 3; De Ira, ii. 28, 1; iii. 27, 3.

Ep. 41, 9; Vit. Be. i. 4.

See the pathetic description, De Ira, ii. 8–10, amongst other passages the following: Ferarum iste conventus est: ... certatur ingenti quidem nequitiæ certamine: major quotidie peccandi cupiditas, minor verecundia est, &c.

Diog. vii. 91: τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν φησιν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ λόγῳ τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τοὺς περὶ Σωκράτην, Διογένην καὶ Ἀντισθένην. The limitation likewise contained herein will be presently discussed. Epictet. Man. 15, mentions Heraclitus as well as Diogenes as θεῖοι.

See the immoderate language of praise of his admirer Sen. De Const. 7, 1: The wise man is no unreal ideal, although, like everything else that is great, he is seldom met with; ceteram hic ipse M. Cato vereor ne supra nostrum exemplar sit. Ibid. 2, 1: Catonem autem certius exemplar sapientis viri nobis Deos immortales dedisse quam Ulixen et Herculem prioribus sæculis.

Plutarch, Prof. in Virt. 2, p. 76; Cic. Off. iii. 4, 16, p. 265, 2.

Sen. Benef. iv. 27, 2: Itaque errant illi, qui interrogant Stoicos: quid ergo? Achilles timidus est? quid ergo? Aristides, cui justitia nomen dedit, injustus est? &c. Non hoc dicimus, sic omnia vitia esse in omnibus, quomodo in quibusdam singula eminent: sed malum ac stultum nullo vitio vacare ... omnia in omnibus vitia sunt, sed non omnia in singulis extant (i.e., all points are not equally prominent in each one). It hardly requires to be pointed out how nearly this view coincides with that of Augustine on the virtues of the heathen, how close a resemblance the Stoic doctrine of folly bears to the Christian doctrine of the unregenerate, and how the contrast between wisdom and folly corresponds to that between the faithful and unbelievers.

Plut. C. N. 10, 1; Prof. in Virt. 12, p. 82; Sen. Ep. 75, 8.

Plut. C. Not. 9; Stoic. Abs. Poët. Dic. 2. The Stoics are here ridiculed because, according to their view, a man may go to bed ugly, poor, vicious, miserable, and rise the next morning wise, virtuous, rich, happy, and a king. In Prof. in Virt. 1, p. 75, a saying of Zeno’s is given, that it is possible to tell by a dream whether we are advancing in virtue.

See p. 266, 3; Plut. Prof. in Virt. 1; Com. Not. 10, 2; see p. 269, 1; Sen. Ep. 75, 8.

Plut. C. Not. 9, 1: τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας παραγινομένης πολλάκις οὐδ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸν κτησάμενον οἴονται διαλεληθέναι δ’ αὐτὸν ὅτι μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἀθλιώτατος ὢν καὶ ἀχρονέστατος νῦν ὁμοῦ φρόνιμος καὶ μακάριος γέγονεν. So Sto. Rep. 19, 3. In explanation of these words, Ritter, iii. 657, aptly refers to Stob. ii. 234 (γίγνεσθαι δὲ καὶ διαλεληθότα τινὰ σοφὸν νομίζουσι κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους), and Philo, De Agric. p. 325: Those yet inexperienced in wisdom παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις διαλεληθότες εἶναι λέγονται σοφοί· τοὺς γὰρ ἄχρι σοφίας ἄκρας ἐληλακότας καὶ τῶν ὅρων αὐτῆς ἄρτι πρῶτον ἁψαμένους ἀμήχανον εἰδέναι, φασι, τὴν ἑαυτῶν τελείωσιν. μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἄμφω συνίστασθαι τήν τε πρὸς τὸ πέρας ἄφιξιν καὶ τὴν τῆς ἀφίξεως κατάληψιν, ἀλλ’ εἶναι μεθόριον ἄγνοιαν, κ.τ.λ. Sen. Ep. 75, 9, likewise investigates the same point, but ranges those who have not yet attained the consciousness of perfection among advancers, but not among the wise. Prantl’s conjecture (Gesch. d. Logik, i. 490, 210), that the σοφὸς διαλεληθὼς is connected with the fallacy known as διαλανθάνων, appears to be questionable.

See p. 230, 3.

Cic. Fin. iii. 5, 17. Gell. N. A. xii. 5, 7: The primary objects of natural self-love are the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν; and self-love consists mainly in this: Ut omnibus corporis sui commodis gauderet [unusquisque], ab incommodis omnibus abhorreret. Stob. Ecl. ii. 142: Some things are according to nature, others contrary to nature, others neither one nor the other. Health, strength, and such like, are among things according to nature. Ibid. p. 148: τῶν δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιαφόρων ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστι πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχήν. πρῶτα μέν ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις ἢ σχέσις κατὰ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους γινομένη, οἷον ὑγιεία καὶ αἴσθησις, λεγὼ δὲ τὴν κατάληψιν καὶ ἰσχύν. κατὰ μετοχὴν δὲ ... οἷον χεὶρ ἀρτία καὶ σῶμα ὑγιαῖνον καὶ αἰσθήσεις μὴ πεπηρωμέναι ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν κατ’ ἀνάλογον. Conf. Ibid. p. 60, where the enumeration of the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν is also in the Stoic sense, and above, p. 225.

Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 50: Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum: quam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone: nec ullum sapientis munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quæ ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset neque ullum delectum adhiberi oporteret. The same argument was used by the Stoa against the theoretical ἀδιαφορία of the Sceptics (see above, p. 37, 1), with which the practical ἀδιαφορία of Aristo is most closely connected. It differs only in name from the ἀταραξία of the sceptics, Aristo having a leaning towards Scepticism. See p. 61, 1.

Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 21: Prima est enim conciliatio [οἰκείωσις] hominis ad ea quæ sunt secundum naturam, simul autem cepit intelligentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant ἔννοιαν illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et ut ita dicam concordiam, multo eam pluris æstimavit quam omnia ilia quæ primum dilexerat: atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum ... cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo referenda sint omnia ... quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est, eorum autem quæ sunt prima naturæ propter se nihil expetendum, &c. Similarly Gell. l.c.

Plut. Com. Not. 4; Cic. Fin. iv. 17; v. 24, 72; 29, 89.

Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 22: Ut recte dici possit, omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturæ: nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturæ conciliationibus honesta actio. Consequens enim est et post oritur.

Plut. C. Not. 26, 2: εἰ γὰρ αὐτὰ μὲν [τὰ] πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὰ μή ἐστιν, ἡ δ’ εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογὴ καὶ λῆψις αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πάντα τὰ παρ’ ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν ἕκαστον ἕνεκα τοῦ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ. εἴπερ γὰρ οἴονται, μὴ στοχαζομένους μήδ’ ἐφιεμένους τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐκεῖνον τὸ τέλος ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ οὗ δεῖ ἐκεῖνα ἀναφέρεσθαι, τὴν τούτων ἐκλογὴν, καὶ μὴ ταῦτα. τέλος μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐκεῖνα φρονίμως· ἐκεῖνα δ’ αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν οὐ τέλος, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ὕλη τις ὑπόκειται τὸν ἐκλεκτικὴν ἀξίαν ἔχουσα. Cic. See p. 279, 3.

Cic. l.c. 6, 20; Plut. l.c.; Stob. ii. 142: Diog. vii. 105.

See p. 232. Stob. ii. 132: διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ ληπτὸν ... καὶ καθόλου τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀξίαν ἔχοντος.

Diog. vii. 165: Herillus taught διαφέρειν τέλος καὶ ὑποτελίδα· (On this expression compare Stob. ii. 60) τῆς μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ σοφοὺς στοχάζεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ μόνον τὸν σοφόν. Hence Cic. Fin. iv. 15, 40, raises the objection, Facit enim ille duo sejuncta ultima bonorum, because he neither despises external things, nor connects them with the ultimate aim. Diog. l.c., however, says that he taught τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα εἶναι; and Cic. Off. i. 2, 6, mentions him, together with Pyrrho and Aristo, as upholders of ἀδιαφορία. It would appear from these passages that Herillus was not far removed from true Stoicism. According to Cic. Fin. ii. 13, 43 (conf. Offic.), he had no followers after the time of Chrysippus.

Cic. Legg. i. 21, 55: Si, ut Chius Aristo dixit, solum bonum esse diceret quod honestum esset malumque quod turpe, ceteras res omnes plane pares ac ne minimum quidem utrum adessent an abessent interesse. Ibid. 13, 38. Fin. iv. 17, 47: Ut Aristonis esset explosa sententia dicentis, nihil differre aliud ab alio nec esse res ullas præter virtutes et vitia intra quas quidquam omnino interesset. Ibid. ii. 13, 43; iii. 3, 11; 15, 50; iv. 16, 43; 25, 68; v. 25, 73; Acad. ii. 42, 130; Offic. Fragm. Hortens. (in Nonn. Præfract.); Diog. vii. 160; Sext. Math. xi. 64. Cic. usually places Aristo together with Pyrrho.

Diog. l.c.: τέλος ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαφόρως ἔχοντα ζῇν πρὸς τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας μηδὲ ἡντινοῦν ἐν αὐτοῖς παραλλαγὴν ἀπολείποντα ἀλλ’ ἐπίσης ἐπὶ πάντων ἔχοντα. Cic. Acad. l.c.: Huic summum bonum est in his rebus (the morally adiaphora) neutram in partem moveri; quæ ἀδιαφορία ab ipso dicitur. Chrysippus, in Plut. C. Not. 27, 2: Indifference to that which is neither good nor bad presupposes the idea of the good, and yet, according to Aristo, the good only consists in that state of indifference. Stob. i. 920; Clem. Strom. ii. 416, C. See Cic. Fin. iv. 25, 68, for Chrysippus’ attack on this ἀδιαφορία.

Diog. vii. 105: τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν λέγουσι προηγμένα τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα. προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἔχοντα ἀξίαν· ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα. By ἀξία, the three meanings of which are discussed, they understand here μέσην τινὰ δύναμιν ἢ χρείαν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον. 107: τῶν προηγμένων τὰ μὲν δι’ αὑτὰ προῆκται, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δι’ αὑτὰ καὶ δι’ ἕτερα.... δι’ αὑτὰ μὲν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν ἐστί. δι’ ἕτερα δὲ ὅτι περιποιεῖ χρείας οὐκ ὀλίγας. ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχει καὶ ἀποπροηγμένον κατὰ τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον. Essentially the same account, only somewhat fuller, in Stob. Ecl. ii. 142. Conf. Cic. Acad. i. 10, 36; Fin. iii. 15, 50; iv. 26, 72; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 191; Math. xi. 60; Alex. Aphr. De An. 157. Zeno (in Stob. 156; Cic. Fin. iii. 16, 52) explains the conception προηγμένον, and its distinction from ἀγαθόν: προηγμένον δ’ εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὃ ἀδιάφορον ὂν ἐκλεγόμεθα κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον ... οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι προηγμένον, διὰ τὸ τὴν μεγίστην ἀξίαν αὐτὰ ἔχειν. τὸ δὲ προηγμένον, τὴν δευτέραν χώραν καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχον, συνεγγίζειν πως τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν αὐλῇ τὸν προηγούμενον εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλὰ τὸν μετ’ αὐτὸν τεταγμένον.

Stob. ii. 142: ἀδιάφορα δ’ εἶναι λέγουσι τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν, διχῶς τὸ ἀδιάφορον νοεῖσθαι φάμενοι, καθ’ ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν καὶ τὸ μήτε αἱρετὸν μήτε φευκτόν· καθ’ ἕτερον δὲ τὸ μήτε ὁρμῆς μήτε ἀφορμῆς κινητικόν—τὰ καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα. Similarly Diog. vii. 104. Sext. M. vi. 60, distinguishes a third meaning. It is, however, only a subdivision of the second.

Stob. ii. 144, 156; Sext. P. iii. 191; M. xi. 62.

Diog. xii. 106; Stob. ii. 142; Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 51; Sext. l.c.; Plut. Sto. Rep. 30. The Stoics were not altogether agreed as to whether fame after death belongs to things to be desired. According to Cic. Fin. iii. 17, 57, Chrysippus and Diogenes denied it; whereas the younger Stoics, pressed by the Academician Carneades, allowed it. Sen. Ep. 102, 3, even quotes it as a Stoic maxim that posthumous fame is a good. But probably bonum is here inaccurately used for προηγμένον.

Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 34; 16, 52; Sext. M. xi. 62. See p. 232, 3 and 283, 2.

Sen. Ep. 9, 14: Sapientem nulla re egere [δεῖσθαι], et tamen multis illi rebus opus esse [χρῆναι].

Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 4: ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ἀγαθῶν τρόπον τινὰ συγχωρεῖ καὶ δίδωσι τοῖς βουλομένοις τὰ προηγμένα καλεῖν ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ τἀναντία ταύταις ταῖς λέξεσιν· ἔστι, εἴ τις βούλεται κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας παραλλαγὰς (with reference to the greatness of the difference between προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον) τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῶν λέγειν τὸ δὲ κακὸν ... ἐν μὲν τοῖς σημαινομένοις οὐ διαπίπτοντος αὐτοῦ δ’ ἄλλα στοχαζομένου τῆς κατὰ τὰς ὀνομασίας συνηθείας. See p. 284, 1; Cic. Fin. iv. 25, 68, and the previous remarks on the division of goods, p. 230, 3. Diog. 103, says that Posidonius included bodily and external advantages among the ἀγαθά. In Sen. Ep. 87, 35, he, however, expressly proves that they are not goods.

Sen. Ep. 95, 5: Antipater quoque inter magnos sectæ hujus auctores aliquid se tribuere dicit externis (namely for the perfection of the highest good), sed exiguum admodum. Seneca here declaims, in the spirit of strict Stoicism, against such a heresy, but he himself says (De Vit. Be. 22, 5): Apud me divitiæ aliquem locum habent, only not summum et postremum. But what philosopher would have said they had this?

De Vit. Bea. 21.

Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51; 13, 55; 23, 91; 15, 63; 23, 89. Diogenes of Seleucia says that it is permitted to circulate base money, knowingly to conceal defects in a purchase from the purchaser, and such like. Hecato of Rhodes, a pupil of Panætius, thinks that not only will a wise man look after his property by means lawful and right, but he believes that in a famine he will prefer letting his slaves starve, to maintaining them at too great a sacrifice.

According to Cic. Off. ii. 14, 51, he would allow an attorney to ignore truth, provided his assertions were at least probable.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 2.

Ibid. 5.

According to Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 3 and 7 and 10; 30, 3, Diog. vii. 188, Stob. ii. 224, the Stoics, following Chrysippus, admit three ways of earning an honest livelihood—by teaching, by courting the rich, by serving states and princes. The first and the last were no longer condemned in the Alexandrian period, as they had been before, but still they were in bad repute, and the second was particularly so. Still more at variance with Greek customs was the course advocated by Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 30): καὶ κυβιστήσειν τρὶς ἐπὶ τούτῳ λαβόντα τάλαντον. Chrysippus himself (in Diog.) enumerates the objections to the modes of life just named, and, in general, to all trading for money, but his objections cannot have appeared to him conclusive.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 18, 1 and 3. Com. Not. 12, 4: λυσιτελεῖ ζῇν ἄφρονα μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ βιοῦν κἂν μηδέποτε μέλλῃ φρονήσειν; or, as it is expressed, 11, 8: Heraclitus and Pherecydes would have done well to renounce their wisdom, if they could thereby have got rid of their sickness. A prudent man would rather be a fool in human shape than a wise man in the shape of a beast.

καθῆκον, an expression introduced by Zeno, according to Diog. 108.

See p. 265.

Diog. 107: καθῆκον φασὶν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν τιν’ ἴσχει ἀπολογισμὸν οἷον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν τῇ ζωῇ (the same in Cicero), ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα διατείνει· ὁρᾶσθαι γὰρ κἀπὶ τούτων καθήκοντα. Stob. 158: ὁρίζεται δὲ τὸ καθῆκον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ, ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἀπολογίαν ἔχει· παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον δὲ ἐναντίως. τοῦτο διατείνει καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῴων, ἐνεργεῖ γὰρ τι κἀκεῖνα ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν λογικῶν ζῴων οὕτως ἀποδίδοται, τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ. καθῆκον is, in general, what is according to nature, with which ἀκόλουθον coincides. (See p. 228, 2.) See Diog. 108: ἐνέργημα δ’ αὐτὸ [τὸ καθῆκον] εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκεῖον.

Diog. vii. 109: τῶν καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ καθήκει τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἀεί· καὶ ἀεὶ μὲν καθήκει τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῇν· οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐρωτᾷν τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι καὶ περιπατεῖν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Cic. Fin. iii. 17, 58: Eat autem officium quod ita factum est, ut ejus facti probabilis ratio reddi possit. Ex quo intelligitur, officium medium quoddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis ... quoniam enim videmus, &c. (see p. 265, 2) ... quoniamque non dubium est, quin in iis quæ media dicimus sit aliud sumendum aliud rejiciendum, quidquid ita fit aut dicitur communi officio continetur. Also Off. i. 3, 8. Acad. i. 10, 37. Corresponding to προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον, Zeno placed officium and contra officium, as media quædam between recte factum and peccatum. Stob. ii. 158: τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι ... οὐκ εἶναι δὲ κατορθώματα τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἃ δὴ οὐδὲ τέλεια, καθήκοντα προσαγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ μέσα, οἷον τὸ γαμεῖν, τὸ πρεσβεύειν, τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια.

Stob. 160. Diog. l.c.: τὰ μὲν εἶναι καθήκοντα ἄνευ περιστάσεως, τὰ δὲ περιστατικά. καὶ ἄνευ μὲν περιστάσεως τάδε, ὑγείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· κατὰ περίστασιν δὲ τὸ πηροῦν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν διαῤῥιπτεῖν. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. This distinction, of course, only applies to μέσον καθῆκον. The unconditional duty of virtuous life cannot be abrogated by any circumstances.

Compare, on this point, besides the quotations on p. 265, 2, Diog. 108: τῶν γὰρ καθ’ ὁρμὴν ἐνεργουμένων τὰ μὲν καθήκοντα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον, τὰ δ’ οὔτε καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. καθήκοντα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ὅσα ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ (demands; see p. 244, 2, the αἱρῶν λόγος) ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔχει τὸ γονεῖς τιμᾷν, ἀδελφοὺς, πατρίδα, συμπεριφέρεσθαι φίλοις· παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον δὲ ὅσα μὴ αἱρεῖ λόγος, e.g. neglect of parents; οὔτε δὲ καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον, ὅσα οὔθ’ αἱρεῖ λόγος πράττειν οὔτ’ ἀπαγορεύει, οἷον κάρφος ἀνελέσθαι, κ.τ.λ. Combining with this the passage previously quoted, it appears that καθῆκον includes not only actions which aim at a moral good, but those which aim at a simple προηγμένον; and, in view of the latter, καθῆκον is included among things intermediate, or ἀδιάφορα in its more extended meaning. Cic.; see p. 288, 2. Stob. 158, says that those καθήκοντα which are at the same time κατορθώματα, are οὐδὲ τέλεια, ἀλλὰ μέσα ... παραμετρεῖσθαι δὲ τὸ μέσον καθῆκον ἀδιαφόροις τισὶ καλουμένοις δὲ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τοιαύτην δ’ εὐφυΐαν προσφερομένοις, ὥστ’ εἰ μὴ λαμβάνοιμεν αὐτὰ ἢ διωθούμεθα ἀπερισπάστως (if, without particular occasion, or as Diog. 109 observes, ἄνευ περιστάσεως—see previous note—we despise or reject them) μὴ εὐδαιμονεῖν.

In the latter sense καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα have been already discussed, p. 264.

Sen. De Ira, i. 16, 7: When the wise man sees anything revolting, non ... tangetur animus ejus eritque solito commotior? Fateor, sentiet levem quendam tenuemque motum. Nam, ut dixit Zeno, in sapientis quoque animo etiam cum vulnus sanatum est, cicatrix manet. Id. ii. 2; Ep. 57, 3; De Const. 10, 4; Stob. Floril. 7, 21; Plut. C. Not. 25, 5; Epictet. in Gell. N. A. xix. 1, 17. Conf. p. 253, 5, 6.

Sen. Brevit. Vit. c. 14, 2: Hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum Cynicis excedere. Similarly Ep. 9, 3: Hoc inter nos et illos (Stilpo and the Cynics in general) interest: noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit: illorum ne sentit quidem.

Conf. Sen. De Ira, ii. 2–4, particularly the quotation in Gell. from Epictetus: Even the wise man is apt, at terrible occurrences, paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere, non opinione alicujus mali percepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis, officium mentis atque rationis prævertentibus. But what distinguishes him from the foolish man is that only the foolish man and not the wise man assents (συγκατατίθεται, προσεπιδοξάζει) to such impressions (φαντασίαι).

Diog. vii. 115: εἶναι δὲ καὶ εὐπαθείας φασὶ τρεῖς, χαρὰν, εὐλάβειαν, βούλησιν· καὶ τὴν μὲν χαρὰν ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔπαρσιν· τὴν δὲ εὐλάβειαν τῷ φόβῳ οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔκκλισιν· τῇ δὲ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τὴν βούλησιν οὖσαν εὔλογον ὄρεξιν. Subdivisions of βούλησις are: εὔνοια, εὐμένεια, ἀσπασμὸς, ἀγάπησις; of εὐλάβεια: αἰδὼς, ἁγνεία; of χαρά: τέρψις, εὐφροσύνη, εὐθυμία. The same three εὐπάθειαι are mentioned by Cic. Tusc. iv. 6, 12, with the remark that they only belong to the wise. See Stob. 92, and Sen. Ep. 59, 14; 72, 4 and 8, respecting the wise man’s cheerfulness.

Besides the quotations, p. 271, see Plut. Sto. Rep. 31, 5: καὶ μὴν οὔθ’ αὑτὸν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀποφαίνει σπουδαῖον, οὔτε τινὰ τῶν αὑτοῦ γνωρίμων ἢ καθηγεμόνων. Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 145; Quintil. Inst. xii. 1. 18.

Sen. Tranq. An. 7, 4: Ubi enim istum invenies, quem tot seculis quærimus? (the wise man.) Ep. 42, 1: Scis quem nunc virum bonum dicam? Hujus secundæ notæ. Nam ille alter fortasse tanquam phœnix semel anno quingentesimo nascitur, see p. 273, 1, just as everything great is rare. But compare p. 274, 3.

Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56, and p. 274, 2.

Hos enim (says Sen. De Const. 2, 1, of the two named) Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos laboribus, etc. Further particulars in Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 33 and 70.

Sen. Ep. 90, 5. To these wise men of the old world Posidonius traced back all kinds of useful discoveries. Posidonius is probably meant by the ‘younger Stoics’ (Sext. Math. ix. 28), who say that they introduced belief in the Gods.

Sen. l.c. 44: Non dat natura virtutem, ars est bonum fieri ... ignorantia rerum innocentes erant ... virtus non contingit animo nisi instituto et edocto et ad summum adsidua exercitatione perducto. Ad hoc quidem, sed sine hoc nascimur, &c.

Stob. Ecl. ii. 236: ἴσων δὲ ὄντων τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων εἶναι τινας ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφορὰς, καθόσον τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ σκληρᾶς καὶ δυσιάτου διαθέσεως γίγνεται, τὰ δ’ οὒ. (See p. 251, 2, for the difference between emotion and disease of the soul.) καὶ τῶν σπουδαίων γε ἄλλους ἄλλων προτρεπτικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι καὶ πιστικωτέρους ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀγχινουστέρους, κατὰ τὰ μέσα τὰ ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενα τῶν ἐπιτάσεων συμβαινουσῶν, i.e., virtuous men are not all equally secure. These differences of degree do not, however, apply to wisdom (nor on the other hand to folly), which admits of no increase, but only to such properties as are included in the whole moral state, but are not themselves of moral nature. See Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56, and p. 275, 1.

Stob. Serm. 7, 21: ὁ δ’ ἐπ’ ἄκρον, φησὶ [Χρύσιππος] προκόπτων ἅπαντα πάντως ἀποδίδωσι τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ οὐδὲν παραλείπει· τὸν δὲ τούτου βίον οὐκ εἶναί πω φησὶν εὐδαίμονα ἀλλ’ ἐπιγίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὅταν αἱ μέσαι πράξεις αὗται προσλάβωσι τὸ βέβαιον καὶ ἑκτικὸν καὶ ἰδίαν πῆξίν τινα λάβωσιν. Chrysippus was probably the author of the division of progressers into three classes, which is discussed by Sen. Ep. 75, 8. Of those who have reached the highest stage it is said, omnes jam affectus et vitia posuerunt, quæ erant complectenda didicerunt, sed illis adhuc inexperta fiducia est. Bonum suum nondum in usu habent. Jam tamen in illa quæ fugerunt recidere non possunt, jam ibi sunt unde non est retro lapsus, sed hoc illis de se nondum liquet et ... scire se nesciunt.

See pp. 239, 1; 271, 7.

Sen. Ep. 75, 10: Quidam hoc proficientium genus de quo locutus sum ita complectuntur, ut illos dicant jam effugisse morbos animi, affectus nondum (on this distinction, see p. 251, 2), et adhuc in lubrico stare, quia nemo sit extra periculum malitiæ nisi qui totam eam excussit. The same view is upheld by Sen. Ep. 72, 6.

Diog. vii. 127: τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος μὲν ἀποβλητὴν, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἀναπόβλητον· ὁ μὲν, ἀποβλητὴν, διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν· ὁ δὲ, ἀναπόβλητον, διὰ βεβαίους καταλήψεις. The latter view was that of the Cynics. Although departed from by Chrysippus, it belongs to those points in which the original relation of Stoicism to Cynicism was weakened by him. Sen. Ep. 72, 6, speaking in the spirit of Cleanthes, says that he considered a candidate of the first class secure against relapses. On the other hand, Simpl. Categ. 102, α, β (Schol. in Arist. 86, a, 48; b, 30), says first that the Stoics declared virtue to be indefectible, but subsequently limits this assertion by saying that, ἐν καιροῖς (the reading κάροις is better) καὶ μελαγχολίαις, virtue, together with the whole rational life (λογικὴ ἕξις), is lost, and succeeded, not indeed by vice, but by a ἕξις μέση. A similar question is, Whether the wise man can become mad? which is answered in the negative by Diog. vii. 118, though not without some modifying clauses. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b, also combats the view that the wise man will act virtuously when in a frenzy.

Further particulars have been already given, p. 61. Seneca (Ep. 95, 1) calls the subject of applied ethics, which Aristo rejected, parænetice, or pars præceptiva. Sextus speaks of two τόποι—a παραινετικὸς and a ὑποθετικός. Both terms, however, appear to denote the same thing; for ὑποθετικὸς is defined by Muson. in Stob. Floril. 117, 8, as παραινετικός. He who is himself insufficiently educated will do well ζητῶν λόγων ἀκούειν ὑποθετικῶν παρὰ τῶν πεποιημένων ἔργον εἰδέναι τίνα μὲν βλαβερὰ τίνα δὲ ὠφέλιμα ἀνθρώποις. ὑποθετικὸς τόπος is therefore identical with the suasio of Posidonius (in Sen. Ep. 95, 65). See p. 223, note 1.

Sen. Ep. 94, 4: Cleanthes utilem quidem judicat et hanc partem, sed imbecillam nisi ab universo fluit, nisi decreta ipsa philosophiæ et capita cognovit.

See p. 223, 1.

See Cic. Off. i. 2, 7; 3, 9; iii. 2, 7. Cicero himself said that he chiefly followed Panætius (περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων), not as a mere translator, but correctione quadam adhibita. See p. 300, 2.

Cic. Off. i. 3, 7: Omnis de officio duplex est quæstio: unum genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum: alterum, quod positum est in præceptis, quibus in omnes partes usus vitæ conformari possit. He would devote his attention to officia, quorum præcepta traduntur. Cicero then goes fully into particulars. He treats of amusement and occupation (i. 29, 103); of the peculiar duties of the young and the old, of officials, citizens, foreigners (i. 34); of outward appearance, gait, conversation (i. 36); of the means of winning others (ii. 6, 21). Panætius must have given a similar treatment to the subject.

See p. 223, 1.

Particularly in the portions treating περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων and περὶ προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν.

See p. 260, 4.

See p. 260, 4, and 261, 1.

According to Cic. Off. i. 2; 7, Add Att. xvi. 11, Panætius, in the third chief division of his treatise on duties, intended to discuss cases of collision between apparent interest and duty, but his intentions were never carried out. It appears, however, from Off. i. 45, 159; iii. 12, 50; 13, 55; 23, 89, that these cases were frequently discussed, not only by the pupils of Panætius, Posidonius, and Hecato, but by Diogenes of Seleucia and Antipater of Tarsus.

The Treatise of Panætius appears to have been used as a chief authority, not only by Cicero, but by others. Antipater of Tyre, a cotemporary of Cicero, had added discussions on the care of health and wealth (Cic. Off. ii. 24, 86); and Hecato, in his treatise on duties, had added further casuistical investigations (Cic. iii. 28, 89). Brutus, too, who, like his teacher Antiochus, was devoted to a moderate Stoicism, and of whom Sen. Ep. 95, 45, reports that he had laid down rules for the relations of parents, children, and brothers in his treatise περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος, may have followed Panætius.

Sen. Ep. 94, 1; 95, 1.

Stob. ii. 128: ἐν ἕξει (not only ἐν σχέσει, see p. 230) δὲ οὐ μόνας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας τὰς τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀνδρὶ, ἀλλοιωθείσας ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ γενομένας ἀμεταπτώτους, οἱονεὶ γὰρ ἀρετὰς γίγνεσθαι.

The treatise of Panætius—we learn from Cic. Off. i. 3, 9; iii. 2, 7; 7, 33—discussed its subject first from the platform of duty, and then from that of interest. The third part, which Panætius proposed to himself—the collision between duty and interest—was never fully carried out. Cicero adds discussions on two questions, which of two conflicting duties and which of two conflicting interests must be preferred (i. 3, 10, c. 43; ii. 25). Otherwise he appears in his two first books to follow the order of Panætius.

See pp. 260, 298. Amongst other things, as we learn from the fragment in Athen. xiii. 555, a, Chrysippus discussed the question of shaving; and Alex. Aphr. Top. 26, quotes, in illustration of the useless enquiries of the Stoics, ἐν τοῖς περὶ καθηκόντων, an enquiry whether it is proper to take the largest portion before one’s father at table, and whether it is proper to cross the legs in the school of a philosopher.

εὐταξία, εὐκαιρία, talis ordo actionum ut in vita omnia sint apta inter se et convenientia. i. 40, 142; 144.

i. 43. We omit Cicero’s treatise, this section not being found in Panætius.

Panætius still more diffusively, 5, 16.

Such, for instance, as the prohibition against being angry with enemies (i. 25, 88), which recalls at once the difference of the Stoics and Peripatetics on the admissibility of emotions. See p. 252.

Diog. 117 says: The σόφος or σπουδαῖος is free from vanity (ἄτυπος), is earnest (αὐστηρὸς), frank (ἀκίβδηλος), and with no inclination to pretence. He stands aloof from the affairs of life (ἀπράγμων), lest he should do anything contrary to duty. See p. 323, 1. Stob. ii. 240, says: The wise man is gentle (πρᾶος), quiet (ἡσύχιος), and considerate (κόσμιος), never exciting angry feelings against others, never putting off what he has to do.

Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 1: βλάψουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ ψευδεῖς φαντασίας ἐμποιοῦντες, ἂν αἱ φαντασίαι ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς τὰς συγκαταθέσεις· πολλάκις γὰρ οἱ σοφοὶ ψεύδει χρῶνται πρὸς τοὺς φαύλους καὶ φαντασίαν παριστᾶσι πιθανὴν, οὐ μὴν αἰτίαν τῆς συγκαταθέσεως· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς ὑπολήψεως αἰτία τῆς ψευδοῦς ἔσται καὶ τῆς ἀπάτης. Stob. ii. 230: μὴ ψεύδεσθαι τὸν σόφον ἀλλ’ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀληθεύειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λέγειν τι ψεῦδος τὸ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ διαψευστῶς τὸ ψεῦδος λέγειν καὶ ἐπὶ ἀπάτῃ τῶν πλησίον. τῷ μέντοι ψεύδει ποτὲ συγχρήσασθαι [l. -σεσθαι] νομίζουσιν αὐτὸν κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ἄνευ συγκαταθέσεως· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ στρατηγίαν πρὸς τῶν ἀντιπάλων, καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος προόρασιν (which, however, may not be translated as Ritter iii. 662 does ‘for the sake of advantage’; it rather refers to such cases as those mentioned by Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 17, and Plato, Rep. ii. 382, C, 389, B; iv. 459, C, in which the interests of another or of the community require deception) καὶ κατ’ ἄλλας οἰκονομίας τοῦ βίου πολλάς. In accordance with this passage, too, the statement of Procl. in Alcib. (Op. ed. Cous. iii. 64)—that the Stoics differ from their predecessors in that they reject all lies—must be explained: οὔτε γὰρ ἐξαπατᾷν ἔστι δικαίως κατ’ αὐτοὺς οὔτε βιάζεσθαι οὔτε ἀποστερεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἑκάστη τῶν πράξεων τούτων ἀπὸ μοχθηρᾶς πρόεισιν ἕξεως καὶ ἄδικός ἐστιν. The point here in dispute is simply verbal; the Stoics were, in reality, at one with Plato, in not calling permitted falsehood untruth or deceit only for the reasons quoted by Chrysippus and Stobæus.

Cic. Fin. iii. 20. 68: Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si quis ejusmodi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo. The latter must, however, have been in a minority.

Diog. 121: κυνιεῖν τ’ αὐτὸν [τὸν σοφόν]· εἶναι γὰρ τὸν κυνισμὸν σύντομον ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν ὁδὸν, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρος [on whom, see p. 51, 1] ἐν τῇ ἠθικῇ. Stob. 238: κυνιεῖν τε τὸν σοφὸν λέγουσιν, ἴσον τῷ ἐπιμένειν τῷ κυνισμῷ, οὐ μὴν σοφὸν ὄντ’ ἂν ἄρξασθαι τοῦ κυνισμοῦ.

See p. 274, 2. According to the epigrams of Timon, in Diog. vii. 16, Athen. iv. 158, a, Sext. Math. xi. 172, Zeno’s School must have presented a very Cynical appearance. Probably, the description is partially true of the earlier history of that School; still I would attach no great value to it as illustrating the system.

Ep. 5, 1; 103, 5; Fr. 19, in Lactant. Inst. iii. 15.

See, on this point, Tranq. An. 8, 4; Benef. v. 4, 3; 6, 1; Ep. 90, 14. Sen. Ep. 29, 1, does not, however, agree with the Stoic custom of sowing exhortations broadcast.

As may be seen in Musonius and Epictetus.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 22 (the question being as to the pollution of the temples by the contact with the dead or lying-in women or unclean foods); in other cases indeed, as Plutarch objects, he would not allow these considerations.

Besides Diog. vii. 188, and Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 207, see Chrysippus’s own words, in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 247 (Math. xi. 193). The majority of the Stoics appear to have limited cannibalism to cases of extreme necessity. See Diog. 121. Chrysippus had probably been speaking, in the context, of the different modes of treating the dead among various nations (Cic. Tusc. i. 45, 108), intending to prove that no uniformity of practice prevailed.

Cic. Off. i. 35, 128, with the limitation: Cynici aut si qui fuerunt Stoici pæne Cynici.

Diog. vii. 33: καὶ ἐσθῆτι δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κελεύει χρῆσθαι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ μηδὲν μόριον ἀποκεκρύφθαι. The latter act is only conditional, and allowed in certain cases, such as for purposes of gymnastics.

Diog. 33; 131.

Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 201.

Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 200; 245; Math. xi. 190; Clement. Homil. v. 18.

Sext. Pyrrh. i. 160; iii. 205; 246; Math. xi. 191; Plut. Sto. Rep. 22; Clement. Homil. v. 18.

Plut. l.c. 21, 1.

Sextus, however (Pyrrh. iii. 206), attributes to him, as the representative of the School, what properly only belongs to Chrysippus: τό τε αἰσχρουργεῖν ... ὁ Ζήνων οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζει.

His words (Sext. Math. xi. 190; Pyrrh. iii. 245; Plut. Qu. Con. iii. 6, 1, 6) are as follows: διαμηρίζειν δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἧσσον παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ παιδικὰ μηδὲ θήλεα ἢ ἄρσενα· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα παιδικοῖς ἢ μὴ παιδικοῖς οὐδὲ θηλείαις ἢ ἄῤῥεσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πρέπει τε καὶ πρέποντά ἐστι; and: διαμεμήρικας τὸν ἐρώμενον; οὐκ ἔγωγε· πότερον οὖν ἐπεθύμησας αὐτὸν διαμηρίσαι; καὶ μάλα. ἀλλὰ ἐπεθύμησας παρασχεῖν σοι αὐτὸν ἢ ἐφοβήθης κελεῦσαι; μὰ Δί’. ἀλλ’ ἐκέλευσας; καὶ μάλα. εἶτ’ οὐχ ὑπηρέτησέ σοι; οὐ γάρ. The form of expression is certainly very Cynic-like, but the meaning is not what Sextus supposes. Zeno’s object is not to justify unnatural vice, but to show that those who allow any form of unchastity cannot forbid this form, and that the wish and the attempt are morally on a par with the deed.

See the following note.

