The Art of War

Chapter I. the Relation of Diplomacy to War.

ART. I.--Offensive Wars to Recover Rights.

ART. II.--Wars which are Politically Defensive, and Offensive in a Military View.

ART. III.--Wars of Expediency.

ART. IV.--Wars with or without Allies.

ART. V.--Wars of Intervention.

ART. VI.--Wars of Invasion, through a Desire of Conquest or for other Causes.

ART. VII.--Wars of Opinion.

ART. VIII.--National Wars.

ART. IX.--Civil and Religious Wars.

ART. X.--Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two at the Same Time.

Chapter Ii. Military Policy.

ART. XI.--Military Statistics and Geography.

ART. XII.--Different Causes which have an Influence over the Success of a War.

ART. XIII.--The Military Institutions of States.

ART. XIV.--The Command of Armies and the Supreme Control of Operations.

ART. XV.--The Military Spirit of Nations and the Morale of Armies.

Chapter Iii. Strategy.

Definition of Strategy and Tactics. THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.

ART. XVI.--The System of Offensive or Defensive Operations.

ART. XVII.--The Theater of Operations.

ART. XVIII.--Bases of Operations.

ART. XIX.--Strategic Lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of War, and Objective Points of Operation.

ART. XX.--Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense, and Strategic Positions.

ART. XXI.--Zones and Lines of Operations.

ART. XXII.--Strategic Lines of Maneuver.

ART. XXIII.--Means of Protecting Lines of Operations by Temporary Bases or Strategic Reserves.

ART. XXIV.--The Old and New Systems of War.

ART. XXV.--Depots of Supply, and their Relations to Operations.

ART. XXVI.--Frontiers, and their Defense by Forts and Intrenched Lines.--Wars of Sieges.

ART. XXVII.--Intrenched Camps and Têtes de Ponts in their Relation to Strategy.

ART. XXVIII.--Strategic Operations in Mountainous Countries.

ART. XXIX.--Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.

Epitome of Strategy.

Chapter Iv. Grand Tactics and Battles.

ART. XXX.--Positions and Defensive Battles.

ART. XXXI.--Offensive Battles and Orders of Battle.

ART. XXXII.--Turning Maneuvers, and Too Extended Movements in Battle.

ART. XXXIII.--Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March.

ART. XXXIV.--Surprises of Armies.

ART. XXXV.--Attack of Cities, Intrenched Camps or Lines, and Coups de Main generally.

Chapter V. Several Operations of a Mixed Character, Which Are Partly in

THE DOMAIN OF STRATEGY AND PARTLY OF TACTICS.

ART. XXXVI.--Diversions and Great Detachments.

ART. XXXVII.--Passage of Rivers and other Streams.

ART. XXXVIII.--Retreats and Pursuits.

ART. XXXIX.--Cantonments and Winter Quarters.

ART. XL.--Descents, or Maritime Expeditions.

Chapter Vi. Logistics, or the Practical Art of Moving Armies.

ART. XLI.--A few Remarks on Logistics in general.

ART. XLII.--Reconnoissances, and other Means of Gaining Accurate Information of the Enemy's Movements.

Chapter Vii. Formation and Employment of Troops for Battle.

ART. ART. XLIII--Posting Troops in Line of Battle.

ART. XLIV.--Formation and Employment of Infantry.

ART. XLV.---Formation and Employment of Cavalry.

ART. XLVI.---Formation and Employment of Artillery.

ART. XLVII.--Employment of the Three Arms together.

CONCLUSION.

SUPPLEMENT.

APPENDIX.

SECOND APPENDIX.

SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS.

SUMMARY OF

THE ART OF WAR.

DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR.

The art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purely military branches,--viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Engineering, and Tactics. A sixth and essential branch, hitherto unrecognized, might be termed Diplomacy in its relation to War. Although this branch is more naturally and intimately connected with the profession of a statesman than with that of a soldier, it cannot be denied that, if it be useless to a subordinate general, it is indispensable to every general commanding an army: it enters into all the combinations which may lead to a war, and has a connection with the various operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in this view, it should have a place in a work like this.

