wunder · LibraryCHAPTER VII.
Read in the Wunder reader — freeOF THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE, AND THE SEPARATE OR COMBINED USE OF THE THREE ARMS.
ARTICLE XLIII.
Posting Troops in Line of Battle.
Having explained in Article XXX. what is to be understood by the term line of battle, it is proper to add in what manner it is to be formed, and how the different troops are to be distributed in it.
Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed in regiments and brigades, was collected in a single battle-corps, drawn up in two lines, each of which had a right and a left wing. The cavalry was usually placed upon the wings, and the artillery--which at this period was very unwieldy--was distributed along the front of each line. The army camped together, marching by lines or by wings; and, as there were two cavalry wings and two infantry wings, if the march was by wings four columns were thus formed. When they marched by lines, (which was specially applicable to flank movements,) two columns were formed, unless, on account of local circumstances, the cavalry or a part of the infantry had camped in a third line,--which was rare.
This method simplified logistics very much, since it was only necessary to give such orders as the following:--"The army will move in such direction, by lines or by wings, by the right or by the left." This monotonous but simple formation was seldom deviated from; and no better could have been devised as war was carried on in those days.
The French attempted something new at Minden, by forming as many columns as brigades, and opening roads to bring them to the front in line,--a simple impossibility.
If the labor of staff officers was diminished by this method of camping and marching by lines, it must be evident that if such a system were applied to an army of one hundred thousand or one hundred and fifty thousand men, there would be no end to the columns, and the result would be the frequent occurrence of routs like that of Rossbach.
The French Revolution introduced the system of divisions, which broke up the excessive compactness of the old formation, and brought upon the field fractions capable of independent movement on any kind of ground. This change was a real improvement,--although they went from one extreme to the other, by returning nearly to the legionary formation of the Romans. These divisions, composed usually of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, maneuvered and fought separately. They were very much extended, either to enable them to subsist without the use of depots, or with an absurd expectation of prolonging the line in order to outflank that of the enemy. The seven or eight divisions of an army were sometimes seen marching on the same number of roads, ten or twelve miles distant from each other; the head-quarters was at the center, with no other support than five or six small regiments of cavalry of three hundred or four hundred men each, so that if the enemy concentrated the mass of his forces against one of these divisions and beat it, the line was pierced, and the general-in-chief, having no disposable infantry reserve, could do nothing but order a retreat to rally his scattered columns.
Bonaparte in his first Italian campaign remedied this difficulty, partly by the mobility of his army and the rapidity of his maneuvers, and partly by concentrating the mass of his divisions upon the point where the decisive blow was to fall. When he became the head of the government, and saw the sphere of his means and his plans constantly increasing in magnitude, he readily perceived that a stronger organization was necessary: he avoided the extremes of the old system and the new, while still retaining the advantages of the divisional system. Beginning with the campaign of 1800, he organized corps of two or three divisions, which he placed under the command of lieutenant-generals, and formed of them the wings, the center, and the reserve of his army.
This system was finally developed fully at the camp of Boulogne, where he organized permanent army corps under the command of marshals, who had under their orders three divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry, from thirty-six to forty pieces of cannon, and a number of sappers. Each corps was thus a small army, able at need to act independently as an army. The heavy cavalry was collected in a single strong reserve, composed of two divisions of cuirassiers, four of dragoons, and one of light cavalry. The grenadiers and the guard formed an admirable infantry reserve. At a later period--1812--the cavalry was also organized into corps of three divisions, to give greater unity of action to the constantly-increasing masses of this arm. This organization was as near perfection as possible; and the grand army, that brought about such great results, was the model which all the armies of Europe soon imitated.
Some military men, in their attempts to perfect the art, have recommended that the infantry division, which sometimes has to act independently, should contain three instead of two brigades, because this number will allow one for the center and each wing. This would certainly be an improvement; for if the division contains but two brigades there is an open space left in the center between the brigades on the wings: these brigades, having no common central support, cannot with safety act independently of each other. Besides this, with three brigades in a division, two may be engaged while the third is held in reserve,--a manifest advantage. But, if thirty brigades formed in ten divisions of three brigades are better than when formed in fifteen divisions of two brigades, it becomes necessary, in order to obtain this perfect divisional organization, to increase the numbers of the infantry by one-third, or to reduce the divisions of the army-corps from three to two,--which last would be a serious disadvantage, because the army-corps is much more frequently called upon to act independently than a division, and the subdivision into three parts is specially best for that.
What is the best organization to be given an army just setting out upon a campaign will for a long time to come be a problem in logistics; because it is extremely difficult to maintain the original organization in the midst of the operations of war, and detachments must be sent out continually.
The history of the grand army of Boulogne, whose organization seemed to leave nothing farther to be desired, proves the assertion just made. The center under Soult, the right under Davoust, the left under Ney, and the reserve under Lannes, formed together a regular and formidable battle-corps of thirteen divisions of infantry, without counting those of the guard and the grenadiers. Besides these, the corps of Bernadotte and Marmont detached to the right, and that of Augereau to the left, were ready for action on the flanks. But after the passage of the Danube at Donauwerth every thing was changed. Ney, at first reinforced to five divisions, was reduced to two; the battle-corps was divided partly to the right and partly to the left, so that this fine arrangement was destroyed.
It will always be difficult to fix upon a stable organization. Events are, however, seldom so complicated as those of 1805; and Moreau's campaign of 1800 proves that the original organization may sometimes be maintained, at least for the mass of the army. With this view, it would seem prudent to organize an army in four parts,--two wings, a center, and a reserve. The composition of these parts may vary with the strength of the army; but in order to retain this organization it becomes necessary to have a certain number of divisions out of the general line in order to furnish the necessary detachments. While these divisions are with the army, they may be attached to that part which is to receive or give the heaviest blows; or they may be employed on the flanks of the main body, or to increase the strength of the reserve. Bach of the four great parts of the army may be a single corps of three or four divisions, or two corps of two divisions each. In this last case there would be seven corps, allowing one for the reserve; but this last corps should contain three divisions, to give a reserve to each wing and to the center.
With seven corps, unless several more are kept out of the general line in order to furnish detachments, it may happen that the extreme corps may be detached, so that each wing might contain but two divisions, and from these a brigade might be occasionally detached to flank the march of the army, leaving but three brigades to a wing. This would be a weak order of battle.
These facts lead me to conclude that an organization of the line of battle in four corps of three divisions of infantry and one of light cavalry, with three or four divisions for detachments, would be more stable than one of seven corps, each of two divisions.
But, as every thing depends upon the strength of the army and of the units of which it is composed, as well as upon the character of the operations in which it may be engaged, the arrangement may be greatly varied. I cannot go into these details, and shall simply exhibit the principal combinations that may result from forming the divisions in two or three brigades and the corps in two or three divisions. I have indicated the formation of two infantry corps in two lines, either one behind the other, or side by side. (See Figures from 17 to 28 inclusive.)
Different Formations of Lines of Battle for Two Corps of Infantry.
First Corps. ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- 2d Division. | 1st Division.
Second Corps. ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- 2d Division. | 1st Division.
Second Corps. ^ First Corps. | ----- ----- | ----- ----- 1st Division. | 1st Division. | ----- ----- | ----- ----- 2d Division. | 2d Division.
First Corps.
----- ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- ----- 2d Division. | 1st Division.
Second Corps.
----- ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- ----- 2d Division. | 1st Division.
Second Corps. ^ First Corps. | ----- ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- 1st Division. | 1st Division. | ----- ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- 2d Division. | 2d Division.
First Corps.
2d Division. 1st Division. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Second Corps.
2d Division. 1st Division. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Second Corps. ^ First Corps. | 1st Division. | 1st Division. ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- | ----- | 2d Division. | 2d Division. ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- | -----
Formation of Two Corps of Three Divisions of Two Brigades each.
First Corps. ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- 3d Division. | 2d Division. | 1st Division.
Second Corps. ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- 3d Division. | 2d Division. | 1st Division.
Second Corps. ^ First Corps. ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- | ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- 2d Division. | 1st Division | 2d Division. | 1st Division | ---- ---- | ---- ---- 3d Division. | 3d Division.
2d Corps. ^ 1st Corps. | ---- ---- | ---- ---- 1st Division.| 1st Division. | ---- ---- | ---- ---- 2d Division. | 2d Division. | ---- ---- | ---- ---- 3d Division. | 3d Division.
* * * * *
Two Corps of Three Divisions of Three Brigades each.
First Corps.
^ ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- 2d Division. | 1st Division.
---- ---- ---- 3d Division.
Second Corps.
^ ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- 2d Division. | 1st Division.
---- ---- ---- 3d Division.
Second Corps. ^ First Corps. | 2d Division. ^ 1st Division. | 2d Division. ^ 1st Division. ---- ---- | ---- ---- | ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- | ---- | ---- | | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- 3d Division. | 3d Division.
Fig. 28.]
Second Corps. ^ First Corps. | 2d Division. ^ 1st Division. | 2d Division. ^ 1st Division. ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- 3d Division. | 3d Division.
* * * * *
Note.--In all these formations the unit is the brigade in line; but these lines may be formed of deployed battalions, or of battalions in columns of attack by divisions of two companies. The cavalry attached to the corps will be placed on the flanks. The brigades might be so drawn up as to have one regiment in the first line and one in the second.
The question here presents itself, whether it is ever proper to place two corps one behind the other, as Napoleon often did, particularly at Wagram. I think that, except for the reserves, this arrangement may be used only in a position of expectation, and never as an order of battle; for it is much better for each corps to have its own second line and its reserve than to pile up several corps, one behind the other, under different commanders. However much one general may be disposed to support a colleague, he will always object to dividing up his troops for that purpose; and when in the general of the first line he sees not a colleague, but a hated rival, as too frequently happens, it is probable he will be very slow in furnishing the assistance which may be greatly needed. Moreover, a commander whose troops are spread out in a long line cannot execute his maneuvers with near so much facility as if his front was only half as great and was supported by the remainder of his own troops drawn up in rear.
The table below will show that the number of men in an army will have great influence in determining the best formation for it, and that the subject is a complicated one.
In making our calculations, it is scarcely necessary to provide for the case of such immense masses being in the field as were seen from 1812 to 1815, when a single army contained fourteen corps varying in strength from two to five divisions. With such large numbers nothing better can be proposed than a subdivision into corps of three divisions each. Of these corps, eight would form the main body, and there would remain six for detachments and for strengthening any point of the main line that might require support. If this system be applied to an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, it would be hardly practicable to employ divisions of two brigades each where Napoleon and the allies used corps.
If nine divisions form the main body,--that is, the wings and the center,--and six others form the reserve and detachments, fifteen divisions would be required, or thirty brigades,--which would make one hundred and eighty battalions, if each regiment contains three battalions. This supposition brings our army up to one hundred and forty-five thousand foot-soldiers and two hundred thousand in all. With regiments of two battalions there would be required one hundred and twenty battalions, or ninety-six thousand infantry; but if each regiment contains but two battalions, each battalion should be one thousand men strong, and this would increase the infantry to one hundred and twenty thousand men and the entire army to one hundred and sixty thousand men. These calculations show that the strength of the minor subdivisions must be carefully considered in arranging into corps and divisions. If an army does not contain more than one hundred thousand men, the formation by divisions is perhaps better than by corps. An example of this was Napoleon's army of 1800.
Having now endeavored to explain the best method of giving a somewhat permanent organization to the main body of an army, it will not be out of place for me to inquire whether this permanency is desirable, and if it is not advantageous to deceive the enemy by frequently changing the composition of corps and their positions.
I admit the advantage of thus deceiving the enemy; but it may be gained while still retaining a quite constant organization of the main body. If the divisions intended for detachments are joined to the wings and the center,--that is, if those parts contain each four divisions instead of three,--and if one or two divisions be occasionally added to the wing which is likely to bear the brunt of an engagement, each wing will be a corps properly of four divisions; but detachments will generally reduce it to three, and sometimes two, while it might, again, be reinforced by a portion of the reserve until it reached five divisions. The enemy would thus never know exactly the strength of the different parts of the line.
But I have dwelt sufficiently on these details. It is probable that, whatever be the strength and number of the subdivisions of an army, the organization into corps will long be retained by all the great powers of Europe, and calculations for the arrangement of the line of battle must be made upon that basis.
The distribution of the troops in the line of battle has changed in recent times, as well as the manner of arranging the line. Formerly it was usually composed of two lines, but now of two lines and one or more reserves. In recent conflicts in Europe, when the masses brought into collision were very large, the corps were not only formed in two lines, but one corps was placed behind another, thus making four lines; and, the reserve being drawn up in the same manner, six lines of infantry were often the result, and several of cavalry. Such a formation may answer well enough as a preparatory one, but is by no means the best for battle, as it is entirely too deep.
The classical formation--if I may employ that term--is still two lines for the infantry. The greater or less extent of the battle-field and the strength of an army may necessarily produce greater depth at times; but these cases are the exceptions, because the formation of two lines and the reserves gives sufficient solidity, and enables a greater number of men to be simultaneously engaged.
When an army has a permanent advanced guard, it may be either formed in front of the line of battle or be carried to the rear to strengthen the reserve; but, as has been previously stated, this will not often happen with the present method of forming and moving armies. Each wing has usually its own advanced guard, and the advanced guard of the main or central portion of the army is naturally furnished by the leading corps: upon coming into view of the enemy, these advanced bodies return to their proper positions in line of battle. Often the cavalry reserve is almost entirely with the advanced guard; but this does not prevent its taking, when necessary, the place fixed for it in the line of battle by the character of the position or by the wishes of the commanding general.
From what has been stated above, my readers will gather that very great changes of army organization took place from the time of the revival of the art of war and the invention of gunpowder to the French Revolution, and that to have a proper appreciation of the wars of Louis XIV., of Peter the Great, and of Frederick II., they should consider them from the stand-point of those days.
One portion of the old method may still be employed; and if, by way of example, it may not be regarded as a fundamental rule to post the cavalry on the wings, it may still be a very good arrangement for an army of fifty or sixty thousand men, especially when the ground in the center is not so suitable for the evolutions of cavalry as that near the extremities. It is usual to attach one or two brigades of light cavalry to each infantry corps, those of the center being placed in preference to the rear, whilst those of the wings are placed upon the flanks. If the reserves of cavalry are sufficiently numerous to permit the organization of three corps of this arm, giving one as reserve to the center and one to each wing, the arrangement is certainly a good one. If that is impossible, this reserve may be formed in two columns, one on the right of the left wing and the other on the left of the right wing. These columns may thus readily move to any point of the line that may be threatened.