Musonius, in Stob. Serm. 6, 61 (conf. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 68): Ne amores quidem sanctos alienos a sapiente esse volunt. According to Diog. vii. 129, Stob. ii. 238, love is only directed to beauty of soul. By Diog., Stob., Alex. Aphr. Top. 75, and Cic. Tusc. iv. 34, 72, it is defined to be ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιΐας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον; and, according to Plut. C. Not. 28, ἔμφασις κάλλους is an incentive to love; but these statements are guarded by adding that the bad and irrational are ugly, and the wise are beautiful. It was probably in imitation of Plat. Sym. 203, E, that the Stoics nevertheless stated τοὺς ἐρασθέντας αἰσχρῶν παύεσθαι καλῶν γενομένων. Love is excited by a sensation of εὐφυία πρὸς ἀρετὴν, its object is to develop this capacity into real virtue. Until this end has been attained, the loved one is still foolish, and therefore ugly. When it has been attained, the striving, in which Eros consists, has reached its object, and the love of the teacher to his pupil goes over into friendship between equals.

Conf. Orig. c. Cels. iv. 45: The Stoics made good and evil depend on the intention alone, and declared external actions, independent of intentions, to be indifferent: εἶπον οὖν ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀδιαφόρων τόπῳ ὅτι τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ (the action taken by itself) θυγατράσι μίγνυσθαι ἀδιάφορόν ἐστιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ χρὴ ἐν ταῖς καθεστώσαις πολιτείαις τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν. καὶ ὑποθέσεως χάριν ... παρειλήφασι τὸν σοφὸν μετὰ τῆς θυγατρὸς μόνης καταλελειμμένον παντὸς τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους διεφθαρμένου, καὶ ζητοῦσιν εἰ καθηκόντως ὁ πατὴρ συνελεύσεται τῇ θυγατρὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ἀπολέσθαι ... τὸ πᾶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος.

How strictly he respected chastity and modesty in women is proved by the fragment, preserved by Clem. Pædag. iii. 253, C, respecting the dress and conduct of maidens.

Cic. Fin. iii. 19, 64: Mundum autem censent regi numine Deorum eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et Deorum; et unumquemque nostrum ejus mundi esse partem, ex quo illud consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostræ anteponamus.

M. Aurel. ix. 9; xii. 30. Sen. Ep. 95, 52: The whole world is a unit; membra sumus corporis magni. Natura nos cognatos edidit. Hence mutual love, love of society, justice, and fairness. Ep. 48, 2: Alteri vivas oportet, si vis tibi vivere. Hæc societas ... nos homines hominibus miscet et judicat aliquod esse commune jus generis humani.

Cic. Legg. 12, 33: Quibus enim ratio a natura data est, iisdem etiam recta ratio data est: ergo et lex, quæ est recta ratio in jubendo et vetando (see p. 241, 2): si lex, jus quoque. At omnibus ratio. Jus igitur datum est omnibus. Ibid. 7, 23: Est igitur ... prima homini cum Deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est. Quæ cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum Diis putandi sumus. Inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos communio juris est. Quibus autem hæc sunt inter eos communio, et civitatis ejusdem habendi sunt. Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 119: The Stoics teach ἕνα μὲν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, συμπολιτεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, δικαιοσύνης μετέχοντας φύσει.

Cic. Tusc. iv. 23, 51.

Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67; Off. i. 7, 22; Sen. Clement. i. 3, 2; Benef. vii. 1, 7; M. Aurel. v. 16, 30; vii. 55; viii. 59; ix. 1; xi. 18; Diog. vii. 129; Sext. Math. ix. 131.

Hence, according to Cic. Fin. iii. 21, 69, not only ὠφελήματα and βλάμματα (moral good and evil), but εὐχρηστήματα and δυσχρηστήματα (other advantages and disadvantages) are common to all men.

According to Plut. Sto. Rep. 16, Chrysippus denied that a man could wrong himself. If, in other passages, he seems to assert the contrary, this apparent inconsistency is probably due to the double meaning of ἀδικεῖν, which sometimes means ‘to wrong,’ sometimes simply ‘to harm.’ Strictly speaking, a relation involving justice can only exist towards another. See Cic. on p. 315, 2.

Towards the Gods, man stands, according to the above passages, in a relation involving justice. There is, therefore (Sext. ix. 131), a justice towards the Gods, of which piety (see p. 261, 1) is only a part.

Sen. Benef. iv. 18.

M. Aurel. vii. 13: If you only consider yourself a part, and not a member, of human society, οὔπω ἀπὸ καρδίας φιλεῖς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· οὔπω σε καταληπτικῶς εὐφραίνει τὸ εὐεργετεῖν· ἔτι ὡς πρέπον αὐτὸ ψιλὸν ποιεῖς· οὔπω ὡς αὑτὸν εὖ ποιῶν.

See p. 298, 3.

Off. i. 7, 20: De tribus autem reliquis [virtutibus, the three others besides understanding] latissime patet ea ratio, qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitæ quasi communitas continetur, cujus partes duæ sunt: justitia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua viri boni nominantur, et huic conjuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet.

Off. i. 7–13; ii. 14–17.

See p. 254, 2, 3.

We shall subsequently have occasion to prove this in detail. It may here suffice to refer to the treatises of Seneca, De Beneficiis, De Clementia, and De Ira. On the value of mercy, he remarks (De Clem. i. 3, 2): Nullam ex omnibus virtutibus magis homini convenire, cum sit nulla humanior.

Conf. Panætius, in Cic. Off. i. 25, 88.

De Clem. ii. 5–8.

Among the points characteristic of Stoicism, the censure deserves notice which Sen. (Ep. 7, 3; 95, 33; Tranq. An. 2, 13) passes on gladiatorial shows and the Roman thirst for war. (Ep. 95, 30.) The attitude of the Stoics to slavery and the demand for love of enemies will be considered hereafter.

Stob. ii. 184: τήν τε ὁμόνοιαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν, διὸ καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους πάντας ὁμονοεῖν ἀλλήλοις διὰ τὸ συμφωνεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. Cic. N. D. i. 44, 121: Censent autem [Stoici] sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos, nihil est enim virtute amabilius. Quam qui adeptus erit, ubicumque erit gentium, a nobis diligetur. See Off. i. 17, 55. Conf. p. 309, 3.

Plut. C. Not. 22, 2. The same thought is expressed in the statement (ibid. 33, 2) that the wise man is as useful to deity (the universe) as deity is to him.

Sen. Benef. vii. 12, 2; Ep. 81, 11; 123, 15; 9, 5; Stob. ii. 118; see p. 271, 3. Diog. 124. According to Diog. 32, Zeno, like Socrates, was blamed for asserting that only the good (σπουδαῖοι) among themselves are fellow-citizens, friends, and relations; whilst all the bad are enemies and strangers.

He is, as Sen. Ep. 9, 5, puts it, faciendarum amicitiarum artifex.

Si vis amari, ama, says Hecato, in Sen. Ep. 9, 6.

We have already encountered friendship in the Stoic list of goods. See p. 230, 3. Stob. 186 says, more accurately, that friendship, for the sake of the commonwealth, is not a good, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐκ διεστηκότων ἀγαθὸν εἶναι; on the other hand, friendship, in the sense of friendly relations to others, belongs to external goods; in the sense of a friendly disposition merely, it belongs to intellectual goods. On the value of friendship, Sen. 99, 3. Friendship is defined as κοινωνία βίου (Stob. 130); κοινωνία τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, χρωμένων ἡμῶν τοῖς φίλοις ὡς ἑαυτοῖς (Diog. 124). Similar definitions are given by Stob. of varieties of friendship: γνωριμότης, συνήθεια, κ.τ.λ. On the absolute community of goods among friends, see Sen. Ep. 47, 2; 3, 2; Benef. vii. 4, 1; 12, 1.

Ep. 109, 3 and 11.

Ep. 9, 13: Se contentus est sapiens, ad beate vivendum, non ad vivendum. Ad hoc enim multis illi rebus opus est, ad illud tantum animo sano et erecto et despiciente fortunam.

Ep. 9, 5.

Sen. Ep. 109, 5.

Ep. 109, 13; 9, 8; 10, 12; 18.

See p. 318, 2.

Stob. ii. 208: τὸν γὰρ νόμον εἶναι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, σπουδαῖον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν. ἱκανῶς δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης περὶ τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν λόγον ἠρώτησε τοῦτον· πόλις μὲν εἰ (wrongly struck out by Meineke) ἔστιν οἰκητήριον κατασκεύασμα εἰς ὃ καταφεύγοντας ἔστι δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἀστεῖον δὴ πόλις ἐστιν; Floril. 44, 12. See pp. 223; 241, 3.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 3: Chrysippus recommends political life, placing βίος σχολαστικὸς on the same footing with βίος ἡδονικός. Diog. vii. 121: πολιτεύεσθαί φασιν τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ βίων· καὶ γὰρ κακίαν ἐφέξειν καὶ ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν ἐφορμήσειν. Sen. De Ot. 3, 2: Epicurus ait: non accedet ad rempublicam sapiens, nisi si quid intervenerit. Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam, nisi si quid impedierit. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 68: Since man exists for the sake of other men, consentaneum est huic naturæ, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rempublicam: atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adjungere et velle ex ea liberos procreare. Stob. ii. 184: τό τε δίκαιόν φασι φύσει εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει. ἑπόμενον δὲ τούτοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ... καὶ τὸ νομοθετεῖν τε καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, κ.τ.λ.

Cic. Legg. ii. 5, 11.

Diog. Ibid.: καὶ γαμήσειν, ὡς ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν πολιτείᾳ, καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι. Ibid. 120: The Stoics consider love of children, parents, and kindred to be according to nature. Chrysippus (in Hieron. Ad. Jovin. i. 191): The wise man will marry, lest he offend Zeus Γαμήλιος and Γενέθλιος. Antipater (whether the well-known pupil of Diogenes of Seleucia, or the younger Stoic Antipater of Tyre mentioned by Cic. Off. ii. 24, 86, is not stated) in Stob. Floril. 67, 25: Wife and child are necessary to give completeness to civil and domestic life; a citizen owes children to his country, and family love is the purest. Musonius (Ibid. 67, 20, Conf. 75, 15): A philosopher ought to be a pattern in married life, as in every other natural relation, and discharge his duties as a citizen by founding a family; love for wife and children is the deepest love.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 1: ἐπεὶ τοίνυν πολλὰ μὲν, ὡς ἐν λόγοις, αὐτῷ Ζήνωνι, πολλὰ δὲ Κλεάνθει, πλεῖστα δὲ Χρυσίππῳ γεγραμμένα τυγχάνει περὶ πολιτείας καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν καὶ ῥητορεύειν. Conf. the titles in Diog. vii. 4; 166; 175; 178. Diogenes’s list contains no political writings of Chrysippus. It is, however, known to be incomplete; for Diog. vii. 34; 131, quotes Chrysippus’s treatise περὶ πολιτείας, a treatise also quoted by Plut. Sto. Rep. 21 (1, 3, 5). According to Cic. Legg. iii. 6, 14, Diogenes and Panætius were the only Stoics before his time who had entered into particulars respecting legislation, though others might have written much on politics.

Conf. the fragment of Sen. De Matrimonio, in Hieron. Ad. Jovin. i. 191, Fr. 81 Haase, which, like the Essenes, requires absolute abstinence from pregnant women. A few unimportant fragments are also preserved of Chrysippus’s treatise on the education of children. See Quintil. Inst. i. 11, 17; 1, 4 and 16; 3, 14; 10, 32; Baguet, De Chrys. (Annal. Lovan. iv. p. 335). He is reproached by Posidonius (Galen. Hipp. et Plat. v. 1, p. 465) for neglecting the first germs of education, particularly those previous to birth.

Diog. vii. 131.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 3–5; 7; 30, 3; C. Not. 7, 6.

Diog. vii. 4.

Diog. vii. 131.

Diog. 33: κοινάς τε γὰρ γυναῖκας δογματίζειν ὁμοίως ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς διακοσίους στίχους, μήθ’ ἱερὰ μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε γυμνάσια ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οἰκοδομεῖσθαι ... νόμισμα δ’ οὔτ’ ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν οἴεσθαι δεῖν κατασκευάζειν οὔτ’ ἀποδημίας. Ibid. 131.

Plut. Alex. Virt. i. 6, p. 329.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 1: οἶμαι γὰρ ἔγωγε τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀπράγμονα εἶναι καὶ ὀλιγοπράγμονα καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, ὁμοίως τῆς τε αὐτοπραγίας καὶ ὀλιγοπραγμοσύνης ἀστείων ὄντων ... τῷ γὰρ ὄντι φαίνεται ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἡσυχίαν βίος ἀκίνδυνόν τε καὶ ἀσφαλὲς ἔχειν, κ.τ.λ.

Stob. Ecl. ii. 186: πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαινούσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας πολιτείας.

Stob. Floril. 45, 29: In answer to the question, why he withdrew from public life, he replied: διότι εἰ μὲν πονηρὰ πολιτεύεται [-σεται], τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπαρέσει, εἰ δὲ χρηστὰ, τοῖς πολίταις.

Sen. Ep. 29, 11: Quis enim placere potest populo, cui placet virtus? Malis artibus popularis favor quæritur. Similem te illis facias oportet ... conciliari nisi turpi ratione amor turpium non potest.

Sen. De Ot. 3, 3, p. 320, 3: It needs a special cause for devoting oneself to private life. Causa autem illa late patet: si respublica corruptior est quam ut adjuvari possit, si occupata est malis ... si parum habebit [sc. sapiens] auctoritatis aut virium nec illum admissura erit respublica, si valetudo illum impediet. Ibid. 8, 1: Negant nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rempublicam accessurum: quid autem interest, quomodo sapiens ad otium veniat, utrum quia respublica illi deest, an quia ipse reipublicæ, si omnibus defutura respublica est? (So we ought to punctuate.) Semper autem deerit fastidiose quærentibus. Interrogo ad quam rempublicam sapiens sit accessurus. Ad Atheniensium, etc.? Si percensere singulas voluero, nullam inveniam, quæ sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit. Similarly Athenodorus, in Sen. Tranq. An. 3, 2.

Athenodor. l.c. 3, 3.

Diss. iii. 22, 67.

Sen. De Otio, 4, 1: Duas respublicas animo complectamur, alteram magnam et vere publicam, qua Di atque homines continentur, in qua non ad hunc angulum respicimus aut ad illum, sed terminos civitatis nostræ cum sole metimur: alteram cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi. Does it not seem like reading Augustin’s De Civitate Dei? Some serve the great, others the small state; some serve both. Majori reipublicæ et in otio deservire possumus, immo vero nescio an in otio melius. Ep. 68, 2: Cum sapienti rempublicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est extra rempublicam etiamsi recesserit: immo fortasse relicto uno angulo in majora atque ampliora transit, &c. Epict. Diss. iii. 22, 83: Do you ask whether a wise man will busy himself with the state? What state could be greater than the one about which he does busy himself, not consulting the citizens of one city alone for the purpose of obtaining information about the revenues of a state, and such like, but the citizens of the world, that with them he may converse of happiness and unhappiness, of freedom and slavery? τηλικαύτην πολίτειαν πολιτευσαμένου ἀνθρώπου, σύ μοι πυνθάνῃ, εἰ πολιτεύσεται; πυθοῦ μου καὶ, εἰ ἄρξει· πάλιν ἐρῶ σοι· μωρὲ, ποίαν ἀρχὴν μείζονα ἧς ἄρχει;

Sen. De Otio, 5, 1; 7; 6, 4.

Marcus Aurelius, vi. 44: πόλις καὶ πατρὶς ὡς μὲν Ἀντωνίῳ μοι ἡ Ῥώμη, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ κόσμος. τὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν οὖν ταύταις ὠφέλιμα μόνα ἐστί μοι ἀγαθά. ii. 5: πάσης ὥρας φρόντιζε στιβαρῶς ὡς Ῥωμαῖος καὶ ἄρρην.

Ibid. ix. 29: ὅρμησον ἐὰν διδῶται καὶ μὴ περιβλέπου εἴ τις εἴσεται μηδὲ τὴν Πλάτωνος πολίτειαν ἔλπιζε, ἀλλὰ ἀρκοῦ εἰ τὸ βραχύτατον πρόεισι.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 1.

De Otio, 6, 5; Tranq. An. 1, 10.

See Socrates and Socratic Schools, p. 324.

This connection is already indicated by Plutarch’s grouping the Stoics and Alexander together.

Sen. Ep. 95, 52; M. Aurel. See p. 312, 2; 313.

Diss. i. 13, 3. See p. 331, 2.

Sen. Ep. 95, 52, continues after the quotation in p. 312, 2: Ex illius [naturæ] constitutione miserius est nocere quam lædi. Ex illius imperio paratæ sint juvantis manus. Ille versus et in pectore et in ore sit: homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto. V. Be. 24, 3: Hominibus prodesse natura me jubet, et servi liberine sint hi, ingenui an libertini, justæ libertatis an inter amicos datæ quid refert? Ubicumque homo est, ibi beneficii locus est. De Clem. i. 1, 3: Nemo non, cui alia desint, hominis nomine apud me gratiosus est. De Ira, i. 5.

Sen. De Otio, i. 4: see p. 256, 4: Stoici nostri dicunt ... non desinemus communi bono operam dare, adjuvare singulos, opem ferre etiam inimicis. We shall subsequently meet with similar explanations from Musonius, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. In particular, Seneca’s treatise, De Ira, deserves to be mentioned here, and especially i. 5, 2: Quid homine aliorum amantius? quid ira infestius? Homo in adjutorium mutuum genitus est, ira in exitium. Hic congregari vult, illa discedere. Hic prodesse, illa nocere. Hic etiam ignotis succurrere, illa etiam carissimos perdere. Ibid. ii. 32, 1: It is not so praiseworthy to return injury for injury, as benefit for benefit. Illic vinci turpe est, hic vincere. Inhumanum verbum est ... ultio et talio. Magni animi est injurias despicere. Conf. Cic. Off. i. 25, 88: Violent anger towards enemies must be blamed: nihil enim laudabilius, nihil magno et præclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque clementia. Even when severity is necessary, punishment ought not to be administered in anger, since such an emotion cannot be allowed at all. See p. 254, 1.

Sen. Ep. 95, 52. See p. 328, 3. Cic. Off. i. 13, 41.

Cic. l.c.: Even towards slaves, justice must be observed. Here, too, belongs the question, discussed in full by Sen. Benef. iii. 18–28, Whether a slave can do a kindness to his master? He who denies that he can, says Seneca (18, 2), is ignarus juris humani. Refert enim cujus animi sit, qui præstat, non cujus status: nulli præclusa virtus est, omnibus patet, omnes admittit, omnes invitat, ingenuos, libertinos, servos, reges, exules. Non eligit domum nec censum, nudo homine contenta est. Slavery, he continues, does not affect the whole man. Only the body belongs to his lord; his heart belongs to himself, c. 20. The duties of the slave have limits, and over against them stand certain definite rights (c. 21. Conf. De Clement. i. 18, 2). He enumerates many instances of self-sacrifice and magnanimity in slaves, and concludes by saying: Eadem omnibus principia eademque origo, nemo altero nobilior, nisi cui rectius ingenium ... unus omnium parens mundus est ... neminem despexeris ... sive libertini ante vos habentur sive servi sive exterarum gentium homines: erigite audacter animos, et quicquid in medio sordidi est transilite: expectat vos in summo magna nobilitas, &c. So Ep. 31, 11; V. Be. 24, 3. See p. 328, 3. Conf. Ep. 44: Rank and birth are of no consequence, and p. 270, 3.

Only the wise man is really free; all who are not wise are fools.

Diog. 122, at least, calls δεσποτεία, the possession and government of slaves, something bad.

According to Sen. Benef. iii. 22, 1, Cic. l.c., Chrysippus had defined a slave, perpetuus mercenarius; and hence inferred that he ought to be treated as such: operam exigendam, justa præbenda. Sen. Ep. 47, expresses a very humane view of treating slaves, contrasting a man with a slave: servi sunt; immo homines. He regards a slave as a friend of lower rank, and, since all men stand under the same higher power, speaks of himself as conservus.

M. Aurel. iv. 4: εἰ τὸ νοερὸν ἡμῖν κοινὸν, καὶ ὁ λόγος καθ’ ὃν λογικοί ἐσμεν κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ προστακτικὸς τῶν ποιητέων ἢ μὴ λόγος κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ νόμος κοινός. εἰ τοῦτο, πολῖταί ἐσμεν· εἰ τοῦτο, πολιτεύματός τινος μετέχομεν· εἰ τοῦτο, ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις ἐστί.

See pp. 312, 1, 3; 325, 3, and Plut. Com. Not. 34, 6, who makes the Stoics assert: τὸν κόσμον εἶναι πόλιν καὶ πολίτας τοὺς ἀστέρας. M. Aurel. x. 15: ζῆσον ... ὡς ἐν πόλει τῷ κόσμῳ. iv. 3: ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις.

M. Aurel. iv. 4, and ii. 16. Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 67: Chrysippus asserts that men exist for the sake of each other; quoniamque ea natura esset hominis ut ei cum genere humano quasi civile jus intercederet, qui id conservaret, eum justum, qui migraret, injustum fore. Therefore, in the sequel: in urbe mundove communi. See p. 331, 2 and p. 312, 2. Sen. De Ira, ii. 31, 7: Nefas est nocere patriæ: ergo civi quoque ... ergo et homini, nam hic in majore tibi urbe civis est. Musonius (in Stob. Floril. 40, 9): νομίζει [ὁ ἐπιεικὴς] εἶναι πολίτης τῆς τοῦ Διὸς πόλεως ἣ συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν. Epict. Diss. iii. 5, 26; Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 4.

M. Aurel. iii. 11: ἄνθρωπον πολίτην ὄντα πόλεως τῆς ἀνωτάτης ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις ὥσπερ οἰκίαι εἰσίν.

Sen. De Ot. 4; Ep. 68, 2. See p. 325, 1. Vit. B. 20, 3 and 5: Unum me donavit omnibus [natura rerum] et uni mihi omnis ... patriam meam esse mundum sciam et præsides Deos. Tranq. An. 4, 4: Ideo magno animo nos non unius urbis mœnibus clusimus, sed in totius orbis commercium emisimus patriamque nobis mundum professi sumus, ut liceret latiorem virtuti campum dare. Epict. Diss. iii. 22, 83. Ibid. i. 9: If the doctrine that man is related to God is true, man is neither an Athenian nor a Corinthian, but simply κόσμιος and υἱὸς Θεοῦ. Muson. l.c.: Banishment is no evil, since κοινὴ πατρὶς ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων ὁ κόσμος ἐστίν. It is, says Cic. Parad. 2, no evil for those qui omnem orbem terrarum unam urbem esse ducunt.

Plut. Alex. M. Virt. i. 6, p. 329: καὶ μὴν ἡ πολὺ θαυμαζομένη πολιτεία τοῦ τὴν Στωϊκῶν αἵρεσιν καταβαλλομένου Ζήνωνος εἰς ἓν τοῦτο συντείνει κεφάλαιον, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ πόλεις μηδὲ κατὰ δήμους οἰκῶμεν, ἰδίοις ἕκαστοι διωρισμένοι δικαίοις, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα δημότας καὶ πολίτας, εἷς δὲ βίος ἦ καὶ κόσμος, ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου νόμῳ κοίνῳ τρεφομένης.

In Epictet. Man. c. 53: more fully, Ibid. Diss. iv. 1, 131; 4, 34; and translated by Sen. Ep. 107, 11. See p. 182, 1. The verses are:

ἄγου δέ μ’ ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ σύγ’ ἡ Πεπρωμένη ὅποι ποθ’ ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένος· ὡς ἑψομαί γ’ ἄκονος· ἢν δὲ μὴ θέλω κακὸς γενόμενος οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι.

Sen. Prov. 5, 4 and 8: Boni viri laborant, impendunt, impenduntur, et volentes quidem, non trahuntur a fortuna, etc.... Quid est boni viri? Præbere se fato. Vit. Be. 15, 5: Deum sequere.... Quæ autem dementia est, potius trahi quam sequi?... Quicquid ex universi constitutione patiendum est, magno excipiatur animo. Ad hoc sacramentum adacti sumus, ferre mortalia.... In regno nati sumus: Deo parere libertas est. Ep. 97, 2: Non pareo Deo, sed adsentior. Ex animo illum, non quia necesse est, sequor, etc. Ep. 74, 20; 76, 23; 107, 9. Epictet. Diss. ii. 16, 42: τόλμησον ἀναβλέψας πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι χρῶ μοι λοιπὸν εἰς ὃ ἂν θέλῃς· ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, σός εἰμι. οὐδὲν παραιτοῦμαι τῶν σοι δοκούντων· ὅπου θέλεις, ἄγε. i. 12, 7: The virtuous man submits his will to that of God, as a good citizen obeys the law. iv. 7. 20: κρεῖττον γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι ὃ ὁ θεὸς ἐθέλει, ἢ [ὃ] ἐγώ. iv. 1, 131, in reference to the verses of Cleanthes: αὕτη ἡ ὁδὸς ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίαν ἄγει, αὕτη μόνη ἀπαλλαγὴ δουλείας. Man. 8: θέλε γίνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα ὡς γίνεται καὶ εὐροήσεις. Similarly Fragm. 134, in Stob. Floril. 108, 60. M. Aurel. x. 28: μόνῳ τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ δέδοται τὸ ἑκουσίως ἕπεσθαι τοῖς γινομένοις· τὸ δὲ ἕπεσθαι ψιλὸν πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον. Ibid. viii. 45; x. 14.

Sen. Ep. 120, 11, investigates the question, How does mankind arrive at the conception of virtue? and replies, By the sight of virtuous men. Ostendit illam nobis ordo ejus et decor et constantia et omnium inter se actionum concordia et magnitudo super omnia efferens sese. Hinc intellecta est illa beata vita, secundo defluens cursu, arbitrii sui tota. Quomodo ergo hoc ipsum nobis adparuit? Dicam: Nunquam vir ille perfectus adeptusque virtutem fortunæ maledixit. Nunquam accidentia tristis excepit. Civem esse se universi et militem credens labores velut imperatos subiit. Quicquid inciderat, non tanquam malum aspernatus est, et in se casu delatum, sed quasi delegatum sibi.... Necessario itaque magnus adparuit, qui nunquam malis ingemuit, nunquam de fato suo questus est: fecit multis intellectum sui et non aliter quam in tenebris lumen effulsit, advertitque in se omnium animos, cum esset placidus et lenis, humanis divinisque rebus pariter æquus, &c.

Conf. Baumhauer, Vet. Phil. præcipue Stoicorum Doct. de Mor. Volunt.: Ut. 1842, p. 220.

Diog. vii. 130: εὐλόγως τέ φασιν ἐξάγειν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ βίου τὸν σοφὸν (ἐξαγωγὴ is the standing expression with the Stoics for suicide. Full references for this and other expressions are given by Baumhauer, p. 243). καὶ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος καὶ ὑπὲρ φίλων κἂν ἐν σκληροτέρᾳ γένηται ἀλγηδόνι ἢ πηρώσεσιν ἢ νόσοις ἀνιάτοις. Stob. Ecl. ii. 226. Conf. the comœdian Sopater, in Athen. iv. 160, who makes a master threaten to sell his slave to Zeno ἐπ’ ἐξαγωγῇ.

Ep. 12, 10: Malum est in necessitate vivere. Sed in necessitate vivere necessitas nulla est. Quidni nulla sit? Patent undique ad libertatem viæ multæ, breves, faciles. Agamus Deo gratias, quod nemo in vita teneri potest. Calcare ipsas necessitates licet. Id. Prov. c. 5, 6, makes the deity say: Contemnite mortem quæ vos aut finit aut transfert.... Ante omnia cavi, ne quis vos teneret invitos. Patet exitus.... Nihil feci facilius, quam mori. Prono animam loco posui. Trahitur. Attendite modo et videbitis, quam brevis ad libertatem et quam expedita ducat via, &c. Conf. Ep. 70, 14: He who denies the right of committing suicide non videt se libertatis viam eludere. Nil melius æterna lex fecit, quam quod unum introitum nobis ad vitam dedit, exitus multos. Ep. 65, 22; 117, 21; 120, 14; M. Aurel. v. 29; viii. 47; x. 8 and 32; iii. 1; Epictet. Diss. i. 24, 20; iii. 24, 95.

De Prov. 2, 9; Ep. 71, 16.

In the passages already quoted, pp. 40, 2; 41, 1; 50, 2.

See Epictetus’s discussion of suicide committed simply in contempt of life (Diss. i. 9, 10), against which he brings to bear the rule (in Plato, Phæd. 61, E.) to resign oneself to the will of God. ii. 15, 4. Conf. M. Aurel. v. 10.

Muson. in Stob. Floril. 7, 24, says: ἅρπαζε τὸ καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν ὅτε ἔξεστι, μὴ μετὰ μικρὸν τὸ μὲν ἀποθνήσκειν σοι παρῇ, τὸ δὲ καλῶς μηκέτι ἐξῇ; and, again: He who by living is of use to many, ought not to choose to die, unless by death he can be of use to more.

M. Aurel. v. 29: Even here you may live as though you were free from the body: ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπωσι, τότε καὶ τοῦ ζῇν ἔξιθι· οὕτως μέντοι, ὡς μηδὲν κακὸν πάσχων.

Ep. 70. See p. 338, 3. Clem. Strom. iv. 485, A, likewise calls the restriction of rational action sufficiently decisive reason: αὐτίκα εὔλογον ἐξαγωγὴν τῷ σπουδαίῳ συγχωροῦσι καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι (i.e. the Stoics), εἴ τις τοῦ πράσσειν αὐτὸν οὕτως τηρήσειεν [l. οὕτω στερήσειεν], ὡς μηκέτι ἀπολελεῖφθαι αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἐλπίδα τῆς πράξεως.

Ep. 58, 33; 98, 16; 17, 9; De Ira, iii. 15, 3.

See Ep. 58, 36, and 70, 11.

See p. 335, 2.

Olympiod. in Phædr. 3 (Schol. in Arist. 7, b, 25). The favourite comparison of life to a banquet is here so carried out, that the five occasions for suicide are compared with five occasions for leaving a banquet.

Plut. C. Not. 11, 1: παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν, ἄνθρωπον ᾧ πάντα τἀγαθὰ πάρεστι καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδεῖ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ μακάριον, τούτῳ καθήκειν ἐξάγειν ἑαυτόν· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, ᾧ μηθὲν ἀγαθόν ἐστι μηδ’ ἔσται τὰ δὲ δεινὰ πάντα καὶ τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ κακὰ πάρεστι καὶ πάρεσται διὰ τέλους, τούτῳ μὴ καθήκειν ἀπολέγεσθαι τὸν βίον ἂν μή τι νὴ Δία τῶν ἀδιαφόρων αὐτῷ προσγένηται. Ibid. 22, 7; 33, 3; Sto. Rep. 14, 3; Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b; 158, b.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 18, 5: ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὅλως, φασὶν, οἴεται δεῖν Χρύσιππος οὔτε μονὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, οὔτ’ ἐξαγωγὴν τοῖς κακοῖς παραμετρεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μέσοις κατὰ φύσιν. διὸ καὶ τοῖς εὐδαιμονοῦσι γίνεται ποτὲ καθῆκον ἐξάγειν ἑαυτοὺς, καὶ μένειν αὖθις ἐν τῷ ζῇν τοῖς κακοδαιμονοῦσιν. Ibid. 14, 3. Sen. Ep. 70, 5: Simul atque occurrunt molesta et tranquillitatem turbantia, emittet se. Nec hoc tantum in necessitate ultima facit, sed cum primum illi cœpit suspecta esse fortuna, diligenter circumspicit, numquid illo die desinendum sit. Nihil existimat sua referre, faciat finem an accipiat, tardius fiat an citius. Non tanquam de magno detrimento timet: nemo multum ex stillicidio potest perdere. Conf. 77, 6.

Cic. Fin. iii. 18, 60: Sed cum ab his [the media] omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur, ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes; in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. In quo enim plura sunt, quæ secundum naturam sunt, hujus officium est in vita manere: in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, hujus officium est e vita excedere. E quo apparet, et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser.... Et quoniam excedens e vita et manens æque miser est [stultus], nec diuturnitas magis ei vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur, iis qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint esse in vita manendum. Stob. 226: The good may have reasons for leaving life, the bad for continuing in life, even though they never should become wise: οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν κατέχειν ἐν τῷ ζῇν, οὔτε τὴν κακίαν ἐκβάλλειν· τοῖς δὲ καθήκουσι καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον μετρεῖσθαι τήν τε ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον.

Ep. 70, 11.

Teles. in Stob. Floril. 5, 67, p. 127 Mein.

The well-known hymn to Zeus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 30, and the verses quoted p. 333, 1. Nor is the poetic form used by Cleanthes without importance. He asserted, at least according to Philodem. De Mus. Vol. Herc. i. col. 28: ἀμείνονά γε εἶναι τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ μουσικὰ παραδείγματα καὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἱκανῶς μὲν ἐξαγγέλλειν δυναμένου τὰ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα, μὴ ἔχοντος δὲ ψιλοῦ τῶν θείων μεγεθῶν λέξεις οἰκείας. τὰ μέτρα καὶ τὰ μέλη καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς ὡς μάλιστα προσικνεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς τῶν θείων θεωρίας.

Compare the celebrated dictum of the Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 28, 71: Cultus autem Deorum est optimus idemque castissimus plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura integra incorrupta et mente et voce veneremur; and more particularly Epict. Man. 31, 1: τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβείας ἴσθι ὅτι τὸ κυριώτατον ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ὀρθὰς ὑπολήψεις περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ... καὶ σαυτὸν εἰς τοῦτο κατατεταχέναι, τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ εἴκειν ἐν πᾶσι γινομένοις, κ.τ.λ. Id. Diss. ii. 18, 19. Further particulars on p. 345, 2.

M. Aurel. ix. 40: We ought not to pray the Gods to give us something, or to protect us from something, but only to pray: διδόναι αὐτοὺς τὸ μήτε φοβεῖσθαί τι τούτων μήτε ἐπιθυμεῖν τινος τούτων. Diog. vii. 124: We ought, in fact, only to pray for what is good.

See p. 144, 2. Sext. Math. ix. 28, says that Rome of the younger Stoics (perhaps Posidonius, whose views on the primitive condition have been already mentioned, p. 293, 1) traced the belief in Gods back to the golden age.

In this spirit, Epict. Diss. ii. 20, 32, blames those who throw doubts on the popular Gods, not considering that by so doing they deprive many of the preservatives from evil, the very same argumentum ab utili which is now frequently urged against free criticism.

Characteristic are the utterances of the sceptic pontifex Cotta, in Cic. N. D. i. 22, 61; iii. 2.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 6, 1; Diog. vii. 33. See p. 322, 5.

Ep. 41, 1: Non sunt ad cœlum elevandæ manus nec exorandus ædituus, ut nos ad aures simulacri, quasi magis exaudiri possimus, admittat: prope est a te Deus, tecum est, intus est. Nat. Qu. ii. 35, 1: What is the meaning of expiations, if fate is unchangeable? They are only ægræ mentis solatia. See p. 343, 2.

Benef. iv. 19, 1: Deos nemo sanus timet. Furor est enim metuere salutaria nee quisquam amat quos timet. Not only do the Gods not wish to do harm, but such is their nature that they cannot do harm. De Ira, ii. 27, 1; Benef. vii. 1, 7; Ep. 95, 49. It hardly needs remark, how greatly these statements are at variance with the Roman religion, in which fear holds such a prominent place.

Ep. 95, 47: Quomodo sint Di colendi, solet præcipi: accendere aliquem lucernas sabbatis prohibeamus, quoniam nec lumine Di egent et ne homines quidem delectantur fuligine. Vetemus salutationibus matutinis fungi et foribus adsidere templorum: humana ambitio istis officiis capitur: Deum colit, qui novit. Vetemus lintea et strigiles ferre et speculum tenere Junoni: non quærit ministros Deus. Quidni? Ipse humano generi ministrat, ubique et omnibus præsto est.... Primus est Deorum cultus Deos credere. Deinde reddere illis majestatem suam, reddere bonitatem, &c. Vis Deos propitiare? Bonus esto. Satis illos coluit, quisquis imitatus est. Fr. 123 (in Lactant. Inst. vi. 25, 3): Vultisne vos Deum cogitare magnum et placidum ... non immolationibus et sanguine multo colendum—quæ enim ex trucidatione immerentium voluptas est?—sed mente pura, bono honestoque proposito. Non templa illi congestis in altitudinem saxis extruenda sunt: in suo cuique consecrandus est pectore. Conf. Benef. vii. 7, 3: The only worthy temple of God is the universe.

In Fr. 120 (in Lact. ii. 2, 14), Seneca shows how absurd it is to pray and kneel before images, the makers of which are thought little of in their own profession. On this point he expressed his opinion with great severity in the treatise, De Superstitione, fragments of which Augustin. Civ. D. vi. 10, communicates (Fr. 31 Haase). The immortal Gods, he there says, are transformed into lifeless elements. They are clothed in the shape of men and beasts, and other most extraordinary appearances; and are honoured as Gods, though, were they alive, they would be designated monsters. The manner, too, in which these Gods are honoured is most foolish and absurd; such as by mortification and mutilation, stupid and immoral plays, &c. The wise man can only take part in such acts tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam Diis grata. This view of worship had been previously set forth by Heraclitus, who otherwise was so much admired by the Stoics.

Fr. 119 (in Lact. i. 16, 10): Quid ergo est, quare apud poetas salacissimus Jupiter desierit liberos tollere? Utrum sexagenarius factus est, et illi lex Papia fibulam imposuit? An impetravit jus trium liberorum? An ... timet, ne quis sibi faciat, quod ipse Saturno? Similarly Fr. 39 (in Augustin. l.c.); Brevit. Vit. 16, 5; Vit. Be. 26, 6, the ineptiæ poetarum which, as in the stories of Jupiter’s many adulteries, give free rein to sins.