To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:--

1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.

2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion.

3. Grand Tactics.

4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.

5. Engineering,--the attack and defense of fortifications.

6. Minor Tactics.

It is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first four branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art of engineering.

Familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to be a good infantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for a staff officer, this knowledge is indispensable.

CHAPTER I.. Statesmanship in Its Relation to War.

STATESMANSHIP IN ITS RELATION TO WAR.

Under this head are included those considerations from which a statesman concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the war.

A government goes to war,--

To reclaim certain rights or to defend them;

To protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce, manufactures, or agriculture;

To uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary either for the safety of the government or the balance of power;

To fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances;

To propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or to defend them;

To increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions of territory;

To defend the threatened independence of the state;

To avenge insulted honor; or,

From a mania for conquest.

It may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence in some degree the nature and extent of the efforts and operations necessary for the proposed end. The party who has provoked the war may be reduced to the defensive, and the party assailed may assume the offensive; and there may be other circumstances which will affect the nature and conduct of a war, as,--

1. A state may simply make war against another state.

2. A state may make war against several states in alliance with each other.

3. A state in alliance with another may make war upon a single enemy.

4. A state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary.

5. In the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its beginning or after it has commenced.

6. The theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an ally, or upon its own.

7. If the war be one of invasion, it may be upon adjacent or distant territory: it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be bold and adventurous.

8. It may be a national war, either against ourselves or against the enemy.

9. The war may be a civil or a religious war.

War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the art; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances of the case.

For example: two hundred thousand French wishing to subjugate the Spanish people, united to a man against them, would not maneuver as the same number of French in a march upon Vienna, or any other capital, to compel a peace; nor would a French army fight the guerrillas of Mina as they fought the Russians at Borodino; nor would a French army venture to march upon Vienna without considering what might be the tone and temper of the governments and communities between the Rhine and the Inn, or between the Danube and the Elbe. A regiment should always fight in nearly the same way; but commanding generals must be guided by circumstances and events.

To these different combinations, which belong more or less to statesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the management of armies. The name Military Policy is given to them; for they belong exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but are still of the highest importance in the plans both of a statesman and a general.

ARTICLE I.

Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights.

When a state has claims upon another, it may not always be best to enforce them by arms. The public interest must be consulted before action.

The most just war is one which is founded upon undoubted rights, and which, in addition, promises to the state advantages commensurate with the sacrifices required and the hazards incurred. Unfortunately, in our times there are so many doubtful and contested rights that most wars, though apparently based upon bequests, or wills, or marriages, are in reality but wars of expediency. The question of the succession to the Spanish crown under Louis XIV. was very clear, since it was plainly settled by a solemn will, and was supported by family ties and by the general consent of the Spanish nation; yet it was stoutly contested by all Europe, and produced a general coalition against the legitimate legatee.

Frederick II., while Austria and France were at war, brought forward an old claim, entered Silesia in force and seized this province, thus doubling the power of Prussia. This was a stroke of genius; and, even if he had failed, he could not have been much censured; for the grandeur and importance of the enterprise justified him in his attempt, as far as such attempts can be justified.

In wars of this nature no rules can be laid down. To watch and to profit by every circumstance covers all that can be said. Offensive movements should be suitable to the end to be attained. The most natural step would be to occupy the disputed territory: then offensive operations may be carried on according to circumstances and to the respective strength of the parties, the object being to secure the cession of the territory by the enemy, and the means being to threaten him in the heart of his own country. Every thing depends upon the alliances the parties may be able to secure with other states, and upon their military resources. In an offensive movement, scrupulous care must be exercised not to arouse the jealousy of any other state which might come to the aid of the enemy. It is a part of the duty of a statesman to foresee this chance, and to obviate it by making proper explanations and giving proper guarantees to other states.

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