The artillery of the present day has greater mobility, and may, as formerly, be distributed along the front, that of each division remaining near it. It may be observed, moreover, that, the organization of the artillery having been greatly improved, an advantageous distribution of it may be more readily made; but it is a great mistake to scatter it too much. Few precise rules can be laid down for the proper distribution of artillery. Who, for example, would dare to advise as a rule the filling up of a large gap in a line of battle with one hundred pieces of cannon in a single battery without adequate support, as Napoleon did successfully at Wagram? I do not desire to go here into much detail with reference to the use of this arm, but I will give the following rules:--
1. The horse-artillery should be placed on such ground that it can move freely in every direction.
2. Foot-artillery, on the contrary, and especially that of heavy caliber, will be best posted where protected by ditches or hedges from sudden charges of cavalry. It is hardly necessary for me to add--what every young officer should know already--that too elevated positions are not those to give artillery its greatest effect. Flat or gently-sloping ground is better.
3. The horse-artillery usually maneuvers with the cavalry; but it is well for each army-corps to have its own horse-artillery, to be readily thrown into any desired position. It is, moreover, proper to have horse-artillery in reserve, which may be carried as rapidly as possible to any threatened point. General Benningsen had great cause for self-congratulation at Eylau because he had fifty light guns in reserve; for they had a powerful influence in enabling him to recover himself when his line had been broken through between the center and the left.
4. On the defensive, it is well to place some of the heavy batteries in front, instead of holding them in reserve, since it is desirable to attack the enemy at the greatest possible distance, with a view of checking his forward movement and causing disorder in his columns.
5. On the defensive, it seems also advisable to have the artillery not in reserve distributed at equal intervals in batteries along the whole line, since it is important to repel the enemy at all points. This must not, however, be regarded as an invariable rule; for the character of the position and the designs of the enemy may oblige the mass of the artillery to move to a wing or to the center.
6. In the offensive, it is equally advantageous to concentrate a very powerful artillery-fire upon a single point where it is desired to make a decisive stroke, with a view of shattering the enemy's line to such a degree that he will be unable to withstand an attack upon which the fate of the battle is to turn. I shall at another place have more to say as to the employment of artillery in battles.
FOOTNOTES:
Below are some of the different formations that may be given to infantry.
1st. In regiments of two battalions of eight hundred men each:--
Div's. Brig's. Batt'ns. Men. Four corps of two divisions each, and three divisions for detachments.................. 11 = 22 = 88 = 72,000
Four corps of three divisions each, and three divisions for detachments................... 15 = 30 = 120 = 96,000
Seven corps of two divisions each, and one corps for detachments....................... 16 = 32 = 128 = 103,000
2d. In regiments of three battalions, brigades of six battalions:--
Div's. Brig's. Batt'ns. Men. Four corps of two divisions each, besides detachments,............................... 11 = 22 = 132 105,000
Four corps of three divisions each, besides detachments................................ 15 = 30 = 180 = 144,000
Eight corps of two divisions each............ 16 = 32 = 192 = 154,000
If to these numbers we add one-fourth for cavalry, artillery, and engineers, the total force for the above formations may be known.
It is to be observed that regiments of two battalions if eight hundred men each would become very weak at the end of two or three months' campaigning. If they do not consist of three battalions, then each battalion should contain one thousand men.]
ARTICLE XLIV.
Formation and Employment of Infantry.
Infantry is undoubtedly the most important arm of the service, since it forms four-fifths of an army and is used both in the attack and defense of positions. If we must admit that, next to the genius of the general, the infantry arm is the most valuable instrument in gaining a victory, it is no less true that most important aid is given by the cavalry and artillery, and that without their assistance the infantry might at times be very seriously compromised, and at others could achieve only partial success.
We shall not here introduce those old discussions about the shallow and the deep formations, although the question, which was supposed decided, is far from being settled absolutely. The war in Spain and the battle of Waterloo have again given rise to disputes as to the relative advantages of fire and the shallow order, and of columns of attack and the deep order. I will give my own opinion farther on.
There must, however, be no misconception on this subject. The question now is not whether Lloyd was right in wishing to add a fourth rank, armed with pikes, to the infantry formation, with the expectation of producing more effect by the shock when attacking, or opposing a greater resistance when attacked. Every officer of experience knows the difficulty of moving in an orderly manner several deployed battalions in three ranks at close order, and that a fourth rank would increase the disorder without adding any advantage. It is astonishing that Lloyd, who had seen service, should have insisted so much upon the material advantage to be gained by thus increasing the mass of a battalion; for it very rarely happens that such a collision between opposing troops takes place that mere weight decides the contest. If three ranks turn their backs to the enemy, the fourth will not check them. This increase in the number of ranks diminishes the front and the number of men firing upon the defensive, whilst in the offensive there is not near so much mobility as in the ordinary column of attack. It is much more difficult to move eight hundred men in line of battle in four ranks than in three: although in the former case the extent of front is less, the ranks cannot be kept properly closed.
Lloyd's proposal for remedying this diminution of front is so absurd that it is wonderful how a man of talents could have imagined it. He wishes to deploy twenty battalions, and leave between them one hundred and fifty yards, or an interval equal to their front. We may well ask what would befall those battalions thus separated. The cavalry may penetrate the intervals and scatter them like dust before the whirlwind.
But the real question now is, shall the line of battle consist of deployed battalions depending chiefly upon their fire, or of columns of attack, each battalion being formed in column on the central division and depending on its force and impetuosity?
I will now proceed to sum up the particulars bearing upon a decision of the question in hand.
There are, in fact, only five methods of forming troops to attack an enemy:--l, as skirmishers; 2, in deployed lines, either continuous or checkerwise; 3, in lines of battalions formed in column on the central divisions; 4, in deep masses; 5, in small squares.
The skirmishing-order is an accessory; for the duties of skirmishers are, not to form the line of battle, but to cover it by taking advantage of the ground, to protect the movements of columns, to fill up intervals, and to defend the skirts of a position.
These different manners of formation are, therefore, reducible to four: the shallow order, where the line is deployed in three ranks; the half-deep order, formed of a line of battalions in columns doubled on the center or in battalion squares; the mixed order, where regiments are partly in line and partly in column; finally, the deep order, composed of heavy columns of battalions deployed one behind the other.
Deployed order in two lines. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
The formation into two deployed lines with a reserve was formerly used to a great extent: it is particularly suitable on the defensive. These deployed lines may either be continuous, (Fig. 29,) or checkerwise, or in echelons.
Twelve battalions in columns of attack in two lines, with skirmishers in the intervals.
-----...-----...-----...-----...-----...----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----...-----...-----...-----...-----...----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
A more compact order is shown in Fig. 30, where each battalion is formed into a column of attack, being by divisions upon the central division. It is really a line of small columns
In the three-rank formation, a battalion with four divisions will have twelve ranks in such a column as shown above: there are in this way too many non-combatants, and the column presents too good a mark for the artillery. To remedy in part these inconveniences, it has been proposed, whenever infantry is employed in columns of attack, to form it in two ranks, to place only three divisions of a battalion one behind the other, and to spread out the fourth as skirmishers in the intervals of the battalions and upon the flanks: when the cavalry charges, these skirmishers may rally behind the other three divisions. (See Fig. 31.) Each battalion would thus have two hundred more men to fire, besides those thrown into the two front ranks from the third. There would be, also, an increase of the whole front. By this arrangement, while having really a depth of but six men, there would be a front of one hundred men, and four hundred men who could discharge their fire-arms, for each battalion. Force and mobility would both be obtained. A battalion of eight hundred men, formed in the ordinary manner in a column of four divisions, has about sixty files in each division, of which the first alone--and only two ranks of that--discharge their pieces. Bach battalion would deliver, therefore, one hundred and twenty shots at a volley, whilst formed in the manner shown in Fig. 31 it would deliver four hundred.
While searching after methods of obtaining more fire when necessary, we must not forget that a column of attack is not intended to fire, and that its fire should be reserved until the last; for if it begins to fire while marching, the whole impulsive effect of its forward movement is lost. Moreover, this shallower order would only be advantageous against infantry, as the column of four divisions in three ranks--forming a kind of solid square--would be better against cavalry. The Archduke Charles found it advantageous at Essling, and particularly at Wagram, to adopt this last order, which was proposed by myself in my chapter on the General Principles of War, published in 1807. The brave cavalry of Bessières could make no impression upon these small masses.
To give more solidity to the column proposed, the skirmishers might, it is true, be recalled, and the fourth division reformed; but this would be a two-rank formation, and would offer much less resistance to a charge than the three-rank formation,--particularly on the flanks. If to remedy this inconvenience it is proposed to form squares, many military men believe that when in two ranks squares would not resist so well as columns. The English squares at Waterloo were, however, only in two ranks, and, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the French cavalry, only one battalion was broken. I will observe, in conclusion, that, if the two-rank formation be used for the columns of attack, it will be difficult to preserve that in three ranks for deployed lines, as it is scarcely possible to have two methods of formation, or, at any rate, to employ them alternately in the same engagement. It is not probable that any European army, except the English, will undertake to use deployed lines in two ranks. If they do, they should never move except in columns of attack.
I conclude that the system employed by the Russians and Prussians, of forming columns of four divisions in three ranks, of which one may be employed as skirmishers when necessary, is more generally applicable than any other; whilst the other, of which mention has been made, would be suitable only in certain cases and would require a double formation.
There is a mixed order, which was used by Napoleon at the Tagliamento and by the Russians at Eylau, where, in regiments of three battalions, one was deployed to form the first line, and two others to the rear in columns. (See Fig. 32.) This arrangement--which belongs also to the half-deep order--is suitable for the offensive-defensive, because the first line pours a powerful fire upon the enemy, which must throw him into more or less confusion, and the troops formed in columns may debouch through the intervals and fall with advantage upon him while in disorder. This arrangement would probably be improved by placing the leading divisions of the two battalions of the wings upon the same line with the central deployed battalion. There would thus be a half-battalion more to each regiment in the first line,--a by no means unimportant thing for the delivery of fire. There may be reason to fear that, these divisions becoming actively engaged in firing, their battalions which are formed in column to be readily launched against the enemy may not be easily disengaged for that purpose. The order may be useful in many cases. I have therefore indicated it.
The order in very deep masses (see Figs. 33 and 34) is certainly the most injudicious. In the later wars of Napoleon, twelve battalions were sometimes deployed and closed one upon the other, forming thirty-six ranks closely packed together. Such masses are greatly exposed to the destructive effects of artillery, their mobility and impulsion are diminished, while their strength is not increased. The use of such masses at Waterloo was one cause of the French being defeated. Macdonald's column was more fortunate at Wagram, but at a great sacrifice of life; and it is not probable that this column would have been victorious had it not been for the successes of Davoust and Oudinot on the left of the archduke's line.
When it is decided to risk such a mass, the precaution should certainly be taken of placing on each flank a battalion marching in file, so that if the enemy should charge the mass in flank it need not be arrested in its progress. (See Fig. 33.) Under the protection of these battalions, which may face toward the enemy, the column may continue its march to the point it is expected to reach: otherwise, this large mass, exposed to a powerful converging fire which it has no means of returning, will be thrown into confusion like the column at Fontenoy, or broken as was the Macedonian phalanx by Paulus Emilius.
Squares are good in plains and to oppose an enemy who has a superiority in cavalry. It is agreed that the regimental square is best for the defensive, and the battalion square for the offensive. (See Figs. 35, 36, 37.)
Division in battalion squares.]
The same division in long battalion squares.]
Squared of regiments of three battalions.]
The figures may be perfect squares, or elongated to give a large front and pour a heavier column of fire in the direction of the enemy. A regiment of three battalions will thus form a long square, by wheeling the center battalion half to the right and half to the left.
In the Turkish wars squares were almost exclusively used, because hostilities were carried on in the vast plains of Bessarabia, Moldavia, or Wallachia, and the Turks had an immense force of cavalry. But if the seat of war be the Balkan Mountains or beyond them, and their irregular cavalry be replaced by an army organized according to the proportions usual in Europe, the importance of the square will disappear, and the Russian infantry will show its superiority in Rumelia.
However this may be, the order in squares by regiments or battalions seems suitable for every kind of attack, when the assailant has not the superiority in cavalry and maneuvers on level ground advantageous for the enemy's charges. The elongated square, especially when applied to a battalion of eight companies, three of which would march in front and one on each side, would be much better to make an attack than a deployed battalion. It would not be so good as the column proposed above; but there would be less unsteadiness and more impulsion than if the battalion marched in a deployed line. It would have the advantage, also, of being prepared to resist cavalry.
Squares may also be drawn up in echelons, so as entirely to unmask each other. All the orders of battle may be formed of squares as well as with deployed lines.
It cannot be stated with truth that any one of the formations described is always good or always bad; but there is one rule to the correctness of which every one will assent,--that a formation suitable for the offensive must possess the characteristics of solidity, mobility, and momentum, whilst for the defensive solidity is requisite, and also the power of delivering as much fire as possible.
This truth being admitted, it remains yet to be decided whether the bravest troops, formed in columns but unable to fire, can stand long in presence of a deployed line firing twenty thousand musket-balls in one round, and able to fire two hundred thousand or three hundred thousand in five minutes. In the later wars in Europe, positions have often been carried by Russian, French, and Prussian columns with their arms at a shoulder and without firing a shot. This was a triumph of momentum and the moral effect it produces; but under the cool and deadly fire of the English infantry the French columns did not succeed so well at Talavera, Busaco, Fuentes-de-Onore, Albuera, and Waterloo.
We must not, however, necessarily conclude from these facts that the advantage is entirely in favor of the shallow formation and firing; for when the French formed their infantry in those dense masses, it is not at all wonderful that the deployed and marching battalions of which they were composed, assailed on all sides by a deadly fire, should have been repulsed. Would the same result have been witnessed if they had used columns of attack formed each of a single battalion doubled on the center? I think not. Before deciding finally as to the superiority of the shallow order, with its facility for firing, over the half-deep order and its momentum, there should be several trials to see how a deployed line would stand an assault from a formation like Fig. 31, (page 293.) These small columns have always succeeded wherever I have seen them tried.
Is it indeed an easy matter to adopt any other order when marching to attack a position? Can an immense deployed line be moved up into action while firing? I think no one will answer affirmatively. Suppose the attempt made to bring up twenty or thirty battalions in line, while firing either by file or by company, to the assault of a well-defended position: it is not very probable they would ever reach the desired point, or, if they did, it would be in about as good order as a flock of sheep.
What conclusions shall be drawn from all that has been said? 1. If the deep order is dangerous, the half-deep is excellent for the offensive. 2. The column of attack of single battalions is the best formation for carrying a position by assault; but its depth should be diminished as much as possible, that it may when necessary be able to deliver as heavy a column of fire as possible, and to diminish the effect of the enemy's fire: it ought also to be well covered by skirmishers and supported by cavalry. 3. The formation having the first line deployed and the second in columns is the best-suited to the defensive. 4. Either of them may be successful in the hands of a general of talent, who knows how to use his troops properly in the manner indicated in Articles XVI. and XXX.