Augustin. l.c. Fr. 33: Quid ergo tandem? Veriora tibi videntur T. Tatii aut Romuli aut Tulli Hostilii somnia? Cloacinam Tatius dedicavit Deam, Picum Tiberinumque Romulus, Hostilius Pavorem atque Pallorem, teterrimos hominum adfectus.... Hæc numina potius credes et cœlo recipies? Fr. 39: Omnem istam ignobilem Deorum turbam, quam longo ævo longa superstitio congessit, sic adorabimus ut meminerimus cultum ejus magis ad morem quam ad rem pertinere.

N. D. ii. 24, 63: Alia quoque ex ratione et quidem physica fluxit multitudo Deorum; qui induti specie humana fabulas poetis suppeditaverunt hominum autem vitam superstitione omni referserunt. Atque hic locus a Zenone tractatus post a Cleanthe et Chrysippo pluribus verbis explicatus est ... physica ratio non inelegans inclusa est in impias fabulas. Still stronger language is used by the Stoic, c. 28, 70, respecting the commentitii et ficti Dei, the superstitiones pæne aniles, the futilitas summaque levitas of their anthropomorphic legends.

Phædrus (Philodemus), col. 2 of his fragment, according to Petersen’s restoration. Conf. Cic. N. D. ii. 17, 45; Diog. vii. 147; both of whom assert that the Stoics do not think of the Gods as human in form; and Lactant. De Ir. D. c. 18: Stoici negant habere ullam formam Deum.

The Epicurean in Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36.

Cic. l.c. 37. Conf. Krische, Forschung. i. 406 and 415.

Clem., indeed, says (Strom. vii. 720, D): οὐδὲ αἰσθησέων αὐτῷ [τῷ θεῷ] δεῖ, καθάπερ ἤρεσε τοῖς Στωῑκοῖς, μάλιστα ἀκοῆς καὶ ὄψεως· μὴ γὰρ δύνασθαί ποτε ἑτέρως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. But, according to all accounts, this must be a misapprehension. Clement confounds what Stoic writers have conditionally asserted, for the purpose of disproving it, with their real opinion. Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 139.

Plut. Plac. i. 6, 16, in a description of the Stoic theology, evidently borrowed from a good source: The Gods have been represented as being like men: διότι τῶν μὲν ἁπάντων τὸ θεῖον κυριώτατον, τῶν δὲ ζῴων ἄνθρωπος κάλλιστον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἀρετῇ διαφόρως κατὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ σύστασιν, (τὸ κράτιστον—probably these words should be struck out), τοῖς οὖν ἀριστεύουσι τὸ κράτιστον ὁμοίως καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν διενοήθησαν.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 38, 5; C. Not. 31, 5; Def. Orac. 19, p. 420.

The numina, quæ singula adoramus et colimus, which are dependent on the Deus omnium Deorum, and whom ministros regni sui genuit. Sen. Fr. 26, 16 (in Lact. Inst. i. 5, 26).

Diog. vii. 147.

See p. 206, 1.

Plut. De Fac. Lun. 6, 3.

Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36.

See p. 131.

Cic. N. D. i. 15, 39; ii. 26; Diog. vii. 147.

Plut. De Is. c. 66; Cic. l.c. ii. 23, 60; i. 15, 38, where this view is attributed, in particular, to Zeno’s pupil Persæus. Krische (Forschung. i. 442) reminds, with justice, of the assertion of Prodicus, that the ancients deified everything which was of use to man.

Phædr. (Philodemus), Nat. De. col. 3, and Cic. N. D. i. 15, 38, attribute this assertion specially to Persæus and Chrysippus. Id. ii. 24, 64, after speaking of the deification of Hercules, Bacchus, Romulus, &c., continues: Quorum cum remanerent animi atque æternitate fruerentur, Dii rite sunt habiti, cum et optimi essent et æterni. Diog. vii. 151. See p. 351, 1.

This is done in Plut. Plac. i. 6, 9. Belief in the Gods, it is there said, is held in three forms—the physical, the mythical, and the form established by law (theologia civilis). All the gods belong to seven classes, εἴδη: (1) τὸ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων καὶ μετεώρων: the observation of the stars, and their regularity of movement, the changes of season, &c., has conducted many to faith; and, accordingly, heaven and earth, sun and moon, have been honoured. (2 and 3) τὸ βλάπτον καὶ ὠφελοῦν: beneficent Beings are Zeus, Here, Hermes, Demeter: baleful Beings are the Erinnyes, Ares, &c. (4 and 5) πράγματα, such as Ἐλπὶς, Δίκη, Εὐνομία; and πάθη, such as Ἔρως, Ἀφροδίτη, Πόθος. (6) τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πεπλασμένον (τὸ μυθικὸν), such as the Gods invented by Hesiod for the purpose of his genealogies—Coios, Hyperion, &c. (7) Men who are honoured for their services to mankind—Hercules, the Dioscuri, Dionysus. This list includes not only things which deserve divine honours, but all things to which they have been actually given: hence it includes, besides the purely mythical Gods, things which the Stoics can never have regarded as Gods, such as the baleful Gods and emotions, on which see p. 345, 1; 346, 2. On the other hand, they could raise no objection to the worship of personified virtues. In the above list the elementary Gods, such as Here, are grouped, together with the Gods of fruits, under the category of useful. Another grouping was that followed by Dionysius (whether the well-known pupil of Zeno—see p. 44, 1—or some later Stoic, is unknown), who, according to Tertullian (Ad Nat. ii. 2, conf. c. 14), divided Gods into three classes: the visible—the sun and moon, for instance; the invisible, or powers of nature, such as Neptune (that is, natural forces as they make themselves felt in the elements and in planets); and those facti, or deified men.

Plut. Com. Not. 31, 5: ἀλλὰ Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης, ἐμπεπληκότες, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν θάλατταν, οὐδένα τῶν τοσούτων ἄφθαρτον οὐδ’ ἀΐδιον ἀπολελοίπασι πλὴν μόνου τοῦ Διὸς, εἰς ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς ἄλλους.

Conf. Wachsmuth, Die Ansichten der Stoiker über Mantik und Dämonen (Berl. 1860), pp. 29–39.

Tim. 90, A.

Posid. in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. v. 6, p. 469: τὸ δὴ τῶν παθῶν αἴτιον, τουτέστι τῆς τε ἀνομολογίας καὶ τοῦ κακοδαίμονος βίου, τὸ μὴ κατὰ πᾶν ἕπεσθαι τῷ ἐν αὑτῷ δαίμονι συγγενεῖ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικοῦντι, τῷ δὲ χείρονι καὶ ζῳώδει ποτὲ συνεκκλίνοντας φέρεσθαι. Sen. Ep. 41, 2, according to the quotation, p. 344, 4: Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos. Hic prout a nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat. Ep. 31, 11: Quid aliud voces hunc [animus rectus, bonus, magnus] quam Deum in corpore humano hospitantem? Just as Kant calls the moral idea, a primary notion which mankind has embraced, the moral tone a good spirit governing us. Epict. Diss. i. 14, 12: ἐπίτροπον [ὁ Ζεὺς] ἑκάστῳ παρέστησε τὸν ἑκάστου δαίμονα, καὶ παρέδωκε φυλάσσειν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτον ἀκοίμητον καὶ ἀπαραλόγιστον. He who retires within himself is not alone, ἀλλ’ ὁ θεὸς ἔνδον ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ὑμέτερος δαίμων ἐστί. To him each one has taken an oath of allegiance, as a soldier has to his sovereign, but ἐκεῖ μὲν ὀμνύουσιν, αὐτοῦ μὴ προτιμήσειν ἕτερον· ἐνταῦθα δ’ αὑτοὺς ἁπάντων; so that the demon is lost in the αὐτὸς within. M. Aurel. v. 27: ὁ δαίμων, ὃν ἑκάστῳ προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ. οὗτος δέ ἐστιν ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος. See ii. 13 and 17; iii. 3; Schl. 5, 6, 7, 12, 16; v. 10; viii. 45.

See the passage quoted from Diog. vii. 88, on p. 227, 3. (Diogenes had only just before named Chrysippus περὶ τέλους, as source), which receives its explanation (if it needs one) from the above words of Posidonius.

In this sense, the words of Sen. Ep. 110, 1, must be understood: Sepone in præsentia quæ quibusdam placent, unicuique nostrum pædagogum dari Deum, non quidem ordinarium, sed hunc inferioris notæ ... ita tamen hoc seponas volo, ut memineris, majores nostros, qui crediderunt, Stoicos fuisse: singulis enim et Genium et Junonem dederunt, i.e., the old Romans, not the Stoics.

Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 86. Amongst other things, quoted p. 146, 1, it is there said: If living beings exist on the earth and in the sea, there must be νοερὰ ζῷα in the air, which is so much purer; and these are the demons.

Diog. vii. 151: φασὶ δ’ εἶναι καί τινας δαίμονας ἀνθρώπων συμπάθειαν ἔχοντας, ἐπόπτας τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων· καὶ ἥρωας τὰς ὑπολελειμμένας τῶν σπουδαίων ψυχάς. Plut. De Is. 25, p. 360: Plato, Pythagoras, Xenocrates, and Chrysippus hold, with the old theologians (amongst whom Wachsmuth, p. 32, 40, rightly thinks of the Orphics), that the demons are stronger than men, from which the language used of them by Chrysippus does not follow. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: The Stoics believe demons to be mortal. Plac. i. 8, 2: Θαλῆς, Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, δαίμονας ὑπάρχειν οὐσίας ψυχικάς. A special treatise περὶ ἡρώων καὶ δαιμόνων proceeded from the pen of Posidonius, probably, as was his wont, containing more learned than dogmatic statements, an extract from which is given by Macrob. Sat. i. 23, containing the etymology of δαίμων.

Plut. Quæst. Rom. 51, p. 277: καθάπερ οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον οἴονται φιλόσοφοι φαῦλα δαιμόνια περινοστεῖν, οἷς οἱ θεοὶ δημίοις χρῶνται καλασταῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀνοσίους καὶ ἀδίκους ἀνθρώπους. Id. Def. Orac. 17, p. 419: φαύλους ... δαίμονας οὐκ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μόνον ... ἀπέλιπεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Χρύσιππος—a statement which, particularly as it is extended to Plato, would prove little. The baleful Gods of mythology (p. 350, 2) were explained as being evil demons by those who did not deny their existence altogether. Those demons, however, which purify the soul in another world (Sallust. De Mund. c. 19, p. 266, and whom Villoisin on Cornutus, p. 553, reminds of), are not borrowed from Stoicism, but from Plato (Rep. x. 615, E) and the Neoplatonists.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 37, 2. See p. 191, 2.

Tertull. Test. An. 3, after speaking of demons, adds: Aliqui Chrysippi sectator illudit ea.

The Stoics are not the first who resorted to allegorical explanations of myths. Just as, before philosophy had broken away from mythology, a Pherecydes, an Empedocles, the Pythagoreans had, whether consciously or unconsciously, veiled their thoughts in the language of legend, and even subsequently Plato had used a veil of poetry; so, now that the breach between the two was open, many attempts were made to conceal its breadth, and individual beliefs were represented as the real meaning of popular beliefs, it being always supposed that the original framers had an eye to this meaning. Thus a twofold method of treating the myths resulted—that by natural explanation, and that by allegorical interpretation. The former method referred them to facts of history, the latter to general truths, whether moral or scientific. Both methods agreed in looking for a hidden meaning besides the literal one. This method of treating myths had been already met with among the older teachers, such as Democritus, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, and other followers of Anaxagoras (according to Hesych. even Agamemnon was explained to be the ether). It appears to have been a favourite one in the time of the Sophists (Plato, Theæt. 153, C; Rep. ii. 378, D; Phædr. 229, C; Crat. 407, A, to 530, C; Gorg. 493, A; Xen. Sym. 3, 6), as appears from Euripides and Herodotus. It follows naturally from the view of Prodicus on the origin of belief in the Gods. Plato disapproved of it. Aristotle occasionally appealed to it to note glimmers of truth in popular notions without attributing to it any higher value. The founder of Cynicism and his followers pursued it zealously. From the Cynics the Stoics appear to have taken it. They carried it much further than any of their predecessors, and they, too, exercised a greater influence on posterity than the Cynics.

Cic. N. D. 24, 63; iii. 24, 63, see p. 346, 3.

The definition of allegory: ὁ γὰρ ἄλλα μὲν ἀγορεύων τρόπος, ἕτερα δὲ ὧν λέγει σημαίνων, ἐπωνύμως ἀλληγορία καλεῖται (Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 5, p. 6). Accordingly, it includes every kind of symbolical expression. In earlier times, according to Plut. Aud. Po. c. 4, p. 19, it was termed ὑπόνοια, which term is found in Plato, Rep. ii. 378, D, conf. Io. 530, D; Xen. Symp. 3, 6.

In this way Zeno treated all the poems of Homer and Hesiod (Dio Chrysost. Or. 53, p. 275; Diog. vii. 4; Krische, Forsch. 393), and so did Cleanthes (Diog. vii. 175; Phædr. [Philodem.] De Nat. De. col. 3; Plut. Aud. Po. 11, p. 31; De Fluv. 5, 3, p. 1003; Krische, 433) and Persæus. Chrysippus explained the stories in Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus, and Musæus (Phæd. col. 3; Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iii. 8, vol. v. 349, Krische, 391 and 479), and was followed by Diogenes (Phæd. col. 5; Cic. N. D. i. 15, 41). Compare also Plut. Def. Orac. 12, p. 415, and respecting the theological literature of the Stoics Villoisin on Cornutus, p. xxxix. Among the Romans, the same method was followed by Varro (Preller, Röm. Myth. 29), and from his writings Heraclitus (living under Augustus) derived the material for his Homeric Allegories (edited by Mehler), and Cornutus for his work on the nature of the Gods edited by Osann from Villoisin’s papers.

Cic. N. D. iii. 24, 63.

Corn. c. 17, p. 80: δεῖ δὲ μὴ συγχεῖν τοὺς μύθους, μήδ’ ἐξ ἑτέρου τὰ ὀνόματα ἐφ’ ἕτερον μεταφέρειν, μηδ’ εἴ τι προσεπλάσθη ταῖς κατ’ αὐτοὺς παραδιδομέναις γενεαλογίαις ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ συνέντων ἃ αἰνίττονται κεχρημένων δ’ αὐτοῖς ὡς τοῖς πλάσμασιν, ἀλόγως τίθεσθαι.

Proofs may be found in abundance in Heraclitus and Cornutus. Conf. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 1: The ancients did not believe that Jupiter hurled his thunderbolts broadcast; sed eundem, quem nos Jovem intelligunt, rectorem custodemque universi, animum ac spiritum mundi, &c.

Dio Chrysost. Or. 53, p. 276, R. speaking of Zeno’s commentaries on Homer, says: ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ Ὁμήρου λέγει, ἀλλὰ διηγούμενος καὶ διδάσκων, ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφεν.... ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος Ἀντισθένειός ἐστι πρότερον ... ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἐξειργάσατο αὐτὸν οὐδὲ κατὰ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἐδήλωσεν.

Special references are hardly necessary after those already quoted, p. 148, 1; 153, 2; 164, 2: 165, 5. Conf. the hymn of Cleanthes; Chrysippus, in Stob. Ecl. i. 48; Arat. Phæn. Begin.; Plut. Aud. Poët. c. 11, p. 31; Varro, in August. Civ. D. vii. 5; 6; 9; 28; Servius, in Georg. i. 5; Heraclit. c. 15, p. 31; c. 23, 49; c. 24, 50; Corn. pp. 7; 26; 35; 38, where Ζεὺς is derived from ζῇν or ζέειν and Διὸς from διὰ, ὅτι δι’ αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα; conf. Villoisin and Osann on the passage of Cornutus, who give further authorities in their notes on the respective passages. The same on Cornutus, p. 6, discuss the derivation of θεὸς from θέειν or τιθέναι; of αἰθὴρ from αἴθειν or ἀεὶ θέειν. A portion of these etymologies is well known to be Platonic.

Πολυώνυμος, as he is called by Cleanthes, v. 1. Conf. Diog. 147; Corn. c. 9 and 26. The further expansion of this idea may be found in the Neoplatonic doctrine.

See Diog. l.c.; Cic. N. D. ii. 26, 66; Phæd. (Philodem.), Fragm. col. 2–5; Heracl. c. 25, p. 53. On Here, consult Heracl. c. 15 and 41, p. 85; Corn. c. 3; on Hephæstus, Heracl. c. 26, 55; 43, 91; Corn. c. 19, p. 98; Plut. De Is. c. 66, p. 377 (Diog. l.c. perhaps confounds as Krische, p. 399, supposes, common fire with πῦρ τεχνικὸν, but it is also possible that the artificial God of mythology may have been explained now one way now another in the Stoic School, which is not always uniform in its interpretations); on Poseidon, Heracl. c. 7, 15; c. 18, 77; c. 46, 117; Corn. c. 12; Plut. De Is. c. 40, Schl. p. 367; on Hades, whom Cicero l.c. makes the representative of terrena vis; Heracl. c. 23, p. 50; c. 41, 87; Corn. 5; on Demeter and Hestia, Corn. c. 28, p. 156; Plut. l.c.; on Athene, Heracl. c. 19, 39; c. 28, 59; c. 61, 123; Corn. c. 20, 103. It is only by a forced interpretation of a passage in Homer, that (Heraclit. 25, 53) Athene is made to be earth. That even Zeno treated individual Gods in this way, as parts of one general divine power or Zeus, is rendered probable by Krische, Forsch. 399, by a comparison of Phædr. col. 5, with the passages quoted from Cicero and Diogenes.

Sen. Benef. iv. 8, 1: Hunc [Jovem] et Liberum patrem et Herculem et Mercurium nostri putant. Liberum patrem, quia omnium parens sit.... Herculem, quia vis ejus invicta sit, quandoque lassata fuerit operibus editis, in ignem recessura. Mercurium, quia ratio penes illum est numerusque et ordo et scientia. The solution of Helios into Zeus (Macrob. Sat. i. 23) appears also to be of Stoic origin.

Heracl. c. 25, 52. Conf. Il. i. 395.

Heracl. c. 40, 83; Il. xv. 18.

Ibid. c. 37, 73; Il. viii. 18.

Heracl. c. 26, 54, who applies the same method of interpretation to the legend of Prometheus (otherwise interpreted by Corn. c. 18, 96), Corn. c. 19, 98. On the lameness of Hephæstus, Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 3, p. 922.

According to Eustath. in Il. p. 93, 46, probably following a Stoic interpretation, Here is the spouse of Zeus, because the air is surrounded by the ether; but does not agree with him, because the two elements are opposed to each other.

Heracl. c. 39, 78 (conf. Plut. Aud. Po. p. 19), where this explanation is given very fully. The occurrence on Mount Ida is said to represent the passage of winter into spring. Here’s tresses are the foliage of trees, &c.

See Diog. vii. 187; Proœm. 5; Orig. con. Cels. iv. 48; Theophil. ad Autol. iii. 8, p. 122, C; Clement. Homil. v. 18.

c. 64. Proteus, according to this explanation, denotes unformed matter; the forms which he assumes denote the four elements

See the description. Alleg. Hom. 43–51, p. 90, of which the above is a meagre abstract.

According to Heraclit. 53, 112.

We learn from Ps. Plut. De Fluv. 5, 3, p. 1003, that Cleanthes wrote a θεομαχία, a small fragment of which, containing a portion or the Prometheus legend in a later and evidently apologetically moulded form, is there preserved. The theomachy described by Cleanthes (the Stoic Cleanthes seems to be meant) is, however, not the Homeric theomachy, but the struggle of the Gods with the Giants and Titans, described in the book περὶ γιγάντων (Diog. vii. 175). Perhaps on this occasion he may have discussed the other. At any rate the moral interpretation given by Heraclitus to Homer’s θεομαχία is quite in the style of the interpretation of the legend of Hercules, and was probably borrowed from Cleanthes.

Further particulars on Hermes, Alleg. Hom. c. 72, 141.

Alleg. Hom. c. 54.

Conf. Heracl. c. 6, p. 11; Corn. 32, p. 191; 34, 206; Cic. N. D. ii. 27, 68; Phædr. (Philodem.) Nat. De. col. 5 and 2. In Phædrus, too, col. 2 (τοὺς δὲ τὸν Ἀπόλλω), if ἥλιον seems too wild, perhaps φῶς should be substituted for τούς, for Apollo cannot well symbolise the earth.

Plut. Fac. Lun. 5, 2, p. 922. The Stoics address the moon as Artemis and Athene.

See p. 147, 1.

The name Apollo is explained by Cleanthes, in Macrob. Sat. i. 17, ὡς ἀπ’ ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων τόπων τὰς ἀνατολὰς ποιουμένου; by Chrysippus, as derived from α privative and πολὺς, ὡς οὐχὶ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ φαύλων αὐσιῶν τοῦ πυρὸς ὄντα. The latter explanation is quoted by Plotin. v. 5, 6, p. 525, as Pythagorean, and Chrysippus may have taken it from Pythagoras, or the later Pythagoreans from Chrysippus. Cicero, in imitation, makes his Stoic derive sol from solus. The epithet of Apollo, Loxias, is referred by Cleanthes to the ἕλικες λοξαὶ of the sun’s course, or the ἀκτῖνες λοξαὶ of the sun; and by Œnopides, to the λοξὸς κύκλος (the ecliptic). The epithet Λύκιος is explained by Cleanthes, quod veluti lupi pecora rapiunt, ita ipse quoque humorem eripit radiis; Antipater, ἀπὸ τοῦ λευκαίνεσθαι πάντα φωτίζοντος ἡλίου. In the same author Macrobius found the derivation of πύθιος from πύθειν (because the sun’s heat produces decay). Other explanations of these as well as of other epithets of Apollo, of the name of Artemis and her epithets, of the attributes and symbols of these Gods, are to be found in abundance in Cornutus, c. 32, 34, and in Macrobius, l.c., who probably got most of them from Stoic sources.

The first of these stories is explained by Macrob. Sat. i. 17, down to the most minute details, in the sense of the cosmical views already given, p. 162, 2, and likewise the story of the slaying of the Pytho, the dragon being taken to represent the heavy vapours of the marshy earth, which were overcome by the sun’s heat (the arrows of Apollo). This interpretation being expressly attributed to Antipater by Macrobius, it appears probable that the first one came from the same source. Another likewise quoted by him, according to which the dragon represents the sun’s course, is perhaps also Stoical.

Cornutus, c. 2, p. 10, points to this in explaining Leto as Ληθὼ, and referring it to night, because everything is forgotten in sleep at night.

c. 8, especially p. 16, 22, 28. Ibid. c. 12, p. 24, 28, the clang of Apollo’s arrows is explained to be the harmony of the spheres.

c. 15, p. 31.

Ibid. c. 19, 72, p. 39, 141.

See Corn. c. 20, 105, and Villoisin’s notes on the passage. The most varied derivations of Athene are given: from ἀθρεῖν by Heracl. c. 19, 40; Tzetz. in Hesiod. Ἐρ. καὶ Ἡμε. 70; Etymol. Mag. Ἀθηνᾶ—from θῆλυς or θηλάζειν (Ἀθήνη = ἀθήλη or ἀθηλᾶ = ἡ μὴ θηλάζουσα), by Phædr. Nat. D. col. 6; Athenag. Leg. pro Christ. c. 17, p. 78—from θείνω, because virtue never allows itself to be beaten—from αἰθὴρ + ναίω, so that Ἀθηναία = Αἰθεροναῖα.

This explanation had been already given by Diogenes, according to Phædr. col. 6. Cornutus also mentions it (20, 108), but he prefers the derivation from τρεῖν.

c. 33, p. 69.

It is to be found in Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iii. 8, pp. 349–353, but, according to Phædr. (Philodem.) l.c., conf. Cic. N. D. I. 15, 41, was already put forward by Diogenes. For himself, he prefers the other explanation, according to which Athene comes forth from the head of Jupiter, because the air which she represents occupies the highest place in the universe. Cornut. c. 20, 103, leaves us to choose between this explanation and the assumption that the ancients regarded the head as the seat of the ἡγεμονικόν. Heracl. c. 19, 40, states the latter, Eustath. in Il. 93, 40, the former, as the reason.

p. 349, 4, Corn. 30, p. 172.

See p. 359, 1, Plut. De Is. c. 40, Schl. p. 367: Demeter and Core are τὸ διὰ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν κάρπων διῆκον πνεῦμα. Phædr. col. 2: τὴν Δήμητρα γῆν ἢ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ γόνευμα [γόνιμον πνεῦμα]. On Demeter as γῆ μήτηρ or Δηὼ μήτηρ, see Corn. c. 28, p. 156, and Villoisin on the passage.

Plut. l.c.: Dionysus is τὸ γόνιμον πνεῦμα καὶ τρόφιμον.

Macrob. Sat. i. 18: Cleanthes derived the name Dionysus from διανύσαι, because the sun daily completes his course round the world. It is well known that, before and after his time, the identification of Apollo with Dionysus was common, and it is elaborately proved by Macrobius. Servius, too, on Georg. i. 5, says that the Stoics believed the sun, Apollo, and Bacchus—and likewise the moon, Diana, Ceres, Juno, and Proserpine—to be identical. Other etymologies of Διόνυσος are given by Corn. c. 30, 173.

Corn. 30, discusses the point at large, referring both the story and the attributes of Dionysus to wine. He, and also Heracl. c. 35, p. 71, refer the story of Dionysus and Lycurgus to the vintage.

Corn. c. 28, p. 163, who also refers the legend and worship of Demeter, in all particulars, to agriculture; and the rape of Persephone, to the sowing of fruits. Conf. Cic. N. D. ii. 26, 66. According to Plut. De Is. 66, p. 377, Cleanthes had already called Περσεφόνη, τὸ διὰ τῶν καρπῶν φερόμενον καὶ φονευόμενον πνεῦμα. A somewhat different explanation of the rape of Persephone is given in a passage of Mai’s Mythograph, vii. 4, p. 216, quoted by Osann. on Cornutus, p. 343.

The legend of Triptolemus is explained by Cornutus, l.c. p. 161, as referring to the discovery of agriculture by Triptolemus.

Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 180; Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 7 (Theodoret. Cur. Gr. Aff. vi. 14, p. 87), see p. 171, 1. Conf. Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 5; Corn. c. 13, p. 38; and Plato, Rep. x. 617, C.

According to Sen. Benef. i. 3, 8; 4, 4, he had filled a whole book, probably of a treatise not otherwise mentioned on kind deeds, with these ineptiæ—ita ut de ratione dandi accipiendi reddendique beneficii pauca admodum dicat, nee his fabulas, sed hæc fabulis inserit. A portion of these was made use of by Hecato in his work on this subject.

Chrysippus, in Phædr. (Philodemus), col. 4. Further particulars in Sen. l.c., and Corn. 15, 55. Somewhat similar is the explanation of Λιταί (Corn. 12, 37; Heracl. 37, 75), which at best are only casual personifications.

Corn. 14, 43, who, at the same time, mentions their names and number; Philodem. De Mus. Vol. Herc. i. col. 15; Erato indicates the importance of music for ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή. Ibid. 10, 33, on the Erinnyes; 29, 171, on the Horoi.

Heracl. 31, 63; Plut. Am. 13, 15, p. 757.

Heracl. 28, 60; 30, 62, and above, p. 360.

Ibid. 69, 136. In this sense, Aphrodite might be identified with Zeus, which was really done by Phædr. Nat. De. col. 1: ἀνάλογον εὐν ... θαι [Petersen suggests εὐνομεῖσθαι, but probably it should be ὀνομάζεσθαι] τὸν Δία καὶ τὴν κοινὴν πάντων φύσιν καὶ εἱμαρμένην καὶ ἀνάγκην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ Εὐνομίαν καὶ Δίκην καὶ Ὁμόνοιαν καὶ Εἰρήνην καὶ Ἀφροδίτην καὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πᾶν.

The story of Ares, νείατον ἐς κενεῶνα, means, according to Heracl. 31, 64, that Diomedes, ἐπὶ τὰ κενὰ τῆς τῶν ἀντεπάλων τάξεως παρεισελθὼν, defeated the enemy; that of Aphrodite (ἀφροσύνη, ibid. 30, 62), that, by his experience in war, he overcame the inexperienced troops of barbarians.

In Plut. Aud. Po. c. 4, p. 19, the connection of Ares and Aphrodite is explained as meaning a conjunction of the two planets. Heracl. 69, 136, gives the alternative of referring this connection to the union of φιλία and νεῖκος, which produces harmony, or to the fact that brass (Ares) is moulded in the fire (Hephæstus) into objects of beauty (Aphrodite). The latter interpretation is given by Corn. 19, 102, who also explains the relation of Ares to Aphrodite to mean the union of strength and beauty.

Corn. 27, 148; Plut. Krat. 408, C.

His lewdness was said to indicate the fulness of the σπερματικοὶ λόγοι in nature; his sojourn in the wilderness, the solitariness of the world.

Corn. 17, 91. Conf. Osann ad locum, who points out similar interpretations, probably of Stoic origin, in the Scholia to the theogony, and also in Etymol. M.

Besides the etymologies of οὐρανὸς in Corn. c. 1, and the observation of Plut. Pl. i. 6, 9, that heaven is the father of all things, because of its fertilising rains, and earth the mother, because she brings forth everything, the words in Cic. N. D. ii. 24, 63, on which Krische, Forsch. 397, comments, deserve notice. It is there said, probably after Zeno: Uranos is the Ether, and was deprived of his vitality, because he did not need it for the work of begetting things. Cronos is Time (the same is said by Heraclit. c. 41, 86, who sees in Rhea the ever flowing motions), and consumes his children, just as Time does portions of time. Cronos was bound by Zeus, the unmeasured course of time having been bound by the courses of the stars. A second explanation is given by Corn. 7, 21, after making (c. 3, 10) vain attempts at etymological interpretations of Cronos and Rhea. Cronos (from κραίνειν) stands for the order of nature, putting an end to the all too-violent atmospheric currents on earth, by diminishing the vapour-masses (compare the quotation from Chrysippus on p. 161, 2), and he is bound by Zeus, to represent that change in nature is limited. Macrob. Sat. i. 8 (who betrays that he is following a Stoic example by quoting Chrysippus’s definition of time: certa dimensio quæ ex cœli conversione colligitur, conf. p. 197, 2), gives another explanation: Before the separation of elements, time was not; after the seeds of all things had flowed from heaven down to the earth in sufficient quantity, and the elements had come into being, the process came to an end, and the different sexes were left to propagate animal life.

See p. 292, 4, and Sen. Benef. i. 13, 3.

C. 31, 187.

Plut. De Is. 44, Schl. p. 367: He is τὸ πληκτικὸν καὶ διαιρετικὸν πνεῦμα. Sen. Benef. iv. 8, 1. See above, p. 359, 2, and what Villoisin quotes on Cornutus, p. 366. from Schol. Apollon. Among the natural philosophers, i.e. the Stoics, Hercules symbolises strength and intelligence.

Pers. Sat. v. 63.

Heraclit. c. 33, p. 67, who, in the introduction, expressly refers to δοκιμώτατοι Στωϊκῶν.

C. 70–75.

C. 70–73, p. 137.

Conf. the way in which Heraclitus, 74, 146, expresses himself as to Plato’s and Epicurus’s attacks upon Homer.

Conf. Wachsmuth’s treatise mentioned above, p. 351, 2.

Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6. He there mentions two books of Chrysippus on divination, which are also referred to (as Wachsmuth, p. 12, shows) by Diog. vii. 149; Varro (in Lactant. Inst. i. 6, 9); Phot. Amphiloch. Quæst. (Montfaucon, Bibl. Coisl. p. 347); Philodemus, περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, Vol. Herc. vi. 49, col. 7, 33; and from which Cicero has borrowed Divin. i. 38, 82; ii. 17, 41; 49, 101; 15, 35; 63, 130; and perhaps De Fato, 7. Chrysippus also wrote a book, περὶ χρησμῶν (Cic. Divin. i. 19, 37; ii. 56, 115; 65, 134; Suid. νεοττός); and one περὶ ὀνείρων (Cic. Divin. i. 20, 39; ii. 70, 144; 61, 126; 63, 130; i. 27, 66: Suid. τιμωροῦντος). In the former, he collected oracular responses; in the latter, prophetic dreams.

Diog. vii. 178, mentions a treatise of Sphærus περὶ μαντικῆς. Cic. (Divin. i. 3, 6; i. 38, 83; ii. 17, 41; 43, 90; 49, 101) mentions a treatise having the same title as that of Diogenes of Seleucia, and two books of Antipater περὶ μαντικῆς, in which many interpretations of dreams were given. The same writer (Divin. i. 3, 6; 20, 39; 38, 83; 54, 123; ii. 70, 144; 15, 35; 49, 101) mentions a treatise of Posidonius περὶ μαντικῆς in five books, Diog. vii. 149; Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6; 30, 64; 55, 125; 57, 130; ii. 15, 35; 21, 47; De Fato, 3; Boëth. De Diis et Præsens (in Orelli’s Cicero, v. 1) p. 395.

Boëthus, in his commentary on Aratus, attempted to determine and explain the indications of a storm. Cic. Divin. i. 8, 14; ii. 21, 47. On Panætius’s objections to μαντικὴ a word will be presently said.

Cic. Divin. i. 52, 118: Non placet Stoicis, singulis jecorum fissis aut avium cautibus interesse Deum; neque enim decorum est, nec Diis dignum, nec fieri ullo pacto potest. Ibid. 58, 132: Nunc illa testabor, non me sortilegos, neque eos, qui quæstus causa hariolentur, ne psychomantia quidem ... agnoscere. Similarly in Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 2 (see p. 374, 3), the difference between the Stoic view and the ordinary one is stated to be this, that, according to the Stoics, auguries non quia significatura sunt fiant, but quia facta sunt significent. In c. 42, it is said to be an absurd belief that Jupiter should hurl bolts which as often hit the innocent as the guilty, an opinion invented ad coercendos animos imperitorum.

Conf. Diogenian, in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5: τὸ χρειῶδες αὐτῆς (divination) καὶ βιωφελὲς, δι’ ὃ καὶ μάλιστα Χρύσιππος δοκεῖ ὑμνεῖν τὴν μαντικήν; and M. Aurel. ix. 27; God shows his care for the wicked by means of prophecies and by dreams.

Cic. N. D. ii. 5, 13, where among the four reasons from which Cleanthes deduced belief in Gods, the first is præsensio rerum futurarum, extraordinary natural phenomena—pestilence, earthquakes, monsters, meteors, &c., being the third. Ibid. 65, 105: The Stoic says of divination: Mihi videtur vel maxime confirmare, Deorum providentia consuli rebus humanis, Sext. Math. ix. 132: If there were no Gods, all the varieties of divination would be unmeaning; these are nevertheless universally admitted. Cic. Divin. i. 6, and the quotations on p. 175, 3, 4.

Cic. Divin. i. 5, 9: Ego enim sic existimo: si sint ea genera divinandi vera, de quibus accepimus quæque colimus, esse Deos, vicissimque si Dii sint, esse qui divinent. Arcem tu quidem Stoicorum, inquam, Quinte, defendis. Ibid. 38, 82: Stoic proof of divination: Si sunt Dii neque ante declarant hominibus quæ futura sunt, aut non diligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant, aut existimant nihil interesse hominum, scire quid futurum sit, aut non censent esse suæ majestatis præsignificare hominibus quæ sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi quidem Dii præsignificare possunt. At neque non diligunt nos, &c. Non igitur sunt Dii nee significant futura (οὐκ ἄρα εἰσὶ μὲν θεοὶ οὐ προσημαίνουσι δὲ—the well-known expression of Chrysippus for εἰ θεοί εἰσιν, οὐ προσημαίνουσι, conf. p. 114, 1); sunt autem Dii: significant ergo: et non, si significant, nullas vias dant nobis ad significationis scientiam, frustra enim significarent: nec, si dant vias, non est divinatio. Est igitur divinatio. This proof, says Cicero, was used by Chrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater. It may be easily recognised as belonging to Chrysippus. Cic. ii. 17, 41; 49, 101, again reverts to the same proof. Conf. id. i. 46, 104: Id ipsum est Deos non putare, quæ ab iis significantur, contemnere. Diog. vii. 149: καὶ μὴν καὶ μαντικὴν ὑφεστάναι πᾶσάν φασιν, εἰ καὶ πρόνοιαν εἶναι. Some read ᾗ καὶ πρόνοιαν εἶναι, in which case the argument would be reversed, not from providence to divination, but from divination to providence.

Cic. Div. i. 55, 125: Primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a Deo ... deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis divinandi ratioque repetenda.

Cic. l.c. 55, 126.

Ibid. 57, 129.

See p. 370, 3; 371, 1.

Cic. Divin. i. 27, 56 (Suid. τιμωροῦντος), ii. 65, 135 (Suid. νεοττός), ii. 70, 144, quoting from Chrysippus; i. 54, 123, quoting from Antipater; i. 30, 64, De Fat. 3, 5, from Posidonius—gives instances of stories to which the Stoics attached great value, whilst their opponents either pronounced the stories to be false, or the prophecies to be deceptive, or their fulfilment to be accidental (Cic. Divin. i. 19, 37; ii. 11, 27; 56, 115; De Fato, 3, 5).

Aristotle, in a somewhat different sense, had explained the marvellous by a reference to natural causes, even allowing the existence of presentiments within certain limits.

Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6, after the passage quoted: Sed a Stoicis vel princeps ejus disciplinæ Posidonii doctor discipulus Antipatri degeneravit Panætius, nec tamen ausus est negate vim esse divinandi, sed dubitare se dixit. Ibid. i. 7, 12; ii. 42, 88; Acad. ii. 33, 107; Diog. vii. 149; Epiphan. Adv. Hær. Cicero appears to have borrowed from Panætius, as Wachsmuth rightly observes, this denial of Astrology (Divin. ii. 42–46), and he allows, c. 42, 88; 47, 97, that Panætius was the only Stoic who rejected it.

Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 3: Nimis illum otiosum et pusillæ rei ministrum facis, si aliis somnia aliis exta, disponit. Ista nihilominus divina ope geruntur. Sed non a Deo pennæ avium reguntur nec pecudum viscera sub securi formantur. Alia ratione fatorum series explicatur ... quicquid fit alicujus rei futuræ signum est ... cujus rei ordo est etiam prædictio est, &c. Cic. Divin. i. 52, 118, after the passage quoted, p. 371, 3: Sed ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum, ut certis rebus certa signa præcurrerent, alia in extis, alia in avibus, &c. Posidonius, ibid. 55, 125 (see p. 373, 2). Nor was the meaning otherwise, when portents (according to Cic. Divin. ii. 15, 33; 69, 142) were based on a συμπάθεια τῆς φύσεως (on which see p. 183, 2), an opponent not without reason doubting whether it existed, for instance, between a rent in the liver of a victim and an advantageous business, or between an egg in a dream and treasure trove.

As in the passage quoted from Boëthus on p. 371, 2.

Conf. p. 374, 2; 379, 1, and Cic. Div. ii. 43, 90, according to whom Diogenes of Seleucia conceded so much to astrology as to allow that, from the condition of the stars at birth, it might be known quali quisque natura et ad quam quisque maxime rem aptus futurus sit. More he would not allow, because twins often differ widely in their course of life and destiny.

Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 5.

Cic. l.c. ii. 15, 35: Chrysippus, Antipater, and Posidonius assert: Ad hostiam deligendam ducem esse vim quandam sentientem atque divinam, quæ tota confusa mundo sit, as was explained i. 52, 118.

Cic. ii. 15, 35: Illud vero multum etiam melius, quod ... dicitur ab illis (conf. i. 52, 118): cum immolare quispiam velit, tum fieri extorum mutationem, ut aut absit aliquid, aut supersit: Deorum enim numini parere omnia. See p. 374, 3.

Cic. i. 53, 120, defends auguries somewhat similarly by arguing: If an animal can move its limbs at pleasure, must not God have greater power over His? (his body according to them being the whole world).

See p. 181.

Cic. Divin. ii. 8, 20; Diogenian, in Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5; Alex. Aph. De Fat. 31, p. 96.

Upon the use of divination depends the whole argument for its reality, based on the divine kindness. Cic. i. 38, 83, and above, p. 372, 1.

Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37, 2; 38, 2: Effugiet pericula si expiaverit prædictas divinitus minas. At hoc quoque in fato est, ut expiet, &c. This answer probably came from Chrysippus, who, as it appears from Cic. Divin. ii. 63, 130, and Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, Vol. Herc. vi. col. 7, 33, defended the use of expiation. In the above-quoted and more general form it is found in Alexander and Eusebius, probably also taken from Chrysippus, see p. 181.

According to the definition in Sext. Math. ix. 132, which Cic. Divin. ii. 63, 130, attributes to Chrysippus, it is an ἐπιστήμη (Cic. more accurately: a vis = δύναμις, since besides scientific there is also natural divination), θεωρητικὴ καὶ ἐξηγητικὴ τῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀνθρώποις διδομένων σημείων. Stob. Ecl. ii. 122 and 238; Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5.

Plut. Vit. Hom. 212, p. 1238: [τῆς μαντικῆς] τὸ μὲν τεχνικόν φασιν εἶναι οἱ Στωϊκοί. οἷον ἱεροσκοπίαν καὶ οἰωνοὺς καὶ τὸ περὶ φήμας καὶ κληδόνας καὶ σύμβολα, ἅπερ συλλήβδην τεχνικὰ προσηγόρευσαν· τὸ δὲ ἄτεχνον καὶ ἀδίδακτον, τουτέστιν ἐνύπνια καὶ ἐνθουσιασμούς. To the same effect, Cic. Divin. i. 18, 34; ii. 11, 26.

Conf. the fragment quoted in ‘Aristotle and the Peripatetics,’ p. 300, which throws light on old and well-known views in the spirit of the Platonic Aristotelian philosophy, without, however, defending them.

Cic. Divin. i. 30, 64; ii. 10, 26: The naturale genus divinandi is, quod animos arriperet aut exciperet extrinsecus a divinitate, unde omnes animos haustos aut acceptos aut libatos haberemus. Plut. Plac. v. 1; where, however, the words κατὰ θειότητα τῆς ψυχῆς are only a gloss on the preceding words κατὰ τὸ ἔνθεον, κ.τ.λ. Galen. Hist. Phil. p. 320.

Cic. Divin. i. 50, 115, and Plut. Compare the many Stoic stories of dreams and presentiments in Cic. i. 27, 56; 30, 64; ii. 65, 134; 70, 144.

See besides the passages just quoted, Cic. Divin. i. 49, 110; 50, 113; 51, 115; and in particular i. 57, 129. Hence the prophecies of the dying (ibid. 30, 63, according to Posidonius; conf. Arist. l.c.), and the statement (ibid. 53, 121; see p. 380, 1) that true dreams come of innocent sleep.

Conf. the quotations on p. 375, 4, from Cic. Divin. ii. 10, 26; 15, 35; and his remarks on the instinct us afflatusque divinus. Cic. i. 18, 34.

According to Cic. Divin. i. 30, 64, Posidonius thought prophetic dreams were realised in one of three ways: uno, quod prævideat animus ipse per sese, quippe qui Deorum cognitione teneatur; altero, quod plenus aër sit immortalium animorum, in quibus tanquam insignitæ notæ veritatis appareant; tertio, quod ipsi Dii cum dormientibus colloquantur. Of these three modes, not the first only, but also the second, corresponds with the Stoic hypotheses. Indeed, in Stob. Ecl. ii. 122, 238, μαντικὴ is defined = ἐπιστήμη θεωρητικὴ σημείων τῶν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων πρὸς ἀνθρώπινον βίον συντεινόντων. Posidonius can only have spoken of Gods in condescension to popular views; as a Stoic, he would only know of that connection with the soul of the universe which is referred to in the first mode.

Amongst such external helps, the Stoic in Cic. Divin. i. 50, 114; 36, 79, enumerates the impression derived from music, natural scenery, mountains, woods, rivers, seas and vapours arising from the earth. But it is difficult to understand how, on Stoic principles, he can have attached value to oracles (ibid. 18, 34) by lot, or justified them otherwise than in the way mentioned on p. 375, 4.

Cic. i. 18, 34; 33, 72.

Ibid. i. 56, 127.

Cicero, ii. 11, 26, enumerates the above-named varieties, after having previously (i. 33) treated them separately. Similarly, Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 212. See above, p. 377, 2, Stob. Ecl. ii. 238, mentions tentatively, as varieties of μαντικὴ τό τε ὀνειροκριτικὸν, καὶ τὸ οἰωνοσκοπικὸν, καὶ θυτικόν. Sext. Math. ix. 132, says: If there were no Gods, there would be neither μαντικὴ nor θεοληπτικὴ, ἀστρομαντικὴ nor λογικὴ πρόῤῥησις δι’ ὀνείρων. Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 3, gives a theory of dreams; but in how far it represents the views of the Stoics, it is impossible to say. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 39, i. 41, clearly distinguishes the discussion of natural omens from the doctrines of philosophy.

Cic. i. 55, 124; 56, 128.

Ibid. i. 56, 127.

Cic. i. 53, 121: Ut igitur qui se tradet quieti præparato animo cum bonis cogitationibus tunc rebus (for instance, nourishment; conf. c. 29, 60; 51, 115) ad tranquillitatem accommodatis, certa et vera cernit in somnis; sic castus animus purusque vigilantis et ad astrorum et ad avium reliquorumque signorum et ad extorum veritatem est paratior.

See p. 46.

See p. 139.

See p. 132.

Whether Diogenes, in connecting the Stoics with the Cynics, was following a Stoic authority or not (vii.), is a moot point; nevertheless, the view comes to us from a time in which the relations of the two must have been well known, and the quotation from Posidonius on p. 274, 2, quite accords herewith. Not to mention others, Diog. vi. 14, speaking of Antisthenes, says: δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀνδρωδεστάτης Στωϊκῆς κατάρξαι ... οὗτος ἡγήσατο καὶ τῆς Διογένους ἀπαθείας καὶ τῆς Κράτητος ἐγκρατείας καὶ τῆς Ζήνωνος καρτερίας, αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενος τῇ πόλει τὰ θεμέλια: and Juvenal, xiii. 121, calls the Stoic dogmas a Cynicis tunica (the common dress in distinction to the tribon) distantia.

Krische, Forschungen, i. 363, and above, p. 145, 2.

On Aristo see p. 59; 260; 281.

Aristo cannot, therefore, be considered (as he is by Krische, Forsch. 411) the best representative of the original Stoic theory. On the contrary, he only represents a reaction of the Cynic element in Stoicism against the other component parts of this philosophy.

See p. 290.

Apart from the testimony of Numenius (in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 10), to which no great value can be attached, the acquaintance of Zeno with Heraclitus is established by the fact that not only the ethics, but also the natural science of the Stoic School owes its origin to him. See pp. 40, 3; 62, 2, 3; 126, 2; 141, 2; 144, 4; 145, 1, 2; 146, 4; 148, 2; 151, 1. Diog. mentions treatises of Cleanthes, vii. 174; ix. 15, of Aristo, ix. 5, of Sphærus (vii. 178; ix. 15) treating of Heraclitus; and Phædrus (Philodem.), Fragm. col. 4, says that Chrysippus explained the old myths after the manner of Heraclitus.

Instances have often occurred. See p. 144, 4; 145, 1, 2; 232, 4. Conf. Sen. Ep. 83, 9.

Besides meteorological and other points of natural science, which the Stoics may have borrowed from Heraclitus, Heraclitus’ attitude towards the popular faith also belongs here.

See p. 101, 2.

See p. 100, 4, 5; 101, 2; 140, 1.

As an illustration of the difference, take Heraclitus’ statement of the daily extinction of the sun, which every one must admit would not have been possible in the Stoic School.

πνεῦμα as with the Stoics.

See particularly Antiochus and also Cicero in many passages. See above, p. 39, 2.

See p. 46, 1, 2.

The story in Diog. vii. 3 bears out this view, that Zeno was first won for philosophy by Xenophon’s Memorabilia, and that on asking who was the representative of this line of thought, he was referred to Crates. According to the quotations on pp. 274, 2; 387, 1, the Cynics were regarded in the Stoic School as genuine followers of Socrates.

Consult, on this subject, the valuable treatise of Steinhart, in Ersch and Gruber’s Encyclopædia, sect. i. vol. 35, pp. 459–477.

Diog. x. i. He is frequently mentioned as an Athenian, belonging to the δῆμος Gargettos. Diog. l.c.; Lucret. Nat. Rer. vi. 1; Cic. Ad Fam. xv. 16; Ælian, V. H. iv. 13.

Diog. i.; Strabo, xiv. 1, 18, p. 638. According to these authorities, and Cic. N. D. i. 26, 72, his father had gone thither as a κληροῦχος. That this happened before his birth has been demonstrated by Steinhart, p. 461.

Apollodorus (in Diog. x. 14) mentions 7 Gamelion, Ol. 109, 3, as the birthday of Epicurus. It was observed (Epicurus’ will, Diog. 18) τῇ προτέρᾳ δεκάτῃ τοῦ Γαμηλιῶνος. Gamelion being the seventh month of the Attic year, the time of his birth must have been either early in 341 B.C., or the last days of 342 B.C.

His father, according to Strabo, was a schoolmaster, and Epicurus had assisted him in teaching (Hermippus and Timon, in Diog. 2; Athen. xiii. 588, a). His mother is said to have earned money by repeating charms (καθαρμοί), and Epicurus to have assisted in this occupation (Diog. 4). Although the latter statement evidently comes from some hostile authority, it would seem that his circumstances in early life were not favourable to a thoroughly scientific education. His language in disparagement of culture would lead us to the same conclusion, even were the express testimony of Sext. Math. i. 1 wanting: ἐν πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀμαθὴς Ἐπίκουρος ἐλέγχεται, οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ὁμιλίαις (in common expressions, conf. the censure passed on him by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Aristophanes in Diog. 4, 13) καθαρεύων. Cic. Fin. i. 7, 26: Vellem equidem, aut ipse doctrinis fuisset instructor—est enim ... non satis politus in artibus, quas qui tenent eruditi appellantur—aut ne deterruisset alios a studiis. Athen. xiii. 588, a: ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας ἀμύητος ὤν.

According to his own statement (Diog. 2), he was not more than fourteen (Suid. Ἐπικ. has twelve) years of age when he began to philosophise, i.e. to think about philosophical subjects; probably about chaos, following the suggestion of Hesiod’s verses. He subsequently boasted that he had made himself what he was without a teacher, and refused to own his obligations to those shown to be his teachers. Cic. N. D. i. 26, 72; 33, 93; Sext. Math. i. 2, who mentions his disparagement of Nausiphanes; Diog. 8, 13; Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 18, 4; conf. Sen. Ep. 52, 3. It is, however, established that in his youth he enjoyed the instruction of Pamphilus and of that Nausiphanes, who is sometimes called a follower of Democritus, sometimes of Pyrrho (Cic.; Sext.; Diog. x. 8; 13; 14; ix. 64; 69; Proœm. 15; Suid. Ἐπικ.; Clem. Strom. i. 301, D). The names of two other supposed instructors are also mentioned, Nausicydes and Praxiphanes (Diog. Proœm. 15; x. 13), but they almost seem to be corruptions for Pamphilus and Nausiphanes.

According to Cic. l.c., he denied the fact. Others, however, asserted it, and, among them, Demetrius of Magnesia. Diog. 13.

Whither he came, in his eighteenth year, according to Heraclides Lembus, in Diog. 1. Conf. Strabo, l.c.: τραφῆναί φασιν ἐνθάδε (in Samos) καὶ ἐν Τέῳ καὶ ἐφηβεῦσαι Ἀθήνῃσι.

According to Hermippus (Diog. 2) Democritus first gave him the impulse to pursue philosophy; but this is only a conjecture. Besides Democritus, Aristippus is also mentioned as a philosopher whose doctrines he followed (Diog. 4). Epicurus is even said to have expressed a disparaging opinion of Democritus (Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93; Diog. 8). Nor is this denied by Diog. 9: but it probably refers to particular points only, or it may have reference to the attitude of later Epicureans, such as Colotes (Plut. Adv. Col. 3, 3, p. 1108). Plut. l.c., says, not only that Epicurus for a long time called himself a follower of Democritus, but he also quotes passages from Leonteus and Metrodorus, attesting Epicurus’ respect for Democritus. Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας, Vol. Herc. v. 2, col. 20, seems to refer to expressions of Epicurus which excuse certain mistakes of Democritus. Lucret. iii. 370, v. 620, also speaks of Democritus with great respect; and Philodem. De Mus. Vol. Herc. i. col. 36, calls him ἀνὴρ οὐ φυσιολογώτατος μόνον τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἱστορουμένων οὐδενὸς ἧττον πολυπράγμων.

Diog. 1, 15 mentions Colophon, Mytilene, and Lampsacus. Strabo, xiii. 1, 19, p. 589, also affirms that Epicurus resided for some time at Lampsacus, and there made the acquaintance of Idomeneus and Leonteus.

Diog. 2, on the authority of Heraclides and Sotion. According to him, Epicurus returned to Athens in the archonship of Anaxicrates, 307–6 B.C. In that case the numbers must be slightly reduced in the statement (Diog. 15) that he came to Mytilene when 32, and taught there and in Lampsacus for five years.

Not immediately, however, since Diog. 2 says, on the authority of Heraclides: μέχρι μέν τινος κατ’ ἐπιμιξίαν τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσοφεῖν, ἔπειτ’ ἰδίᾳ πως τὴν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ κληθεῖσαν αἵρεσιν συστήσασθαι.

On this celebrated garden, after which the Epicureans were called οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν κήπων, see Diog. 10, 17; Plin. H. N. xix. 4, 51; Cic. Fin. i. 20, 65; v. 1, 3; Ad Fam. xiii. 1; Sen. Ep. 21, 10; Steinhart, p. 462, 45; 463, 72. Epicurus had purchased it for 80 minæ.

This subject will be discussed at a later period.

Such as Themista or Themisto, the wife of Leonteus (Diog. 5; 25; 26; Clem. Strom. iv. 522, D).

Diog. 4; 6; 7; Cleomed. Meteor. p. 92, Balfor.; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 4, 8; 16, 1 and 6; Lat. Viv. 4, 2. The best-known among these ἑταῖραι is Leontion, who lived with Metrodorus, a pupil of Epicurus (Diog. 6; 23), and wrote with spirit against Theophrastus (Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93; Plut. Hist. Nat. Præf. 29). Conf. Diog. 5; Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας, Vol. Herc. v. 2, Fr. 9. Athen. xiii. 593, b, tells a fine story of self-sacrifice of her daughter Danaë.

Ol. 127, 2, in the archonship of Pytharatus, and in his seventy-second year. Diog. 15; Cic. De Fat. 9, 19.

Diog. 15; 22; Cic. Ad Fam. vii. 26; Fin. ii. 30, 96; Sen. Ep. 66, 47; 92, 25. That he put an end to his own life (Baumhauer, Vet. Philo. Doct. De Mort. Volunt. 322), Hermippus (Diog. 15) by no means implies.

According to Diog. Pro. 16, x. 26, he was, next to Chrysippus, the most voluminous writer of the ancient philosophers, his writings filling 300 rolls. The titles of his most esteemed works are given by Diog. 27. Conf. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii. 595, Harl.

Three epistles in Diog. 35; 84; 122; and the κύριαι δόξαι, an epitome of his ethics, mentioned by Cic. N. D. i. 30, 85, and 139. Of his 37 books περὶ φύσεως, fragments of books 2 and 11 have been edited (Vol. Hercul. ii.).

Fragments in Diog. 5; 7. Besides the testament and the letter to Idomeneus (Diog. 16–22), many individual expressions of Epicurus have been preserved by Seneca.

Aristophanes (in Diog. 13) calls his style ἰδιωτικωτάτη. Cleomed. Meteor. p. 91, complains of his awkward and barbarous expressions, instancing: σαρκὸς εὐσταθῆ καταστήματα· τὰ περὶ ταύτης πιστὰ ἐλπίσματα· λιπάσμα ὀφθαλμῶν· ἱερὰ ἀνακραυγάσματα· γαργαλισμοὺς σώματος. In this respect, Chrysippus may be compared with him. See above, p. 48, 1.

See Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii. 598, Harl. They were, no doubt, very numerous. Diog. x. 9, probably exaggerates their number in saying the friends of Epicurus would fill towns. Cic. Fin. i. 20, 65, speaks of magni greges amicorum. Plut. Lat. Viv. 3, 1, also mentions his friends in Asia and Egypt. In Greece, however, on his own testimony, and that of Metrodorus (Sen. Ep. 79, 15), they attracted little notice.

A native of Lampsacus (Strabo, xiii. 1, 19, p. 589), and, next to Epicurus, the most celebrated teacher of the School. Cicero, Fin. ii. 28, 92, calls him pæne alter Epicurus, and states (Fin. ii. 3, 7) that Epicurus gave him the name of a wise man (Diog. 18; Sen. Ep. 52, 3). Further particulars respecting him and his writings in Diog. x. 6; 18; 21–24; Philodem. De Vitiis, ix. (Vol. Herc. iii.), col. 12; 21; 27; Athen. vii. 279; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 7, 1; 12, 2; 16, 6 and 9; Adv. Col. 33, 2 and 6; Sen. Ep. 98, 9; 99, 25. Fragments of the letters are to be found in Plutarch, Seneca, and Philodemus. Whether the fragments of a treatise περὶ αἰσθητῶν in vol. vi. of Vol. Hercul. belong to him, is very uncertain. According to Diog. 23, he died seven years before Epicurus, in his fifty-third year, and must therefore have been born 330 or 329 B.C. For the education of his children probably by Leontion, whom Diog. 23 calls παλλακὴ, and Sen. Fr. 45 in Hieron. Adv. Jovin. i. 191 calls his wife, provision is made by Epicurus in his will (Diog. 19, 21).

Son of Athenodorus, likewise a native of Lampsacus (Diog. 24), a capital mathematician, according to Cic. Acad. ii. 33, 106; Fin. i. 6, 20. Diog. l.c. calls him ἐπιεικὴς καὶ φιλήκοος; Metrodorus, in Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας (Vol. Herc. v. a), col. 6, ἀποφθεγματίας. Sen. Ep. 6, 6, calls him, Metrodorus, and Hermarchus, viros magnos. Philodemus (vol. v. b), Fr. 49. praises his frankness towards his teacher. A son of his is also mentioned in Epicurus’ will (Diog. 19), whose mother would appear to have been a courtesan, according to Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 6.

This individual’s name, formerly written Hermachus, appears as Hermarchus in the modern editions of Diogenes, Cicero, and Seneca. The latter form is now established beyond doubt by the Herculanean fragments from Philodemus (περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, vol. vi. col. 13, 20; De Vitiis, ix. vol. iii. col. 25, 1), and the inscription on a monument to him (Antiquitat. Hercul. V. 17). His birthplace was Mytilene, Agemarchus being his father. (Diog. 17, 15, 24.) Diog. 24 gives a list of his books. Epicurus (Diog. 20) describes him as one of his oldest and most faithful friends, in the words: μετὰ τοῦ συγκαταγεγηρακότος ἡμῖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ. On his character, see Sen. Ep. 6, 6.

According to what is stated in the testament of Epicurus. Diog. 16.

Colotes, a native of Lampsacus. Diog. 25. Further particulars about him may be obtained from Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 5; 1, 1; N. P. Suav. Vivi, 1, 1; Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 2. Vol. Hercul. iv. Introd. in Polystr. p. iii.

In particular, Neocles, Chairedemus, and Aristobulus, the brothers of Epicurus (Diog. 3, 28; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 5, 3; where Ἀγαθόβουλος is evidently a copyist’s error; 16, 3; De Lat. Viv. 3, 2); Idomeneus, a native of Lampsacus (Diog. 25; 22; 23; 5; Plut. Adv. Col. 18, 3; Strabo, xiii. 1, 19, p. 589; Athen. vii. 279; Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας. Fr. 72, Vol. Herc. v. 2; Sen. Ep. 21, 3 and 7; 22, 5; Phot. Lex.; and Suid. Πύθια καὶ Δήλια), from whose historical writings many fragments are quoted by Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. ii. 489; Leonteus, likewise a native of Lampsacus (Diog. 5; 25; Plut. Adv. Col. 3, 3; Strabo, l.c.); Herodotus (Diog. 4 and 34); Pythocles (Diog. 5 and 83; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 12, 1; Adv. Col. 29, 2; Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας, Fr. 6); Apelles (Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 12, 1); Menœceus (Diog. 121); Nicanor (Diog. 20); Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, who afterwards fell out with Epicurus (Diog. 4 and 6; 23 and 28; Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93: Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9; Adv. Col. 32, 7; Comment. in Hesiod. Fr. 7, 1; Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας, Vol. Herc. v. a, col. 20). This Timocrates must not be confounded with the Athenian Timocrates, whom Epicurus appointed his heir, jointly with Amynomachus (Diog. 16; Cic. Fin. ii. 31, 101). The two last named were probably pupils of Epicurus. Other pupils were: Mithras, a Syrian, an official under Lysimachus (Diog. 4 and 28; Plut. Adv. Col. 33, 2; N. P. Suav. Viv. 15, 5); Mys, a slave of Epicurus, on whom he bestowed liberty (Diog. 21; 3; 10; Gell. ii. 18, 8; Macrob. Sat. i. 11; the ladies mentioned on p. 407, 2, 3; likewise Anaxarchus, to whom Epicurus addressed a letter, and Timarchus, to whom Metrodorus addressed one (Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 3); Hegesianax, who died early (Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 20, 5); the poet Menander, whose wondrous epigram on Epicurus is to be found in the anthology; and probably Dionysius ὁ μεταθέμενος. (See above, p. 44, 1.)

Diog. 16. In Cicero’s time, the plot of ground, together with the tenement standing thereupon, and at that time in ruins (parietinæ), was in the hands of C. Memmius, a distinguished Roman, to whom Cicero wrote (Ad Fam. xiii. 1), conf. Ad Att. v. 11, begging him to restore it to the School. Whether he was successful is not known from Sen. Ep. 21, 10.

Diog. 25. does not say that Polystratus was a personal disciple of Epicurus, but it seems probable. Fragments of a treatise of his περὶ ἀλόγου καταφρονήσεως in the fourth volume of Vol. Hercul.

According to Valer. Max. i. 8, ext. 17, both these individuals were born on the same day, and passed their whole lives together with a common purse. Lysias, according to the older text of Diog. x. 25, was a cotemporary, at whose house Hermarchus died, as Fabric. Bibl. Gr. iii. 606 believes, and who is styled in Athen. v. 215, b, tyrant of Tarsus, Cobet, however, reads παραλύσει instead of παρὰ Λυσίᾳ.

Diog. 25. The Dionysius referred to can hardly be Dionysius ὁ μεταθέμενος (see p. 44, 1), or Diogenes would have said so. Besides the chronology forbids such an assumption.

Strabo, xiv. 2, 20, p. 658. He is probably the Protarchus whose sayings are quoted by Simpl. Phys. 78, a; Themist. Phys. 27, a.

According to Strabo, l.c., Diog. 26, Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. iii. 137, Math. viii. 348, x. 219, Erotian, Lex. Hippocr. Κλαγγώδη, Demetrius was one of the most distinguished Epicureans. Whether a treatise on mathematics, illegible fragments of which are found in Herculaneum (Vol. Herc. iv. Introd. in Polystr. iii. 2), is his, or belongs to another Demetrius mentioned by Strabo, xii. 3, 16, page 548, it is impossible to say.

Both the Ptolemies of Alexandria (Diog. 25); Diogenes of Tarsus (Diog. vi. 81; x. 26; 97; 118; 136; 138); Orion (Diog. 26); Timagoras (Cic. Acad. ii. 25, 80); and also Metrodorus of Stratonice, who went over from Epicurus to Carneades (Diog. 9)—a very rare thing for an Epicurean to do—may be named among his pupils.

According to Athen. xii. 547, a, Ælian, V. H. ix. 12, two Epicureans, Alcius and Philiscus, were banished from Rome, in the consulate of L. Postumius (173 or 155 B.C.; see Clinton’s Fasti), because of their evil influence on youth. Although the story is obviously taken from a hostile authority and in Suid. (Ἐπίκουρος, vol. i. b, 419 Bern.), it is told with such exaggerations as to inspire grave mistrust, it can hardly be altogether without some foundation. Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 19, 4, says, that in some cities severe laws were passed against the Epicureans, and just at that time there was a strong feeling in Rome against innovations, witness the well-known enquiry into the Bacchanalia instituted 186 B.C.

According to Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 6, Amafinius seems to have come forward not long after the philosophic embassy of 156 B.C.; nor is this at variance with Lucr. v. 336, who claims primus cum primis to have set forth the Epicurean teaching in Latin. His works made a great impression at the time, according to Cic. l.c. (cujus libris editis commota multitudo contulit se ad eam potissimum disciplinam). According to Acad. i. 2, 5, he pursued natural science, carefully following the views of Epicurus. Cicero then complains of him and Rabirius, we know not which one is meant, nor whether he was an Epicurean, qui nulla arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis vulgari sermone disputant: nihil definiunt, nihil partiuntur, &c. Conf. Tusc. ii. 3, 7. Cassius, too (Cic. Ad Fam. xv. 12), calls him and Catius (see p. 414, 3) mali verborum interpretes.

Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 7: Post Amafinium autem multi ejusdem æmuli rationis multa cum scripsissent, Italiam totam occupaverunt, quodque maxumum argumentum est non dici illa subtiliter, quod et tam facile ediscantur et ab indoctis probentur, id illi firmamentum esse discipliæ putant. Conf. in Fin. i. 7, 25, the question: Cur tam multi sint Epicurei?

Surnamed ὁ κηποτύραννος, the writer of more than 400 books. Diog. 25; 2; 13; vii. 181.

Diog. vii. 35, x. 25, and Procl. in Euclid. 55, says that Zeno was a native of Sidon, and a pupil of Apollodorus; nor can these statements be referred to an older Zeno, as some previous writers maintained, believing Apollodorus to be called in error a pupil of Epicurus by Diog. x. 25, instead of to the one mentioned by Cicero. For no trace of such a one exists; and Diogenes vii. 35 would then have passed over the teacher of Cicero without notice, although the latter cannot possibly have been unknown to him. According to Cic. Acad. i. 12, 46, Zeno attended the lectures of Carneades and admired them; and since Carneades died not later than 129 B.C., Zeno cannot have been born much later than 150 B.C. If, therefore, Zeno was really the successor of Apollodorus, the latter must be placed entirely in the second century. But this fact is not sufficiently established. Cicero, in company with Atticus, attended his lectures (Cic. l.c.; Fin. i. 5, 16; Tusc. iii. 17, 38. In Cic. N. D. i. 21, 58, Cotta says the same of himself), on his first visit to Athens, 78 or 79 B.C.; conf. N. D. i. 34, 93; but this cannot possibly be the same Zeno or Xeno (as Krische, Forsch. 26, maintains) whom Cic. Ad Att. v. 10, 11; xvi. 3 mentions as living in 50 and 43 B.C. Cic. N. D. i. 21, calls him princeps Epicureorum (and Philo of Larissa, coryphæus Epicureorum); Tusc. l.c., acriculus senex, istorum (Epicureans) acutissimus. Diog. x. 25, calls him πολύγραφος ἀνήρ. From Procl. in Euclid. 55; 59; 60, we hear of a treatise of Zeno, in which he attacked the validity of mathematical proofs. Philodemus’ treatise περὶ παῤῥησίας (Vol. Herc. v. a) seems, from the title, to have been an abstract from Zeno. Cotemporary with Zeno was that Aristio, or Athenio, who played a part in Athens during the Mithridatic war, and is sometimes called a Peripatetic, and sometimes an Epicurean (Plut. Sulla, 12; 14; 23). See Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 759, 2. Perhaps to the time of his despotism the statement may be referred (Demetrius Magnes in Athen. xiii. 611, b) that the Stoic Theotimus, who wrote against Epicurus, was killed at the instance of Zeno.

Cicero (N. D. i. 33, 93; Fin. i. 5, 16; v. 1, 3; Legg. i. 20, 53) had also studied under him in Athens, and previously in Rome, where Phædrus must then have been residing (Ad Fam. xiii. 1). He was old when Cicero for the second time was brought into relations with him. According to Phlegon, in Phot. Bibl. Cod. 97, p. 84, a, 17, he was succeeded by Patro (Ol. 177, 3, or 70 B.C.) in the headship of the School, after holding it only for a very short time; but this is not a well-ascertained fact. Cicero l.c. praises the character of Phædrus. He calls him nobilis philosophus (Philip, v. 5, 13). It is supposed that Cicero’s description (N. D. i. 10, 25; 15, 41), and that the fragments first published by Drummond (Herculanensia: London, 1810), and then by Petersen (Phædri ... de Nat. De. Fragm.: Hamb. 1833), and illustrated by Krische (Forschungen), were from a treatise of Phædrus on the Gods, to which perhaps Cic. Ad Att. xiii. 39 refers. But Spengel (from the Herculanean rolls, Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας. Abh. d. Münch. Akad. Philos-philol. Kl. x. 1, 127) and Sauppe (De Philodemi libro ... de pietate. Gött. Lectionsverz. für Sommer, 1864) have shown that the Neapolitan (Vol. Herc. Coll. Alt. i. ii. 1862) editors are right in regarding these fragments as the remains of a treatise of Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας.

Philodemus (see Vol. Herc. i. 1; Gros, Philod. Rhet. cxii.; Preller, Allg. Encycl. Sect. III. Bd. xxiii. 345) was a native of Gadara. in Cœle-Syria (Strabo, xvi. 2, 29, p. 759). He lived at Rome in Cicero’s time, and is mentioned by Cicero as a learned and amiable man (Fin. ii. 35, 119; Or. in Pison. 28). Besides philosophic works, he also wrote poems (Cic. In Pis.; Hor. Sat. i. 2, 121). A number of the latter, in the shape of epigrams, are preserved. Of his philosophical works mentioned by Diog. x. 3; 24, no fewer than thirty-six books were discovered in Herculaneum, which have, for the most part, been published (Vol. Herc. iv. Introd. in Polystr. iii.) so far as they were legible. Spengel and Gros have separately edited Rhet. IV.; Sauppe, De Vitiis X.; and Petersen and Sauppe, the fragments περὶ εὐσεβείας.

Cic. Acad. ii. 33, 106; Fin. ii. 35, 110; Ad Fam. vi. 11. According to Virgil, Catal. 7, 9; 10, 1, Donat. Vita Virg. 79, Serv. Ad Ecl. vi. 13, Æn. vi. 264, he was the teacher of Virgil. The name is variously written as Syro, Siro, Sciro, Scyro. Somewhat earlier is the grammarian Pompilius Andronicus, from Syria, who, according to Sueton. Illust. Gram. c. 8, lived at Rome at the same time as Gnipho, the teacher of Cæsar (Ibid. c. 7), and gave up his profession for the Epicurean philosophy, and afterwards lived at Cumæ.

Cic. Ad Fam. xiii. 1; Ad Att. v. 11; vii. 2; Ad Quint. Fratr. i. 2, 4, where besides him an Epicurean Plato of Sardes is mentioned, and above, pp. 410, 1; 413, 1.

Besides Lucretius, the most important among them are T. Albutius, called by Cic. Brut. 35, 131, perfectus Epicureus (Cic. Brut. 26, 102; Tusc. v. 37, 108; N. D. i. 33, 93; Fin. i. 3, 8 [De Orat. iii. 43, 171]; In Pison. 38, 92; Offic. ii. 14, 50; Orator, 44, 149; In Cæcil. 19, 63; Provin. Cons. 7, 15; De Orat. ii. 70, 281), and Velleius, who, as Krische (Forsch. 20) proves, by a gloss on Nat. De. i. 29, 82 and Cic. De N. D. i. 28, 79 (conf. Divin. i. 36, 79), was a native of Lanuvium, and was considered the most distinguished Epicurean of his time (Cic. N. D. i. 6, 15; 21, 58; conf. De Orat. iii. 21, 78). Other Epicureans were: C. Catius, a native of Gaul, spoken of by Cicero (Ad Fam. xv. 16) as one long ago dead. By Quintilian, x. 1, 124, he is called levis quidem sed non injucundus tamen auctor; and the Comment. Cruqu. in Hor. Sat. ii. 4, 1, says that he wrote four books De Rerum Natura et De Summo Bono;—C. Cassius, the well-known leader of the conspiracy against Cæsar (Cic. Ad Fam. xv. 16, 19; Plut. Brut. 37); C. Vibius Pansa, who died as consul at Mutina in 43 B.C. (Cic. Ad Fam. vii. 12; xv. 19); Gallus (Ad Fam. vii. 26); L. Piso, the patron of Philodemus (Cic. in Pis. 28, see above, p. 413, 2; l.c. 9, 20; 16, 37; 18, 42; 25, 59; Post Red. 6, 14); Statilius (Plut. Brut. 12); a second Statilius appears to be meant (Cat. Min. 65); L. Manlius Torquatus, to whom Cic. Fin. i. 5, 13 delegates the representation of the Epicurean teaching. T. Pomponius Atticus, the well-known friend of Cicero, approached nearest to the Epicurean School, calling its adherents nostri familiares (Cic. Fin. v. 1, 3) and condiscipuli (Legg. i. 7, 21). He was a pupil of Zeno and Phædrus and a friend of Patro’s; but his relations to philosophy were too free to entitle him properly to be ranked in any one school (Cic. Fam. xiii. 1). The same observation applies also to his friend, L. Saufeius (Nepos, Att. 12; Cic. Ad Att. iv. 6). Still less can C. Sergius Orata (Cic. Fin. ii. 22, 70; Off. iii. 16, 67; De Orat. i. 39, 178), L. Thorius Balbus (Fin. l.c.), and Postumius (Ibid.) be called Epicureans. Nor can anything be stated with certainty respecting L. Papirius Pætus (Cic. Ad Fam. vii. 17 to 26), not even from the chief passage Ep. 25, or respecting C. Trebatius from Cic. Ad Fam. vii. 12. C. Memmius (from the way in which he is spoken of by Cic. Ad Fam. xiii. 1) cannot be regarded as a member of the Epicurean School, although Lucret. De Rer. Nat. i. 24; v. 9, expressed the hope of winning him.

Born, according to Hieron, (in Eus. Chron.), 95 B.C., he died in his 44th year, or 51 B.C. In Vita Virgilii, 659 ought therefore to be substituted for 699 A.U.C. It is clear, from Nepos, Att. 12, that he was dead before the assassination of Cæsar. Teuffel (in Pauly’s Realencycl. iv. 1195) justly disputes the statement of Hieronymus, that he committed suicide in a fit of madness.

According to Sext. Math. vii. 201, a cotemporary of Antiochus of Ascalon, whose language towards him is there quoted, and reckoned by Galen. Isag. c. 4, vol. xiv. 683 among the leaders of the logical School of Physicians. His medical treatises are often referred to by Galen. Plutarch in his Placita often names him.

Known for three things—his theory of atoms, his theory of the acquisition of knowledge, and his resolution of the soul into matter.

All bodies, he held, consist of atoms, which differ from the atoms of Democritus in that they owe their origin to the meeting and breaking up of greater masses, and are not in quality alike and unchangeable (ἀπαθεῖς). Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 32; Math. ix. 363; x. 318; viii. 220; iii. 5; Galen. l.c. 9, p. 698; Dionys.; Alex. (in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 23, 4); Cœl. Aurelian. De Pass. Acut. i. 14. See Fabric. on Pyrrh. iii. 32. The latter is probably in error in describing the primary atoms of Asclepiades as without quality, differing only in size, form, number, and arrangement. Although in this respect he resembled Heraclides, with whom he is generally classed, and applied, like him, the name ὄγκοι to atoms, still it is probable that his knowledge of Heraclides was traditionally derived from the Epicureans.

He also asserted, with Epicurus (Antiochus, in Sext. Math. vii. 201): τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἀντιλήψεις εἶναι, λόγῳ δὲ μηδὲν ὅλως ἡμᾶς καταλαμβάνειν. At the same time he maintained that our senses cannot distinguish the component parts of things, but even Epicurus and Democritus admitted as much in respect of atoms.

He differs entirely from Epicurus in denying the existence of a soul apart from body, and in referring every kind of notion, including the soul itself, to the action of the senses (Sext. Math. vii. 380; Plut. Plac. iv. 2, 6; Cœl. Aurelian. l.c. in Fabric. on the passage of Sext.; Tertullian, De An. 15). What is elsewhere stated of Asclepiades, leaving alone his medical views, for instance, that with Heraclitus he believed in a perpetual flux of things, is not at variance with Epicurean principles.

Quint Inst. vi. 3, 78, names L. Varus as an Epicurean, a friend of Augustus, perhaps the individual who according to Donat. V. Virg. 79, Serv. on Ecl. vi. 13. attended the lectures of Syro in company with Virgil. Horace, notwithstanding Ep. i. 4, 15, was no Epicurean, but only a man who gathered everywhere what he could make use of (Sat. i. 5, 101). In Caligula’s time, a senator Pompedius was an Epicurean (Joseph. Antiquit. ix. 1, 5); under Nero, Aufidius Bassus, a friend of Seneca (Sen. Ep. 30, 1 and 3 and 5; 14), the elder Celsus (Orig. c. Cels. i. 8), and Diodorus, who committed suicide (Sen. Vi. Be. 19, 1); under Vespasian or his sons, Pollius (Stat. Silv. ii. 2, 113). In the first half of the second century, Cleomedes, Met. p. 87, complained of the honours paid to Epicurus. In the second half of the same century lived Antonius, mentioned by Galen. De Prop. An. Affect. v. 1, and Zenobius, who, according to Simpl. Phys. 113, b, was an opponent of Alexander of Aphrodisias. In the first half of the third century lived Diogenes Laërtius, who, if not a perfect Epicurean himself, was at least a friend of the Epicureans. Amongst other Epicureans, the names of Athenæus (whose epigram on Epicurus is quoted by Diog. x. 12). Autodorus (Diog. v. 92), and Hermodorus (Lucian, Icaromen. 16) may be mentioned; but Diog. x. 11 does not justify us calling Diocles of Magnesia an Epicurean.

Diog. x. 9, in the first half of the third century, writes: ἥ τε διδαχὴ πασῶν σχεδὸν ἐκλιπουσῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἐσαεὶ διαμένουσα καὶ νηρίθμους ἀρχὰς ἀπολύουσα ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης τῶν γνωρίμων. The testimony of Lactantius, Inst. iii. 17, to the wide extension of Epicureanism is not so trustworthy, although he treats it as an existing fact. It may be that he is only following older writers, as Cicero does. See above, p. 412, 1.

Cic. Fin. ii. 7, 20: Quis enim vestrum non edidicit Epicuri κυρίας δόξας? Diog. 12 (according to Diocles). Epicurus often exhorted his scholars (Ibid. 83; 85; 35) to commit to memory what they had heard. His last exhortation to his friends was (Diog. 16): τῶν δογμάτων μεμνῆσθαι.

He speaks of himself and Metrodorus in Cic. Fin. ii. 3, 7, as wise men. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 18, 5, quotes, as coming from him: ὡς Κολώτης μὲν αὐτὸν φυσιολογοῦντα προσκυνήσειεν γονάτων ἁψάμενος· Νεοκλῆς δὲ ὁ ἀδελφὸς εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων ἀποφαίνοιτο μηδένα σοφώτερον Ἐπικούρου γεγονέναι μηδ’ εἶναι· ἡ δὲ μήτηρ ἀτόμους ἔσχεν ἐν αὑτῇ τοσαύτας, οἷαι συνελθοῦσαι σοφὸν ἂν ἐγέννησαν. Conf. Id. Frat. Am. 16, p. 487; Adv. Col. 17, 5; Cleomed. Meteor. p. 89. Not only was Epicurus’ birthday observed by the Epicurean School during his lifetime, but the 20th of every month was celebrated as a festival in honour of him and Metrodorus. In his testament Epicurus especially ordered this twofold observance for the future. Diog. 18; Cic. Fin. ii. 31, 101; Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 4, 8; Plin. H. N. xxxv. 5. Athen. vii. 298 d: Ἐπικούρειός τις εἰκαδιστῆς. Epicurus’ picture is constantly referred to (Cic. Fin. v. 1, 3; Plin. l.c.). The extravagant importance attached to Epicurus in his School is proved by the high eulogies in Lucret. i 62; iii. 1 and 1040; v. 1; vi. 1. Metrodorus, in Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 4, praises τὰ Ἐπικούρου ὡς ἀληθῶς θεόφαντα ὄργια.

Cic. Tusc. ii. 3, 8.

Sen. Ep. 33, 4, compares the scientific independence of the Stoics with the Epicurean’s dependence on the founder: Non sumus sub rege: sibi quisque se vindicat. Apud istos quicquid dicit Hermarchus, quicquid Metrodorus, ad unum refertur. Omnia quæ quisquam in illo contubernio locutus est, unius ductu et auspiciis dicta sunt. On the other hand, Numenius (in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 3), little as he can agree with their tenets, commends the Epicureans for faithfully adhering to their master’s teaching, a point in which only the Pythagoreans are their equals. Of the Epicureans, it may be said: μηδ’ αὐτοῖς εἰπεῖν πω ἐναντίον οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὔτε Ἐπικούρῳ μηδὲν [μηδένα] εἰς μηδὲν, ὅτου καὶ μνησθῆναι ἄξιον, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς παρανόμημα, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀσέβημα, καὶ κατέγνωσται τὸ καινοτομηθέν. Thus the Epicurean School resembles a state animated by one spirit, in which there are no divisions of party.

It has been already observed, p. 405, 1; 406, 1, that Epicurus ignored his obligations to his teachers Pamphilus and Nausicydes, and only confessed his debt to Democritus. All other philosophers provoked not only his contempt, but likewise his abuse. Diog. 8, probably on the authority of Timocrates, communicates his remarks on Plato, Aristotle, and others. Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93: Cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Phædoni Socratico turpissime maledixerit. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 2, 2: Compared with Epicurus and Metrodorus, Colotes is polite; τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις αἴσχιστα ῥήματα, βωμολοχίας, ληκυθισμοὺς, κ.τ.λ. συναγαγόντες Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πρωταγόρου καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου καὶ Ἱππάρχου, καὶ τίνος γὰρ οὐχὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν, κατεσκέδασαν.

Cic. N. D. ii. 29, 73: Nam vobis, Vellei, minus notum est, quem ad modum quidque dicatur; vestra enim solum legitis, vestra amatis, ceteros causa incognita condemnatis. Ibid. i. 34, 93: Zeno not only despised cotemporary philosophers, but he even called Socrates a scurra Atticus, Macrob. Somn. i. 2 (Colotes ridiculing Plato’s Republic).

Sext. Math. xi. 169: Ἐπίκουρος ἔλεγε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι λόγοις καὶ διαλογισμοῖς τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον περιποιοῦσαν. Conf. Epic. in Diog. 122: The demand to study philosophy in youth, as well as in age, is supported on the ground that it is never too early nor too late to be happy.

It was mentioned, p. 408, 3, that Epicurus’ own education was defective. Not content therewith, he upholds this defectiveness on principle. Nullam eruditionem, says the Epicurean in Cic. Fin. i. 21, 71, esse duxit, nisi quæ beatæ vitæ disciplinam adjuvaret. In poets, nulla solida utilitas omnisque puerilis est delectatio. Music, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy et a falsis initiis profecta vera esse non possunt, et si essent vera nihil afferrent, quo jucundius, i.e. quo melius viveremus.

Cic. Fin. ii. 4, 12: Vestri quidem vel optime disputant, nihil opus esse eum, philosophus qui futurus sit, scire literas. They fetch their philosophers, like Cincinnatus, from the plough. In this spirit, Epicurus (Diog. 6; Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 12, 1) wrote to Pythocles: παιδείαν δὲ πᾶσαν (the παιδεία ἐγκύκλιος, the learned culture), μακάριε, φεῦγε τὸ ἀκάτιον ἀράμενος; and to Apelles (Plut. l.c.; Athen. xiii. 588, a): μακαρίζω σε, ὦ οὗτος, ὅτι καθαρὸς πάσης αἰτίας (Plut. explains it: τῶν μαθημάτων ἀποσχόμενος) ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὥρμησας. Metrodorus asserted (Plut. l.c.) that it need not be a source of trouble to anyone, if he had never read a line of Homer, and did not know whether Hector were a Trojan or a Greek. The art of reading and writing, γραμματικὴ in the limited sense, was the only art recognised by Epicurus. Sext. Math. i. 49.

Sext. Math. i. 1; Cic. Fin. i. 6, 20.

Cic. Fin. i. 21 (see p. 421, 1), which probably only means, that mathematical ideas cannot be applied to phenomena. Hence Acad. ii. 33, 106 (conf. Fin. i. 6, 20): Polyænus ... Epicuro adsentiens totam geometriam falsam esse credidit. Conf. Procl. in Eucl. p. 85.

See p. 421, 1; Sext. Math. i. 1: Epicurus rejects mathematics ὡς τῶν μαθημάτων μηδὲν συνεργούντων πρὸς σοφίας τελείωσιν. According to Diog. 93, Epicurus calls astronomy τὰς ἀνδραποδώδεις τῶν ἀστρολόγων τεχνιτείας. Conf. Diog. 79.

Plut. l.c. 13, 1. Philodemus, in his treatise περὶ μουσικῆς, had discussed at length the value of music, as we gather from the fragments of the 4th Book, Vol. Herc. i.; in particular rejecting the notion that it has a moral effect, see col. i. 24, 28. He was even opposed to music at table (Col. 38, as Epicurus was in Plut., l.c.). The statement of Diog. 121, that only the wise man can give a right opinion on poetry and music, is not at variance with these passages.

Philodemus, De Rhet. Vol. Herc. iv. col. 3; 12. The same polemic is continued in the further fragments of this treatise. Ibid. V. Col. 6.

Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22: In logic iste vester plane, ut mihi quidem videtur, inermis ac nudus est. Tollit definitiones: nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet. Non quomodo efficiatur concludaturque ratio, tradit, non qua via captiosa solvantur, ambigua distinguantur, ostendit. Ibid. 19, 63: In dialectica autem vestra nullam existimavit [Epic.] esse nec ad melius vivendum nec ad commodius disserendum viam. Acad. ii. 30, 97: Ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et inridet. Diog. 31: τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς παρέλκουσαν ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν· ἀρκεῖν γὰρ τοὺς φυσικοὺς χωρεῖν κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων φθόγγους.

See p. 424.

Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63: In physicis plurimum posuit [Epic.]. Ibid. 6, 17: In physicis, quibus maxime gloriatur, primum totus est alienus.

Epic. in Diog. x. 82 and 85: μὴ ἄλλο τι τέλος ἐκ τῆς περὶ μετεώρων γνώσεως ... νομίζειν δεῖ εἶναι ἤπερ ἀταραξίαν καὶ πίστιν βέβαιον καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. Ibid. 112: εἰ μηθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ περὶ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν καὶ αἱ περὶ θανάτου ... οὐκ ἂν προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας; but this becomes necessary, since, without knowledge of nature, we cannot he perfectly free from fear. The same in Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 8, 7; conf. Diog. 79 and 143; Cic. Fin. iv. 5, 11; Lucret. i. 62; iii. 14; vi. 9.

In Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63, the Epicurean speaks of a fivefold, or, excluding Canonic, of a fourfold use of natural science: fortitudo contra mortis timorem; constantia contra metum religionis; sedatio animi omnium rerum occultarum ignoratione sublata; moderatio natura cupiditatum generibusque earum explicatis.

Diog. 29: διαιρεῖται τοίνυν [ἡ φιλοσοφία] εἰς τρία, τό τε κανονικὸν καὶ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν. Canonic was also called περὶ κριτηρίου καὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ στοιχειωτικόν; natural science, περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ περὶ φύσεως; ethics, περὶ αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ περὶ βίων καὶ τέλους.

Diog. 30: τὸ μὲν οὖν κανονικὸν ἐφόδους ἐπὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ἔχει.

Diog. l.c.: εἰώθασι μέντοι τὸ κανονικὸν ὁμοῦ τῷ φυσικῷ συντάττειν. Cic. Fin. i. 19. See p. 423, 4. Hence Sext. Math. vii. 14: Some reckon Epicurus amongst those who only divide philosophy into natural and moral science; whilst, according to others, he adhered to a threefold division, at the same time rejecting the Stoic logic. Sen. Ep. 89, 11: Epicurei duas partes philosophiæ putaverunt esse, naturalem atque moralem: rationalem removerunt, deinde cum ipsis rebus cogerentur, ambigua secernere, falsa sub specie veri latentia coarguere, ipsi quoque locum, quem de judicio et regula appellant, alio nomine rationalem induxerunt: sed eum accessionem esse naturalis partis existimant.

Ritter, iii. 463; Schleiermacher, Gesch. d. Phil. p. 123.

Steinhart in the treatise often referred to.

Diog. 29; Sext. Math. vii. 22.

Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22. See p. 422, 4.

Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22; Sext. Math. vii. 203. If, according to Diog. 31, and Cic. Acad. ii. 46, 142, Epicurus named three criteria—πρόληψις, αἴσθησις, and πάθη—instead of the above two, it must be an inaccuracy of expression; πρόληψις, as we have seen, is derived from sensation.

Epicurus, in Diog. x. 146; Lucr. iv. 467–519; Cic. Fin. i. 19, 54. Colotes (in Plut. Adv. Col. 24, 3) replies to the Cyrenaic scepticism by saying: μὴ δύνασθαι ζῇν μηδὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν. In this case, as in the case of the Stoics, the dogmatism in favour of the senses is based on a practical postulate, the need of a firm basis of conviction for human life.

Epic. in Diog. x. 50, and 147; Sext. Math. vii. 203–210; viii. 9; 63; 185; Plut. Adv. Col. 4, 3; 5, 2; 25, 2; Plac. iv. 9, 2: Lucr. iv. 377–519; Cic. Acad. ii. 25, 79; 32, 101; Fin. i. 7, 22; N. D. i. 25, 70; Tertull. De An. 17. Further particulars below respecting sense-perception.

Diog. x. 31; Lucr. iv. 480.

Sext. Math. vii. 203 and 216. In Diog. x. 52, instead of ἐνεργείας, we should read with Cobet ἐναργείας. Besides this peculiar expression, Epicurus uses sometimes αἴσθησις, sometimes φαντασία (Sext. l.c.), for sensation. An impression on the senses, he calls φανταστικὴ ἐπιβολή. Diog. 50.

Diog. 32.

Diog. 33: τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἱονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, τουτέστι μνήμην τοῦ πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος. By the help of this passage, Cicero’s description, N. D. i. 16, 43, must be corrected.

Diog. l.c.: ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥηθῆναι ἄνθρωπος εὐθὺς κατὰ πρόληψιν καὶ ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ νοεῖται προηγουμένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων. παντὶ οὖν ὀνόματι τὸ πρώτως ὑποτεταγμένον ἐναργές ἐστι· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐζητήσαμεν τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἐγνώκειμεν αὐτὸ ... οὐδ’ ἂν ὠνομάσαμέν τι μὴ πρότερον αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόληψιν τὸν τύπον μαθόντες. Hence the exhortation in Epicurus’ letter to Herodotus (in Diog. x. 37): πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις δεῖ εἰληφέναι ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα ἔχωμεν εἰς ὃ ἀνάγοντες ἐπικρίνειν, κ.τ.λ. Every impression must be referred to definite perceptions; apart from perceptions, no reality belongs to our impressions; or, as it is expressed Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 107, Math. viii. 13, 258: The Epicureans deny the existence of a λεκτὸν, and between a thing and its name there exists a third intermediate something—a conception. See also Sext. vii. 267.

Diog. 33. Sext. Math. i. 57 (xi. 21): οὔτε ζητεῖν οὔτε ἀπορεῖν ἔστι κατὰ τὸν σόφον Ἐπίκουρον ἄνευ προλήψεως. Ibid. viii. 337, p. 521; Plut. De An. 6: The difficulty, that all learning presupposes knowledge, the Stoics met by φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι, the Epicureans by προλήψεις, which accordingly are the natural test of truth.

See p. 426, 1. Diog. l.c.: ἐναργεῖς οὖν εἰσιν αἱ προλήψεις καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν ἀπὸ προτέρου τινὸς ἐναργοῦς ἤρτηται, ἐφ’ ὃ ἀναφέροντες λέγομεν.

See previous note and Epic. in Diog. 38: ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ’ ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖσθαι, εἴπερ ἕξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον ἐφ’ ὃ ἀνάξομεν.

Diog. 33 (conf. 38, 104): περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων χρὴ σημειοῦσθαι.

See p. 422, 4. Steinhart, p. 466, goes too far in saying that Epicurus defied all law and rule in thought.

Diog. 32: καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπίνοιαι πᾶσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων γεγόνασι, κατά τε περίπτωσιν (probably: the coincidence of several sensations which must be distinguished from their σύνθεσις or free combination) καὶ ἀναλογίαν καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ σύνθεσιν, συμβαλλομένου τι καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ. Conf. p. 422, 4; 429, 1, and the corresponding doctrine of the Stoics, p. 80, with the teaching of Epicurus, on the genesis of thoughts from sensations.

Diog. 33: καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν ἀπὸ προτέρου τινὸς ἐναργοῦς ἤρτηται ... τὴν δὲ δόξαν καὶ ὑπόληψιν λέγουσιν. ἀληθῆ τέ φασι καὶ ψευδῆ· ἂν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμαρτυρῆται ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρῆται ἀληθῆ εἶναι· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρῆται ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρῆται ψευδῆ τυγχάνειν. Sext. Math. vii. 211: τῶν δοξῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς· ἀληθεῖς μὲν αἵ τε ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι πρὸς τῆς ἐναργείας, ψευδεῖς δὲ αἵ τε ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι πρὸς τῆς ἐναργείας. Ritter, iii. 486, observes that these statements are contradictory. According to Sextus, an opinion is only then true when it can be proved and not refuted; according to Diogenes, when it can be proved or not refuted. The latter is, however, clearly meant by Sextus, and is affirmed by Epicurus in Diog. 50 and 51.

Epicur. in Diog. 50; Ibid. 33; Sext. vii. 212. The object of a future sensation is called by Diog. 38, τὸ προσμένον. Diog. x. 34, himself gives a perverted explanation of this term, which probably misled Steinhart, p. 466.

Sext. l.c. 213.

The two tests of truth, proof and absence of refutation, do not, therefore, as Sextus expressly says, refer to the same cases. Our assumptions in respect of external appearances must be proved, before they can be allowed to be true; our impressions of the secret causes of these appearances must not be refuted. The former test applies to opinions regarding τὸ προσμένον; the latter, to opinions regarding τὸ ἄδηλον. Diog. 38.

Compare the passages in Sext. vii. 206, quoted p. 427, 1.

Cic. Acad. ii. 14, 45: Nam qui voluit subvenire erroribus Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem, dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate sejungere, nihil profecit, ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.

Plut. Adv. Col. 7, 2 (Stob. Ecl. i. 366; Lucr. ii. 795): ὁ Ἐπίκουρος οὐκ εἶναι λέγων τὰ χρώματα συμφυῆ τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ γεννᾶσθαι κατὰ ποιάς τινας τάξεις καὶ θέσεις πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν. For says Epicurus, οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως δεῖ τὰ ἐν σκότει ταῦτα ὄντα φῆσαι χρώματα ἔχειν. Often some see colour where others do not; οὐ μᾶλλον οὖν ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν χρῶμα ῥηθήσεται τῶν σωμάτων ἕκαστον.

Simpl. Categ. 109, β (Schol. in Arist. 92, a, 10): Since Democritus and Epicurus attribute all qualities, to atoms except those of form and mode of combination, ἐπιγίνεσθαι λέγουσι τὰς ἄλλας ποιότητας, τάς τε ἁπλᾶς, οἷον θερμότητας καὶ λειότητας, καὶ τὰς κατὰ χρώματα καὶ τοὺς χυμούς. Lucret. l.c.

Compare the passages already quoted, on the truth of the impressions of the senses, and the words of Epicurus, in Diog. 68: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ βάρεα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ σώματος ὡς ἂν εἰς αὐτὸ βεβηκότα καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνόντα ἢ τοῖς ὁρατοῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὴν γνωστοῖς, οὐθ’ ὡς καθ’ ἑαυτάς εἰσι φύσεις δοξαστέον (οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ἐπινοῆσαι τοῦτο), οὔθ’ ὅλως ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν, οὔθ’ ὡς ἕτερά τινα προσυπάρχοντα τούτῳ ἀσώματα οὔθ’ ὡς μορία τούτου, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὸ ὅλον σῶμα καθόλου μὲν ἐκ τούτων πάντων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον ἀΐδιον, κ.τ.λ.

Epic. in Diog. 143: οὐκ ἦν τὸν φοβούμενον περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων λύειν μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἡ τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσις ἀλλ’ ὑποπτευόμενόν τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους. ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίας τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν. For further particulars, p. 422.

οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἰδιολογίας καὶ κενῆς δόξης ὁ βίος ἡμῶν ἔχει χρείαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀθορύβως ἡμᾶς ζῇν. Epic. in Diog. 87.

Diog. 27, mentions 37 books of his περὶ φύσεως, besides smaller works.

Epic. in Diog. 78: καὶ μὴν καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων αἰτίαν ἐξακριβῶσαι φυσιολογίας ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τὸ μακάριον ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν μετεώρων γνώσει ἐνταῦθα πεπτωκέναι· καὶ ἐν τῷ, τίνες φύσεις αἱ θεωρούμεναι κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα ταυτὶ, καὶ ὅσα συγγενῆ πρὸς τὴν εἰς ταῦτα ἀκρίβειαν· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ πλεοναχῶς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι [evidently μὴ εἶναι must be read], καὶ τὸ εὐδεχομένως καὶ ἄλλως πως ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀφθάρτῳ καὶ μακαρίᾳ φύσει τῶν διάκρισιν ὑποβαλλόντων ἢ τάραχον μηθέν· καὶ τοῦτο καταλαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς οὕτως εἶναι. τὸ δ’ ἐν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πεπτωκὸς τῆς δύσεως καὶ ἀνατολῆς καὶ τροπῆς καὶ ἐκλείψεως καὶ ὅσα συγγενῆ τούτοις μηθὲν ἔτι πρὸς τὸ μακάριον τῆς γνώσεως συντείνειν (how very different from Aristotle! See Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, ii. b, 113, 3; 114, 3; 359, 2), ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως τοὺς φόβους ἔχειν τοὺς ταῦτα κατιδόντας τίνες δὲ αἱ φύσεις ἀγνοοῦντας καὶ τίνες αἱ κυριώταται αἰτίαι, καὶ εἰ (as if) μὴ προσῄδεσαν ταῦτα, τάχα δὲ καὶ πλείους, ὅταν τὸ θάμβος ἐκ τῆς τούτων προκατανοήσεως μὴ δύνηται τὴν λύσιν λαμβάνειν κατὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων οἰκονομίαν. (Conf. Lucr. vi. 50; v. 82.) διὸ δὴ καὶ πλείους αἰτίας εὑρίσκομεν τροπῶν, κ.τ.λ. καὶ οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν ὑπὲρ τούτων χρείαν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ἀπειληφέναι ὅση πρὸς τὸ ἀτάραχον καὶ μακάριον ἡμῶν συντείνει, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. 104: καὶ κατ’ ἄλλους δὲ τρόπους πλείονας ἐνδέχεται κεραυνοὺς ἀποτελεῖσθαι. μόνον ὁ μῦθος ἀπέστω.

Ibid. 87: πάντα μὲν οὖν γίνεται ἀσείστως κατὰ πάντων, κατὰ πλεοναχὸν τρόπον ἐκκαθαιρομένων συμφώνως τοῖς φαινομένοις, ὅταν τις τὸ πιθανολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δεόντως καταλίπῃ. ὅταν δέ τις τὸ μὲν ἀπολίπῃ, τὸ δὲ ἐκβάλῃ ὁμοίως σύμφωνον ὂν τῷ φαινομένῳ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐκ παντὸς ἐκπίπτει φυσιολογήματος ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταῤῥεῖ. Ibid. 98: οἱ δὲ τὸ ἓν λαμβάνοντες (those who allow only one explanation for every phenomenon) τοῖς τε φαινομένοις μάχονται καὶ τοῦ τί δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ θεωρῆσαι διαπεπτώκασιν. In investigating nature, they proceed on suppositions chosen at random (ἀξιώματα κενὰ καὶ νομοθεσίαι, Epic. l.c. 86). Conf. 94; 104; 113. Lucret. vi. 703.

Epic. in Diog. 88; 92–95. Many other similar instances might be quoted. In support of the view that the sun was extinguished at setting, Epicurus, according to Cleomed. Meteora, p. 89, is said to have appealed to the story (respecting which Posidonius in Strabo, iii. 1, 5, p. 138) that, as it sets, the hissing of the ocean may be heard on the sea-shore.

The principle is thus expanded by Lucret. i. 1021:—

Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum Ordine se suo quæque sagaci mente locarunt, Nec quos quæque darent motuspepigere profecto; Sed quia multa modis multis mutata per omne Ex infinito vexantur percita plagis, Omne genus motus et cœtus experiundo, Tandem deveniunt in tales disposituras, Qualibus hæc rebus consistit summa creata.

v. 156:

Dicere porro hominum causa voluisse [scil. Deos] parare Præclaram mundi naturam, &c. Desipere est. Quid enim immortalibus atque beatis Gratia nostra queat largirier emolumenti, Ut nostra quidquam causa gerere adgrediantur? Quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos Inlicere, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?... Exemplum porro gignundis rebus et ipsa Notities hominum, Dis unde est insita primum; ... Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi?

Conf. iv. 820; v. 78; 195; 419. In these views, he is only following Epicurus. Heavenly phenomena, says the latter, in Diog. 76, μήτε λειτουργοῦντός τινος νομίζειν δεῖ γίνεσθαι καὶ διατάττοντος ἢ διατάξαντος καὶ ἅμα τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα ἔχοντος μετ’ ἀφθαρσίας· οὐ γὰρ συμφωνοῦσι πραγματεῖαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ χάριτες τῇ μακαριότητι, ἀλλ’ ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίον ταῦτα γίνεται. Ibid. 97: ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμῆ προσαγέσθω, ἀλλ’ ἀλειτούργητος διατηρείσθω καὶ ἐν τῇ πάσῃ μακαριότητι. Ibid. 113. With these passages Cic. N. D. i. 20, 52, and Plut. Plac. i. 7, 7 (likewise ii. 3, 2; Stob. i. 442), are quite in agreement.

Lucr. i. 440:—

Præterea per se quodcumque erit aut faciet quid Aut aliis fungi [πάσχειν] debebit agentibus ipsum, Aut erit, ut possint in eo res esse gerique. At facere et fungi sine corpore nulla potest res, Nec præbere locum porro nisi inane vacansque. Ergo præter inane et corpora tertia per se Nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqui.

Epic. in Diog. 67: καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ ἀσώματον πλὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ κενοῦ. τὸ δὲ κενὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν μόνον δι’ ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς σώμασι παρέχεται. ὥσθ’ οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ματαιάζουσιν. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν εἰ ἦν τοιαύτη.

Diog. 68; 40. Lucr. i. 449, who expresses συμβεβηκότα by conjuncta, and συμπτώματα by eventa. Among the latter Lucretius, 459, reckons time, because in itself it is nothing, and only comes to our knowledge through motion and rest. Likewise Epicurus, in Diog. 72 (conf. Stob. i. 252), shows that time is composed of days and nights, and their portions, of states of feeling or unconsciousness, of motion or rest, and hence that it is only a product (σύμπτωμα) of these phenomena; and these being again συμπτώματα, time is defined by the Epicurean Demetrius (Sext. Math. x. 219; Pyrrh. iii. 137): σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξὶ καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ μοναῖς. The distinction between abstract and sensuous or undivided time (Steinhart, l.c. 466) does not appear to exist in Diogenes. His χρόνοι διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὶ (Diog. 47) are imperceptibly small divisions of time, tempora multa, ratio quæ comperit esse, which, according to Lucret. iv. 792, are contained in every given time.

Lucret. i. 358.

Lucret. l.c. and i. 329; Diog. 40 and 67; Sext. Math. vii. 213; viii. 329. Most of the remarks in Lucret. i. 346 and 532 point to the same fundamental idea: Without vacant interstices, nourishment cannot be diffused over the whole bodies of plants or animals, nor can noise, cold, fire and water penetrate through solid bodies, or any body be broken up into parts. The same in Themist. 40, b; Simpl. De Cœlo, Schol. in Arist. 484, a, 26.

Lucr. i. 440; Diog. 39; Plut. Adv. Col 11, 5.

Body is defined by Epicurus (Sext. Math. i. 21; x. 240; 257; xi. 226) as τὸ τριχῆ διαστατὸν μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας, or as σύνοδος κατὰ ἀθροισμὸν μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ βάρους. Emptiness is (according to Sext. x. 2) φύσις ἀναφὴς or ἔρημος παντὸς σώματος. When occupied by a body, it is called τόπος; when bodies pass through it, it is χώρα; so that all three expressions, as Stob. Ecl. i. 388 rightly observes, are only different names for the same thing. To the same effect is the statement in Plut. Plac. i. 20.

Hence, in Diog. 69, ἄθροισμα and συμπεφορήμενον are used of bodies; in Diog. 71, all bodies are called συμπτώματα; and according to Epicurus (Sext. Math. x. 42), all changes in bodies are due to local displacement of the atoms. Plut. Amator. 24, 3, p. 769, observes that Epicurus deals with ἁφὴ and συμπλοκὴ, but never with ἑνότης.

Epic. in Diog. 40: τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι συγκρίσεις τὰ δ’ ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηνται· ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἄτομα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα εἴπερ μὴ μέλλει πάντα εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθαρήσεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἰσχύοντα ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων ... ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀτόμους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σωμάτων φύσεις. Ibid. 56; Lucr. i. 147; ii. 551; 751; 790. Further arguments for the belief in atoms in Lucret. i. 498: Since a body and the space in which it is are entirely different, both must originally have existed without any intermingling. If things exist composed of the full and the empty, the full by itself must exist, and likewise the empty. Bodies in which there is no empty space cannot be divided. They may be eternal, and must be so, unless things have been produced out of nothing. Without empty space, soft bodies could not exist, nor hard bodies without something full. If there were no indivisible parts, everything must have been long since destroyed. The regularity of phenomena presupposes unchangeable primary elements. All that is composite must ultimately consist of simple indivisible parts. If there were no indivisible parts, every body would consist of innumerable parts, as many in the smaller as in the greater body (conf. Epic. in Diog. 56). If nature did not reduce things to their smallest parts, it could not make new things. These arguments, very unequal in value, were borrowed by Lucretius from Epicurus. Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev. 1, 8, 9, quotes, as an Epicurean principle, that unchangeable Being must be at the bottom of everything.

Epicurus and Lucretius, l.c. Lucr. i. 529; Sext. Math. ix. 219; x. 318; Stob. Ecl. i. 306; Plut. Pl. Phil. i. 3, 29.

Epic. in Diog. 41; Lucret. i. 528; Simpl. De Cœlo, Schol. in Arist. 484, a, 23.

Diog. 44 and 55; Lucret. i. 266, where it is proved, by many analogies, that there may be invisible bodies; Stob. l.c.; Plut. l.c.; Simpl. Phys. 216, a.

Diog. 44; 54; Lucr. ii. 736 and 841; Plut. l.c. See page 433, 2.

Lucret. v. 235.

Diog.; Plut. Plac. i. 3, 29. The statement there made, that Democritus only allowed to atoms size and shape, and that Epicurus added weight, is not correct.

Diog. 42; Lucr. ii. 333 and 478; Plut. Plac. i. 3, 30 (where, however, it would be against the sense to substitute ἢ for μὴ as Steinhart l.c. p. 473 note 94 does); Alex. Aphr. in Philop. Gen. et Corr. 3, b; Cic. N. D. i. 24, 66. It does not, however, appear that Lucret. ii. 333, made the variety of figures as great as the number of atoms. (Ritter, iv. 101.)

Lucret. i. 500.

Diog. x. 55; Lucr. ii. 381.

See the passages quoted, p. 442, 6, and 445, 5. The text of Stobæus, Ecl. i. 346, must be corrected by the aid of these passages. Plut. Plac. i. 12, 5.

Epic. in Diog. 41: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἄπειρόν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ πεπερασμένον ἄκρον ἔχει· τὸ δ’ ἄκρον παρ’ ἕτερόν τι θεωρεῖται. ὥστε οὐκ ἔχον ἄκρον πέρας οὐκ ἔχει, πέρας δ’ οὐκ ἔχον ἄπειρον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ πεπερασμένον. The same argument is used by Lucret. i. 951; 1008–1020. He continues 984, 1021: If space were limited, all bodies would collect towards its lower part by reason of their weight, and their motion would cease. Unless the quantity of matter were unlimited, the amount lost by bodies in their mutual contact could not be supplied. Conf. also Plut. Adv. Col. 13, 3; in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9; Plac. i. 3, 28; Alex. in Simpl. Phys. 107, b, who mentions the above-quoted argument of Epicurus as the chief argument of the Epicureans.

We have but little information; but it has been already shown p. 433, 2, and follows too as a matter of course, that he referred all the properties of bodies to the shape and arrangement of the atoms. Whenever he found in the same body different qualities combined, he assumed that it was composed of different kinds of atoms. For instance, he asserted of wine: οὐκ εἶναι θερμὸν αὐτοτελῶς τὸν οἶνον, ἀλλ’ ἔχειν τινὰς ἀτόμους ἐν αὑτῷ θερμασίας ἀποτελεστικὰς, ἑτέρας δ’ αὖ ψυχρότητος. According to the difference of constitution, it has on some a cooling, on others a heating effect. Plut. Qu. Conviv. iii. 5, 1, 4; Adv. Col. 6. This agrees with the remarks made on Democritus in vol. i. 597.

Diog. 43; 47; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 54. What idea Epicurus formed to himself of motion we are not told. We learn, however, from Themist. Phys. 52, b, that he replied to Aristotle’s proof of motion, that no constant quantities can be composed of indivisible particles (Phys. vi. 1), by saying: Whatever moves in a given line moves in the whole line, but not in the individual indivisible portions of which the line consists. With reference to the same question, the Epicureans, according to Simpl. Phys. 219, b, asserted that everything moves equally quickly through indivisible spaces.

Cic. Fin. i. 6, 18; Lucret. i. 1074.

Lucr. ii. 1052 (the text being faulty); Simpl. De Cœlo, Schol. in Arist. 510, b, 30; 486, a, 7. The latter writer inaccurately groups Epicurus together with others (Democritus and Strato). The same point, according to Simpl. Phys. 113, b, was a subject of contention between Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Epicurean Zenobius, at the close of the second century after Christ.

As Aristotle had already done.

Diog. 60; conf. Plut. Def. Orac. 28, p. 425.

Epic. in Diog. 43; 61; Lucr. ii. 225; Plut. C. Not. 43, i. p. 1082. This objection was borrowed from Aristotle by Epicurus.

Lucr. ii. 216; 261; Cic. Fin. i. 6, 18; N. D. i. 25, 69; De Fato, 10, 22; Plut. An. Procr. 6, 9, p. 1015; Solert. Anim. 7, 2, p. 964; Plac. i. 12, 5; 23, 4; Stobæus, Ecl. i. 346, 394.

Diog. 44; conf. 62; 90; Plut. Plac. i. 12, 5; Fac. Lun. 4, 5, p. 921; Stob. i. 346; Lucret. v. 432.

Diog. 73; Lucr. i. 1021. See above, p. 437, 1; Plut. Def. Or. 19, p. 420.

Cic. Fin. i. 6, 17. See p. 444, 3.

Diog. 45; 73; Lucret. ii. 1048; Plut. Plac. ii. 1, 3. It need hardly be remarked that by worlds world-bodies are not meant. In Diog. 88, Epicurus defines the world as a part of the heaven, surrounding the earth and stars, having a definite shape, and, towards other parts of the heaven, bounded.

Diog. 45; 74; 88; Plut. Plac. ii. 2, 2; 7, 3; Stob. i. 490; Cic. N. D. ii. 18, 48; Acad. ii. 40, 125.

Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9: Epicurus says, ὅτι οὐδὲν ξένον ἀποτελεῖται ἐν τῷ παντὶ παρὰ τὸν ἤδη γεγενημένον χρόνον ἄπειρον.

Diog. 73; 89; Lucret. ii. 1105; v. 91 and 235, where the transitory character of the world is elaborately proved; Cic. Fin. i. 6, 21. Stob. i. 418; Epicurus makes the world decay in the greatest variety of ways. Plut. Plac. ii. 4, 2.

Diog. x. 89.

v. 324, arguing that historical memory would otherwise go much further back, and arts and sciences be of much greater antiquity.

On this point see Lucret. ii. 1112. The principle that similar elements naturally congregate is there explained in this way.

Lucr. v. 416–508; Plut. Plac. i. 4. The latter view has been referred, in vol. i. 604, to the Atomists. It would now appear that it must be deduced from Epicureanism, and its agreement with the views attributed to Leucippus in other places explained by the well-known connection between Epicurus and Democritus. The views of Epicurus on the formation of the world do not entirely agree with those of Democritus. It was probably with an eye to Democritus (compare the extracts in vol. i. 608 from Orig. Philosoph. p. 17) that Epicurus, in Diog. 90, denied that the world could be increased from without, or that sun and moon could be possibly absorbed in our world. Lucret. ii. 1105, however, supposes an increase of the world from without to be possible.