Since this chapter was first written, numerous improvements have been made in the arms both of infantry and artillery, making them much more destructive. The effect of this is to incline men to prefer the shallower formations, even in the attack. We cannot, however, forget the lessons of experience; and, notwithstanding the use of rocket-batteries, shrapnel-shot, and the Perkins musket, I cannot imagine a better method of forming infantry for the attack than in columns of battalions. Some persons may perhaps desire to restore to infantry the helmets and breastplates of the fifteenth century, before leading them to the attack in deployed lines. But, if there is a general return to the deployed system, some better arrangement must be devised for marching to the attack than long, continuous lines, and either columns must be used with proper distances for deployment upon arriving near the enemy's position, or lines drawn up checkerwise, or the march must be by the flanks of companies,--all of which maneuvers are hazardous in presence of an enemy who is capable of profiting by the advantages on his side. A skillful commander will use either, or a combination of all, of these arrangements, according to circumstances.
Experience long ago taught me that one of the most difficult tactical problems is that of determining the best formation of troops for battle; but I have also learned that to solve this problem by the use of a single method is an impossibility.
In the first place, the topography of different countries is very various. In some, as Champagne, two hundred thousand men might be maneuvered in deployed lines. In others, as Italy, Switzerland, the valley of the Rhine, half of Hungary, it is barely possible to deploy a division of ten battalions. The degree of instruction of the troops, and their national characteristics, may also have an influence upon the system of formation.
Owing to the thorough discipline of the Russian army and its instruction in maneuvers of every kind, it may maintain in movements in long lines so much order and steadiness as to enable it to adopt a system which would be entirely out of the question for the French or Prussian armies of the present day. My long experience has taught me to believe that nothing is impossible; and I do not belong to the class of men who think that there can be but one type and one system for all armies and all countries.
To approximate as nearly as we can to the solution of the problem, it seems to me, we ought to find out:--1. The best method of moving when in sight of the enemy, but beyond his reach; 2. The best method of coming to close quarters with him; 3. The best defensive order.
In whatever manner we may settle these points, it seems desirable in all cases to exercise the troops--1. In marching in columns of battalions doubled on the center, with a view to deployment, if necessary, when coming into musket-range, or even to attack in column; 2. In marching in continuous deployed lines of eight or ten battalions; 3. In marching in deployed battalions arranged checkerwise,--as these broken lines are more easily moved than continuous lines; 4. In moving to the front by the flanks of companies; 5. In marching to the front in small squares, either in line or checkerwise; 6. In changing front while using these different methods of marching; 7. In changes of front executed by columns of companies at full distance, without deployment,--a more expeditious method than the others of changing front, and the one best suited to all kinds of ground.
Of all the methods of moving to the front, that by the flanks of companies would be the best if it was not somewhat dangerous. In a plain it succeeds admirably, and in broken ground is very convenient. It breaks up a line very much; but by accustoming the officers and privates to it, and by keeping the guides and color-bearers well aligned, all confusion can be avoided. The only objection to it is the danger to which the separated companies are exposed of being ridden down by cavalry. This danger may be avoided by having good cavalry scouts, and not using this formation too near the enemy, but only in getting over the first part of the large interval separating the two armies. At the least sign of the enemy's proximity the line could be reformed instantly, since the companies can come into line at a run. Whatever precautions may be taken, this maneuver should only be practiced with well-disciplined troops, never with militia or raw troops. I have never seen it tried in presence of an enemy,--but frequently at drills, where it has been found to succeed well, especially in changing front.
I have also seen attempts made to march deployed battalions in checkerwise order. They succeeded well; whilst marches of the same battalions in continuous lines did not. The French, particularly, have never been able to march steadily in deployed lines. This checkered order would be dangerous in case of an unexpected charge of cavalry. It may be employed in the first stages of the movement forward, to make it more easy, and the rear battalions would then come into line with the leading ones before reaching the enemy. Moreover, it is easy to form line at the moment of the charge, by leaving a small distance only between the leading and following battalions; for we must not forget that in the checkered order there are not two lines, but a single one, which is broken, to avoid the wavering and disorder observed in the marches of continuous lines.
It is very difficult to determine positively the best formation for making a serious and close attack upon an enemy. Of all the methods I have seen tried, the following seemed to succeed best. Form twenty-four battalions in two lines of battalions in columns doubled on the center ready for deployment: the first line will advance at charging-pace toward the enemy's line to within twice musket-range, and will then deploy at a run; the voltigeur-companies of each battalion will spread out in skirmishing-order, the remaining companies forming line and pouring in a continued fire by file; the second line of columns follows the first, and the battalions composing it pass at charging-step through the intervals of the first line. This maneuver was executed when no enemy was present; but it seems to me an irresistible combination of the advantages of firing and of the column.
Besides these lines of columns, there are three other methods of attacking in the half-deep order.
The first is that of lines composed of deployed battalions with others in column on the wings of those deployed, (Fig. 32, page 295.) The deployed battalions and the leading divisions of those in column would open fire at half musket-range, and the assault would then be made. The second is that of advancing a deployed line and firing until reaching half musket-range, then throwing forward the columns of the second line through the intervals of the first. The third is the order in echelons, mentioned on page 193, and shown in Fig. 15 on that page.
Finally, a last method is that of advancing altogether in deployed lines, depending on the superiority of fire alone, until one or the other party takes to its heels,--a case not likely to happen.
I cannot affirm positively which of these methods is the best; for I have not seen them used in actual service. In fact, in real combats of infantry I have never seen any thing but battalions deployed commencing to fire by company, and finally by file, or else columns marching firmly against the enemy, who either retired without awaiting the columns, or repulsed them before an actual collision took place, or themselves moved out to meet the advance. I have seen mêlées of infantry in defiles and in villages, where the heads of columns came in actual bodily collision and thrust each other with the bayonet; but I never saw such a thing on a regular field of battle.
In whatever manner these discussions terminate, they are useful, and should be continued. It would be absurd to discard as useless the fire of infantry, as it would be to give up entirely the half-deep formation; and an army is ruined if forced to adhere to precisely the same style of tactical maneuvers in every country it may enter and against every different nation. It is not so much the mode of formation as the proper combined use of the different arms which will insure victory. I must, however, except very deep masses, as they should be entirely abandoned.
I will conclude this subject by stating that a most vital point to be attended to in leading infantry to the combat is to protect the troops as much as possible from the fire of the enemy's artillery, not by withdrawing them at inopportune moments, but by taking advantage of all inequalities and accidents of the ground to hide them from the view of the enemy. When the assaulting troops have arrived within musket-range, it is useless to calculate upon sheltering them longer: the assault is then to be made. In such cases covers are only suitable for skirmishers and troops on the defensive.
It is generally quite important to defend villages on the front of a position, or to endeavor to take them when held by an enemy who is assailed; but their importance should not be overestimated; for we must never forget the noted battle of Blenheim, where Marlborough and Eugene, seeing the mass of the French infantry shut up in the villages, broke through the center and captured twenty-four battalions which were sacrificed in defending these posts.
For like reasons, it is useful to occupy clumps of trees or brushwood, which may afford cover to the party holding them. They shelter the troops, conceal their movements, cover those of cavalry, and prevent the enemy from maneuvering in their neighborhood. The case of the park of Hougoumont at the battle of Waterloo is a fine example of the influence the possession of such a position, well chosen and strongly defended, may have in deciding the fate of a battle. At Hochkirch and Kolin the possession of the woods was very important.
FOOTNOTES:
ARTICLE XLV.
Cavalry.
The use a general should make of his cavalry depends, of course, somewhat upon its numerical strength as compared with that of the whole army, and upon its quality. Even cavalry of an inferior character may be so handled as to produce very great results, if set in action at proper moments.
The numerical proportion of cavalry to infantry in armies has varied greatly. It depends on the natural tastes of nations making their people more or less fit for good troopers. The number and quality of horses, also, have something to do with it. In the wars of the Revolution, the French cavalry, although badly organized and greatly inferior to the Austrian, performed wonders. In 1796 I saw what was pompously called the cavalry reserve of the army of the Rhine,--a weak brigade of barely fifteen hundred horses! Ten years later I saw the same reserve consisting of fifteen thousand or twenty thousand horses,--so much had ideas and means changed.
As a general rule, it may be stated that an army in an open country should contain cavalry to the amount of one-sixth its whole strength; in mountainous countries one-tenth will suffice.
The principal value of cavalry is derived from its rapidity and ease of motion. To these characteristics may be added its impetuosity; but we must be careful lest a false application be made of this last.
Whatever may be its importance in the ensemble of the operations of war, cavalry can never defend a position without the support of infantry. Its chief duty is to open the way for gaining a victory, or to render it complete by carrying off prisoners and trophies, pursuing the enemy, rapidly succoring a threatened point, overthrowing disordered infantry, covering retreats of infantry and artillery. An army deficient in cavalry rarely obtains a great victory, and finds its retreats extremely difficult.
The proper time and manner of bringing cavalry into action depend upon the ideas of the commander-in-chief, the plan of the battle, the enemy's movements, and a thousand other circumstances which cannot be mentioned here. I can only touch upon the principal things to be considered in its use.
All are agreed that a general attack of cavalry against a line in good order cannot be attempted with much hope of success, unless it be supported by infantry and artillery. At Waterloo the French paid dearly for having violated this rule; and the cavalry of Frederick the Great fared no better at Kunnersdorf. A commander may sometimes feel obliged to push his cavalry forward alone, but generally the best time for charging a line of infantry is when it is already engaged with opposing infantry. The battles of Marengo, Eylau, Borodino, and several others prove this.
There is one case in which cavalry has a very decided superiority over infantry,--when rain or snow dampens the arms of the latter and they cannot fire. Augereau's corps found this out, to their sorrow, at Eylau, and so did the Austrian left at Dresden.
Infantry that has been shaken by a fire of artillery or in any other way may be charged with success. A very remarkable charge of this kind was made by the Prussian cavalry at Hohenfriedberg in 1745. A charge against squares of good infantry in good order cannot succeed.
A general cavalry charge is made to carry batteries of artillery and enable the infantry to take the position more easily; but the infantry must then be at hand to sustain the cavalry, for a charge of this character has only a momentary effect, which must be taken advantage of before the enemy can return offensively upon the broken cavalry. The beautiful charge of the French upon Gosa at the battle of Leipsic, October 16, is a fine example of this kind. Those executed at Waterloo with the same object in view were admirable, but failed because unsupported. The daring charge of Ney's weak cavalry upon Prince Hohenlohe's artillery at Jena is an example of what may be done under such circumstances.
General charges are also made against the enemy's cavalry, to drive it from the field of battle and return more free to act against his infantry.
Cavalry may be successfully thrown against the flank or rear of an enemy's line at the moment of its being attacked in front by the infantry. If repulsed, it may rally upon the army at a gallop, and, if successful, it may cause the loss of the enemy's army. This operation is rarely attempted, but I see no reason why it should not be very good; for a body of cavalry well handled cannot be cut off even if it gets in rear of the enemy. This is a duty for which light cavalry is particularly fitted.
In the defensive, cavalry may also produce very valuable results by opportune dashes at a body of the enemy which has engaged the opposing line and either broken it through or been on the point of doing so. It may regain the advantages lost, change the face of affairs, and cause the destruction of an enemy flushed and disordered by his own success. This was proved at Eylau, where the Russians made a fine charge, and at Waterloo by the English cavalry. The special cavalry of a corps d'armée may charge at opportune moments, either to co-operate in a combined attack, or to take advantage of a false movement of the enemy, or to finish his defeat by pressing him while in retreat.
It is not an easy matter to determine the best mode of attacking, as it depends upon the object in view and other circumstances. There are but four methods of charging,--in columns, in lines at a trot, in lines at a gallop, and in open order,--all of which may be successfully used. In charges in line, the lance is very useful; in mêlées, the saber is much better: hence comes the idea of giving the lance to the front rank, which makes the first onslaught, and the saber to the second rank, which finishes the encounter usually in individual combats. Pistol-firing is of very little use except for outpost-duty, in a charge as foragers, or when light cavalry desires to annoy infantry and draw its fire previous to a charge. I do not know what the carbine is good for; since a body of cavalry armed with it must halt if they wish to fire with any accuracy, and they are then in a favorable condition for the enemy to attack. There are few marksmen who can with any accuracy fire a musket while on horseback and in rapid motion.
I have just said that all the methods of charging may be equally good. It must not be understood, however, that impetuosity always gives the advantage in a shock of cavalry against cavalry: the fast trot, on the contrary, seems to me the best gait for charges in line, because every thing depends, in such a case, upon the ensemble and good order of the movement,--things which cannot be obtained in charges at a fast gallop. Galloping is proper against artillery when it is important to get over the ground as rapidly as possible. In like manner, if the cavalry is armed with sabers, it may take the gallop at two hundred yards from the enemy's line if it stands firmly to receive the attack. But if the cavalry is armed with the lance, the fast trot is the proper gait, since the advantageous use of that weapon depends upon the preservation of good order: in a mêlée the lance is almost useless.
If the enemy advances at a fast trot, it does not seem prudent to gallop to meet him; for the galloping party will be much disordered, while the trotting party will not. The only advantage of the gallop is its apparent boldness and the moral effect it produces; but, if this is estimated at its true value by the enemy, it is reasonable to expect his firm and compact mass to be victorious over a body of horsemen galloping in confusion.
In their charges against infantry the Turks and Mamelukes showed the small advantage of mere impetuosity. No cavalry will penetrate where lancers or cuirassiers at a trot cannot. It is only when infantry is much disordered, or their fire poorly maintained, that there is any advantage in the impetuous gallop over the steady trot. To break good squares, cannon and lancers are required, or, better still, cuirassiers armed with lances. For charges in open order there are no better models for imitation than the Turks and the Cossacks.
Whatever method be adopted in charging, one of the best ways of using cavalry is to throw several squadrons opportunely upon the flanks of an enemy's line which is also attacked in front. That this maneuver may be completely successful, especially in charges of cavalry against cavalry, it should be performed at the very moment when the lines come in collision; for a minute too soon or too late its effect may be lost. It is highly important, therefore, that a cavalry commander should have a quick eye, sound judgment, and a cool head.
Much discussion has taken place about the proper manner of arming and organizing cavalry. The lance is the best arm for offensive purposes when a body of horsemen charge in line; for it enables them to strike an enemy who cannot reach them; but it is a very good plan to have a second rank or a reserve armed with sabers, which are more easily handled than the lance in hand-to-hand fighting when the ranks become broken. It would be, perhaps, better still to support a charge of lancers by a detachment of hussars, who can follow up the charge, penetrate the enemy's line, and complete the victory.
The cuirass is the best defensive armor. The lance and the cuirass of strong leather doubled seem to me the best armament for light cavalry, the saber and iron cuirass the best for heavy cavalry. Some military men of experience are inclined even to arm the cuirassiers with lances, believing that such cavalry, resembling very much the men-at-arms of former days, would bear down every thing before them. A lance would certainly suit them better than the musketoon; and I do not see why they should not have lances like those of the light cavalry.