On these mœnia mundi, which, according to Lucretius, coincide with the ether or fire-belt, see Epic. in Diog. 88; Id. περὶ φύσεως, xi. (Vol. Herc. ii.) col. 2; Plut. Plac. ii. 7, 3; Lucr. i. 73; ii. 1144; v. 454.

On this point see page 434.

See p. 437, 1.

In Diog. 77; 81; Lucret. v. 78 and 114, where the contrast is more fully brought out. By ζῷα οὐράνια, in Plut. Plac. v. 20, 2, we must by no means think of the stars.

Examples have already been met with, p. 436. A complete review of the Epicurean astronomy is not worth our while. It may be studied in the following passages: For the substance of the stars, consult Plut. Plac. ii. 13, 9; for their rising and setting, Diog. 92; Lucr. v. 648; Cleomed. Met. p. 87; for their revolution and deviation, Diog. 92; 112–114; Lucr. v. 509; 612; for the appearance of the moon, Diog. 94, and Lucr. v. 574, 703; for eclipses of sun and moon, Diog. 96; Lucr. v. 749; for changes in the length of day, Diog. 98; Lucr. v. 678.

Diog. 91; Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 82; Fin. i. 6, 20; Sen. Qu. Nat. i. 3, 10; Cleomed. Met. ii. 1; Plut. Plac. ii. 21, 4; 22, 4; Lucr. v. 564. The body of the sun was considered by Epicurus (Plut. Plac. ii. 20, 9; Stob. i. 530) to consist of earth-like and spongy matter, saturated with fire. According to Lucret. v. 471, sun and moon stand midway between ether and earth in point of density.

It is still more difficult to imagine the world as stationary, which is tacitly assumed. It would then be bounded by endless space, and soon come into collision with other masses.

Lucr. v. 534. Conf. Epic. in Diog. 74, and περὶ φύσεως, xi. col. 1. In the latter passage, Epicurus appeals to the fact that the earth is equidistant from the bounds of the world.

Further particulars: on clouds, Diog. 99: Lucr. vi. 451; Plut. Plac. iii. 4, 3; on rain, Diog. 100; Lucret. vi. 495; on thunder, Diog. 100; 103; Lucret. vi. 96; on lightning, Diog. 101; Lucr. vi. 160; on sirocco, Diog. 104; Lucr. vi. 423; Plac. iii. 3, 2; on earthquakes, Diog. 105; Lucr. vi. 535; Plac. iii. 15, 11; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 20, 5; on winds, Diog. 106; on hail, Diog. 106; Plac. iii. 4, 3; on snow, thaw, ice, frost, Diog. 107–109; on the rainbow, Diog. 109; on the halo of the moon, Diog. 110; on comets, Diog. 111; on shooting-stars, Diog. 114. Explanations are given by Lucretius of volcanoes (vi. 639), of the overflow of the Nile (vi. 712), of Lake Avernus (vi. 738–839), of the magnet (vi. 906–1087), of the reputed chilling of the springs in summer (vi. 840).

Lucret. ii. 1157; v. 780. Otherwise, we learn that the Epicureans were as far as the Stoics from attributing to plants a soul. Plut. Plac. v. 26, 3.

Lucr. ii. 1155; v. 787, giving further particulars as to the origin and maintenance of living beings, and the subsequent abatement of the productive powers of earth.

Epic. in Diog. 74.

Anaximander, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Democritus, all taught the procreation of living beings from earth.

Lucr. v. 834–921.

v. 922–1008. Conf. Plato, Polit. 274, B; Arist. Polit. ii. 8, 1269, a, 4; Horace, Serm. i. 3, 99, appears to have had an eye to Lucretius.

Lucr. v. 1009–1025.

Epicurus, in Diog. 75, thus sums up his views on the origin of language: τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει γενέσθαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰς τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθ’ ἕκαστα ἔθνη ἴδια πασχούσας πάθη καὶ ἴδια λαμβανούσας φαντάσματα ἰδίως τὸν ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν ... ὕστερον δὲ κοινῶς καθ’ ἕκαστα τὰ ἔθνη τὰ ἴδια τεθῆναι πρὸς τὸ τὰς δηλώσεις ἧττον ἀμφιβόλους γενέσθαι ἀλλήλοις καὶ συντομωτέρως δηλουμένας. He who invents any new thing puts, at the same time, new words into circulation. Lucret. v. 1026–1088, explains more fully that language is of natural origin. On the voice, Ibid. iv. 522; Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 2.

Epic. in Diog. 75: ἀλλὰ μὴν ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτὴν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναί τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι· τὸν δὲ λογισμὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα καὶ ὕστερον ἐπακριβοῦν καὶ προσεξευρίσκειν, ἐν μέν τισι θᾶττον ἐν δέ τισι βραδύτερον.

Lucr. v. 1450:—all arts

Usus et impigræ simul experientia mentis Paulatim docuit.

Ibid. 1103:—

Inque dies magis hi victum vitamque priorem Commutare novis monstrabant rebu’ benigni Ingenio qui præstabant et corde vigebant.

In harmony with these premises, Lucretius then tries to explain various inventions. The first fire was obtained by lightning, or the friction of branches in a storm. The sun taught cooking (v. 1089). Forests on fire, melting brass, first taught men how to work in metal (v. 1239–1294). Horses and elephants were used for help in war, after attempts had been previously made with oxen and wild beasts (v. 1295). Men first dressed themselves in skins; afterwards they wore twisted, and then woven materials (v. 1009; 1348; 1416). The first ideas of planting and agriculture were from the natural spread of plants (v. 1359). The first music was in imitation of birds; the first musical instrument was the pipe, through which the wind was heard to whistle; from this natural music, artificial music only gradually grew (v. 1377). The measure and arrangement of time was taught by the stars (v. 1434); and, comparatively late, came the arts of poetry and writing (v. 1438).

Lucr. v. 1106.

Lucr. iii. 161; Diog. 67. See p. 439, 1.

Lucr. iii. 177; Diog. 63.

Diog. 63: ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερὲς παρ’ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα (the body), παρεσπαρμένον· προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι. 66: ἐξ ἀτόμων αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλοτάτων πολλῷ τινι διαφερουσῶν τῶν τοῦ πυρός.

Lucr. iii. 231; 269; Plut. Plac. iv. 3, 5 (Stob. i. 798), conf. Alex. Aphr. De An. 127, b.

Lucr. iii. 288.

According to Plut. Plac. v. 3, 5, he considered the seed an ἀπόσπασμα ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος; and, since he believed in a feminine σπέρμα, he must have regarded the soul of the child as formed by the intermingling of the soul-atoms of both parents. Ibid. v. 16, 1.

Diog. 63; Lucret. iii. 216; 276; 323; 370.

Metrodor. περὶ αἰσθητῶν (Vol. Herc. vi.), col. 7.

Lucr. iii. 98, contradicts the assertion that the soul is the harmony of the body; Epicurus having already replied (in Philop. De An. E. 1) to one of the objections urged against it by Plato.

Diog. 66; Lucr. iii. 94; 136; 396; 612; Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 3. Lucretius calls the rational part animus or mens, and the irrational part anima. The statement, Pl. Phil. iv. 23, 2, that Epicurus made feeling reside in the organs of sense, because the ἡγεμονικὸν was feelingless, can hardly be correct.

Diog. and Lucr. In sleep, a portion of the soul is supposed to leave the body (Lucr. iv. 913, conf. Tertull. De An. 43), whilst another part is forcibly confined within the body. Probably this is all that is meant by Diog. 66.

Epic. in Diog. 64. Lucr. iii. 417–827, gives an elaborate proof of the mortality of the soul. Other passages, Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 27, 1 and 3; 30, 5; Sext. Math. ix. 72, hardly need to be referred to. Observe the contrast between Epicureanism and Stoicism. In Stoicism, the soul keeps the body together; in Epicureanism, the body the soul. In Stoicism, the soul survives the body; in Epicureanism, this is impossible. In Stoicism, the mind is a power over the world, and hence over the body; in Epicureanism, it is on a level with the body, and dependent on it.

Epic. in Diog. 124–127, for instance: τὸ φρικωδέστατον οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἐπειδήπερ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ὦμεν ὁ θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν· ὅταν δὲ ὁ θάνατος παρῇ τόθ’ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμεν. Id. in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 229 (Alex. Aphr. Anal. Pri. 117, Top. 9. Gell. N. A. ii. 8, 1; Stob. Serm. 118, 30): ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμας· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Lucr. iii. 828–975.

Lucr. iii. 830.

Diog. 81; 142; Lucr. iii. 37.

Lucr. ii. 991:—

Denique cœlesti sumus omnes semine oriundi, &c.

999:—

Cedit item retro de terra quod fuit ante In terras: et quod missum est ex ætheris oris Id rursum cœli rellatum templa receptant.

Democritus, from whom Epicurus has borrowed the rest of this theory, makes them mould the air.

Epic. in Diog. 46–50; 52; and in the fragments of the second book περὶ φύσεως; Lucr. iv. 26–266; 722; vi. 921 Cic. Ad Famil. xv. 16; Plut. Qu. Conviv. viii. 10, 2, 2; Plac. iv. 3, 1; 19, 2; Sext. Math. vii. 206; Gell. N. A. v. 16; Macrob. Sat. vii. 14; the remarks of Lucr. iv. 267; 568; Plut. Plac. iv. 14, 2, on reflected images and the echo belong likewise to the doctrine of idola.

For instance, the impressions in the minds of dreamers and madmen. Diog. 32; Lucr. iv. 730.

Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: εἰ δὲ χρὴ γελᾷν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὰ εἴδωλα γελαστέον τὰ κωφὰ καὶ τυφλὰ καὶ ἄψυχα, ἃ ποιμαίνουσιν [sc. οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι] ἀπλέτους ἐτῶν περιόδους ἐμφαινόμενα καὶ περινοστοῦντα πάντη τὰ μὲν ἔτι ζώντων τὰ δὲ πάλαι κατακαέντων ἢ κατασαπέντων ἀποῤῥυέντα.

Lucr. l.c.

Sext. l.c.; Lucr. iv. 351.

Lucr. iv. 766–819; and on the incessant streaming forth of images, v. 141; Diog. 48.

Epic. in Diog. x. 52: τὸ δὲ διημαρτημένον οὐκ ἂν ὑπῆρχεν, εἰ μὴ ἐλαμβάνομεν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συνημμένην μὲν, διάληψιν [al. διάλειψιν] δʹ ἔχουσαν κατὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν συνημμένην τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ [impression on the senses], διάληψιν δ’ ἔχουσαν ἐὰν μὲν μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ τὸ ψεῦδος γίνεται, ἐὰν δὲ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ τὸ ἀληθές.

As to terminology, Epicurus, according to Plut. Plac. iv. 8, 2, Diog. 32, called the faculty of sensation αἴσθησις, and sensation itself, ἐπαίσθημα.

Lucr. iv. 874; conf. Galen, De Hipp. et Plat. v. 2, vol. v. 367, K.

Diog. 133: τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον· ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτὸν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκεν. ἐπεὶ κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἱμαρμένῃ δουλεύειν.

Cic. N. D. i. 25, 70: [Epicurus] pertimuit, ne si concessum esset hujusmodi aliquid: aut vivet cras aut non vivet Epicurus, alterutrum fieret necessarium; totum hoc; aut etiam aut non negavit esse necessarium. Acad. ii. 30, 97; De Fat. 10, 21.

Steinhart, p. 466.

Cic. De Fato, 16, 37, at least says, referring to the above question: Nisi forte voluimus Epicureorum opinionem sequi, qui tales propositiones nec veras nec falsas esse dicunt, aut cum id pudet illud tamen dicunt, quod est impudentius, veras esse ex contrariis disjunctiones, sed quæ in his enuntiata essent eorum neutrum esse verum. Cicero indeed adds: O admirabilem licentiam et miserabilem inscientiam dicendi! but he has no reason for this exclamation; for the proposition: Either A or B must follow is not identical with the proposition: It may be stated either of A or of B that it will follow. Epicurus could, therefore, justly allow the former and deny the latter. In so doing he is really following Aristotle.

Diog. x. 123: οἵους δ’ αὐτοὺς [τοὺς θεοὺς] οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουσιν αὐτοὺς οἵους νομίζουσιν. ἀσεβὴς δὲ οὐχ ὁ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν ἀλλ’ ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῖς προσάπτων. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 16, 42.

iii. 14; vi. 49; and, specially, the celebrated passage i. 62:—

Humana ante oculos fœde cum vita jaceret In terris oppressa gravi sub relligione, Quæ caput a cœli regionibus ostendebat Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans, &c.

as far as to 101:—

Tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum.

Conf. Epic. in Diog. 81, and above p. 423, 3; 437, 1.

Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 4: [Ἐπίκουρος] ἅπασαν ὁμοῦ ποιητικὴν ὥσπερ ὀλέθριον μύθων δέλεαρ ἀφοσιούμενος. Ibid. c. 75.

Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: Ἐπικουρείων δὲ χλευασμοὺς καὶ γέλωτας οὔτι φοβητέον οἷς τολμῶσι χρῆσθαι καὶ κατὰ τῆς προνοίας μῦθον αὐτὴν ἀποκαλοῦντες. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 2: διαβάλλοντες τὴν πρόνοιαν ὥσπερ παισὶν Ἔμπουσαν ἢ Ποινὴν ἀλιτηριώδη καὶ τραγικὴν ἐπιγεγραμμένην. In Cic. N. D. i. 8, 18, the Epicurean calls πρόνοια anus fatidica, to which it was often reduced, no doubt, by the Stoics.

See p. 460, 1.

Lucr. v. 196; ii. 1090; Plut. Plac. i. 7, 10. Conf. the disputation of the Stoic and Epicurean in Lucian, Jup. Trag. c. 35, and especially c. 46.

Lucr. v. 165; conf. p. 437, 1; Plut. Plac. i. 7, 8.

Diog. 76; 97; 113; see p. 437, 1; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 52; Plut. Plac. i. 7, 7.

Cic. l.c. 54.

Plut. Def. Orac. 19; Plac. i. 83.

Conf. the captious argument of Hermarchus, in Procl. in Tim. 66, E: If prayer is necessary for everything, it is necessary for prayer, and so on, ad infin.

Diog. 135; Lucr. v. 379; Plut. Plac. v. 1, 2; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 55; Divin. ii. 17, 40; Tertull. De An. 46.

Lucr. v. 1159–1238; conf. iv. 33; vi. 49; Sext. Math. ix. 25; vi. 19; Diog. 98; 115.

This view is especially prominent in Lucretius. See p. 462, 2. Conf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 10; Cic. N. D. i. 20, 54.

He drew up separate treatises περὶ θεῶν and περὶ ὁσιότητος. Diog. 27; Cic. N. D. i. 41, 115; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 21, 11.

Posidonius, in Cic. N. D. i. 44, 123; Conf. 30, 85; iii. 1, 3; Plut. l.c.

Epic. in Diog. 123: θεοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσι· ἐναργὴς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ γνῶσις. The Epicurean in Cic. N. D. i. 16, 43: Solus enim [Epicurus] vidit, primum esse Deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quæ est enim gens aut quod genus hominum quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam Deorum? quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus, &c. These statements must, however, be received with some caution, since Cicero appears to give up his own views as to innate ideas. Inasmuch, however, as he expressly refers to Epicurus’ treatise περὶ κανόνος, we may assume that belief in Gods with Epicurus rests on a general πρόληψις.

In support of this view, see Cic. N. D. i. 18, 46. It is there said of the form of the Gods: A natura habemus omnes omnium gentium speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam Deorum. Quæ enim alia forma occurrit umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti? φυσικὴ πρόληψις is here referred to sensations derived from εἴδωλα. Ibid. 19, 49; and Lucr. vi. 76:

de corpore quæ sancto simulacra feruntur In mentis hominum divinæ nuntia formæ.

Diog. 121. Cic. N. D. i. 17, 45: Si nihil aliud quæreremus, nisi ut Deos pie coleremus et ut superstitione liberaremur, satis erat dictum: nam et præstans Deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et æterna esset et beatissima ... et metus omnis a vi atque ira Deorum pulsus esset. Ibid. 20, 56: We do not fear the Gods, et pie sancteque colimus naturam excellentem atque præstantem. Ibid. 41, 115. Sen. Benef. iv. 19, 3: Epicurus denied all connection of God with the world, but, at the same time, would have him honoured as a father, propter majestatem ejus eximiam singularemque naturam.

Cic. N. D. i. 18, 46; Divin. ii. 17, 40; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 218; Plut. Pl. Phil. i. 7, 18 (Stob. i. 66); Phædr. (Philodem.) Fragm. col. 7; Metrodorus, περὶ αἰσθητῶν (Vol. Herc. vi.), col. 10; col. 16, 21.

Cic. N. D. i. 34, 95.

Epic. in Diog. 123: πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων ... μηδὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ πρόσαπτε, κ.τ.λ. Ibid. 139. Cic. N. D. i. 17, 45; 19, 51; Lucr. ii. 646; v. 165.

Cic. N. D. ii. 23, 59; i. 18, 49; 25, 71; 26, 74; Divin. ii. 17, 40; Lucr. v. 148; Metrodor. περὶ αἰσθητῶν, col. 7; Plut. l.c. Epicurus has, as Cicero remarks, monogrammos Deos; his Gods have only quasi corpus and quasi sanguinem. They are perlucidi and perflabiles, or, according to Lucretius, tenues, so that they cannot be touched, and are indestructible.

Cic. Divin. ii. 17, 40; Lucr. ii. 646; iii. 18; v. 146; Sen. Benef. iv. 19, 2.

Epic. in Diog. 77; 97; 139; Cic. N. D. i. 19, 51 (amongst other things: nos autem beatam vitam in animi securitate et in omnium vacatione munerum ponimus, both of which features must therefore be attributed to the Gods); Legg. i. 7, 21; Lucr. ii. 646; iii. 1092; iv. 83; vi. 57; Sen. Benef. iv. 4, 1; 19, 2. Conf. p. 436; 464, 1; 466, 1.

In the fragments of his treatise περὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν εὐστοχουμένης διαγωγῆς, κατὰ Ζήνωνα, col. 12.

The κλίσια discussed by Hermarchus and Pythocles, col. 13, 20, had reference to these, and not to ordinary feasts.

Col. 14: The reason being assigned that λέγονται μὴ πολὺ διαφερούσαις κατὰ τὰς ἀρθρώσεις χρῆσθαι φωναῖς, καὶ μόνον οἴδαμεν γεγονότας θεοὺς Ἑλληνίδι γλώττῃ χρωμένους. The first statement seems to refer to the words of the divine language quoted by Homer; the second statement, to stories of appearances of the Gods. For the whole tone of the system militates against our thinking of men who have afterwards become Gods. The sceptical question, Whether the Gods possess speech? raised by Carneades in Sext. Math. ix. 178, appears to refer to this μυθολογία Ἐπικούρου.

Cic. N. D. i. 20, 54; Sen. Benef. iv. 19, 1.

Philodem. De Mus. iv. (V. Herc. i.) col. 4, says that the Gods do not need this worship, but it is natural for us to show it: μάλιστα μὲν ὁσίαις προλήψεσιν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸ πάτριον παραδεδομένοις ἑκάστῳ τῶν κατὰ μέρος.

Cic. l.c. i. 19, 50, the sentence, et si quæ interimant, belonging, however, to Cicero only. For Epicurus cannot have described his ease-taking Gods as sustainers of the universe.

Cic. N. D. i. 19, 49: (Epicurus) docet eam esse vim et naturam Deorum ut primum non sensu sed mente cernatur: nec soliditate quadam nec ad numerum, ut ea, quæ ille propter firmitatem στερέμνια appellat, sed imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis: cum infinita simillimarum imaginum species ex innumerabilibus individuis exsistat et ad Deos (probably instead of Deos, which gives no sense, we should read nos. See the commentators in the editions of Moser and Kreuzer) affluat, cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam infixamque nostram intelligentiam capere quæ sit et beata natura et æterna. The meaning of these words appears to be, that ideas of the Gods are not formed in the same way as the ideas of other solid bodies, by a number of similar pictures from the same object striking our senses (nec soliditate nec ad numerum, Diog. x. 95), but by single pictures emanating from innumerable divine individuals, all so much alike that they leave behind them the impressions of perfect happiness and immortality. The passage of Diog. x. 139, ought probably to be corrected by that in Cicero. It runs: ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησι, τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητοὺς εἶναι· οὓς μὲν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας, οὓς δὲ κατὰ ὁμοειδίαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιῤῥύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσμένους ἀνθρωποειδῶς. The similarity of most of the expressions leaves no doubt that Diogenes followed the same authority as Cicero (probably the same as Plut. Plac. i. 7, 18 followed), but in the words οὓς μὲν κ.τ.λ., it asserts the very opposite of this and the Epicurean teaching. There must, therefore, be some error here, either due to Diogenes or a copyist. This error does not apparently belong to the words κατ’ ἀριθμὸν, which Cicero renders ad numerum, so that Steinhart’s suggestion, p. 477, καθ’ ἁρμὸν or καθ’ ἁρμοὺς, is clearly wrong. It is more probably to be found in the words οὓς μὲν—οὓς δὲ. We might suggest for οὓς μὲν, οὐ μέντοι.

In Phædrus (Philodem. περὶ εὐσεβείας), Fragm. col. 7 (10) it is said in answer to the Stoics: ἐπιδεικνύσθωσαν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἕνα μόνον [θεὸν] ἅπαντα λέγοντες οὐδὲ πάντας ὅσους ἡ κοινὴ φήμη παρέδωκεν, ἡμῶν οὐ μόνον ὅσους φασὶν οἱ Πανέλληνες ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείονας εἶναι λεγόντων ἔπειθ’ ὅτι τοιούτους οὐδὲ μεμήκασιν ἀπολείπειν, οἵους σέβονται πάντες καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμολογοῦμεν. ἀνθρωποειδεῖς γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐ νομίζουσιν ἀλλὰ ἀέρα καὶ πνεύματα καὶ αἰθέρα, ὥστ’ ἔγωγε καὶ τεθαῤῥηκότως εἴπαιμι τούτους Διαγόρου μᾶλλον πλημμελεῖν. It is then shown how little the natural substances of the Stoics resemble Gods (col. 9): τὰ θεῖα τοιαῦτα καταλείπουσιν ἃ καὶ γεννητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ φαίνεται, τοῖς δὲ πᾶσιν ἡμεῖς ἀκολούθως ἀϊδίους κἀφθάρτους εἶναι δογματίζομεν. Here we have a phenomenon witnessed in modern times, Deists and Pantheists mutually accusing one another of atheism, the former missing personality, the latter missing activity in the deity of their opponents.

See p. 469, 1.

Lucr. ii. 598, explains the Mother of the Gods as meaning the earth. ii. 655, he allows the expressions, Neptune, Ceres, Bacchus, for the sea, corn, and wine. iii. 976, he interprets the pains of the nether-world as the qualms now brought on by superstition and folly.

Epic. in Diog. 128: τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῇν ... πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον ... πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονὴ ... ἀγαθόν.... καθάπερ καὶ ἀλγηδὼν πᾶσα κακόν. Ibid. 141. Cic. Fin. i. 9, 29; Tusc. v. 26, 73: Cum præsertim omne malum dolore definiat, bonum voluptate.

Diog. 129: ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φευγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει τὸ ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες. Plut. Adv. Col. 27, 1.

Diog. 137; Cic. Fin. i. 7, 23; 9, 30; ii. 10, 31; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 194; Math. xi. 96.

Stob. Ecl. ii. 58: τοῦτο δ’ [the τέλος] οἱ κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον φιλοσοφοῦντες οὐ προσδέχονται λέγειν ἐνεργούμενον, διὰ τὸ παθητικὸν ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ τέλος, οὐ πρακτικόν· ἡδονὴ γάρ· ὅθεν καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἀποδιδόασι τοῦ τέλους, τὸ οἰκείως διατεθεῖσθαι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν χωρὶς τῆς ἐπ’ ἄλλο τε ἁπάσης ἐπιβολῆς. Alex. Aphr. De An. 154, a: τοῖς δὲ περὶ Ἐπίκουρον ἡδονὴ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον ἔδοξεν εἶναι ἁπλῶς· προϊόντων δὲ διαρθροῦσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἡδονήν φασι.

Diog. 129; Cic. Fin. i. 14, 48; Tusc. v. 33, 95; Sen. De Otio, 7, 3.

Epic. in Diog. 139 (Gell. N. A. ii. 9, 2): ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. Id. in Diog. 128: τούτων γὰρ [τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν] ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπαναγαγεῖν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν. ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῇν ἐστι τέλος. τούτου γὰρ χάριν ἅπαντα πράττομεν ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν· ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμὼν οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῴου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι ... τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρείαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν· ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα. Ibid. 131; 144; conf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 3, 10; Stob. Serm. 17, 35; Lucr. ii. 14; Cic. Fin. i. 11, 37.

Epicurus and Metrodorus, in Plut. l.c. 7, 1.

Diog. 136, quotes the words of Epicurus: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναὶ, ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται. Ritter, iii. 469, suggests instead of ἐνεργείᾳ ἐναργείᾳ, but ἐνεργείᾳ gives a very fair meaning: they appear actually in motion. Sen. Ep. 66, 45: Apud Epicurum duo bona sunt, ex quibus summum illud beatumque componitur, ut corpus sine dolore sit, animus sine perturbatione.

Hence Sen. Brevit. Vit. 14, 2: Cum Epicuro quiescere. Benef. iv. 4, 1: Quæ maxima Epicuro felicitas videtur, nihil agit.

Diog. 131. Similar views are expressed by Metrodorus, in Clement, Strom. v. 614, B, in praise of philosophers who escape all evils by rising to the contemplation of the eternal καθαροὶ καὶ ἀσήμαντοι τούτου, ὃ νῦν σῶμα περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν. Id. in Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 4: ποιήσωμέν τι καλὸν ἐπὶ καλοῖς, μόνον οὐ καταδύντες ταῖς ὁμοιοπαθείαις καὶ ἀπαλλαγέντες ἐκ τοῦ χαμαὶ βίου εἰς τὰ Ἐπικούρου ὡς ἀληθῶς θεόφαντα ὄργια.

Epic. in Diog. 122: μήτε νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν μήτε γέρων ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν. οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδείς ἐστιν οὔτε πάρωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον. He who says it is too early or too late to study philosophy means πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μήπω παρεῖναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι. Id. in Sen. Ep. 8, 7: Philosophiæ servias oportet, ut tibi contingat vera libertas.

Epic. in Diog. 127: τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ αἱ δὲ κεναί· καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον. τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῇν. Ibid. 149, further particulars are given as to the classes. Ibid. 144; Lucr. ii. 20; Cic. Fin. i. 13, 45; Tusc. v. 33, 94; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 3, 10; Eustrat. Eth. N. 48, b; Sen. Vit. Be. 13, 1.

Sen. Benef. iii. 4, 1: Epicuro ... qui adsidue queritur, quod adversus præterita simus ingrati. Epic. in Sen. Ep. 15, 10: Stulta vita ingrata est et trepida, tota in futurum fertur; and Lucr. iii. 929.

Diog. 11; 130; 144; 146; Stob. Floril. 17; 23; 30; 34; Sen. Ep. 2, 5; 16, 7; 25, 4.

Diog. 144: βραχεῖα σοφῷ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς διῴκηκε. The like in Stob. Ecl. ii. 354; Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63; Sen. De Const. 15, 4; Epicurus and Metrodorus in Cic. Tusc. v. 9, 26, and Plut. Aud. Po. 14, p. 37.

Diog. 135: κρεῖττον εἶναι νομίζων εὐλογίστως ἀτυχεῖν ἢ ἀλογίστως εὐτυχεῖν.

Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 20, 4.

Diog. 118; Plut. l.c. 3, 9; Sen. Ep. 66, 18; 67, 15; Cic. Tusc. v. 26, 73.

Diog. 22; Cic. Fin. ii. 30, 96; Tusc. ii. 7, 17; M. Aurel. ix. 41; Sen. Ep. 66, 47; 92, 25; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 18, 1, the latter perverting Epicurus’ words to a terrible extent.

Diog. 137: ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναϊκοὺς διαφέρεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ χείρους τὰς σωματικὰς ἀλγηδόνας λέγουσι τῶν ψυχικῶν ... ὁ δὲ τὰς ψυχικάς. τὴν γοῦν σάρκα διὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον χειμάζειν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν καὶ διὰ τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ τὸ παρὸν καὶ τὸ μέλλον. οὕτως οὖν καὶ μείζονας ἡδονὰς εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς. Further particulars in Plut. l.c. 3, 10: Cic. Tusc. v. 33, 96. The Epicureans spoke of bodily pleasure by ἥδεσθαι, mental by χαίρειν. Plut. l.c. 5, 1.

Diog. 145. Epicurus appears to have first used σὰρξ to express the body in contrast to the soul: σῶμα, in his system, includes the soul. See Diog. 137; 140; 144; Metrodor. in Plut. Colot. 31, 2. (Plut. in N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9; Plut. has γαστρὶ instead of σαρκί.)

Diog. x. 6, from Epicurus περὶ τέλους: οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω τἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονὰς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς δι’ ἀφροδισίων καὶ τὰς δι’ ἀκροαμάτων καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφᾶς (-ῆς). The like, in a more expanded form, in Cic. Tusc. iii. 18, 41.

Plut. l.c. 16, 9: ὡς καὶ ἐχάρην καὶ ἐθρασυνάμην ὅτε ἔμαθον παρ’ Ἐπικούρου ὀρθῶς γαστρὶ (see previous note) χαρίζεσθαι; and: περὶ γαστέρα γὰρ, ὦ φυσιολόγε Τιμόκρατες, τὸ ἀγαθόν. Conf. ibid. 3, 1.

See p. 478, 1, and Epic. in Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 4, 10: τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις. Ibid. 5, 1: τὸ μὲν ἡδόμενον τῆς σαρκὸς τῷ χαίροντι τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπερείδοντες, αὖθις δ’ ἐκ τοῦ χαίροντος εἰς τὸ ἡδόμενον τῇ ἐλπίδι τελευτῶντας.

Conf., besides the extracts on p. 478, 1 and 2, Cic. Fin. i. 17, 55: Animi autem voluptates et dolores nasci fatemur e corporis voluptatibus et doloribus; it is only a misapprehension on the part of several Epicureans to deny this fact. Mental pleasures and pains may therefore be the stronger ones for the reasons assigned above.

In his last letter (Diog. 22), after describing his painful illness, Epicurus continues: ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ.

Diog. 142; Cic. Fin. ii. 7, 21.

Diog. 140; 133; Cic. Fin. i. 15, 49; Plut. Aud. Po. 14, p. 36; M. Aurel. vii. 33, 64.

Diog. 140: οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῇν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ δικαίως ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. The same p. 132, 138. Cic. Tusc. v. 9, 26; Fin. i. 16, 50; 19, 62; Sen. Ep. 85, 18.

Sen. Vit. Be. 13, 1 (conf. 12, 4): In ea quidem ipse sententia sum (invitis nec nostris popularibus—the Stoics—dicam), sancta Epicurum et recta præcipere, et si propius accesseris tristia: voluptas enim illa ad parvum et exile revocatur, et quam nos virtuti legem dicimus eam ille dicit voluptati ... itaque non dico, quod plerique nostrorum, sectam Epicuri flagitiorum magistram esse, sed illud dico: male audit, infamis est, et immerito. Ep. 33, 2: Apud me vero Epicurus est et fortis, licet manuleatus sit. Seneca not infrequently quotes sayings of Epicurus, and calls (Ep. 6, 6) Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyænus, magnos viros. Conf. Cic. Fin. ii. 25, 81.

Epic. in Plut. Adv. Col. 17, 3: ἐγὼ δ’ ἐφ’ ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς παρακαλῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀρετὰς, κενὰς καὶ ματαίας καὶ ταραχώδεις ἐχούσας τῶν κάρπων τὰς ἐλπίδας.

Diog. 138: διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι οὐ δι’ αὑτάς· ὥσπερ τὴν ἰατρικὴν διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν, καθά φησι καὶ Διογένης. Cic. Fin. i. 13, 42 (conf. ad Att. vii. 2): Istæ enim vestræ eximiæ pulchræque virtutes nisi voluptatem efficerent, quis eas aut laudabiles aut expetendas arbitraretur? ut enim medicorum scientiam non ipsius artis sed bonæ valetudinis causa probamus, &c. ...; sic sapientia, quæ ars vivendi putanda est, non expeteretur si nihil efficeret; nunc expetitur quod est tanquam artifex conquirendæ et comparandæ voluptatis. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b: [ἡ ἀρετὴ] περὶ τὴν ἐκλογήν ἐστι τῶν ἡδέων κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον.

Sen. Ep. 85, 18: Epicurus quoque judicat, cum virtutem habeat beatum esse, sed ipsam virtutem non satis esse ad beatam vitam, quia beatum efficiat voluptas quæ ex virtute est, non ipsa virtus.

Diog. 132; Cic. Fin. i. 13, 43; 19, 62.

Cic. Fin. i. 13, 47.

Cic. l.c. 13, 49. Diog. 120: τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν φύσει μὴ γίνεσθαι, λογισμῷ δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος.

Cic. Fin. i. 16, 50; Diog. 144; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 6, 1; Sen. Ep. 97, 13 and 15. Lucr. v. 1152: The criminal can never rest, and often in delirium or sleep betrays himself. Epicurus, however, refused to answer the question, Whether the wise man would do what is forbidden, if he could be certain of not being discovered? Plut. col. 34, 1.

Philodemus, De Rhet. Vol. Herc. v. a, col. 25: The laws ought to be kept τῷ μὴ τὰ διωρισμένα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τὴν ὁμοείδειαν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα διαφυλάττειν, κἀκεῖνα μὴ μόνον συνειδότων, ἀλλὰ κἂν λανθάνωμεν ἀπαξάπαντας, καὶ μεθ’ ἡδονῆς, οὐ δι’ ἀνάγκην, καὶ βεβαίως, ἀλλ’ οὐ σαλευομένως.

Diog. 117; 118; 119.

Plut. Adv. Col. 19, 2.

Diog. 118; Sen. Ep. 81, 11. The Stoic assertion of the equality of virtues and vices was, however, denied by the Epicureans. Diog. 120.

Diog. 135; conf. Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi, 7, 3; Lucr. iii. 323.

Cic. Fin. i. 19, 61; v. 27 80: Semper beatum esse sapientem. Tusc. v. 9, 26; Stob. Serm. 17, 30. See p. 477.

Diog. 117.

Diog. 117: τὸν ἅπαξ γενόμενον σοφὸν μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν λαμβάνειν διάθεσιν μήδ’ ἐπαλλάττειν ἑκόντα. The latter words appear to admit the possibility of an involuntary loss of wisdom, perhaps through madness.

Diog. 126; 145; Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63.

See also page 476, 2.

We gather this from the fragments of Philodemus’ treatise περὶ κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν οἷς εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ἅ. The 10th book of this treatise gives a portrait of the ὑπερήφανος, and kindred faults, after the manner of Theophrastus; the 9th, a mild criticism of Xenophon’s and Aristotle’s οἰκονομικός. It is objected to the latter that the master of the house is there made (col. ii. 30) to rise earlier than his servants, and to go to bed later than they do, such conduct being ταλαίπωρον καὶ ἀνοίκειον φιλοσόφου.

Diog. 144; 146; 130; Stob. Floril. 17, 23; Sen. Ep. 16, 7; Lucr. ii. 20; iii. 59; v. 1115; Philod. De Vit. ix. col. 12: φιλοσόφῳ δ’ ἐστὶ πλούτου μικρόν· ὃ παρεδώκαμεν ἀκολούθως [for thus and not by εὐκαίρως must the defective -ως be represented] τοῖς καθηγεμόσιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ πλούτου λόγοις. Conf. p. 476, 3; 477.

Diog. 130.

Stob. Floril. 17, 24 and 37; Sen. Ep. 21, 7; 14, 17; 2, 5: Honesta, inquit, res est læta paupertas. Ep. 17, 11: Multis parasse divitias non finis miseriarum fuit, sed mutatio.

Stob. Flor. 17, 30. Conf. Sen. Ep. 9, 20: Si cui sua non videntur amplissima, licet totius mundi dominus sit tamen miser est.

Diog. 11; Stob. Floril. 17, 34; Cic. Tusc. v. 31, 89; Sen. Ep. 25, 4. Epicurus lived very abstemiously. The charge of luxury brought against him was fully disposed of by Gassendi, De Vit. et Mor. Epic. 153. Timocrates, on the strength of one of his letters, asserts that he spent a mina every day on his table. If this statement be not a pure invention, it must refer to the whole circle of his friends. It could otherwise only have happened at such a time as the siege of Athens by Demetrius Poliorcetes, when a modius of wheat cost 300 drachmæ, and when Epicurus counted out to his friends the beans on which they lived. Plut. Demetr. 33. The further statement of Timocrates—(Diog. 6: αὐτὸν δὶς τῆς ἡμέρας ἐμεῖν ἀπὸ τρυφῆς)—is certainly an unfounded calumny. The moderation of Epicurus is admitted by Sen. Vit. B. 12, 4; 13, 1; and Epicurus flatters himself, in Sen. Ep. 18, 9: Non toto asse pasci, Metrodorum, qui nondum tantum profecerit, toto; and, in Diog. 11, because he was satisfied with bread and water. Ibid. he writes: πέμψον μοι τυροῦ Κυθνίου, ἵν’ ὅταν βούλωμαι πολυτελεύσασθαι, δύνωμαι. Still less have we any reason to connect the diseases of which Epicurus and some of his scholars died (as Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 5, 3 does, herein following Timocrates in Diog. 7) with their presumed luxuriousness.

Stob. Floril. 17, 30. See p. 477, 2.