Opinions will be always divided as to those amphibious animals called dragoons. It is certainly an advantage to have several battalions of mounted infantry, who can anticipate an enemy at a defile, defend it in retreat, or scour a wood; but to make cavalry out of foot-soldiers, or a soldier who is equally good on horse or on foot, is very difficult. This might have been supposed settled by the fate of the French dragoons when fighting on foot, had it not been seen that the Turkish cavalry fought quite as well dismounted as mounted. It has been said that the greatest inconvenience resulting from the use of dragoons consists in the fact of being obliged at one moment to make them believe infantry squares cannot resist their charges, and the next moment that a foot-soldier armed with his musket is superior to any horseman in the world. This argument has more plausibility than real force; for, instead of attempting to make men believe such contradictory statements, it would be much more reasonable to tell them that if brave cavalry may break a square, brave foot-soldiers may resist such a charge; that victory does not always depend upon the superiority of the arm, but upon a thousand other things; that the courage of the troops, the presence of mind of the commanders, the opportuneness of maneuvers, the effect of artillery and musketry fire, rain,--mud, even,--have been the causes of repulses or of victories; and, finally, that a brave man, whether on foot or mounted, will always be more than a match for a coward. By impressing these truths upon dragoons, they will believe themselves superior to their adversaries whether they fight on foot or on horseback. This is the case with the Turks and the Circassians, whose cavalry often dismount to fight on foot in a wood or behind a cover, musket in hand, like foot-soldiers.
It requires, however, fine material and fine commanders to bring soldiers to such perfection in knowledge of their duties.
The conviction of what brave men can accomplish, whether on foot or mounted, doubtless induced the Emperor Nicholas to collect the large number of fourteen or fifteen thousand dragoons in a single corps, while he did not consider Napoleon's unfortunate experiment with French dragoons, and was not restrained by the fear of often wanting a regiment of these troops at some particular point. It is probable that this concentration was ordered for the purpose of giving uniformity to the instruction of the men in their duties as foot and mounted soldiers, and that in war they were to be distributed to the different grand divisions of the army. It cannot be denied, however, that great advantages might result to the general who could rapidly move up ten thousand men on horseback to a decisive point and bring them into action as infantry. It thus appears that the methods of concentration and of distribution have their respective advantages and disadvantages. A judicious mean between the extremes would be to attach a strong regiment to each wing of the army and to the advanced guard, (or the rear-guard in a retreat,) and then to unite the remaining troops of this arm in divisions or corps.
Every thing that was said with reference to the formation of infantry is applicable to cavalry, with the following modifications:--
1. Lines deployed checkerwise or in echelons are much better for cavalry than full lines; whilst for infantry lines drawn up checkerwise are too much disconnected, and would be in danger if the cavalry should succeed in penetrating and taking the battalions in flank. The checkerwise formation is only advantageous for infantry in preparatory movements before reaching the enemy, or else for lines of columns which can defend themselves in every direction against cavalry. Whether checkered or full lines be used, the distance between them ought to be such that if one is checked and thrown into confusion the others may not share it. It is well to observe that in the checkered lines the distance may be less than for full lines. In every case the second line should not be full. It should be formed in columns by divisions, or at least there should be left the spaces, if in line, of two squadrons, that may be in column upon the flank of each regiment, to facilitate the passage through of the troops which have been brought up.
2. When the order of columns of attack doubled on the center is used, cavalry should be formed in regiments and infantry only in battalions. The regiments should contain six squadrons, in order that, by doubling on the center into divisions, three may be formed. If there are only four squadrons, there can be but two lines.
3. The cavalry column of attack should never be formed en masse like that of infantry; but there should always be full or half squadron distance, that each may have room to disengage itself and charge separately. This distance will be so great only for those troops engaged. When they are at rest behind the line of battle, they may be closed up, in order to cover less ground and diminish the space to be passed over when brought into action. The masses should, of course, be kept beyond cannon-range.
4. A flank attack being much more to be apprehended by cavalry than in a combat of infantry with infantry, several squadrons should be formed in echelons by platoons on the flanks of a line of cavalry, which may form to the right or left, to meet an enemy coming in that direction.
5. For the same reason, it is important to throw several squadrons against the flanks of a line of cavalry which is attacked in front. Irregular cavalry is quite as good as the regular for this purpose, and it may be better.
6. It is also of importance, especially in cavalry, that the commander-in-chief increase the depth rather than the extent of the formation. For example, in a deployed division of two brigades it would not be a good plan for one brigade to form in a single line behind the other, but each brigade should have one regiment in the first line and one in the second. Each unit of the line will thus have its own proper reserve behind it,--an advantage not to be regarded as trifling; for in a charge events succeed each other so rapidly that it is impossible for a general to control the deployed regiments.
By adopting this arrangement, each general of brigade will be able to dispose of his own reserve; and it would be well, also, to have a general reserve for the whole division. This consideration leads me to think that five regiments would make a good division. The charge may then be made in line by brigades of two regiments, the fifth serving as a general reserve behind the center. Or three regiments may form the line, and two may be in column, one behind each wing. Or it may be preferable to use a mixed order, deploying two regiments and keeping the others in column. This is a good arrangement, because the three regiments, formed in columns by divisions behind the center and flanks of the line, cover those points, and can readily pass the line if it is beaten back. (See Fig. 38.)
Cavalry deployed should be in checkered order rather than in full lines.]
7. Two essential points are regarded as generally settled for all encounters of cavalry against cavalry. One is that the first line must sooner or later be checked; for, even upon the supposition of the first charge being entirely successful, it is always probable that the enemy will bring fresh squadrons to the contest, and the first line must at length be forced to rally behind the second. The other point is that, with troops and commanders on both sides equally good, the victory will remain with the party having the last squadrons in reserve in readiness to be thrown upon the flank of the enemy's line while his front is also engaged.
Attention to these truths will bring us to a just conclusion as to the proper method of forming a large mass of cavalry for battle.
Whatever order be adopted, care must be taken to avoid deploying large cavalry corps in full lines; for a mass thus drawn up is very unmanageable, and if the first line is checked suddenly in its career the second is also, and that without having an opportunity to strike a blow. This has been demonstrated many times. Take as an example the attack made by Nansouty in columns of regiments upon the Prussian cavalry deployed in front of Chateau-Thierry.
In opposing the formation of cavalry in more than two lines, I never intended to exclude the use of several lines checkerwise or in echelons, or of reserves formed in columns. I only meant to say that when cavalry, expecting to make a charge, is drawn up in lines one behind the other, the whole mass will be thrown into confusion as soon as the first line breaks and turns.
With cavalry still more than with infantry the morale is very important. The quickness of eye and the coolness of the commander, and the intelligence and bravery of the soldier, whether in the mêlée or in the rally, will oftener be the means of assuring a victory than the adoption of this or that formation. When, however, a good formation is adopted and the advantages mentioned above are also present, the victory is more certain; and nothing can excuse the use of a vicious formation.
The history of the wars between 1812 and 1815 has renewed the old disputes upon the question whether regular cavalry will in the end get the better over an irregular cavalry which will avoid all serious encounters, will retreat with the speed of the Parthians and return to the combat with the same rapidity, wearing out the strength of its enemy by continual skirmishing. Lloyd has decided in the negative; and several exploits of the Cossacks when engaged with the excellent French cavalry seem to confirm his opinion. (When I speak of excellent French cavalry, I refer to its impetuous bravery, and not to its perfection; for it does not compare with the Russian or German cavalry either in horsemanship, organization, or in care of the animals.) We must by no means conclude it possible for a body of light cavalry deployed as skirmishers to accomplish as much as the Cossacks or other irregular cavalry. They acquire a habit of moving in an apparently disorderly manner, whilst they are all the time directing their individual efforts toward a common object. The most practiced hussars can never perform such service as the Cossacks, Tscherkesses, and Turks do instinctively.
Experience has shown that irregular charges may cause the defeat of the best cavalry in partial skirmishes; but it has also demonstrated that they are not to be depended upon in regular battles upon which the fate of a war may depend. Such charges are valuable accessories to an attack in line, but alone they can lead to no decisive results.
From the preceding facts we learn that it is always best to give cavalry a regular organization, and furnish them long weapons, not omitting, however, to provide, for skirmishing, &c., an irregular cavalry armed with pistols, lances, and sabers.
Whatever system of organization be adopted, it is certain that a numerous cavalry, whether regular or irregular, must have a great influence in giving a turn to the events of a war. It may excite a feeling of apprehension at distant parts of the enemy's country, it can carry off his convoys, it can encircle his army, make his communications very perilous, and destroy the ensemble of his operations. In a word, it produces nearly the same results as a rising en masse of a population, causing trouble on the front, flanks, and rear of an army, and reducing a general to a state of entire uncertainty in his calculations.
Any system of organization, therefore, will be a good one which provides for great enlargement of the cavalry in time of war by the incorporation of militia; for they may, with the aid of a few good regular squadrons, be made excellent partisan soldiers. These militia would certainly not possess all the qualities of those warlike wandering tribes who live on horseback and seem born cavalry-soldiers; but they could in a measure supply the places of such. In this respect Russia is much better off than any of her neighbors, both on account of the number and quality of her horsemen of the Don, and the character of the irregular militia she can bring into the field at very short notice.
Twenty years ago I made the following statements in Chapter XXXV. of the Treatise on Grand Military Operations, when writing on this subject:--
"The immense advantages of the Cossacks to the Russian army are not to be estimated. These light troops, which are insignificant in the shock of a great battle, (except for falling upon the flanks,) are terrible in pursuits and in a war of posts. They are a most formidable obstacle to the execution of a general's designs,--because he can never be sure of the arrival and carrying out of his orders, his convoys are always in danger, and his operations uncertain. If an army has had only a few regiments of these half-regular cavalry-soldiers, their real value has not been known; but when their number increases to fifteen thousand or twenty thousand, their usefulness is fully recognized,--especially in a country where the population is not hostile to them.
"When they are in the vicinity, every convoy must be provided with a strong escort, and no movement can be expected to be undisturbed. Much unusual labor is thus made necessary upon the part of the opponent's regular cavalry, which is soon broken down by the unaccustomed fatigue.
"Volunteer hussars or lancers, raised at the time of war breaking out, may be nearly as valuable as the Cossacks, if they are well officered and move freely about from point to point."
In the Hungarians, Transylvanians, and Croats, Austria has resources possessed by few other states. The services rendered by mounted militia have proved, however, that this kind of cavalry may be very useful, if for no other purpose than relieving the regular cavalry of those occasional and extra duties to be performed in all armies, such as forming escorts, acting as orderlies, protecting convoys, serving on outposts, &c. Mixed corps of regular and irregular cavalry may often be more really useful than if they were entirely composed of cavalry of the line,--because the fear of compromising a body of these last often restrains a general from pushing them forward in daring operations where he would not hesitate to risk his irregulars, and he may thus lose excellent opportunities of accomplishing great results.
FOOTNOTES:
ARTICLE XLVI.
Employment of Artillery.
Artillery is an arm equally formidable both in the offensive and defensive. As an offensive means, a great battery well managed may break an enemy's line, throw it into confusion, and prepare the way for the troops that are to make an assault. As a defensive means, it doubles the strength of a position, not only on account of the material injury it inflicts upon the enemy while at a distance, and the consequent moral effect upon his troops, but also by greatly increasing the peril of approaching near, and specially within the range of grape. It is no less important in the attack and defense of fortified places or intrenched camps; for it is one of the main reliances in modern systems of fortification.
I have already in a former portion of this book given some directions as to the distribution of artillery in a line of battle; but it is difficult to explain definitely the proper method of using it in the battle itself. It will not be right to say that artillery can act independently of the other arms, for it is rather an accessory. At Wagram, however, Napoleon threw a battery of one hundred pieces into the gap left by the withdrawal of Massena's corps, and thus held in check the Austrian center, notwithstanding their vigorous efforts to advance. This was a special case, and should not be often imitated.
I will content myself with laying down a few fundamental rules, observing that they refer to the present state of artillery service, (1838.) The recent discoveries not yet being fully tested, I shall say little with reference to them.
1. In the offensive, a certain portion of the artillery should concentrate its fire upon the point where a decisive blow is to be struck. Its first use is to shatter the enemy's line, and then it assists with its fire the attack of the infantry and cavalry.
2. Several batteries of horse-artillery should follow the offensive movements of the columns of attack, besides the foot-batteries intended for the same purpose. Too much foot-artillery should not move with an offensive column. It may be posted so as to co-operate with the column without accompanying it. When the cannoneers can mount the boxes, it may have greater mobility and be advanced farther to the front.
3. It has already been stated that half of the horse-artillery should be held in reserve, that it may be rapidly moved to any required point. For this purpose it should be placed upon the most open ground, whence it can move readily in every direction. I have already indicated the best positions for the heavy calibers.
4. The batteries, whatever may be their general distribution along the defensive line, should give their attention particularly to those points where the enemy would be most likely to approach, either on account of the facility or the advantage of so doing. The general of artillery should therefore know the decisive strategic and tactical points of the battle-field, as well as the topography of the whole space occupied. The distribution of the reserves of artillery will be regulated by these.
5. Artillery placed on level ground or ground sloping gently to the front is most favorably situated either for point-blank or ricochet firing: a converging fire is the best.
6. It should be borne in mind that the chief office of all artillery in battles is to overwhelm the enemy's troops, and not to reply to their batteries. It is, nevertheless, often useful to fire at the batteries, in order to attract their fire. A third of the disposable artillery may be assigned this duty, but two-thirds at least should be directed against the infantry and cavalry of the enemy.
7. If the enemy advance in deployed lines, the batteries should endeavor to cross their fire in order to strike the lines obliquely. If guns can be so placed as to enfilade a line of troops, a most powerful effect is produced.
8. When the enemy advance in columns, they may be battered in front. It is advantageous also to attack them obliquely, and especially in flank and reverse. The moral effect of a reverse fire upon a body of troops is inconceivable; and the best soldiers are generally put to flight by it. The fine movement of Ney on Preititz at Bautzen was neutralized by a few pieces of Kleist's artillery, which took his columns in flank, checked them, and decided the marshal to deviate from the excellent direction he was pursuing. A few pieces of light artillery, thrown at all hazards upon the enemy's flank, may produce most important results, far overbalancing the risks run.
9. Batteries should always have supports of infantry or cavalry, and especially on their flanks. Cases may occur where the rule may be deviated from: Wagram is a very remarkable example of this.
10. It is very important that artillerists, when threatened by cavalry, preserve their coolness. They should fire first solid shot, next shells, and then grape, as long as possible. The infantry supports should, in such a case, form squares in the vicinity, to shelter the horses, and, when necessary, the cannoneers. When the infantry is drawn up behind the pieces, large squares of sufficient size to contain whatever they should cover are best; but when the infantry is on the flanks, smaller squares are better. Rocket-batteries may also be very efficient in frightening the horses.