Epicurus and Metrodorus, in Stob. Floril. 16, 28; 20, Conf. Plut. Tran. An. 16, p. 474: ὁ τῆς αὔριον ἥκιστα δεόμενος, ὥς φησιν Ἐπίκουρος, ἥδιστα πρόσεισι πρὸς τὴν αὔριον.

Serious charges on this head, against which Gassendi defends him, are preferred against Epicurus by Timocrates, in Diog. 6; but neither the testimony of Timocrates, nor the fact that a woman of loose morality (see above p. 406) was in his society, can be considered conclusive. Chrysippus in Stob. Floril. 63, 31, calls Epicurus ἀναίσθητος. Epicurus is, however, far below our standard of morality. Thus, in the quotation on p. 479, 1, he reckons ἡδοναὶ δι’ ἀφροδισίων among the necessary ingredients of the good. By Eustrat. in Eth. N. 48, such pleasures are included among φυσικαὶ (see p. 476, 3), not among ἡδοναὶ ἀναγκαῖαι. They are treated in the same light by Lucr. v. 1050; and Plut. Qu. Conviv. iii. 6, 1, 1, not only discusses the most suitable time for the enjoyment of love, but quotes as the words of Epicurus: εἰ γέρων ὁ σοφὸς ὢν καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος πλησιάζειν ἔτι ταῖς τῶν καλῶν ἁφαῖς χαίρει καὶ ψηλαφήσεσιν (N. P. Suav. V. 12, 3). These enjoyments, according to Epicurus, are only then allowed when they do not entail any bad consequences (Diog. 118), or produce passionate states of feeling. Hence he not only forbids unlawful commerce (Diog. 118), but declares οὐκ ἐρασθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν. Diog. 118; Stob. Floril. 63, 31. Eros is defined (Alex. Aphr. Top. 75) = σύντονος ὄρεξις ἀφροδισίων. Conf. Plut. Amat. 19, 16, p. 765. It is consequently a passionate and disturbing state, which the wise man must avoid. The Stoics, on the contrary, allowed Eros to their wise man. The same view is taken of Eros by Lucretius, who cannot find words strong enough to express the restlessness and confusion entailed by love, the state of dependence in which it places man, and the loss to his fortune and good name. His advice is to allay passion as quickly as possible by means of Venus volgivaga, and to gratify it in a calm way.

Diog. 120; 140; Cic. Tusc. ii. 12, 28; Lucr. iii. 59; 993.

Sen. De Const. 16, 1.

Diog. 118: οὐδὲ ταφῆς φροντιεῖν.

Lucr. iii. 74.

See pp. 479, 455. A further argument may, however, be here quoted. In Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 16, 3, he says: ὅτι νόσῳ νοσῶν ἀσκίτῃ τινὰς ἑστιάσεις φίλων συνῆγε, καὶ οὐκ ἐφθόνει τῆς προσαγωγῆς τοῦ ὑγροῦ τῷ ὕδρωπι, καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων Νεοκλέους λόγων μεμνημένος ἐτήκετο τῇ μετὰ δακρύων ἡδονῇ. It is true that a certain mawkishness and self-conceit may be detected in this language.

Diog. 119; Philodem. De Vit. ix. 12; 27, 40.

Diog. 120: κτήσεως προνοήσεσθαι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος. 121: χρηματίσεσθαί τε ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας ἀπορήσαντα. The limitation implied in the text would, however, seem to require μόνης. Philodem. in the same sense l.c. 23, 23, says that Epicurus received presents from his scholars, Conf. Plut. Adv. Col. 18, 3, also 15, 31.

Diog. 121: εἰκόνας τε ἀναθήσειν εἰ ἔχοι· ἀδιαφόρως ἕξειν ἂν μὴ σχοίη (Cobet, not intelligibly: ἀδιαφόρως ἂν σχοίης).

Epic. in Diog. 130: καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν οὐχ ἵνα πάντως τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλὰ τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα πεπεισμένοι γνησίως ὅτι ἥδιστα πολυτελείας ἀπολαύουσιν οἱ ἥκιστα αὐτῆς δεόμενοι.

The Epicurean in Cic. Fin. i. 15, 49: Si tolerabiles sint [dolores] feramus, sin minus, æquo animo e vita, cum ea non placeat, tanquam e theatro exeamus. Epic. in Sen. Ep. 12, 10: Malum est in necessitate vivere, sed in necessitate vivere necessitas nulla est. On the other hand, Ep. 24, 22: Objurgat Epicurus non minus eos qui mortem concupiscunt, quam eos, qui timent, et ait: ridiculum est currere ad mortem tædio vitæ, cum genere vitæ ut currendum esset ad mortem effeceris. Diog. 119, the older editions read: καὶ πηρωθεὶς τὰς ὄψεις μεθέξειν αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου. Cobet: μετάξειν αὑτὸν τοῦ βίου. Instead of πηρωθεὶς πηρωθέντα is read, or, as we might prefer, instead of μετάξειν μετάξει. Suicide was only allowed by Epicurus in extreme cases. In Seneca’s time, when an Epicurean, Diodorus, committed suicide, his fellow-scholars were unwilling to allow that suicide was permitted by the precepts of Epicurus (Sen. Vit. B. 19, 1).

Epict. Diss. ii. 20, 6: Ἐπίκουρος ὅταν ἀναιρεῖν θέλῃ τὴν φυσικὴν κοινωνίαν ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κ.τ.λ.

Diog. 150; 154. From this point of view, Lucr. v. 1106, gives a long description of the rise of a state.

Stob. Floril. 43, 139.

Diog. 150; Lucr. v. 1149; Sen. Ep. 97, 13, and 15; Plut. Adv. Col. 35. See p. 482, 4.

Diog. 150–153.

Diog. 140.

Plut. Adv. Col. 31; 33, 4; N. P. Suav. Vivi, 16, 9; Epictet. Diss. i. 23, 6; Lucr. v. 1125; Cic. pro Sext. 10, 23. Philodem. περὶ ῥητορικῆς (Vol. Herc. iv.) col. 14: οὐδὲ χρησίμην ἡγούμεθα τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν, οὔτ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς κεκτημένοις, οὔτε ταῖς πόλεσιν, αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτήν· ἀλλὰ πολλάκις αἰτίαν καὶ συμφορῶν ἀνηκέστων, when combined with uprightness, it benefits the community, and is sometimes useful; at other times, harmful to statesmen themselves.

Plut. De Latenter Vivendo, c. 4. In this respect, T. Pomponius Atticus is the true type of an Epicurean, on whose conduct during the civil war and withdrawal from public life, see Nepos, Att. 6.

Metrodorus, in Stob. Floril. 45, 26: ἐν πόλει μήτε ὡς λέων ἀναστρέφου μήτε ὡς κώνωψ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκπατεῖται τὸ δὲ καιροφυλακεῖται.

Seneca well expresses the difference on this point between Epicureans and Stoics in the passage quoted, p. 320, 3.

Plut. Tranq. An. c. 2, p. 465.

Epic. in Sen. Ep. 29, 10: Nunquam volui populo placere; nam quæ ego scio non probat populus, quæ probat populos ego nescio. Similar expressions from Stoics have been previously quoted.

Diog. 121: καὶ μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν [τὸν σοφόν]. Lucr. v. 1125:—

Ut satius multo jam sit parere quietum, Quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere.

Epict. Diss. i. 23, 3 (against Epicurus): διατὶ ἀποσυμβουλεύεις τῷ σοφῷ τεκνοτροφεῖν; τί φοβῇ μὴ διὰ ταῦτα εἰς λύπας ἐμπέσῃ; ii. 20, 20: Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν ἀνδρὸς πάντ’ ἀπεκόψατο καὶ τὰ οἰκοδεσπότου καὶ φίλου. The last words prove with what caution these statements must be taken.

Diog. 119. The passage is, however, involved in much obscurity, owing to a difference of reading. The earlier text was: καὶ μὴν καὶ γαμήσειν καὶ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφὸν, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ταῖς διαπορίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς περὶ φύσεως. κατὰ περίστασιν δέ ποτε βίου οὐ γαμήσειν. Cobet reads instead: καὶ μηδὲ γαμήσειν μηδὲ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφόν ... κατὰ περίστασιν δέ ποτε βίου γαμήσειν. What the MS. authority for this reading is, we are not told. In sense it agrees with Hieron. Adv. Jovin. i. 191, quoting from Seneca, De Matrimonio: Epicurus ... raro dicit sapienti ineunda conjugia, quia multa incommoda admixta sunt nuptiis. Like riches, honours, health, ita et uxores sitas in bonorum malorumque confinio, grave autem esse viro sapienti venire in dubium, utrum bonam an malam ducturus sit.

Plut. Adv. Col. 27, 6; De Am. Prol. 2, p. 495; Epictet. Diss. i. 23, 3.

Diog. 10: ἥ τε πρὸς τοὺς γονέας εὐχαριστία καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς εὐποιΐα. Diogenes himself appeals to Epicurus’ testament, ibid. 18.

Diog. 120: καὶ τὴν φιλίαν διὰ τὰς χρείας [γίνεσθαι] ... συνίστασθαι δὲ αὐτὴν κατὰ κοινωνίαν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς. Epic. Ibid. 148 (also in Cic. Fin. i. 20, 68): καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὡρισμένοις ἀσφάλεαν φιλίας μάλιστα κρήσει δεῖ νομίζειν συντελουμένην. (Cobet, however, reads: φιλίας μάλιστα κατιδεῖν εἶναι συντελυμένην, in which case φιλίᾳ should be substituted for φιλίας or else κτήσει for κατιδεῖν.) Sen. Ep. 9, 8: The wise man needs a friend, non ad hoc quod Epicurus dicebat in hac ipsa epistola (a letter in which Stilpo’s cynical self-contentment is blamed), ut habeat, qui sibi ægro adsideat, succurrat in vincula conjecto vel inopi; sed ut habeat aliquem, cui ipse ægro adsideat, quem ipse circumventum hostili custodia liberet. Cic. Fin. i. 20, 66: Cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur animus et a spe pariendarum voluptatum sejungi non potest, etc. On the same grounds, Philodem. De Vit. ix. (V. Herc. iii.) col. 24, argues that it is much better to cultivate friendship than to withdraw from it.

Cic. Fin. i. 20, 69.

Ibid. 70.

Ibid. 67.

The same need finds expression in the advice given by Epicurus (Sen. Ep. 11, 8; 25, 5): Let every one choose some distinguished man as his pattern, that so he may live, as it were, perpetually under his eye. Man requires a stranger to give him moral support.

As illustrations in modern times, the reunions of the French freethinkers, or the societies of Rousseau, Mendelssohn, Jacobi, may be mentioned. It deserves notice that in these societies, as amongst the Epicureans, an important part was played by women. This is quite natural, when philosophy is confined to cultivated intercourse and conversation.

Diog. 148: ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις. Cic. Fin. ii. 25, 80: Epicurus exalts friendship to heaven. In Diog. 120, Cobet reads instead of the usual φίλον τε οὐδένα κτήσεσθαι [τὸν σοφὸν], which is altogether untrustworthy, φίλων τε οὐδὲν κτήσεσθαι.

Sen. Ep. 19, 10, with the addition: Nam sine amico visceratio leonis ac lupi vita est.

Plut. Adv. Col. 8, 7; Diog. 121. We have no reason to suppose, with Ritter, iii. 474, that this was not the expression of a real sentiment. That it is inconsistent we can well allow.

The Epicureans in Cic. Fin. i. 20, 65: At vero Epicurus una in domo, et ea quidem angusta, quam magnos quantaque amoris conspiratione consentientes tenuit amicorum greges! quod fit etiam nunc ab Epicureis. Ibid. ii. 25, 80.

Instances have already been quoted, p. 418, 2, of the extravagant honours required by Epicurus; nor did he fail to eulogise his friends, as the fragments of his letters to Leontion, Themista, and Pythocles (Diog. 5) prove. When Metrodorus had tried to obtain the release of a captive friend, Epicurus applauded him (Plut. N. P. Sua. Vivi, 15, 5, Adv. Col. 33, 2): ὡς εὖ τε καὶ νεανικῶς ἐξ ἄστεως ἅλαδε κατέβη Μίθρῳ τῷ Σύρῳ βοηθήσων. Ibid. 15, 8, he expresses his thanks for a present: δαΐως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἐπεμελήθητε ἡμῶν τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σίτου κομιδὴν, καὶ οὐρανομήκη σημεῖα ἐνδέδειχθε τῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ εὐνοίας. He wrote of Pythocles before he was 18: οὐκ εἶναι φύσιν ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀμείνω, καὶ τερατικῶς αὐτὸν εὖ ἀπαγγέλλειν, καὶ πάσχειν αὖ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, εὐχόμενος ἀνεμέσητα εἶναι πάντα καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ νεανισκοῦ (Plut. Adv. Col. 29, 2); and he also said (Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας, Fr. 6, V. Herc. v. 2, 11): ὡς διὰ Πυθοκλέα τύχην θεώσει παρὰ τὸ τεθεμισμένον. Compare the remarks on p. 488, 3.

Diog. 11: τόν τε Ἐπίκουρον μὴ ἀξιοῦν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν κατατίθεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας καθάπερ τὸν Πυθαγόραν κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων λέγοντα, ἀπιστούντων γὰρ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον· εἰ δ’ ἀπίστων οὐδὲ φίλων.

Philodem. περὶ παῤῥησίας (V. Herc. v. 2), Fr. 15; 72; 73, mentions Epicurus and Metrodorus as patterns of genial frankness towards friends. Probably the words in Sen. Ep. 28, 9—initium salutis est notitia peccati—are taken from a moral exhortation addressed to a friend.

Not only does Diogenes 9, praise his unequalled benevolence, his kindness to his slaves, and his general geniality, but Cicero calls him (Tusc. ii. 19, 44) vir optimus, and (Fin. ii. 25, 30) bonum virum et comem et humanum.

Diog. 118: οὔτε κολάσειν οἰκέτας ἐλεήσειν μέντοι, καὶ συγγνώμην τινὶ ἕξειν τῶν σπουδαίων. 121. ἐπιχαρίσεσθαί τινι ἐπὶ τῷ διορθώματι.

Plut. N. P. Suav. Vi. 15, 4 (similarly C. Princ. Philos. 3, 2, p. 778): αὐτοὶ δὲ δήπου λέγουσιν ὡς τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἥδιόν ἐστι τοῦ πάσχειν. Conf. Alex. Aphr. Top. 123. A similar maxim is attributed by Ælian, V. H. xiii. 13, to Ptolemy Lagi. Conf. Acts xx. 35.

Cic. Fin. ii. 25, 81: Et ipse bonus vir fuit et multi Epicurei fuerunt et hodie sunt, et in amicitiis fideles et in omni vita constantes et graves nec voluptate sed officio consilia moderantes. Atticus is a well-known example of genuine human kindness and ready self-sacrifice, and Horace may be also quoted as an illustration of the same character. See Steinhart’s remarks, l.c. p. 470.

See p. 445.

Conf. p. 126, 2, with 439, 1.

It has been already stated, p. 405, 1, 4, that Epicurus admitted his debt to Democritus, but not without some reserve; otherwise he claimed to be entirely self-taught, and to have learned nothing from the ancient teachers, and expressed himself with such conceit and scorn as to spare neither them nor their writings. Diog. 8, besides mentioning his abuse of Nausiphanes (sup. 342, 1), refers also to his calling the Platonists Διονυσοκόλακας, Plato himself in irony the golden Plato, Heraclitus κυκητήν, Democritus Ληρόκριτον, Antidorus Σαινίδωρον, the Cynics ἐχθροὺς τῆς Ἑλλάδος, the Dialecticians πολυφθονέρους, Pyrrho ἀμαθῆν and ἀπαίδευτον, and charging Aristotle and Protagoras with vices in their youth. Diogenes refuses to allow that any of these statements are true, Epicurus’ friendliness being well known. But the devotion of Epicurus to his friends and admirers does not exclude hatred and injustice towards his predecessors (see p. 418, 2), of whom a fair estimate was rendered impossible by the superficial nature of his knowledge and the onesidedness of his point of view. Sext. Math. i. 2, attests τὴν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους δυσμένειαν; Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 1, mentions a false objection to Arcesilaus; and Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93, says: Cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Phædoni Socratico turpissime maledixerit, etc. The rude jokes mentioned by Diogenes are in harmony with a man whom Cic. N. D. ii. 17, 46, calls homo non aptissimus ad jocandum minimeque resipiens patriam. On these jokes he apparently prided himself as well as on a certain bombastic elegance. See p. 496, 6. In this Epicurus was followed by his pupils. Cic. N. D. i. 34, 93, says of Zeno: Non eos solum, qui tunc erant, Apollodorum, Silum, ceteros figebat maledictis, sed Socratem ipsum ... scurram Atticum fuisse dicebat (according to Cic. Brut. 85, 292, Epicurus had already expressed a disparaging opinion of the Socratic irony), Chrysippum nunquam nisi Chrysippam vocabat.

Compare in this connection the quotations from Metrodorus on p. 476, 1.

Democritus had denied all truth to sensuous impressions. The same sceptical tone was more strongly apparent in Metrodorus (Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 19, 5; Sext. Math. vii. 88; Epiphan. Exp. Fid. 1088, A, although he cannot be considered a full Sceptic, notwithstanding his usual agreement with the physical views of Democritus (Plut. in Eus. l.c. i. 8, 11; id. Fac. Lun. 15, 3, p. 928; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 19). Scepticism appears to have passed from him to Pyrrho, Anaxarchus being the middleman (see p. 518, 2, 3), and herewith may be connected the Sceptical imperturbability. This doctrine of imperturbability being held by Epicurus, the pupil of Nansiphanes, it might be supposed that before Pyrrho’s time a doctrine not unlike that of Pyrrho had been developed in the School of Democritus, from whom it was borrowed by Epicurus. The connection is, however, uncertain. We have seen that the doubts of Democritus extended only to sense-impressions, not to intellectual knowledge. The case of Metrodorus was similar. His sceptical expressions refer only to the ordinary conditions of human knowledge, that of ideas derived from the senses: greater dependence is, however, placed on thought. We must therefore take the statement ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶν ὃ ἄν τις νοήσαι subject to this limitation. Anaxarchus is said (Sext. Math. vii. 87) to have compared the world to a stage-scene, which involves no greater scepticism than the similar expressions used by Plato as to the phenomenal world. However much, therefore, these individuals may have contributed to Pyrrhonism, a simple transference of Scepticism from Democritus to Pyrrho is not to be thought of. And as regards imperturbability, Epicurus may have borrowed the expression from Pyrrho, whom, according to Diog. ix. 64 and 69, he both knew and esteemed.

Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 1; Diog. ix. 61. We are indebted almost exclusively to Diogenes for our information respecting Pyrrho. Besides Antigonus the Carystian, Apollodorus, Alexander Polyhistor, Diocles, &c., are the chief authorities drawn upon by Diogenes.

Attention has been drawn to the chronological difficulties in ‘Socrates and the Socratic Schools,’ p. 255, note 1 (2nd edition). Either Pyrrho is falsely called a pupil of Bryso, or Bryso is falsely called the son of Stilpo. The former seems more probable, Diog. ix. 61, having derived his statement from Alexander’s διαδοχαί, and it is quite in the style of the compilers of the διαδοχαὶ to assign a Megarian teacher to a Sceptic whose connection with that School was sufficiently obvious.

Diog. ix. 61; Aristocl. l.c. 18, 20; 17, 8. We gather from them that Pyrrho was originally a painter. Suidas, Πύῤῥων, only copies the present text of Diogenes with a few mistakes.

Besides the passage quoted from Sextus, p. 515, 1, which is little known, we have no proof of the sceptical tone in Anaxarchus which Sextus, Math. vii. 48, attributes to him, and since the latter quotes no proofs, it may be assumed that he had none. Anaxarchus appears to have been unjustly included among the Sceptics, like so many others who were called Sceptics by later writers on the strength of a single word or expression. According to other accounts, he belonged to the School of Democritus. Plut. Tranq. An. 4, p. 466. In Valer. Max. viii. 14, ext. 2, he propounds to Alexander the doctrine of an infinite number of worlds; and Clemens, Strom. i. 287, B, quotes a fragment, in which, agreeing with Democritus, he observes that πολυμαθία is only useful when it is properly made use of. Like Epicurus, Anaxarchus followed Democritus, calling happiness the highest object of our desire; and this assertion probably gained for him the epithet ὁ εὐδαιμονικός (Clemens, l.c.; Athen. vi. 250; xii. 548, b; Æl. V. H. ix. 37). In other respects, he differed from Democritus. For first he is charged by Clearchus in Athen. xii. 548, b, with a luxurious indulgence far removed from the earnest and pure spirit of Democritus; and according to Plut. Alex. 52, he had, when in Asia, renounced the independence of a philosopher for a life of pleasure; Timon also in Plut. Virt. Mor. 6, p. 446, says he was led away by φύσις ἡδονοπλὴξ contrary to his better knowledge. Again, he is said to have commended in Pyrrho (Diog. ix. 63) an indifference which went a good deal beyond the imperturbability of Democritus; and Timon commends him for his κυνικὸν μένος. He meets external pain with the haughty pride expressed in his much-admired dictum under the blows of Nitocreon’s club—Diog. ix. 59; Plut. Virt. Mor. c. 10, p. 449; Clemens, Strom. iv. 496, D; Valer. Max. iii. 3, ext. 4; Plin. Hist. Nat. vii. 87; Tertull. Apol. 50; Dio Chrysos. Or. 37, p. 126, B. But he treats men with the same contempt; and whilst meeting the Macedonian conqueror with an air of independence, he spoils the whole by adroit flattery. Conf. Plut. Alex. 52; Ad Princ. Iner. 4, p. 781; Qu. Conv. ix. 1, 2, 5; Æl. V. H. ix. 37; Athen. vi. 250. His indifference was, at any rate, very much lacking in nobility. Respecting Anaxarchus see Lusac. Lect. Att. 181.

Diog. ix. 64; 109.

According to Diog. 64, they made him head-priest, and, on his account, allowed to philosophers immunity from taxation. According to Diocles (Diog. 65), the Athenians presented him with citizenship for his services in putting a Thracian prince Cotys to death.

Diog. 66; 62.

Examples in Diog. 67. It sounds, however, highly improbable; and doubts were expressed by Ænesidemus whether his indifference ever went to the extent described by Antigonus, Ibid. 62, of not getting out of the way of carriages and precipices, so that he had to be preserved from danger by his friends. He must, moreover, have enjoyed a special good fortune to attain the age of 90, notwithstanding such senseless conduct.

All the dates here are very uncertain. Neither the date of his death nor of his birth is given, and the notice in Suidas that he lived after the 111 Olympiad (336–332 B.C.) is indefinite. If, however, as Diog. 62 says, he attained the age of 90, and if he joined Anaxarchus at Alexander’s first invasion of Asia, being then between 24 and 30, the statements above given are true.

Diog. Pro. 16; 102; Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 1 are better authorities than Sext. Math. i. 282, or Plut. Alex. Fort. i. 10, p. 331. Neither does Sextus say that the supposed poem on Alexander was extant. The whole statement is evidently untrustworthy.

Timon (see Wachsmuth, De Timone Phliasio, Leipzig, 1859) was a native of Phlius (Diog. ix. 109). A public dancer at first (Diog. 109; Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 12), when tired of this mode of life he repaired to Megara, to hear Stilpo (Diog. 109). Stilpo being alive in the third century, and Timon’s birth having happened approximately between 325–315 B.C., the connection is not so impossible as Wachsmuth, p. 5, and Preller, Hist. Phil. Gr. et Rom. 398, suppose, though in the uncertainty of chronological data it cannot be positively stated. Subsequently Timon became acquainted with Pyrrho, and leaving his staunch admirers (Diog. 109, 69; Aristocl. l.c. 11, 14, 21), removed with his wife to Elis. He then appeared as a teacher in Chalcis, and, having amassed a fortune, concluded his life in Athens (Diog. 110; 115). It appears from Diog. 112 and 115, that he survived Arcesilaus (who died 241 B.C.), having nearly attained the age of 90. His death may therefore be approximately fixed in 230, his birth in 320 B.C. For his life and character, see Diog. 110; 112–115; Athen. x. 438, a; Æl. V. H. ii. 41. Of his numerous writings, the best known is a witty and pungent satire on previous and cotemporary philosophers. Respecting this satire (Diog. 110) consult Wachsmuth, p. 9 and 3. The latter, p. 51, has collected the fragments.

Diog. 67–69, mentions, besides Timon, a certain Eurylochus as his pupil, who, however, was not very successful in the way of keeping his temper; also Philo, an Athenian, Hecatæus of Abdera, the well-known historian (on whom see Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. ii. 384); and Nausiphanes, the teacher of Epicurus. The last assertion is only tenable on the supposition that Nausiphanes appeared as a teacher only a few years after Pyrrho, for Pyrrho cannot have returned to Elis before 322 B.C., and Epicurus must have left the School of Nausiphanes before 310 B.C. See p. 406, 3. According to Diog. 64, Epicurus must have become acquainted with Pyrrho whilst a pupil of Nausiphanes. Nausiphanes is said not to have agreed with Pyrrho, but only to have admired his character (Diog. l.c.), so that he cannot properly be called his pupil. The mention of Numenius, by Diog. 102 (conf. 68), among Pyrrho’s συνήθεις, is suspicious, because Ænesidemus is named at the same time. It may be questioned whether he as well as Ænesidemus does not belong to a later period of Scepticism.

According to Diog. 115, Menodotus (a Sceptic belonging to the latter half of the second century after Christ) asserted that Timon left no successor, and that the School was in abeyance from Timon to Ptolemæus, i.e. until the second half of the first century B.C. Sotion and Hippobotus, however, asserted that his pupils were Dioscurides, Nicolochus, Euphranor, and Praÿlus. His son, too, the physician Xanthus, followed the father. (Diog. 109.) That Timon was himself a physician, as Wachsmuth, p. 5, supposes, cannot be concluded with certainty from the words ἰατρικὸν ἐδίδαξε, since these words only imply that he had received instruction in medicine. On the other hand, according to Suid. Πύῤῥων, the second Pyrrho, called Timon’s pupil, was a changeling. If Aratus of Soli was a pupil (Suid. Ἄρατος; conf. Diog. ix. 113), he was certainly not a follower of his views. See p. 43, 2.

In Diog. 116, Eubulus is called a pupil of Euphranor, also on the authority of Sotion and Hippobotus. If Ptolemæus was the next one who is said to have come after him, no philosopher of Pyrrho’s ἀγωγὴ can have been known for 150 years.

Diog. 114.

Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 2: ὁ δέ γε μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ Τίμων φησὶ δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαιμονήσειν εἰς τρία ταῦτα βλέπειν· πρῶτον μὲν ὁποῖα πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα· δεύτερον δὲ, τίνα χρὴ τρόπον ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτὰ διακεῖσθαι· τελευταῖον δὲ τί περιέσται τοῖς οὕτως ἔχουσιν.

Aristocl. l.c.: τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματά φησιν αὐτὸν (Pyrrho) ἀποφαίνειν ἐπίσης ἀδιάφορα καὶ ἀστάθμητα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτα, διὰ τοῦτο [τὸ] μήτε τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡμῶν μήτε τὰς δόξας ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. Diog. ix. 61: οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε εἶναι ἕκαστον. Gell. xi. 5, 4: Pyrrho is said to have stated οὐ μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει τόδε ἢ ἐκείνως ἢ οὐθετέρως.

See the above-quoted passage of Aristocles and Diog. ix. 114.

Timon, in Diog. ix. 105: τὸ μέλι ὅτι ἐστὶ γλυκὺ οὐ τίθημι· τὸ δ’ ὅτι φαίνεται ὁμολογῶ.

Diog. ix. 61: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔφασκεν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε αἰσχρὸν οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων, μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, νόμῳ δὲ καὶ ἔθει πάντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράττειν, οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε εἶναι ἕκαστον. Sext. Math. xi. 140: οὔτε ἀγαθόν τί ἐστι φύσει οὔτε κακὸν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα νόῳ κέκριται κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα.

In this sense the words of Ænesidemus, in Diog. ix. 106, must be understood: οὐδέν φησιν ὁρίζειν τὸν Πύῤῥωνα δογματικῶς διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν. See note 1.

Diog. ix. 114, on Timon: συνεχές τε ἐπιλέγειν εἰώθει πρὸς τοὺς τὰς αἰσθήσεις μετ’ ἐπιμαρτυροῦντος τοῦ νοῦ ἐγκρίνοντας· συνῆλθεν Ἀτταγᾶς τε καὶ Νουμήνιος. The meaning of this proverb has been already explained.

Diog. ix. 79 refers these τρόποι to Pyrrho, but inasmuch as he was there describing Sceptic views, the author of which to his mind was Pyrrho, nothing follows from his statement. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 36 generally attributes them to the ancient Sceptics, by whom, according to Math. vii. 345, he understood Ænesidemus and his followers. Aristocles, l.c. 18, 11, refers them to Ænesidemus, and they may easily have been referred to Pyrrho by mistake, since Ænesidemus himself (Diog. ix. 106) and subsequent writers (Favorin. in Gell. xi. 5, 5; Philostr. Vit. Soph. i. 491) call every kind of sceptical statement λόγοι or τρόποι Πυῤῥώνειοι. That they cannot belong to Pyrrho in the form in which they are presented by Sextus and Diogenes is clear, since they obviously refer to later views.

Sext. Math. vi. 66; x. 197 quotes an argument of Timon against the reality of time, and further states (Math. iv. 2) that Timon, in his conflict with the philosophers of nature, maintained that no assertion should be made without proof: in other words, he denied dogmatism; for every proof supposes something established, i.e. another proof, and so on for ever.

Aristocl. l.c. 18, 3: διὰ τοῦτο οὖν μηδὲ πιστεύειν αὐτοῖς δεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἀδοξάστους καὶ ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀκραδάντους εἶναι περὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου λέγοντας ὅτι οὐ μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ καὶ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτ’ οὐκ ἔστιν. Diog. ix. 61. Ibid. 76: οὐ μᾶλλον means, according to Timon, τὸ μηδὲν ὁρίζειν ἀλλὰ ἀπροσθετεῖν.

Ænesidem. in Diog. ix. 106: οὐδὲν ὁρίζειν τὸν Πύῤῥωνα δογματικῶς διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν, τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν. Timon. Ibid. 105. See p. 522, 3.

Diog. ix. 103: περὶ μὲν ὧν ὡς ἄνθρωποι πάσχομεν ὁμολογοῦμεν ... περὶ δὲ ὧν οἱ δογματικοὶ διαβεβαιοῦνται τῷ λόγῳ φάμενοι κατειλῆφθαι ἐπέχομεν περὶ τούτων ὡς ἀδήλων· μόνα δὲ τὰ πάθη γινώσκομεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι ὁρῶμεν ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ τὸ ὅτι τόδε νοοῖμεν γινώσκομεν, πῶς δ’ ὁρῶμεν ἢ πῶς νοοῦμεν ἀγνοοῦμεν· καὶ ὅτι τόδε λευκὸν φαίνεται διηγηματικῶς λέγομεν οὐ διαβεβαιούμενοι εἰ καὶ ὄντως ἐστί ... καὶ γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον τιθέμεθα οὐχ ὡς καὶ τοιοῦτον ὄν· καὶ ὅτι πῦρ καίει αἰσθανόμεθα· εἰ δὲ φύσιν ἔχει καυστικήν, ἐπέχομεν.

Diog. l.c.: περὶ δὲ τῆς Οὐδὲν ὁρίζω φωνῆς καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων λέγομεν ὡς οὐ δογμάτων· οὐ γάρ εἰσιν ὅμοια τῷ λέγειν ὅτι σφαιροειδής ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἄδηλον, αἱ δὲ ἐξομολογήσεις εἰσίν. ἐν ᾧ οὖν λέγομεν μηδὲν ὁρίζειν οὐδ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁριζόμεθα. Diog. gives this view in its later form, probably following Sext. Pyrrh. i. 197, but agreeing in substance with the quotations from Timon and Pyrrho.

Diog. ix. 61 and 107; Aristocl. l.c. The expressions ἀφασία, ἀκαταληψία, ἐποχὴ, invariably mean the same thing. Later writers use instead of them, ἀῤῥεψία, ἀγνωσία τῆς ἀληθείας κ.τ.λ. If, according to Aristocles and Diog. 107, Timon first mentioned ἀφασία in dealing with the third of his questions, this statement is obviously inaccurate.

Πυῤῥώνειοι, σκεπτικοὶ, ἀπορητικοὶ, ἐφεκτικοὶ, ζητητικοί. Conf. Diog. 69.

Aristocl. l.c. 2: τοῖς μέντοι διακειμένοις οὕτω περιέσεσθαι Τίμων φησὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀφασίαν ἔπειτα δ’ ἀταραξίαν. Diog. 107: τέλος δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοί φασι τὴν ἐποχὴν, ᾗ σκιᾶς τρόπον ἐπακολουθεῖ ἡ ἀταραξία, ὥς φασιν οἵ τε περὶ τὸν Τίμωνα καὶ Αἰνεσίδημον. Apathy is substituted for ataraxy in Diog. 108; Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 130.

Timon, in Aristocl. l.c. 18, 14, speaking of Pyrrho:—

ἀλλ’ οἷον τὸν ἄτυφον ἐγὼ ἴδον ἠδ’ ἀδάμαστον πᾶσιν, ὅσοις δάμνανται ὁμῶς ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε (conf. Wachsmuth, p. 62) λαῶν ἔθνεα κοῦφα, βαρυνόμεν’ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἐκ παθέων δόξης τε καὶ εἰκαίης νομοθήκης.

Id. in Sext. Math. xi. 1: The Sceptic lives—

ῥῇστα μεθ’ ἡσυχίης αἰεὶ ἀφροντίστως καὶ ἀκινήτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ μὴ προσέχων δειλοῖς ἡδυλόγου σοφίης.

Id. in Diog. 65.

Cic. Fin. ii. 13, 43: Quæ (externals) quod Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime ægrotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse. iii. 3, 11: Cum Pyrrhone et Aristone qui omnia exæquent. Acad. ii. 42, 130: Pyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quæ ἀπάθεια nominatur. Epictet. Fragm. 93 (in Stob. Serm. 121, 28): Πύῤῥων ἔλεγεν μηδὲν διαφέρειν ζῇν ἢ τεθνάναι.

Cic. Fin. iv. 16, 43: Pyrrho ... qui virtute constituta nihil omnino quod appetendum sit relinquat. The same Ibid. ii. 13, 43; iii. 4, 12.

See p. 521, 3; 525, 3.

Diog. 105: ὁ Τίμων ἐν τῷ Πύθωνί φησι μὴ ἐκβεβηκέναι [τὸν Πύῤῥωνα] τὴν συνήθειαν. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἰνδαλμοῖς οὕτω λέγει· ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον παντὶ σθένει οὗπερ ἂν ἔλθῃ. (Conf. Sext. Math. vii. 30.) Ibid. 106, of Pyrrho: τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν. See p. 519, 4.

See p. 524, 1, 2.

Sext. Math. xi. 20: κατὰ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον τούτων ἕκαστον ἔχομεν ἔθος ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον προσαγορεύειν καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τοῖς ἰνδαλμοῖς ἔοικε δηλοῦν ὅταν φῇ

ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω ὥς μοι καταφαίνεται εἶναι μῦθον ἀληθείης ὀρθὸν ἔχων κανόνα· ὡς ἡ τοῦ θείου τε φύσις καὶ τἀγαθοῦ αἰεὶ, ἐξ ὧν ἰσότατος γίγνεται ἀνδρὶ βίος.

According to an anecdote preserved by Antigonus of Carystus (Aristocl. l.c. 18, 19; Diog. ix. 66), Pyrrho apologised for being agitated by saving: It is difficult to lay aside humanity altogether. This language only proves what his aim was, and that he had found no mediating principle between the apathy required by his system and practical needs. Neither do the remarks of Ritter, iii. 451, prove that the doctrine of moderation belongs to Pyrrho and his school.

Conf. Diog. ix. 114. Tennemann’s view (Gesch. d. Phil. iv. 190), that Arcesilaus arrived at his conclusions independently of Pyrrho, does not appear to be tenable.

Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 10; 6, 5, says that Zeno and Arcesilaus were fellow-pupils under Polemo, and that their rivalry whilst at school was the origin of the later quarrels between the Stoa and the Academy. The same may have been stated by Antiochus, since Cic. Acad. i. 9, 35, ii. 24, 76, appeals to him to prove that they were together at school. Still the assertion is valueless. There can be no doubt that both Zeno and Arcesilaus were pupils of Polemo, but it is hardly possible that they can have been under him at the same time; nor if they were, could the intellectual differences of the two schools be referred simply to their personal relation.

Cic. De Orat. ii. 18, 68; Diog. iv. 28; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16; Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220. Clemens, Strom. i. 301, C, calls Arcesilaus the founder of the New (second or middle) Academy.