11. When infantry threatens artillery, the latter should continue its fire to the last moment, being careful not to commence firing too soon. The cannoneers can always be sheltered from an infantry attack if the battery is properly supported. This is a case for the co-operation of the three arms; for, if the enemy's infantry is thrown into confusion by the artillery, a combined attack upon it by cavalry and infantry will cause its destruction.
12. The proportions of artillery have varied in different wars. Napoleon conquered Italy in 1800 with forty or fifty pieces,--whilst in 1812 he invaded Russia with one thousand pieces thoroughly equipped, and failed. These facts show that any fixed rule on the subject is inadmissible. Usually three pieces to a thousand combatants are allowed; but this allowance will depend on circumstances.
The relative proportions of heavy and light artillery vary also between wide limits. It is a great mistake to have too much heavy artillery, whose mobility must be much less than that of the lighter calibers. A remarkable proof of the great importance of having a strong artillery-armament was given by Napoleon after the battle of Eylau. The great havoc occasioned among his troops by the numerous guns of the Russians opened his eyes to the necessity of increasing his own. With wonderful vigor, he set all the Prussian arsenals to work, those along the Rhine, and even at Metz, to increase the number of his pieces, and to cast new ones in order to enable him to use the munitions previously captured. In three months he doubled the matériel and personnel of his artillery, at a distance of one thousand miles from his own frontiers,--a feat without a parallel in the annals of war.
13. One of the surest means of using the artillery to the best advantage is to place in command of it a general who is at once a good strategist and tactician. This chief should be authorized to dispose not only of the reserve artillery, but also of half the pieces attached to the different corps or divisions of the army. He should also consult with the commanding general as to the moment and place of concentration of the mass of his artillery in order to contribute most to a successful issue of the day, and he should never take the responsibility of thus massing his artillery without previous orders from the commanding general.
FOOTNOTES:
ARTICLE XLVII.
Of the Combined Use of the Three Arms.
To conclude this Summary in a proper manner, I ought to treat of the combined use of the three arms; but I am restrained from so doing by considering the great variety of points necessary to be touched upon if I should attempt to go into an examination of all the detailed operations that would arise in the application of the general rules laid down for each of the arms.
Several authors--chiefly German--have treated this subject very extensively, and their labors are valuable principally because they consist mainly of citations of numerous examples taken from the actual minor engagements of the later wars. These examples must indeed take the place of rules, since experience has shown that fixed rules on the subject cannot be laid down. It seems a waste of breath to say that the commander of a body of troops composed of the three arms should employ them so that they will give mutual support and assistance; but, after all, this is the only fundamental rule that can be established, for the attempt to prescribe for such a commander a special course of conduct in every case that may arise, when these cases may be infinitely varied, would involve him in an inextricable labyrinth of instructions. As the object and limits of this Summary do not allow me to enter upon the consideration of such details, I can only refer my readers to the best works which do treat of them.
I have said all I can properly say when I advise that the different arms be posted in conformity with the character of the ground, according to the object in view and the supposed designs of the enemy, and that they be used simultaneously in the manner best suited to them, care being taken to enable them to afford mutual support. A careful study of the events of previous wars, and especially experience in the operations of war, will give an officer correct ideas on these points, and the ability to use, at the right time and place, his knowledge of the properties of the three arms, either single or combined.
CONCLUSION.
I am constrained to recapitulate the principal facts which may be regarded as fundamental in war. War in its ensemble is not a science, but an art. Strategy, particularly, may indeed be regulated by fixed laws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this is not true of war viewed as a whole. Among other things, combats may be mentioned as often being quite independent of scientific combinations, and they may become essentially dramatic, personal qualities and inspirations and a thousand other things frequently being the controlling elements. The passions which agitate the masses that are brought into collision, the warlike qualities of these masses, the energy and talent of their commanders, the spirit, more or less martial, of nations and epochs,--in a word, every thing that can be called the poetry and metaphysics of war,--will have a permanent influence on its results.
Shall I be understood as saying that there are no such things as tactical rules, and that no theory of tactics can be useful? What military man of intelligence would be guilty of such an absurdity? Are we to imagine that Eugene and Marlborough triumphed simply by inspiration or by the superior courage and discipline of their battalions? Or do we find in the events of Turin, Blenheim, and Ramillies maneuvers resembling those seen at Talavera, Waterloo, Jena, or Austerlitz, which were the causes of the victory in each case? When the application of a rule and the consequent maneuver have procured victory a hundred times for skillful generals, and always have in their favor the great probability of leading to success, shall their occasional failure be a sufficient reason for entirely denying their value and for distrusting the effect of the study of the art? Shall a theory be pronounced absurd because it has only three-fourths of the whole number of chances of success in its favor?
The morale of an army and its chief officers has an influence upon the fate of a war; and this seems to be due to a certain physical effect produced by the moral cause. For example, the impetuous attack upon a hostile line of twenty thousand brave men whose feelings are thoroughly enlisted in their cause will produce a much more powerful effect than the attack of forty thousand demoralized or apathetic men upon the same point.
Strategy, as has already been explained, is the art of bringing the greatest part of the forces of an army upon the important point of the theater of war or of the zone of operations.
Tactics is the art of using these masses at the points to which they shall have been conducted by well-arranged marches; that is to say, the art of making them act at the decisive moment and at the decisive point of the field of battle. When troops are thinking more of flight than of fight, they can no longer be termed active masses in the sense in which I use the term.
A general thoroughly instructed in the theory of war, but not possessed of military coup-d'oeil, coolness, and skill, may make an excellent strategic plan and be entirely unable to apply the rules of tactics in presence of an enemy: his projects will not be successfully carried out, and his defeat will be probable. If he be a man of character, he will be able to diminish the evil results of his failure, but if he lose his wits he will lose his army.
The same general may, on the other hand, be at once a good tactician and strategist, and have made all the arrangements for gaining a victory that his means will permit: in this case, if he be only moderately seconded by his troops and subordinate officers, he will probably gain a decided victory. If, however, his troops have neither discipline nor courage, and his subordinate officers envy and deceive him, he will undoubtedly see his fine hopes fade away, and his admirable combinations can only have the effect of diminishing the disasters of an almost unavoidable defeat.
No system of tactics can lead to victory when the morale of an army is bad; and even when it may be excellent the victory may depend upon some occurrence like the rupture of the bridges over the Danube at Essling. Neither will victories be necessarily gained or lost by rigid adherence to or rejection of this or that manner of forming troops for battle.
These truths need not lead to the conclusion that there can be no sound rules in war, the observance of which, the chances being equal, will lead to success. It is true that theories cannot teach men with mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case; but it is also certain that they will always point out the errors which should be avoided; and this is a highly-important consideration, for these rules thus become, in the hands of skillful generals commanding brave troops, means of almost certain success.
The correctness of this statement cannot be denied; and it only remains to be able to discriminate between good rules and bad. In this ability consists the whole of a man's genius for war. There are, however, leading principles which assist in obtaining this ability. Every maxim relating to war will be good if it indicates the employment of the greatest portion of the means of action at the decisive moment and place. In Chapter III. I have specified all the strategic combinations which lead to such a result. As regards tactics, the principal thing to be attended to is the choice of the most suitable order of battle for the object in view. When we come to consider the action of masses on the field, the means to be used may be an opportune charge of cavalry, a strong battery put in position and unmasked at the proper moment, a column of infantry making a headlong charge, or a deployed division coolly and steadily pouring upon the enemy a fire, or they may consist of tactical maneuvers intended to threaten the enemy's flanks or rear, or any other maneuver calculated to diminish the confidence of the adversary. Each of these things may, in a particular case, be the cause of victory. To define the cases in which each should be preferred is simply impossible.
If a general desires to be a successful actor in the great drama of war, his first duty is to study carefully the theater of operations, that he may see clearly the relative advantages and disadvantages it presents for himself and his enemies. This being done, he can understandingly proceed to prepare his base of operations, then to choose the most suitable zone of operations for his main efforts, and, in doing so, keep constantly before his mind the principles of the art of war relative to lines and fronts of operations. The offensive army should particularly endeavor to cut up the opposing army by skillfully selecting objective points of maneuver; it will then assume, as the objects of its subsequent undertakings, geographical points of more or less importance, depending upon its first successes.
The defensive army, on the contrary, should endeavor, by all means, to neutralize the first forward movement of its adversary, protracting operations as long as possible while not compromising the fate of the war, and deferring a decisive battle until the time when a portion of the enemy's forces are either exhausted by labors, or scattered for the purpose of occupying invaded provinces, masking fortified places, covering sieges, protecting the line of operations, depots, &c.
Up to this point every thing relates to a first plan of operations; but no plan can provide with certainty for that which is uncertain always,--the character and the issue of the first conflict. If your lines of operations have been skillfully chosen and your movements well concealed, and if on the other hand your enemy makes false movements which permit you to fall on fractions of his army, you maybe successful in your campaign, without fighting general battles, by the simple use of your strategic advantages. But if the two parties seem about equally matched at the time of conflict, there will result one of those stupendous tragedies like Borodino, Wagram, Waterloo, Bautzen, and Dresden, where the precepts of grand tactics, as indicated in the chapter on that subject, must have a powerful influence.
If a few prejudiced military men, after reading this book and carefully studying the detailed and correct history of the campaigns of the great masters of the art of war, still contend that it has neither principles nor rules, I can only pity them, and reply, in the famous words of Frederick, that "a mule which had made twenty campaigns under Prince Eugene would not be a better tactician than at the beginning."
Correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual events of wars, and added to accurate military history, will form a true school of instruction for generals. If these means do not produce great men, they will at least produce generals of sufficient skill to take rank next after the natural masters of the art of war.
FOOTNOTES:
SUPPLEMENT
TO THE
SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.
My Summary of the Art of War, published in 1836, to assist in the military instruction of the Hereditary Grand Duke of Russia, contained a concluding article that was never printed. I deem it expedient to give it now in the form of a supplement, and add a special article upon the means of acquiring a certain and ready strategic coup-d'oeil.
It is essential for the reader of my Summary to understand clearly that in the military science, as in every other, the study of details is easy for the man who has learned how to seize the fundamental features to which all others are secondary. I am about to attempt a development of these elements of the art; and my readers should endeavor to apprehend them clearly and to apply them properly.
I cannot too often repeat that the theory of the great combinations of war is in itself very simple, and requires nothing more than ordinary intelligence and careful consideration. Notwithstanding its simplicity, many learned military men have difficulty in grasping it thoroughly. Their minds wander off to accessory details, in place of fixing themselves on first causes, and they go a long way in search of what is just within their reach if they only would think so.
Two very different things must exist in a man to make him a general: he must know how to arrange a good plan of operations, and how to carry it to a successful termination. The first of these talents may be a natural gift, but it may also be acquired and developed by study. The second depends more on individual character, is rather a personal attribute, and cannot be created by study, although it may be improved.
It is particularly necessary for a monarch or the head of a government to possess the first of these talents, because in such case, although he may not have the ability to execute, he can arrange plans of operations and decide correctly as to the excellence or defects of those submitted to him by others. He is thus enabled to estimate properly the capacity of his generals, and when he finds a general producing a good plan, and having firmness and coolness, such a man may be safely trusted with the command of an army.
If, on the other hand, the head of a state is a man of executive ability, but not possessing the faculty of arranging wise military combinations, he will be likely to commit all the faults that have characterized the campaigns of many celebrated warriors who were only brave soldiers without being at all improved by study.
From the principles which I have laid down, and their application to several famous campaigns, my readers will perceive that the theory of the great combinations of war may be summed up in the following truths.
The science of strategy consists, in the first place, in knowing how to choose well a theater of war and to estimate correctly that of the enemy. To do this, a general must accustom himself to decide as to the importance of decisive points,--which is not a difficult matter when he is aided by the hints I have given on the subject, particularly in Articles from XVIII. to XXII.
The art consists, next, in a proper employment of the troops upon the theater of operations, whether offensive or defensive. (See Article XVII.) This employment of the forces should be regulated by two fundamental principles: the first being, to obtain by free and rapid movements the advantage of bringing the mass of the troops against fractions of the enemy; the second, to strike in the most decisive direction,--that is to say, in that direction where the consequences of his defeat may be most disastrous to the enemy, while at the same time his success would yield him no great advantages.
The whole science of great military combination is comprised in these two fundamental truths. Therefore, all movements that are disconnected or more extended than those of the enemy would be grave faults; so also would the occupation of a position that was too much cut up, or sending out a large detachment unnecessarily. On the contrary, every well-connected, compact system of operations would be wise; so also with central strategic lines, and every strategic position less extended than the enemy's.
The application of these fundamental principles is also very simple. If you have one hundred battalions against an equal number of the enemy's, you may, by their mobility and by taking the initiative, bring eighty of them to the decisive point while employing the remaining twenty to observe and deceive half of the opposing army. You will thus have eighty battalions against fifty at the point where the important contest is to take place. You will reach this point by rapid marches, by interior lines, or by a general movement toward one extremity of the hostile line. I have indicated the cases in which one or the other of these means is to be preferred. (See pages 114 and following.)
In arranging a plan of operations, it is important to remember "that a strategic theater, as well as every position occupied by an army, has a center and two extremities." A theater has usually three zones,--a right, a left, and a central.
In choosing a zone of operations, select one,--1, that will furnish a safe and advantageous base; 2, in which the least risk will be run by yourself, while the enemy will be most exposed to injury; 3, bearing in mind the antecedent situations of the two parties, and, 4, the dispositions and inclinations of the powers whose territories are near the theater of war.
One of the zones will always be decidedly bad or dangerous, while the other two will be more or less suitable according to circumstances.
The zone and base being fixed upon, the object of the first attempts must be selected. This is choosing an objective of operations. There are two very different kinds: some, that are called territorial or geographical objectives, refer simply to an enemy's line of defense which it is desired to get possession of, or a fortress or intrenched camp to be captured; the others, on the contrary, consist entirely in the destruction or disorganization of the enemy's forces, without giving attention to geographical points of any kind. This was the favorite objective of Napoleon.
I can profitably add nothing to what I have already written on this point, (page 86;) and, as the choice of the objective is by far the most important thing in a plan of operations, I recommend the whole of Article XIX., (pages 84 and following.)
The objective being determined upon, the army will move toward it by one or two lines of operations, care being taken to conform to the fundamental principle laid down, and to avoid double lines, unless the character of the theater of war makes it necessary to use them, or the enemy is very inferior either in the number or the quality of his troops. Article XXI. treats this subject fully. If two geographical lines are used, it is essential to move the great mass of the forces along the most important of them, and to occupy the secondary line by detachments having a concentric direction, if possible, with the main body.
The army, being on its way toward the objective, before arriving in presence of the enemy and giving battle, occupies daily or temporary strategic positions: the front it embraces, or that upon which the enemy may attack, is its front of operations. There is an important consideration with reference to the direction of the front of operations and to changes it may receive, which I have dwelt upon in Article XX., (page 93.)
The fundamental principle requires, even when the forces are equal, that the front be less extensive than the enemy's,--especially if the front remains unchanged for some time. If your strategic positions are more closely connected than the enemy's, you can concentrate more rapidly and more easily than he can, and in this way the fundamental principle will be applied. If your positions are interior and central, the enemy cannot concentrate except by passing by the mass of your divisions or by moving in a circle around them: he is then exactly in a condition not to be able to apply the fundamental principle, while it is your most obvious measure.
But if you are very weak and the enemy very strong, a central position, that may be surrounded on all sides by forces superior at every point, is untenable, unless the enemy's corps are very far separated from each other, as was the case with the allied armies in the Seven Years' War; or unless the central zone has a natural barrier on one or two of its sides, like the Rhine, the Danube, or the Alps, which would prevent the enemy from using his forces simultaneously. In case of great numerical inferiority it is, nevertheless, wiser to maneuver upon one of the extremities than upon the center of the enemy's line, especially if his masses are sufficiently near to be dangerous to you.
It was stated above that strategy, besides indicating the decisive points of a theater of war, requires two things:--1st, that the principal mass of the force be moved against fractions of the enemy's, to attack them in succession; 2d, that the best direction of movement be adopted,--that is to say, one leading straight to the decisive points already known, and afterward upon secondary points.
To illustrate these immutable principles of strategy, I will give a sketch of the operations of the French at the close of 1793. (See Plate III.)
It will be recollected that the allies had ten principal corps on the frontier of France from the Rhine to the North Sea.
The Duke of York was attacking Dunkirk. (No. 1.)
Marshal Freytag was covering the siege. (No. 2.)
The Prince of Orange was occupying an intermediate position at Menin. (No. 3.)
The Prince of Coburg, with the main army, was attacking Maubeuge, and was guarding the space between that place and the Scheldt by strong detachments. (No. 4.)
Clairfayt was covering the siege. (No. 5.)
Benjouski was covering Charleroi and the Meuse, toward Thuin and Charleroi, the fortifications of which were being rebuilt. (No. 6.)
Another corps was covering the Ardennes and Luxembourg. (No. 7.)
The Prussians were besieging Landau. (No. 8.)
The Duke of Brunswick was covering the siege in the Vosges. (No. 9.)
General Wurmser was observing Strasbourg and the army of the Rhine. (No. 10.)
The French, besides the detachments in front of each of the hostile corps, had five principal masses in the camps of Lille, Douai, Guise, Sarre Louis, and Strasbourg, (a, b, c, d, e.) A strong reserve, (g,) composed of the best troops drawn from the camps of the northern frontier, was intended to be thrown upon all the points of the enemy's line in succession, assisted by the troops already in the neighborhood, (i, k, l, m.)
This reserve; assisted by the divisions of the camp of Cassel near Dunkirk, commenced its operations by beating corps 1 and 2, under the Duke of York; then that of the Dutch, (No. 3,) at Menin; next that of Clairfayt, (5,) before Maubeuge; finally, joining the army of the Moselle toward Sarre Louis, it beat the Duke of Brunswick in the Vosges, and, with the assistance of the army of the Rhine, (f,) drove Wurmser from the lines of Wissembourg.
The general principle was certainly well applied, and every similar operation will be praiseworthy. But, as the Austrians composed half the allied forces, and they had their lines of retreat from the points 4, 5, and 6 upon the Rhine, it is evident that if the French had collected three of their large corps in order to move them against Benjouski at Thuin, (No. 6,) and then fallen upon the Prince of Coburg's left by the Charleroi road, they would have thrown the imperial army upon the North Sea, and would have obtained immense results.
The Committee of Public Safety deemed it a matter of great importance that Dunkirk should not be permitted to fell into the hands of the English. Besides this, York's corps, encamped on the downs, might be cut off and thrown upon the sea; and the disposable French masses for this object were at Douai, Lille, and Cassel: so that there were good reasons for commencing operations by attacking the English. The principal undertaking failed, because Houchard did not appreciate the strategic advantage he had, and did not know how to act on the line of retreat of the Anglo-Hanoverian army. He was guillotined, by way of punishment, although he saved Dunkirk; yet he failed to cut off the English as he might have done.
It will be observed that this movement of the French reserve along the whole front was the cause of five victories, neither of which had decisive results, because the attacks were made in front, and because, when the cities were relieved, the allied armies not being cut through, and the French reserve moving on to the different points in succession, none of the victories was pushed to its legitimate consequences. If the French had based themselves upon the five fortified towns on the Meuse, had collected one hundred thousand men by bold and rapid marches, had fallen upon the center of those separated corps, had crushed Benjouski, assailed the Prince of Coburg in his rear, beaten him, and pursued him vigorously as Napoleon pursued at Ratisbon, and as he wished to do at Ligny in 1815, the result would have been very different.
I have mentioned this example, as it illustrates very well the two important points to be attended to in the strategic management of masses of troops; that is, their employment at different points in succession and at decisive points.
Every educated military man will be impressed by the truths educed, and will be convinced that the excellence of maneuvers will depend upon their conforming to the principle already insisted upon; that is to say, the great part of the force must be moved against one wing or the center, according to the position of the enemy's masses. It is of importance in battles to calculate distances with still greater accuracy; for the results of movements on the battle-field following them more rapidly than in the case of strategic maneuvers, every precaution must be taken to avoid exposing any part of the line to a dangerous attack from the enemy, especially if he is compactly drawn up. Add to these things calmness during the action; the ability to choose positions for fighting battles in the manner styled the defensive with offensive returns, (Art. XXX.;) the simultaneous employment of the forces in striking the decisive blow, (see pages from 202 to 204;) the faculty of arousing the soldiers and moving them forward at opportune moments; and we have mentioned every thing which can assist, as far as the general is concerned, in assuring victories, and every thing which will constitute him a skillful tactician.
It is almost always easy to determine the decisive point of a field of battle, but not so with the decisive moment; and it is precisely here that genius and experience are every thing, and mere theory of little value.
It is important, also, to consider attentively Article XLII., which explains how a general may make a small number of suppositions as to what the enemy may or can do, and as to what course of conduct he shall himself pursue upon those hypotheses. He may thus accustom himself to be prepared for any eventuality.
I must also call attention to Article XXVIII., upon great detachments. These are necessary evils, and, if not managed with great care, may prove ruinous to the best armies. The essential rules on this point are, to make as few detachments as possible, to have them readily movable, to draw them back to the main body as soon as practicable, and to give them good instructions for avoiding disasters.
I have nothing to say relative to the first two chapters on military policy; for they are themselves nothing more than a brief summary of this part of the art of war, which chiefly concerns statesmen, but should be thoroughly understood by military men. I will, however, invite special attention to Article XIV., relating to the command of armies or to the choice of generals-in-chief,--a subject worthy the most anxious care upon the part of a wise government; for upon it often depends the safety of the nation.
We may be confident that a good strategist will make a good chief of staff for an army; but for the command in chief is required a man of tried qualities, of high character and known energy. The united action of two such men as commander-in-chief and chief of staff, when a great captain of the first order cannot be had, may produce the most brilliant results.
FOOTNOTES:
NOTE
UPON
THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING A GOOD STRATEGIC COUP-D'OEIL.
The study of the principles of strategy can produce no valuable practical results if we do nothing more than keep them in remembrance, never trying to apply them, with map in hand, to hypothetical wars, or to the brilliant operations of great captains. By such exercises may be procured a rapid and certain strategic coup-d'oeil,--the most valuable characteristic of a good general, without which he can never put in practice the finest theories in the world.
When a military man who is a student of his art has become fully impressed by the advantages procured by moving a strong mass against successive fractions of the enemy's force, and particularly when he recognizes the importance of constantly directing the main efforts upon decisive points of the theater of operations, he will naturally desire to be able to perceive at a glance what are these decisive points. I have already, in Chapter III., page 70, of the preceding Summary, indicated the simple means by which this knowledge may be obtained. There is, in fact, one truth of remarkable simplicity which obtains in all the combinations of a methodical war. It is this:--in every position a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to operate by the right, by the left, or by the front.
To be convinced of the correctness of this assertion, let us first take this general in his private office at the opening of the war. His first care will be to choose that zone of operations which will give him the greatest number of chances of success and be the least dangerous for him in case of reverse. As no theater of operations can have more than three zones, (that of the right, that of the center, and that of the left,) and as I have in Articles from XVII. to XXII. pointed out the manner of perceiving the advantages and dangers of these zones, the choice of a zone of operations will be a matter of no difficulty.
When the general has finally chosen a zone within which to operate with the principal portion of his forces, and when these forces shall be established in that zone, the army will have a front of operations toward the hostile army, which will also have one. Now, these fronts of operations will each have its right, left, and center. It only remains, then, for the general to decide upon which of these directions he can injure the enemy most,--for this will always be the best, especially if he can move upon it without endangering his own communications. I have dwelt upon this point also in the preceding Summary.
Finally, when the two armies are in presence of each other upon the field of battle where the decisive collision is to ensue, and are upon the point of coming to blows, they will each have a right, left, and center; and it remains for the general to decide still between these three directions of striking.
Let us take, as an illustration of the truths I have mentioned, the theater of operations, already referred to, between the Rhine and the North Sea. (See Fig. 39.)
Although this theater presents, in one point of view, four geographical sections,--viz.: the space between the Rhine and the Moselle, that between the Moselle and the Meuse, that between the Meuse and the Scheldt, and that between the last river and the sea,--it is nevertheless true that an army of which A A is the base and B B the front of operations will have only three general directions to choose from; for the two spaces in the center will form a single central zone, as it will always have one on the right and another on the left.
The army B B, wishing to take the offensive against the army CC, whose base was the Rhine, would have three directions in which to operate. If it maneuvered by the extreme right, descending the Moselle, (toward D,) it would evidently threaten the enemy's line of retreat toward the Rhine; but he, concentrating the mass of his forces toward Luxembourg, might fall upon the left of the army D and compel it to change front and fight a battle with its rear toward the Rhine, causing its ruin if seriously defeated.
If, on the contrary, the army B wished to make its greatest effort upon the left, (toward E,) in order to take advantage of the finely-fortified towns of Lille and Valenciennes, it would be exposed to inconveniences still more serious than before. For the army CC, concentrating in force toward Audenarde, might fall on the right of B, and, outflanking this wing in the battle, might throw it upon the impassable country toward Antwerp between the Scheldt and the sea,--where there would remain but two things for it to do: either to surrender at discretion, or cut its way through the enemy at the sacrifice of half its numbers.
It appears evident, therefore, that the left zone would be the most disadvantageous for army B, and the right zone would be inconvenient, although somewhat favorable in a certain point of view. The central zone remains to be examined. This is found to possess all desirable advantages, because the army B might move the mass of its force toward Charleroi with a view of cutting through the immense front of operations of the enemy, might overwhelm his center, and drive the right back upon Antwerp and the Lower Scheldt, without seriously exposing its own communications.
When the forces are chiefly concentrated upon the most favorable zone, they should, of course, have that direction of movement toward the enemy's front of operations which is in harmony with the chief object in view. For example, if you shall have operated by your right against the enemy's left, with the intention of cutting off the greater portion of his army from its base of the Rhine, you should certainly continue to operate in the same direction; for if you should make your greatest effort against the right of the enemy's front, while your plan was to gain an advantage over his left, your operations could not result as you anticipated, no matter how well they might be executed. If, on the contrary, you had decided to take the left zone, with the intention of crowding the enemy back upon the sea, you ought constantly to maneuver by your right in order to accomplish your object; for if you maneuvered by the left, yourself and not the enemy would be the party thrown back upon the sea in case of a reverse.
Applying these ideas to the theaters of the campaigns of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena, we find the same three zones, with this difference, that in those campaigns the central direction was not the best. In 1800, the direction of the left led straight to the left bank of the Po, on the line of retreat of Mélas; in 1805, the left zone was the one which led by the way of Donauwerth to the extreme right, and the line of retreat of Mack; in 1806, however, Napoleon could reach the Prussian line of retreat by the right zone, filing off from Bamberg toward Gera.
In 1800, Napoleon had to choose between a line of operations on the right, leading to the sea-shore toward Nice and Savona, that of the center, leading by Mont-Cenis toward Turin, and that of the left, leading to the line of communications of Mélas, by way of Saint-Bernard or the Simplon. The first two directions had nothing in their favor, and the right might have been very dangerous,--as, in fact, it proved to Massena, who was forced back to Genoa and there besieged. The decisive direction was evidently that by the left.
I have said enough to explain my ideas on this point.
The subject of battles is somewhat more complicated; for in the arrangements for these there are both strategical and tactical considerations to be taken into account and harmonized. A position for battle, being necessarily connected with the line of retreat and the base of operations, must have a well-defined strategic direction; but this direction must also depend somewhat upon the character of the ground and the stations of the troops of both parties to the engagement: these are tactical considerations. Although an army usually takes such a position for a battle as will keep its line of retreat behind it, sometimes it is obliged to assume a position parallel to this line. In such a case it is evident that if you fall with overwhelming force upon the wing nearest the line of retreat, the enemy may be cut off or destroyed, or, at least, have no other chance of escape than in forcing his way through your line.
I will here mention as illustrations the celebrated battle of Leuthen in 1757, of which I have given an account in the history of Frederick's wars, and the famous days of Krasnoi, in the retreat from Moscow in 1812.
The annexed figure (40) explains the combination at Krasnoi. The line A A is Napoleon's line of retreat toward C. He took the position B B to cover his line. It is evident that the principal mass of Koutousoff's army D D should have moved to E E in order to fall on the right of the French, whose army would have been certainly destroyed if it had been anticipated at C; for everybody knows in what a state it was while thus fifteen hundred miles from its true base.
There was the same combination at Jemmapes, where Dumouriez, by outflanking the Austrian left, instead of attacking their right, would have entirely cut them off from the Rhine.
At the battle of Leuthen Frederick overwhelmed the Austrian left, which was in the direction of their line of retreat; and for this reason the right wing was obliged to take refuge in Breslau, where it capitulated a few days later.
In such cases there is no cause for hesitation. The decisive point is that wing of the enemy which is nearest his line of retreat, and this line you must seize while protecting your own.
When an enemy has one or two lines of retreat perpendicular to and behind his position of battle, it will generally be best to attack the center, or that wing where the obstacles of the ground shall be the least favorable for the defense; for in such a case the first consideration is to gain the battle, without having in view the total destruction of the enemy. That depends upon the relative numerical strength, the morale of the two armies, and other circumstances, with reference to which no fixed rules can be laid down.