Arcesilaus (see Geffers, De Arcesila, Gött. 1842, Gymn. Progr.) was born at Pitane, in Æolia (Strabo, xiii. 1, 67, p. 614; Diog. iv. 28). His birth-year is not stated; but as Lacydes (Diog. iv. 61) was his successor in 240 B.C., and he was then 75 years of age (Diog. 44), it must have been about 315 B.C. Having enjoyed the instruction of the mathematician Autolycus in his native town, he repaired to Athens, where he was first a pupil of Theophrastus, but was won for the Academy by Crantor (Diog. 29; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 2). With Crantor he lived on the most intimate terms; but as Polemo was the president of the Academy, he is usually called a pupil of Polemo (Cic. De Orat. iii. 18, 67; Fin. v. 31, 94; Strabo). On the death of Polemo, he was probably a pupil of Crates; but it is not stated by Diog. 33, or Numen. in Eus. l.c. xiv. 5, 10, that he was a pupil of either Pyrrho, Menedemus, or Diodorus. If Eusebius seems to imply it, he may have misunderstood the statement that he made use of their teaching. Fortified with extraordinary acuteness, penetrating wit, and ready speech (Diog. 30; 34; 37; Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 18; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 2; Plut. De Sanit. 7, p. 126; Qu. Conv. vii. 5, 3, 7; ii. 1, 10, 4; Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 193, 28), learned, especially in mathematics (Diog. 32), and well acquainted with native poets (Diog. 30, who mentions his own attempts at poetry, quoting some of his epigrams), he appears to have early distinguished himself. From Plut. Adv. Col. 26, p. 1121, it appears that in Epicurus’ lifetime, consequently before 270 B.C., he had propounded his sceptical views with great success. Apollodorus, however, appears to have placed his career too early (Diog. 45), in making his ἀκμὴ between 300 and 296 B.C. On the death of Crates, the conduct of the School devolved upon Arcesilaus (Diog. 32), through whom it attained no small note (Strabo, i. 2, 2, p. 15; Diog. 37; Numen. in Eus. xiv. 6, 14). From public matters he held aloof, and lived in retirement (Diog. 39), esteemed even by opponents for his pure, gentle, and genial character (Diog. 37; quoting many individual traits, 44; vii. 171; ix. 115; Cic. Fin. v. 31, 94; Plut. De Adulat. 22, p. 63; Coh. Ira, 13, p. 461. Ælian, V. H. xiv. 96). On his relations to Cleanthes, conf. Diog. vii. 171; Plut. De Adulat. 11, p. 55. He left no writings (Diog. 32; Plut. Alex. Virt. 4, p. 328).

Cic. De Orat. iii. 18, 67: Arcesilas primum ... ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit: quem ferunt ... aspernatum esse omne animi sensusque judicium, primumque instituisse ... non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se sentire dixisset, disputare. This is, in fact, the calumniandi licentia with which Augustin, herein doubtless following Cicero, c. Acad. iii. 17, 39, charges him, contra omnia velle dicere quasi ostentationis causa.

Conf. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv, 6, 12, and above, p. 86, 4.

Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 2; Cic. Acad. i. 12, 44. Ritter’s view of the latter passage, that Arcesilaus quoted the diversities of philosophic teaching by way of refuting it (iii. 478), appears to be entirely without foundation. He rather quoted its uniform resemblance by way of overcoming doubt.

Cic. De Orat. iii. 18. See p. 530, 1.

Sext. Pyrrh. i. 234; Diocles of Cnidus, in Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, 5; Augustin, c. Acad. iii. 17, 38. Geffers regards Arcesilaus as a true follower of the older Academy.

Sext. Math. vii. 153.

Sext. Math. l.c. 154.

Cic. Acad. ii. 24, 27. Zeno asserted: An irresistible or conceptional perception is such an impression of a real object as cannot possibly come from an unreal one. Arcesilaus endeavoured to prove nullum tale visum esse a vero, ut non ejusdem modi etiam a falso posset esse. The same view in Sext. l.c. To these may be added discussions on deceptions of the senses and contradictions in the statements of the senses in Sext. vii. 408, and others attributed to the Academicians. Conf. Cic. N. D. i. 25, 70: Urgebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum ipse falsa omnia diceret, quæ sensibus viderentur, Zenon autem nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia. To these attacks on Zeno Plut. De An. (Fr. vii.) 1, probably refers: ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν αἴτιον τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὡς Ἀρκεσίλαος. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη τῆς ἐπιστήμης αἴτια φανεῖται. All that is here attributed to Arcesilaus is the assertion that ἐπιστητόν is the cause of ἐπιστήμη, and that it is so when it produces a φαντασία καταληπτική. The connection in which these statements were made by Arcesilaus was probably this: If there is such a thing as knowledge, there must be objects which produce it. These objects, however, do not exist, there being no object which does not admit a false opinion equally well with a true one.

Sext. 155: μὴ οὔσης δὲ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὐδὲ κατάληψις γενήσεται· ἦν γὰρ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσις· μὴ οὔσης δὲ καταλήψεως πάντα ἔσται ἀκατάληπτα.

Sext. l.c.; Cic. Acad. i. 12, 45; ii. 20, 66; Plut. Adv. Col. 24, 2; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16; 6, 4. By Sext. Pyrrh. i. 233, it is thus expressed: Arcesilaus regards ἐποχὴ as being a good in every case, συγκατάθεσις as an evil.

Cic. Acad. i. 12, 45.

Cic. Fin. ii. 1, 2; v. 4, 11; De Orat. iii. 18, 67; Diog. iv. 28; conf. Plut. C. Not. 37, 7.

Stob. Floril. 82, 4: Ἀρκεσίλαος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἔφη τοὺς διαλεκτικοὺς ἐοικέναι τοῖς ψηφοπαίκταις (jugglers), οἵτινες χαριέντως παραλογίζονται; and, Ibid. 10 (under the heading: Ἀρκεσιλάου ἐκ τῶν Σερήνου ἀπομνημονευμάτων): διαλεκτικὴν δὲ φεῦγε, συγκυκᾷ τἄνω κάτω.

The authority is a very uncertain one, particularly as Arcesilaus left nothing in writing, and the remarks quoted would seem to be more appropriate to the Chian Aristo (see p. 59) than to Arcesilaus. Still, if Chrysippus condemned the dialectic of the Sceptics (according to p. 66, 1), Arcesilaus may very well have condemned that of the Stoics and Megarians. Does not even Cic. Acad. ii. 28, 91, probably following Carneades (see p. 541, 4), object to dialectic, because it furnishes no knowledge?

This fact is recognised not only by Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, 4, but by Sext. Pyrrh. i. 232. The difference which the later Sceptics draw between themselves and the Academicians, viz. that they assert the principle of doubt tentatively, whereas the Academicians assert it absolutely, does not apply to Arcesilaus (see p. 533, 1). Even Sextus says the same, but with some diffidence (πλὴν εἰ μὴ λέγοι τις ὅτι κ.τ.λ.). On account of this connection with Pyrrho, the Stoic Aristo called Arcesilaus (following Il. vi. 181): πρόσθε Πλάτων ὄπιθεν Πύῤῥων, μέσος Διόδωρος. Sext. l.c.; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 5, 11; Diog. iv. 33.

It has been already seen that this was the key to the position which the Stoics and Epicureans took up against the Sceptics.

Plut. Adv. Col. 26, 3, defending Arcesilaus against the attacks of Colotes, says: The opponents of Scepticism cannot show that ἐποχὴ leads to inactivity, for πάντα πειρῶσι καὶ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῖς οὐχ ὑπήκουσεν ἡ ὁρμὴ γενέσθαι συγκατάθεσις οὐδὲ τῆς ῥοπῆς ἀρχὴν ἐδέξατο τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἀγωγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐφάνη μὴ δεομένη τοῦ προστίθεσθαι. Perception arises and influences the will without συγκατάθεσις. Since this statement was controverted by Chrysippus (Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 12. See above 87, 1), there can be no doubt that it was propounded by Arcesilaus.

Sext. Math. vii 158: ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἔδει καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ Βίου διεξαγωγῆς ζητεῖν ἥ τις οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου πέφυκεν ἀποδίδοσθαι, ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τουτέστι τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος, ἠρτημένην ἔχει τὴν πίστιν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὅτι ὁ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων κανονιεῖ τᾶς αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς καὶ κοινῶς τὰς πράξεις τῷ εὐλόγῳ, κατὰ τοῦτό τε προερχόμενος τὸ κριτήριον κατορθώσει· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν περιγίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς φρονήσεως, τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν κινεῖσθαι ἐν τοῖς κατορθώμασι, τὸ δὲ κατόρθωμα εἶναι (according to the Stoic definition) ὅπερ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν. ὁ προσέχων οὖν τῷ εὐλόγῳ κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει. It is a mistake to suppose, with Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, that, Arcesilaus denied probabilities.

In Plut. Tran. An. 9, sub fin. p. 470, he gives the advice rather to devote attention to oneself and ones own life than to works of art and other external things. In Stob. Floril. 95, 17, he says: Poverty is burdensome, but educates for virtue. Ibid. 43, 91: Where there are most laws, there are most transgressions of law. Plut. Cons. ad Apoll. 15, p. 110, has a saying of his as to the folly of the fear of death. Id. De Sanit. 7, p. 126, Qu. Conv. vii. 5, 3, 7, records a somewhat severe judgment on adulterers and prodigals. Quite unique is the statement in Tertull. Ad. Nation. ii. 2: Arcesilaus held that there were three kinds of Gods (in other words he divided the popular Gods into three classes): the Olympian, the stars, and the Titans. It implies that he criticised the belief in the Gods. It also appears by the language used in Plut. C. Not. 37, 7, respecting the Stoic theory of a κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλου, that his criticism of dogmatism extended to natural science.

Conf. p. 529, 3 sub fin.

Geffers, De Arcesilæ Successoribus (including Carneades): Gött. 1845. Arcesilaus was succeeded by Lacydes of Cyrene, who died 240 B.C., after presiding over the School for 26 years. In his lifetime (probably shortly before his death) he entrusted it to the care of the Phocæans Telecles and Euandros (Diog. iv. 59–61). The statements made in Diog. l.c., Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, Plut. De Adul. 22, p. 63, Ælian, V. H. ii. 41, Athen. x. 438, a. xiii. 606, C, Plin. H. N. x. 22, 51, refer to individual peculiarities which he appears to have had. They must be received with caution, particularly the gossip which Diog. 59 mentions casually and Numenius dwells upon with intolerable garrulity. Diog. calls him ἀνὴρ σεμνότατος καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγους ἐσχηκὼς ζηλωτάς· φιλόπονός τε ἐκ νέου καὶ πένης μὲν, εὔχαρις δ’ ἄλλως καὶ εὐόμιλος. To his admirers belongs Attalus I. of Pergamum. A visit to his court was however declined in skilful language (Diog. 60, which Geffers, p. 5, clearly misunderstands). In doctrine, he deviated little from Arcesilaus, and, having been the first to commit to writing the teaching of the New Academy (Suid. Λακ.: ἔγραψε φιλόσοφα καὶ περὶ φύσεως—the latter is somewhat extraordinary for a Sceptic), he was by some mistake called its founder (Diog. 59). According to Diog. vii. 183, see p. 46, 1, he appears to have taught in the Academy during Arcesilaus’ lifetime. Panaretus (Athen. xii. 552, d; Æl. V. H. x. 6), Demophanes, and Ecdemus or Ecdelus (Plutarch. Philopon. 1; Arat. 5, 7) are also called pupils of Arcesilaus. The most distinguished pupil of Lacydes, according to Eus. xiv. 7, 12, was Aristippus of Cyrene, also mentioned by Diog. ii. 83. Another, Paulus, is mentioned by Timotheus, in Clemens, Strom. 496, D. His successors were Telecles and Euander, who jointly presided over the School. Euander, however, according to Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, Diog. 60, Eus. l.c., survived his colleague, and was followed by Hegesinus (Diog. 60; Cic. l.c.) or Hegesilaus (as he is called by Clemens, Strom. p. 301, C). who was the immediate predecessor of Carneades. Respecting these individuals nothing is known beyond the names.

Carneades, the son of Epicomus or Philocomus, was born at Cyrene (Diog. iv. 62; Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, p. 838; Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 5), and died, according to Apollodorus (Diog. 65), 129 B.C., in his 85th year. Lucian, Macrob. 20, assigns to him the same age. With less probability Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, Valer. Max. viii. 7, 5, extend his age to 90, making his birth-year 213 B.C. Later admirers find it remarkable that his birthday, like Plato’s, occurred on the Carnean festival (Plut. Qu. Conv. viii. 1, 2, 1). Little is known of his life. He was a disciple and follower of Hegesinus, but at the same time received instruction in dialectic (Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 98) from the Stoic Diogenes, and studied philosophic literature with indefatigable zeal (Diog. 62), more particularly the writings of Chrysippus (Diog. 62; Plut. Sto. Rep. 10, 44; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 13). In 156 B.C. he took part in the well-known association of philosophers, and produced the greatest impression on his Roman hearers by the force of his language and the boldness with which he attacked the current principles of morals. Shortly before his death, probably also at an earlier period, he became blind (Diog. 66). He left no writings, the preservation of his doctrines being the work of his pupils, in particular of Clitomachus (Diog. 66, 67; Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 98; 32, 102). Respecting his character, we may gather from a few expressions that, whilst vigorous in disputation (Diog. 63; Gell. N. A. vi. 14, 10), he was not wanting in a repose of mind which was in harmony with his principles (Diog. 66). That he was a just man, notwithstanding his speech against justice, we can well believe (Quintil. xii. 1, 35).

The quotation in Diog. 64 (ἡ συστήσασα φύσις καὶ διαλύσει) does not indicate fear of death, but simple resignation to the course of nature. Still less does his language on Antipater’s suicide, and also what is quoted in Stob. (Floril. 119, 19) that he made a faint-hearted attempt to imitate him which he afterwards abandoned. It was only a not very clever way of ridiculing an action which appeared to Carneades eminently mad.

Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12; Lucian, Macrob. 20.

His School held him in such esteem, that it considered him, together with Plato, because of his birthday (unless the idea grew out of his name), to be a special favourite of Apollo. Tradition says that an eclipse of the moon (Suid. Καρν. adds an eclipse of the sun) commemorated his death; συμπάθειαν, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, αἰνιττομένου τοῦ μεθ’ ἥλιον καλλίστου τῶν ἄστρων (Diog. 64). Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, p. 838, says of him: οὗτος δὲ τῶν ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας ἄριστος φιλοσόφων ὁμολογεῖται. There was only one opinion among the ancients as to the force of his logic, and the power and attraction of his eloquence. These gifts were aided by unusually powerful organs (see the anecdotes in Plut. Garrul. 21, p. 513; Diog. 63). Conf. Diog. 62; Cic. Fin. iii. 12, 41; De Orat. ii. 38, 161; iii. 18, 68; Gell. N. A. vi. 14, 10; Numen. in Eusebius, Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 2 and 5; Lactant. Inst. v. 14; Plut. Cato Maj. 22. The latter, speaking of his success at Rome, says: μάλιστα δ’ ἡ Καρνεάδου χάρις, ἧς δύναμίς τε πλείστη καὶ δόξα τῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἀποδέουσα ... ὡς πνεῦμα τὴν πόλιν ἠχῆς ἐνέπλησε. καὶ λόγος κατεῖχεν, ὡς ἀνὴρ Ἕλλην εἰς ἔκπληξιν ὑπερφυὴς, πάντα κηλῶν καὶ χειρούμενος, ἔρωτα δεινὸν ἐμβέβληκε τοῖς νέοις, ὑφ’ οὗ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν καὶ διατριβῶν ἐκπεσόντες ἐνθουσιῶσι περὶ φιλοσοφίαν.

Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16.

See p. 536, note.

Sext. Math. vii. 159: ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος. ὁ δὲ Καρνεάδης οὐ μόνον τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀντιδιετάσσετο περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου. In Math. ix. 1, Sextus charges the School of Carneades with unnecessary diffuseness in discussing the fundamental principles or every system. The Stoics were, however, the chief object of his attack. Cic. Tusc. v. 29, 82; N. D. ii. 65, 162; Plut. Garrul. 23, p. 514; Augustin. c. Acad. iii. 17, 39.

Sext. l.c.: καὶ δὴ πρῶτος μὲν αὐτῷ καὶ κοινὸς πρὸς πάντας ἐστὶ λόγος καθ’ ὃν παρίσταται ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἁπλῶς ἀληθείας κριτήριον, οὐ λόγος οὐκ αἴσθησις οὐ φαντασία οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα συλλήβδην διαψεύδεται ἡμᾶς.

Sext. l.c. 160–163.

Conf. Sext. vii. 403; Cic. Acad. ii. 15, 47; 28, 89—where Carneades is undoubtedly meant, although he is not mentioned by name. For the other sceptical arguments which Cicero mentions tally with those which Sextus attributes to Carneades, and Cicero makes Antiochus refute them, who was the immediate adversary of Carneades.

According to Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 40; 26, 83, the Academic system of proof rests on the four following propositions: (1) that there are false notions; (2) that these cannot be known, i.e. be recognised as true; (3) that of two indistinguishable notions, it is impossible to know the one and not the other; (4) that there is no true notion by the side of which a false one cannot be placed indistinguishable from it. The second and third of these propositions are not denied at all, and the first is only denied by Epicurus in regard to impressions on the senses. Hence all importance attaches to the fourth proposition, to which Sextus, vii. 164 and 402, and Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 4, look as the most important argument.

Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 42: Dividunt enim in partes et eas quidem magnas: primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quæ ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt (the συνήθεια against which Chrysippus already directed severe attacks. See p. 46, 2; 91, 2). Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne ratione quidem et conjectura ulla res percipi possit. Hæc autem universa etiam concidunt minutius.

Sext. vii. 409; Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 84; 7, 19; 25, 79; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 5. Therewith is probably connected the statement in Galen, De Opt. Doct. c. 2, vol. i. 45, K, that Carneades persistently denied the axiom that two things that are equal to a third are equal to one another. His assertion probably comes to this, that it may be possible to distinguish two things as unequal, which cannot be distinguished from a third, that therefore two things may appear equal to a third without being or appearing equal to one another.

Sext. 402 and 408.

The fallacy called ψευδόμενος is carefully investigated in Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 95 (by Carneades as he says, 98), as an instance in point.

Sext. 416; Cic. l.c. 29, 92. Since Chrysippus tried to meet the chain-argument, it may be supposed that this fallacy had been used by Arcesilaus against the Stoics.

Sext. vii. 164; Augustin. c. Acad. ii. 5, 11.

Sext. 165.

Cic. Acad. ii. 28, 91, who here appears to be following Philo, and, subsequently, Carneades as well. Carneades also gives utterance to a similar view of dialectic in Stob. Floril. 93, 13 (conf. Plut. C. Not. 2, 4), comparing it to a polypus consuming its own tentacles. It is able, he conceives, to expose fallacies, but not to discover truth.

Cic. Acad. ii. 36, 117. Carneades is not mentioned by name, but there can be no doubt that the reference is to some Academician, and it is probable that it was the work of Carneades.

Diog. iv. 62.

Cic. N. D. i. 2, 5, after a brief description of the Stoical views of Gods: Contra quos Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret homines non socordes ad veri investigandi cupiditatem.

Cic. N. D. i. 23, 62; iii. 4, 11. Here, too, Carneades is not mentioned by name, but the reference to him is made clear by Cicero’s remark that he is quoting the Academic view.

Conf. Cic. N. D. iii. 5, 11.

The Academician in Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 120. That these arguments were used by Carneades is clear from Plut. in Porphyr. De Abst. iii. 20, where, traversing the arguments of the Stoics, he justifies the existence of vermin, poisonous plants, and beasts of prey. In answer to Chrysippus’ assertion, that the final cause of a pig is to be killed, Carneades argues: A pig, therefore, by being killed, must attain the object for which it was destined; it is always beneficial for a thing to attain its object—therefore it must be beneficial to a pig to be killed and eaten.

Cic. N. D. iii. 25, 65–70. It is here presumed that the leading thoughts in Cicero’s description belong to the School of Carneades.

Ibid. 31, 76.

Ibid. 32, 79.

Cic. N. D. iii. 32, 80.

Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 120; N. D. iii. 11, 28.

Cic. N. D. iii. 8, 21; 10, 26; 11, 27.

Ibid. 10, 25.

L.c.

Cic. N. D. iii. 12, 29; 14, 34.

Cic. N. D. iii. 13, 32. More fully Sext. Math. ix. 139–147. Here too Carneades is expressly mentioned. But were he not mentioned the agreement of the argument with that given by Cicero would show that the same person was being referred to.

Cic.; Ibid. Further proofs of the transient nature of all earthly beings are there given.

Sext. Math. ix. 152–175, quotes the same argument for σωφροσύνη, and so does Cic. N. D. iii. 15, 38. Neither mentions Carneades by name, but since both writers introduce these proofs in the same position in a longer argument, in which Carneades is expressly mentioned both before and after, there can be no doubt that to him they refer.

Sext. ix. 176. The argument has a look of sophistry about it. It alludes to the important question which engaged so much attention in the middle ages, viz. How is the universal related in Deity to the individual? Are goodness and reason a law for God independent of His will or not?

As Epicurus did. See p. 468, 3.

Sext. 178.

Sext. l.c. 148–151; 180. That Sextus here refers to Carneades is clear from his agreement with Cic. N. D. 12, 29–31; 14, 34. Cicero introduces his remarks with the words: Illa autem, quæ Carneades afferebat, quemadmodum dissolvitis? Sextus himself seems to refer not only individual arguments, but the whole series of them, to Carneades, when he continues, 182: ἠρώτηνται δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καρνεάδου καὶ σωριτικῶς τινες κ.τ.λ.

Sext. 182–190. More fully in Cic. N. D. iii. 17, 43. Sextus also observes, 190: καὶ ἄλλους δὴ τοιούτους σωρείτας ἐρωτῶσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι θεούς.

To him, or probably to his School, belongs the learned argument given by Cic. N. D. iii. 21, 53, to 23, 60, in which he proves the want of unity in traditional myths by the multiplicity of Gods of the same name. The whole drift of this argument shows that it was borrowed from some Greek treatise.

See Cic. Divin. i. 4, 7; 7, 12.

Ibid. ii. 3, 9.

Ibid. v. 13; but Carneades is not here mentioned by name.

Ibid. i. 13, 23; 49, 109.

Cic. l.c. and Divin. ii. 21, 48.

Cic. l.c. ii. 11, 27.

Cic. De Fato, 11, 23; 14, 31. The freedom of the will, he there says, may be asserted even granting that every motion is referred to a cause, for it is not necessary that this law should hold good of the will. He will therefore confine it to bodily motion, and not allow to it unconditional validity.

Lact. Instit. v. 14, following Cic. De Rep. iii. 4; Plut. Cato Maj. c. 22; Quintil. Instit. xii. 1, 35.

Lactant. l.c. 16; Cic. De Rep. iii. 8–12; 14; 17; Fin. ii. 18, 59. On the above casuistical cases see De Off. iii. 13; 23, 89, and above, p. 299, 2. Probably Carneades was the cause of the study of casuistry among the later Stoics.

Cic. Acad. ii. 34, 108; conf. 31, 98. In Id. Att. xiii. 21, he compares this ἐποχὴ to the drawing up of a charioteer, or to the guard of a pugilist. No doubt it is with reference to ἐποχὴ that Alex. Aphr. De An. 154 a, says: The Academicians consider ἀπτωσία the πρῶτον οἰκεῖον, πρὸς ταύτην γάρ φασιν ἡμᾶς οἰκείως ἔχειν πρώτην, ὥστε μηδὲν προσπταίειν. ἀπροσπτωσία or ἀπροπτωσία is, according to the Stoic definition (Diog. vii. 46) = ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ μή. It consists, therefore, in not giving a hasty assent to any proposition. According to the Sceptics, this is only possible, and you are only then safe from error, when you give assent to none whatever. ἀπροσπτωσία becomes then identical with ἐποχὴ or ἄγνοια, which Max. Tyr. Diss. 35, 7, speaks of as the ultimate end of Carneades. Hence Carneades, as Arcesilaus had done before him, spoke for and against every subject without expressing a decided opinion. Cic. N. D. i. 5, 11; Acad. ii. 18, 60; Divin. ii. 72, 150; Rep. iii. 5, 8; Tusc. v. 4, 11; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12.

Cic. Acad. ii. 9, 28.

Sext. Math. vii. 166: ἀπατούμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτός [ὁ Καρνεάδης] τι κριτήριον πρός τε τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὴν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τὴς εὐδαιμονίας περίκτησιν δυνάμιν ἀπαναγκάζεται καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸν περὶ τούτου διατάττεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 99 (of Clitomachus): Etenim contra naturam esset, si probabile nihil esset, et sequitur omnis vitæ ... eversio. Ibid. 101; 32, 104: Nam cum placeat, eum qui de omnibus rebus contineat se de assentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit ejusmodi visa, quibus ad actionem excitemur, etc. Hence the assurance (Ibid. 103; Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 234) that the Academicians do not wish to go into the question of perception. They accept it as a phenomenon of consciousness and a basis of action, but they deny that it strictly furnishes knowledge. The senses are ὑγιεῖς, but not ἀκριβεῖς.

Sext. and Cic. l.c.

Sext. l.c. 167–170.

Ibid. 171–173; or, as it is expressed by Cicero, Acad. ii. 24, 78: It is possible nihil percipere et tamen opinari. It is of no importance that Philo and Metrodorus said Carneades had proved this statement, whereas Clitomachus had stated, hoc magis ab eo disputatum quam probatum. Acad. ii. 48, 148; 21, 67, attributes the statement to Carneades, without any qualification, adding only: Adsensurum (aliquando, as the latter passage adds) non percepto, i.e. opinaturum sapientem.

Conf. Augustin. c. Acad. ii. 11, 26 (undoubtedly in point of matter and probably in terms following Cicero): Id probabile vel verisimile Academici vocant, quod nos ad addendum sine adsensione potest invitare. Sine adsensione autem dico, ut id quod agimus non opinemur verum esse aut non id scire arbitremur, agamus tamen. To the same effect, Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12: Carneades declared it impossible to withhold judgment on all points, and asserted πάντα μὲν εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα, οὐ πάντα δὲ ἄδηλα. Conf. Cic. Acad. ii. 17, 54, where the objection is raised to the new Academicians: Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod nolunt; ea dico incerta, quæ ἄδηλα Græci.

Sext. l.c. 173; 175–182; Pyrrh. i. 227; conf. Cic. Acad. ii. 11, 33; 31, 99; 32, 104.

Sext. l.c. 173; 181.

Ibid. 176; 183.

Ibid. 184.

Sext. l.c. 174; Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 99.

Cic. l.c. 32, 103; 48, 148. This explanation does away with the charge of inconsistency which is brought against Carneades in Cic. Acad. ii. 18, 59; 21, 67; 24, 78 (see p. 554, 3), on the ground that he allowed, in contradistinction to Arcesilaus, that the wise man will sometimes follow opinion, and will give his assent to certain statements. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 7, even asserts that he expressed his own convictions to his friends in private; but this assertion is no more true of him than of Arcesilaus (see p. 531, 3), as may be seen from the passage on p. 557, 2.

Sext. Pyrrh. i. 226: ἀγαθὸν γάρ τί φασιν εἶναι οἱ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὶ καὶ κακὸν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ πεπεῖσθαι ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι μᾶλλον ὃ λέγουσιν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον; καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ὁμοίως.

See p. 553, 2; 554, 4.

Here the question arises, Whence does the Sceptic derive his conviction as to probabilities in morals? and as perception is not available for the purpose, Geffers concludes (De Arc. Successor. 20) that Carneades assumed a peculiar source of conviction in the mind. For such an assumption, however, our authorities give no proof. It cannot be gathered from the hypothetical language respecting the freedom of the will in Cic. De Fato, ii. 23. See p. 551, 2. Nor is it, indeed, necessary that Carneades, who never pretended to hold any psychological theory, should have had any opinion on the subject. Supposing he did have it, he might have appealed to experience quite as readily or more so than the Stoics, and have been content with the fact that certain things are far more agreeable or disagreeable, and either promote or disturb happiness.

Cic. Fin. v. 6, 16, to 8, 23; conf. Tusc. v. 29, 84; Ritter, iii. 686, has hardly expressed with accuracy Carneades’ division, or he would not have accused it of being inaccurate and superficial.

Cic. Acad. ii. 45, 139.

Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 131: Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo probaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui iis rebus, quas primas natura conciliavisset (οἰκειοῦν). Similarly Fin. v. 7, 20; Tusc. v. 30, 84. This view differs from that of the Stoics, because it makes the highest Good consist not in natural activity as such, but in the enjoyment of natural goods.

Cic. Fin. ii. 11, 35: Ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi vel Epicuri (pleasure), alter Hieronymi (freedom from pain), Carneadis tertius (the satisfaction of natural instincts). Conf. Ibid. v. 7, 20; 8, 22.

Cic. Acad. ii. 45, 139: Ut Calliphontem sequar, cujus quidem sententiam Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam videretur. Callipho is reckoned among those who consider honestas cum aliqua accessione—or, as it is said, Fin. v. 8, 21; 25, 73; Tusc. v. 30, 85, voluptas cum honestate—the highest Good.

Plut. Tranq. An. 16, p. 475.

Cic. Tusc. iii. 22, 54. Let it be observed that this view of Carneades is specially placed under the head of conviction on probabilities. It is said, he attacked the proposition, videri fore in ægritudine sapientem patria capta. The other statements of Carneades on ethics, such as that in Plut. De Adulat. 16, p. 51, have nothing characteristic about them.

See p. 279.

Plut. C. Not. 27, 14; Stob. Ecl. ii. 134. Plutarch, however, only quotes it as the opinion of individuals. It appears more probable that it was an opinion of Chrysippus which Antipater defended against Carneades. Carneades even practically attributes it to the Stoics.

Cic. Fin. iii. 12, 41: Carneades tuus ... rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit, in omni hac quæstione, quæ de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum.

Fin. iii. 17, 57.

Cic. Tusc. iii. 25, 59.

Ibid. v. 29, 83: Et quoniam videris hoc velle, ut, quæcumque dissentientium philosophorum sententia sit de finibus, tamen virtus satis habeat ad vitam beatam præsidii, quod quidem Carneadem disputare solitum accepimus, etc.

He explicitly says, Fin. v. 7, 18, that as each one defines the highest good, so he determines the honestum (the καλὸν, virtue). The view of the Stoics, he says, places the honestum and bonum in activity aiming at what is according to nature; adding that, according to the view which places it in the possession of what is according to nature, the prima secundum naturam are also prima in animis quasi virtutum igniculi et semina.

See p. 560, 3, and Plut. Tranq. An. 19, p. 477, where, however, the greater part seems to belong to Plutarch.

Quintil. Instit. xii. 1, 35. See above 536, 1, end.

Cic. N. D. iii. 17, 44: Hæc Carneades aiebat, non ut Deos tolleret—quid enim philosopho minus conveniens?—sed ut Stoicos nihil de Diis explicare convinceret. In this sense the Academician in Cicero (i. 22, 62) frequently asserts, that he would not destroy belief in God, but that he finds the arguments unsatisfactory. Likewise Sextus, Pyrrh. iii. 2: τῷ μὲν βίῳ κατακολουθοῦντες ἀδοξάστως φαμὲν εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ σέβομεν θεοὺς καὶ προνοεῖν αὐτοὺς φαμέν.

Ritter, iii. 730, 694.

Clitomachus was a native of Carthage. Hence he is called by Max Tyr. Diss. 10, 3, ὁ Λίβυς. He originally bore the name of Hasdrubal. At home he devoted himself to study, and wrote several treatises in his mother tongue (τῇ ἰδίᾳ φωνῇ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι ἐφιλοσόφει). When 40 years of age (according to Steph. Byz. De urbe Καρχηδὼν; 28), he came to Athens, was initiated by Carneades into Greek philosophy, and devoted himself to it with such zeal and success (Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 17; 31, 98; Athen. ix. 402, c) that he became esteemed as a philosopher and voluminous writer (Diog. iv. 67). Treatises of his are mentioned by Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 98; 32, 102; Diog. ii. 92. He died (according to Stob. Floril. vii. 55) by suicide, not before 110 B.C. (as Zumpt remarks, Ueber d. philosoph. Schulen in Ath., Abh. d. Berl. Akad., Jahrg. 1842. Hist. Philol. Kl. p. 67), since, according to Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 45, L. Crassus, during his quæstorship, which falls at the earliest in this year, met him at Athens. He must then have been very old.

Diog. iv. 67; Cic. Acad. ii. 32, 102.

As the peculiar observation in Diog. iv. proves: (ἀνὴρ ἐν ταῖς τρισὶν αἱρέσεσι διαπρέψας, ἔν τε τῇ Ἀκαδημαϊκῇ Περιπατητικῇ καὶ Στωϊκῇ).

According to Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 17; De Orat. i. 11. 45; Orator, 16, 51, Charmadas was a pupil of Carneades, whom he followed not only in teaching but also in method. He must have survived Clitomachus, since he taught at the same time with Philo. See p. 566, 1. Philo, however, according to Clitomachus, undertook the presidency of the School (Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 9). According to Cic. De Orat. ii. 88, 360. Tusc. i. 24, 59, he was remarkable for a good memory.

Cic. De Orat. i. 18, 84: Charmadas asserted, eos qui rhetores nominabantur et qui dicendi præcepta traderent nihil plane tenere, neque posse quenquam facultatem assequi dicendi, nisi qui philosophorum inventa didicissent. Sext. Math. ii. 20, also mentions the hostile attitude of Clitomachus and Charmadas towards rhetoricians, and says that both he and the School to which he belonged were engaged in disputes with them. His fellow-disciple Agnon drew up a treatise, according to Quintil. ii. 17, 15, entitled ‘Charges against the rhetoricians.’ Ritter’s inferences, that Charmadas recommended philosophy as the only way to eloquence, and thus betrayed the object of the philosophical doctrine of probability, iii. 695, make far too much of a casual expression which means no more than what the Stoics, and before them Plato, had said.

In addition to Clitomachus and Charmadas, Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16, mentions Agnon and Melanthius of Rhodes, the former of whom is also referred to by Quintilian. (See Athen. xiii. 602, d.) Cicero adds that Metrodorus of Stratonice passed for a friend of Carneades; he had come over from among the Epicureans (Diog. x. 9) to join him. This Metrodorus must neither be confounded with Metrodorus of Skepsis, the pupil of Charmadas (see p. 566, 1), nor with the Metrodorus distinguished as a painter, 168 B.C., whom Æmilius Paulus brought to Rome (Plin. H. N. xxxv. 11, 135). The former must have been younger, the latter older, than Metrodorus of Stratonice. A pupil of Melanthius (Diog. ii. 64), and also of Carneades in his later years (Plut. An Seni. s. ger. Resp. 13, 1, p. 791), was Æschines of Naples, according to Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 45, who was likewise a distinguished teacher in the Academic School towards the close of the second century. Another pupil, Mentor, was by Carneades forbidden the School, because he was caught with his concubine (Diog. iv. 63; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 7).

Exc. Vatic. xii 26: καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων [τῶν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ] τινὲς βουλόμενοι περί τε τῶν προφανῶς καταληπτῶν εἶναι δοκούντων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκαταλήπτων εἰς ἀπορίαν ἄγειν τοὺς προσμαχομένους τοιαύταις χρῶνται παραδοξολογίαις καὶ τοιαύτας εὐποροῦσι πιθανότητας, ὥστε διαπορεῖν, ἀδύνατόν [l. εἰ δυνατόν] ἐστι, τοὺς ἐν Ἀθήναις ὄντας ὀσφραίνεσθαι τῶν ἑψομένων ὠῶν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, καὶ διστάζειν, μή πω καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ διαλέγονται περὶ τούτων οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἄλλων ἄρ’ ἐν οἴκῳ κατακείμενοι τούτους διατίθενται τοὺς λόγους· ἐξ ὧν δι’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς παραδοξολογίας εἰς διαβολὴν ἤχασι τὴν ὅλην αἵρεσιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ καλῶς ἀπορούμενα παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς ἀπιστίαν ἦχθαι, καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ἰδίας ἀστοχίας καὶ τοῖς νέοις τοιοῦτον ἐντετόκασι ζῆλον, ὥστε τῶν μὲν ἠθικῶν καὶ πραγματικῶν λόγων μηδὲ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἐπίνοιαν ποιεῖσθαι, δι’ ὧν ὄνησις τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσι, περὶ δὲ τὰς ἀνωφελεῖς καὶ παραδόξους εὑρεσιλογίας κενοδοξοῦντες κατατρίβουσι τοὺς βίους. In the time of Carneades, whose cotemporary was Polybius, to whom the language as to the enthusiasm of youth for Sceptical teaching refers, such depreciatory remarks could not have been made of the Academy. The historical value, therefore, of the whole passage is suspicious. It bears besides the mark of exaggeration so strongly that it is of no greater use for giving a view of the Academy than are the caricatures of opponents for conveying an idea of modern German philosophy.

Among these pupils the tendency to lay stress on the doctrine of probabilities in relation to Scepticism was already strong. Proof may be found not only in the accounts already given us of Clitomachus and Æschines, but also in the circumstance that many of the older writers made the fourth Academy date from Philo and Charmadas, the fifth from Antiochus (Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16). At a still earlier date, Metrodorus is said to have departed from the platform of Carneades. Augustin. c. Acad. iii. 18, 41, after speaking of Antiochus and his renunciation of Scepticism, says: Quamquam et Metrodorus id antea facere tentaverat, qui primus dicitur esse confessus, non decreto placuisse Academicis, nihil posse comprehendi, sed necessario contra Stoicos hujus modi eos arma sumsisse. Probably Augustin borrowed this passage from a lost treatise of Cicero; hence it may be relied upon. The Metrodorus referred to is probably Metrodorus of Stratonice (see p. 564, 5), mentioned by Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16. Metrodorus of Skepsis might also be suggested (Strabo, xiii. 155, p. 609; xvi. 4, 16, p. 775; Plut. Lucull. 22; Diog. v. 84; Cic. De Orat. ii. 88, 360; 90, 365; iii. 20, 75; Tusc. i. 24, 59; Plin. Hist. Nat. vii. 24, 89; Quintil. x. 6, 1; xi. 2, 22; Müller, Hist. Gr. iii. 203), who first learned rhetoric at Chalcedon, afterwards entered the service of Mithridates, and was put to death by his orders, B.C. 70, at an advanced age. Cic. De Orat. iii. 20, 75, calls him an Academician; and he is mentioned, Ibid. i. 11, 45, as a pupil of Charmadas. The language quoted by Augustin may have come from the treatise περὶ συνηθείας (Strabo, p. 775). He is otherwise only known as a rhetorician and politician. The same uncertainty prevails as to the Metrodorus referred to in Cic. Acad. ii. 24, 78 (see p. 554, 3). We do not know who he is, but it may be inferred that it is the same Metrodorus who is mentioned by Augustin.