Finally, it happens sometimes that an army succeeds in seizing the enemy's line of retreat before fighting a battle, as Napoleon did at Marengo, Ulm, and Jena. The decisive point having in such case been secured by skillful marches before fighting, it only remains to prevent the enemy from forcing his way through your line. You can do nothing better than fight a parallel battle, as there is no reason for maneuvering against one wing more than the other. But for the enemy who is thus cut off the case is very different. He should certainly strike most heavily in the direction of that wing where he can hope most speedily to regain his proper line of retreat; and if he throws the mass of his forces there, he may save at least a large portion of them. All that he has to do is to determine whether this decisive effort shall be toward the right or the left.
It is proper for me to remark that the passage of a great river in the presence of a hostile army is sometimes an exceptional case to which the general rules will not apply. In these operations, which are of an exceedingly delicate character, the essential thing is to keep the bridges safe. If, after effecting the passage, a general should throw the mass of his forces toward the right or the left with a view of taking possession of some decisive point, or of driving his enemy back upon the river, whilst the latter was collecting all his forces in another direction to seize the bridges, the former army might be in a very critical condition in case of a reverse befalling it. The battle of Wagram is an excellent example in point,--as good, indeed, as could be desired. I have treated this subject in Article XXXVII., (pages 224 and following.)
A military man who clearly perceives the importance of the truths that have been stated will succeed in acquiring a rapid and accurate coup-d'oeil. It will be admitted, moreover, that a general who estimates them at their true value, and accustoms himself to their use, either in reading military history, or in hypothetical cases on maps, will seldom be in doubt, in real campaigns, what he ought to do; and even when his enemy attempts sudden and unexpected movements, he will always be ready with suitable measures for counteracting them, by constantly bearing in mind the few simple fundamental principles which should regulate all the operations of war.
Heaven forbid that I should pretend to lessen the dignity of the sublime art of war by reducing it to such simple elements! I appreciate thoroughly the difference between the directing principles of combinations arranged in the quiet of the closet, and that special talent which is indispensable to the individual who has, amidst the noise and confusion of battle, to keep a hundred thousand men co-operating toward the attainment of one single object. I know well what should be the character and talents of the general who has to make such masses move as one man, to engage them at the proper point simultaneously and at the proper moment, to keep them supplied with arms, provisions, clothing, and munitions. Still, although this special talent, to which I have referred, is indispensable, it must be granted that the ability to give wise direction to masses upon the best strategic points of a theater of operations is the most sublime characteristic of a great captain. How many brave armies, under the command of leaders who were also brave and possessed executive ability, have lost not only battles, but even empires, because they were moved imprudently in one direction when they should have gone in the other! Numerous examples might be mentioned; but I will refer only to Ligny, Waterloo, Bautzen, Dennewitz, Leuthen.
I will say no more; for I could only repeat what has already been said. To relieve myself in advance of the blame which will be ascribed to me for attaching too much importance to the application of the few maxims laid down in my writings, I will repeat what I was the first to announce:--"that war is not an exact science, but a drama full of passion; that the moral qualities, the talents, the executive foresight and ability, the greatness of character, of the leaders, and the impulses, sympathies, and passions of the masses, have a great influence upon it." I may be permitted also, after having written the detailed history of thirty campaigns and assisted in person in twelve of the most celebrated of them, to declare that I have not found a single case where these principles, correctly applied, did not lead to success.
As to the special executive ability and the well-balanced penetrating mind which distinguish the practical man from the one who knows only what others teach him, I confess that no book can introduce those things into a head where the germ does not previously exist by nature. I have seen many generals--marshals, even--attain a certain degree of reputation by talking largely of principles which they conceived incorrectly in theory and could not apply at all. I have seen these men intrusted with the supreme command of armies, and make the most extravagant plans, because they were totally deficient in good judgment and were filled with inordinate self-conceit. My works are not intended for such misguided persons as these, but my desire has been to facilitate the study of the art of war for careful, inquiring minds, by pointing out directing principles. Taking this view, I claim credit for having rendered valuable service to those officers who are really desirous of gaining distinction in the profession of arms.
Finally, I will conclude this short summary with one last truth:--
"The first of all the requisites for a man's success as a leader is, that he be perfectly brave. When a general is animated by a truly martial spirit and can communicate it to his soldiers, he may commit faults, but he will gain victories and secure deserved laurels."
SECOND APPENDIX
TO THE
SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.
ON THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE.
Happening to be in Paris, near the end of 1851, a distinguished person did me the honor to ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements in fire-arms would cause any great modifications in the manner of making war.
I replied that they would probably have an influence upon the details of tactics, but that, in great strategic operations and the grand combinations of battles, victory would, now as ever, result from the application of the principles which had led to the success of great generals in all ages,--of Alexander and Cæsar as well as of Frederick and Napoleon. My illustrious interlocutor seemed to be completely of my opinion.
The heroic events which have recently occurred near Sebastopol have not produced the slightest change in my opinion. This gigantic contest between two vast intrenched camps, occupied by entire armies and mounting two thousand guns of the largest caliber, is an event without precedent, which will have no equal in the future; for the circumstances which produced it cannot occur again.
Moreover, this contest of cannon with ramparts, bearing no resemblance to regular pitched battles fought in the center of a continent, cannot influence in any respect the great combinations of war, nor even the tactics of battles.
The bloody battles of the Alma and Inkermann, by giving evidence of the murderous effect of the new fire-arms, naturally led me to investigate the changes which it might be necessary to make on this account in the tactics for infantry.
I shall endeavor to fulfill this task in a few words, in order to complete what was published on this point twenty years ago in the Summary of the Art of War.
The important question of the influence of musketry-fire in battles is not new: it dates from the reign of Frederick the Great, and particularly from the battle of Mollwitz, which he gained (it was said) because his infantry-soldiers, by the use of cylindrical rammers in loading their muskets, were able to fire three shots per minute more than their enemies. The discussion which arose at this epoch between the partisans of the shallow and deep orders of formation for troops is known to all military students.
The system of deployed lines in three ranks was adopted for the infantry; the cavalry, formed in two ranks, and in the order of battle, was deployed upon the wings, or a part was held in reserve.
The celebrated regulation for maneuvers of 1791 fixed the deployed as the only order for battle: it seemed to admit the use of battalion-columns doubled on the center only in partial combats,--such as an attack upon an isolated post, a village, a forest, or small intrenchments.
The insufficient instruction in maneuvers of the troops of the Republic forced the generals, who were poor tacticians, to employ in battle the system of columns supported by numerous skirmishers. Besides this, the nature of the countries which formed the theaters of operations--the Vosges, Alps, Pyrenees, and the difficult country of La Vendée--rendered this the only appropriate system. How would it have been possible to attack the camps of Saorgio, Figueras, and Mont-Cenis with deployed regiments?
In Napoleon's time, the French generally used the system of columns, as they were nearly always the assailants.
In 1807, I published, at Glogau in Silesia, a small pamphlet with the title of "Summary of the General Principles of the Art of War," in which I proposed to admit for the attack the system of lines formed of columns of battalions by divisions of two companies; in other words, to march to the attack in lines of battalions closed in mass or at half-distance, preceded by numerous skirmishers, and the columns being separated by intervals that may vary between that necessary for the deployment of a battalion and the minimum of the front of one column.
What I had recently seen in the campaigns of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and Eylau had convinced me of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of marching an army in deployed lines in either two or three ranks, to attack an enemy in position. It was this conviction which led me to publish the pamphlet above referred to. This work attracted some attention, not only on account of the treatise on strategy, but also on account of what was said on tactics.
The successes gained by Wellington in Spain and at Waterloo with troops deployed in lines of two ranks were generally attributed to the murderous effect of the infantry-fire, and created doubt in some minds as to the propriety of the use of small columns; but it was not till after 1815 that the controversies on the best formation for battle wore renewed by the appearance of a pamphlet by the Marquis of Chambray.
In these discussions, I remarked the fatal tendency of the clearest minds to reduce every system of war to absolute forms, and to cast in the same mold all the tactical combinations a general may arrange, without taking into consideration localities, moral circumstances, national characteristics, or the abilities of the commanders. I had proposed to use lines of small columns, especially in the attack: I never intended to make it an exclusive system, particularly for the defense.
I had two opportunities of being convinced that this formation was approved of by the greatest generals of our times. The first was at the Congress of Vienna, in the latter part of 1814: the Archduke Charles observed "that he was under great obligations for the summary I had published in 1807, which General Walmoden had brought to him in 1808 from Silesia." At the beginning of the war of 1809, the prince had not thought it possible to apply the formation which I had proposed; but at the battle of Essling the contracted space of the field induced him to form a part of his army in columns by battalions, (the landwehr particularly,) and they resisted admirably the furious charges of the cuirassiers of General d'Espagne, which, in the opinion of the archduke, they could not have done if they had been deployed.
At the battle of Wagram, the greater part of the Austrian line was formed in the same way as at Essling, and after two days of terrible fighting the archduke abandoned the field of battle, not because his army was badly beaten, but because his left was outflanked and thrown back so as to endanger his line of retreat on Hungary. The prince was satisfied that the firm bearing of his troops was in part due to this mixture of small columns with deployed battalions.
The second witness is Wellington; although his evidence is, apparently, not so conclusive. Having been presented to him at the Congress of Verona in 1823, I had occasion to speak to him on the subject of the controversies to which his system of formation for battle (a system to which a great part of his success had been attributed) had given rise. He remarked that he was convinced the manner of the attack of the French upon him, in columns more or less deep, was very dangerous against a solid, well-armed infantry having confidence in its fire and well supported by artillery and cavalry. I observed to the duke that these deep columns were very different from the small columns which I proposed,--a formation which insures in the attack steadiness, force, and mobility, while deep masses afford no greater mobility and force than a deployed line, and are very much more exposed to the ravages of artillery.
I asked the illustrious general if at Waterloo he had not formed the Hanoverian, Brunswick, and Belgian troops in columns by battalions. He answered, "Yes; because I could not depend upon them so well as upon the English." I replied that this admission proved that he thought a line formed of columns by battalions was more firm than long deployed lines. He replied, "They are certainly good, also; but their use always depends upon the localities and the spirit of the troops. A general cannot act in the same manner under all circumstances."
To this illustrious evidence I might add that Napoleon himself, in the campaign of 1813, prescribed for the attack the formation of the infantry in columns by divisions of two companies in two ranks, as the most suitable,--which was identically what I had proposed in 1807.
The Duke of Wellington also admitted that the French columns at Waterloo, particularly those of their right wing, were not small columns of battalions, but enormous masses, much more unwieldy and much deeper.
If we can believe the Prussian accounts and plans of the battle, it would seem that Ney's four divisions were formed in but four columns, at least in their march to the attack of La Haye Sainte and the line extending from this farm to the Papelotte. I was not present; but several officers have assured me that at one time the troops were formed in columns by divisions of two brigades each, the battalions being deployed behind each other at six paces' interval.
This circumstance demonstrates how much is wanting in the military terms of the French. We give the same name of division to masses of four regiments and to fractions of a battalion of two companies each,--which is absurd. Let us suppose, for example, that Napoleon had directed on the 18th of June, 1815, the formation of the line in columns by divisions and by battalions, intending that the regulation of 1813 should be followed. His lieutenants might naturally have understood it very differently, and, according to their interpretation of the order, would have executed one of the following formations:--
1. Either the four divisions of the right wing would have been formed in four large masses, each one of eight or twelve battalions, (according to the strength of the regiments,) as is indicated in this figure for eight battalions.
2. Or each division would have been formed in eight or twelve columns of battalions by divisions of two platoons or companies, according to the system I have proposed, as in this figure, viz.:--
I do not mean to assert positively that this confusion of words led to the deep masses at Waterloo; but it might have done so; and it is important that in every language there should be two different terms to express two such different things as a division of twelve battalions and a division of a quarter of a battalion.
Struck with what precedes, I thought it proper to modify my Summary already referred to, which was too concise, and in my revision of it I devoted a chapter to the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the different formations for battle. I also added some considerations relative to a mixed system used at Eylau by General Benningsen, which consisted in forming a regiment of three battalions by deploying the central one, the other two being in column on the wings.
* * * * *
After these discussions, I drew the conclusions:--
1. That Wellington's system was certainly good for the defensive.
2. That the system of Benningsen might, according to circumstances, be as good for the offensive as for the defensive, since it was successfully used by Napoleon at the passage of the Tagliamento.
3. That the most skillful tactician would experience great difficulty in marching forty or fifty deployed battalions in two or three ranks over an interval of twelve or fifteen hundred yards, preserving sufficient order to attack an enemy in position with any chance of success, the front all the while being played upon by artillery and musketry.
I have never seen any thing of the kind in my experience. I regard it as impossible, and am convinced that such a line could not advance to the attack in sufficiently good order to have the force necessary for success.
Napoleon was in the habit of addressing his marshals in these terms:--"Take your troops up in good order, and make a vigorous assault upon the enemy." I ask, what means is there of carrying up to the assault of an enemy forty or fifty deployed battalions as a whole in good order? They will reach the enemy in detachments disconnected from each other, and the commander cannot exercise any control over the mass as a whole.
I saw nothing of this kind either at Ulm, Jena, Eylau, Bautzen, Dresden, Culm, or Leipsic; neither did it occur at Austerlitz, Friedland, Katzbach, or Dennewitz.
I am not aware that Wellington, in any of his battles, ever marched in deployed lines to the attack of an enemy in position. He generally awaited the attack. At Vittoria and Toulouse he gained the victory by maneuvers against the flanks; and at Toulouse Soult's right wing was beaten while descending the heights to attack. Even at Waterloo, what fate would have befallen the English army if, leaving the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean, it had marched in deployed order to attack Napoleon in position on the heights of La Belle Alliance?
I will be pardoned for these recapitulations, as they seem to be necessary to the solution of a question which has arisen since my Summary of the Art of War was written.
Some German generals, recognizing fully the advantages derived in 1813 from the system of columns of battalions, have endeavored to add to its value by dividing up the columns and increasing their number, so as to make them more shallow and to facilitate their deployment. With this view, they propose, instead of forming four divisions or companies one behind the other, to place them beside each other, not deployed, but in small columns. That is, if the battalion consists of four companies of two hundred and forty men each, each company is to be divided into four sections of sixty each: one of these sections will be dispersed as skirmishers, and the other three, in two ranks, will form a small column; so that the battalion, instead of forming one column, will form four, and the regiment of three battalions will form twelve small columns instead of three--
3d Battalion. 2d Battalion. 1st Battalion. --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---]
It is certain that it would be easier to march such a line against the enemy than if deployed; but these diminutive columns of sixty skirmishers and one hundred and eighty men in the ranks would never present the same order and solidity as a single column of a battalion. Still as the system has some advantages, it deserves a trial; and, indeed, it has already been practiced in Prussia and Austria.
The same formation applies equally to battalions of six or eight companies. In this case the battalion would not be formed by companies, but by divisions of two companies,--that is, in three or four columns, according to the number of companies.
Two serious inconveniences appear to me to attach to each of these formations. If vigorously charged by cavalry, these small subdivisions would be in great danger; and even in attacking the enemy's line, if driven back and pursued, disorder would be more likely to occur than in the columns of battalions. Still, either of them may be employed, according to circumstances, localities, and the morale of the troops. Experience alone can assign to each its proper value. I am not aware whether the Austrians applied these columns of companies at Custozza and Novara, or whether these maneuvers have only been practiced in their camps of instruction.
Be that as it may, there is another not less important question to be considered:--
"Will the adoption of the rifled small-arms and improved balls bring about any important changes in the formation for battle and the now recognized principles of tactics?"
If these arms aided the allies at the Alma and Inkermann, it was because the Russians were not provided with them; and it must not be forgotten that in a year or two all armies will alike be furnished with them, so that in future the advantage will not be confined to one side.
What change will it make in tactics?
Will whole armies be deployed as skirmishers, or will it not still be necessary to preserve either the formation of lines deployed in two or three ranks, or lines of battalions in columns?
Will battles become mere duels with the rifle, where the parties will fire upon each other, without maneuvering, until one or the other shall retreat or be destroyed?
What military man will reply in the affirmative?
It follows, therefore, that, to decide battles, maneuvers are necessary, and victory will fall to the general who maneuvers most skillfully; and he cannot maneuver except with deployed lines or lines of columns of battalions, either whole or subdivided into columns of one or two companies. To attempt to prescribe by regulation under what circumstances either of these systems is to be applied would be absurd.
If a general and an army can be found such that he can march upon the enemy in a deployed line of forty or fifty battalions, then let the shallow order be adopted, and the formation in columns be confined to the attack of isolated posts; but I freely confess that I would never accept the command of an army under this condition. The only point for a regulation for the formation for battle is to forbid the use of very deep columns, because they are heavy, and difficult to move and to keep in order. Besides, they are so much exposed to artillery that their destruction seems inevitable, and their great depth does not increase in any respect their chances of success.
If the organization of an army were left to me, I would adopt for infantry the formation in two ranks, and a regimental organization according with the formation for battle. I would then make each regiment of infantry to consist of three battalions and a depot. Each battalion should consist of six companies, so that when in column by division the depth would be three divisions or six ranks.
This formation seems most reasonable, whether it is desired to form the battalion in columns of attack by divisions on the center of each battalion, or on any other division.
The columns of attack, since the depth is only six ranks, would not be so much exposed to the fire of artillery, but would still have the mobility necessary to take the troops up in good order and launch them upon the enemy with great force. The deployment of these small columns could be executed with great ease and promptitude; and for the forming of a square a column of three divisions in depth would be preferable in several respects to one of four or six divisions.
In the Russian service each battalion consists of four companies of two hundred and fifty men each; each company being as strong as a division in the French organization. The maneuver of double column on the center is not practicable, since the center is here merely an interval separating the second and third companies. Hence the column must be simple, not on the center, but on one of the four companies. Something analogous to the double column on the center would be attained by forming the first and fourth companies behind the second and third respectively; but then the formation would be in two lines rather than in column; and this is the reason why I would prefer the organization of the battalion in six companies or three divisions.
By dividing each of the four companies into two platoons, making eight in all, the formation of double column on the center might be made on the fourth and fifth platoons as the leading division; but then each division would be composed of two platoons belonging to different companies, so that each captain would have half of the men of his company under the command of another officer, and half of his own division would be made up of another company.
Such an arrangement in the attack would be very inconvenient; for, as the captain is the real commander, father, and judge of the men of his own company, he can always obtain more from them in the way of duty than any stranger. In addition, if the double column should meet with a decided repulse, and it should be necessary to reform it in line, it would be difficult to prevent disorder, the platoons being obliged to run from one side to the other to find their companies. In the French system, where each battalion consists of eight companies, forming as many platoons at drill, this objection does not exist, since each company is conducted by its own captain. It is true that there will be two captains of companies in each division; but this will be rather an advantage than the reverse, since there will be a rivalry and emulation between the two captains and their men, which will lead to greater display of bravery: besides, if necessary, the senior captain is there, to command the division as a whole.
It is time to leave these secondary details and return to the important question at issue.
Since I have alluded to the system adopted by Wellington, it is proper to explain it so that it can be estimated at its true value in the light of historical events.
In Spain and Portugal, particularly, Wellington had under his command a mass of troops of the country, in which he placed but little confidence in regular formation in a pitched battle, on account of their want of instruction and discipline, but which were animated by a lively hatred of the French and formed bodies of skirmishers useful in harassing the enemy. Having learned by experience the effects of the fury and impetuosity of the French columns when led by such men as Massena and Ney, Wellington decided upon wise means of weakening this impetuosity and afterward securing a triumph over it. He chose positions difficult to approach, and covered all their avenues by swarms of Spanish and Portuguese riflemen, who were skilled in taking advantage of the inequalities of the ground; he placed a part of his artillery on the tactical crest of his position, and a part more to the rear, and riddled the advancing columns with a murderous artillery and musketry fire, while his excellent English infantry, sheltered from the fire, were posted a hundred paces in rear of the crest, to await the arrival of these columns; and when the latter appeared on the summit, wearied, out of breath, decimated in numbers, they were received with a general discharge of artillery and musketry and immediately charged by the infantry with the bayonet.
This system, which was perfectly rational and particularly applicable to Spain and Portugal, since he had there great numbers of this kind of troops and there was a great deal of rough ground upon which they could be useful as marksmen, needed some modifications to make it applicable to Belgium. At Waterloo the duke took his position on a plateau with a gentle slope like a glacis, where his artillery had a magnificent field of fire, and where it produced a terrible effect: both flanks of this plateau were well protected. Wellington, from the crest of the plateau, could discover the slightest movement in the French army, while his own were hidden; but, nevertheless, his system would not have prevented his losing the battle if a number of other circumstances had not come to his aid.
Every one knows more or less correctly the events of this terrible battle, which I have elsewhere impartially described. I demonstrated that its result was due neither to the musketry-fire nor to the use of deployed lines by the English, but to the following accidental causes, viz.:--
1. To the mud, which rendered the progress of the French in the attack painful and slow, and caused their first attacks to be less effective, and prevented their being properly sustained by the artillery.
2. To the original formation of very deep columns on the part of the French, principally on the right wing.
3. To the want of unity in the employment of the three arms: the infantry and cavalry made a number of charges alternating with each other, but they were in no case simultaneous.
4. Finally and chiefly, to the unexpected arrival of the whole Prussian army at the decisive moment on the right flank, if not the rear, of the French.
Every experienced military man will agree that, in spite of the mud and the firmness of the English infantry, if the mass of the French infantry had been thrown on the English in columns of battalions immediately after the great charge of cavalry, the combined army would have been broken and forced back on Antwerp. Independently of this, if the Prussians had not arrived, the English would have been compelled to retreat; and I maintain that this battle cannot justly be cited as proof of the superiority of musketry-fire over well-directed attacks in columns.
From all these discussions we may draw the following conclusions, viz.:--
1. That the improvements in fire-arms will not introduce any important change in the manner of taking troops into battle, but that it would be useful to introduce into the tactics of infantry the formation of columns by companies, and to have a numerous body of good riflemen or skirmishers, and to exercise the troops considerably in firing. Those armies which have whole regiments of light infantry may distribute them through the different brigades; but it would be preferable to detail sharp-shooters alternately in each company as they are needed, which would be practicable when the troops are accustomed to firing: by this plan the light-infantry regiments could be employed in the line with the others; and should the number of sharp-shooters taken from the companies be at any time insufficient, they could be reinforced by a battalion of light infantry to each division.
2. That if Wellington's system of deployed lines and musketry-fire be excellent for the defense, it would be difficult ever to employ it in an attack upon an enemy in position.
3. That, in spite of the improvements of fire-arms, two armies in a battle will not pass the day in firing at each other from a distance: it will always be necessary for one of them to advance to the attack of the other.
4. That, as this advance is necessary, success will depend, as formerly, upon the most skillful maneuvering according to the principles of grand tactics, which consist in this, viz.: in knowing how to direct the great mass of the troops at the proper moment upon the decisive point of the battle-field, and in employing for this purpose the simultaneous action of the three arms.
5. That it would be difficult to add much to what has been said on this subject in Chapters IV. and V.; and that it would be unreasonable to define by regulation an absolute system of formation for battle.
6. That victory may with much certainty be expected by the party taking the offensive when the general in command possesses the talent of taking his troops into action in good order and of boldly attacking the enemy, adopting the system of formation best adapted to the ground, to the spirit and quality of his troops, and to his own character.
Finally, I will terminate this article with the following remark: That war, far from being an exact science, is a terrible and impassioned drama, regulated, it is true, by three or four general principles, but also dependent for its results upon a number of moral and physical complications.
FOOTNOTES:
Frederick did not adopt the cylindrical ramrod till 1777, thirty-six years after the battle of Mollwitz. The advantage of the cylindrical ramrod consisted in this,--that the soldier in loading saved the time necessary to turn the ramrod; but obviously this small economy of time could never have enabled him to load three times while the enemy loaded once,--all other things being equal.--Translators.]
SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS.
I have thought it proper to give here an account of the principal maritime expeditions, to be taken in connection with maxims on descents.
The naval forces of Egypt, Phoenicia, and Rhodes are the earliest mentioned in history, and of them the account is confused. The Persians conquered these nations, as well as Asia Minor, and became the most formidable power on both land and sea.
About the same time the Carthaginians, who were masters of the coast of Mauritania, being invited by the inhabitants of Cadiz, passed the straits, colonized Boetica and took possession of the Balearic Isles and Sardinia, and finally made a descent on Sicily.
The Greeks contended against the Persians with a success that could not have been expected,--although no country was ever more favorably situated for a naval power than Greece, with her fifty islands and her great extent of coast.
The merchant marine of Athens produced her prosperity, and gave her the naval power to which Greece was indebted for her independence. Her fleets, united with those of the islands, were, under Themistocles, the terror of the Persians and the rulers of the East. They never made grand descents, because their land-forces were not in proportion to their naval strength. Had Greece been a united government instead of a confederation of republics, and had the navies of Athens, Syracuse, Corinth, and Sparta been combined instead of fighting among each other, it is probable that the Greeks would have conquered the world before the Romans.
If we can believe the exaggerated traditions of the old Greek historians, the famous army of Xerxes had not less than four thousand vessels; and this number is astonishing, even when we read the account of them by Herodotus. It is more difficult to believe that at the same time, and by a concerted movement, five thousand other vessels landed three hundred thousand Carthaginians in Sicily, where they were totally defeated by Gelon on the same day that Themistocles destroyed the fleet of Xerxes at Salamis. Three other expeditions, under Hannibal, Imilcon, and Hamilcar, carried into Sicily from one hundred to one hundred and fifty thousand men: Agrigentum and Palermo were taken, Lilybæum was founded, and Syracuse besieged twice. The third time Androcles, with fifteen thousand men, landed in Africa, and made Carthage tremble. This contest lasted one year and a half.
Alexander the Great crossed the Hellespont with only fifty thousand men: his naval force was only one hundred and sixty sail, while the Persians had four hundred; and to save his fleet Alexander sent it back to Greece.
After Alexander's death, his generals, who quarreled about the division of the empire, made no important naval expedition.
Pyrrhus, invited by the inhabitants of Tarentum and aided by their fleet, landed in Italy with twenty-six thousand infantry, three thousand horses, and the first elephants which had been seen in Italy. This was two hundred and eighty years before the Christian era.
Conqueror of the Romans at Heraclea and Ascoli, it is difficult to understand why he should have gone to Sicily at the solicitation of the Syracusans to expel the Carthaginians. Recalled, after some success, by the Tarentines, he recrossed the straits, harassed by the Carthaginian fleet: then, reinforced by the Samnites or Calabrians, he, a little too late, concluded to march on Rome. He in turn was beaten and repulsed on Beneventum, when he returned to Epirus with nine thousand men, which was all that remained of his force.
Carthage, which had been prospering for a long time, profited by the ruin of Tyre and the Persian empire.
The Punic wars between Carthage and Rome, now the preponderating power in Italy, were the most celebrated in the maritime annals of antiquity. The Romans were particularly remarkable for the rapidity with which they improved and increased their marine. In the year 264 B.C. their boats or vessels were scarcely fit to cross to Sicily; and eight years after found Regulus conqueror at Ecnomos, with three hundred and forty large vessels, each with three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty combatants, making in all one hundred and forty thousand men. The Carthaginians, it is said, were stronger by twelve to fifteen thousand men and fifty vessels.
The victory of Ecnomos--perhaps more extraordinary than that of Actium--was the first important step of the Romans toward universal empire. The subsequent descent in Africa consisted of forty thousand men; but the greater part of this force being recalled to Sicily, the remainder was overthrown, and Regulus, being made prisoner, became as celebrated by his death as by his famous victory.
The great fleet which was to avenge him was successful at Clypea, but was destroyed on its return by a storm; and its successor met the same fate at Cape Palinuro. In the year 249 B.C. the Romans were defeated at Drepanum, and lost twenty-eight thousand men and more than one hundred vessels. Another fleet, on its way to besiege Lilybæum, in the same year, was lost off Cape Pactyrus.
Discouraged by this succession of disasters, the Senate at first resolved to renounce the sea; but, observing that the power of Sicily and Spain resulted from their maritime superiority, it concluded to arm its fleets again, and in the year 242 Lutatius Catullus set out with three hundred galleys and seven hundred transports for Drepanum, and gained the battle in the Ægates Islands, in which the Carthaginians lost one hundred and twenty vessels. This victory brought to a close the first Punic war.
The second, distinguished by Hannibal's expedition to Italy, was less maritime in its character. Scipio, however, bore the Roman eagles to Cartagena, and by its capture destroyed forever the empire of the Carthaginians in Spain. Finally, he carried the war into Africa with a force inferior to that of Regulus; but still he succeeded in gaining the battle of Zama, imposing a shameful peace on Carthage and burning five hundred of her ships. Subsequently Scipio's brother crossed the Hellespont with twenty-five thousand men, and at Magnesia gained the celebrated victory which surrendered to the mercy of the Romans the kingdom of Antiochus and all Asia. This expedition was aided by a victory gained at Myonnesus in Ionia, by the combined fleets of Rome and Rhodes, over the navy of Antiochus.
From this time Rome had no rival, and she continued to add to her power by using every means to insure to her the empire of the sea. Paulus Emilius in the year 168 B.C. landed at Samothrace at the head of twenty-five thousand men, conquered Perseus, and brought Macedonia to submission.
Twenty years later, the third Punic war decided the fate of Carthage. The important port of Utica having been given up to the Romans, an immense fleet was employed in transporting to this point eighty thousand foot-soldiers and four thousand horses; Carthage was besieged, and the son of Paulus Emilius and adopted son of the great Scipio had the glory of completing the victory which Emilius and Scipio had begun, by destroying the bitter rival of his country.
After this triumph, the power of Rome in Africa, as well as in Europe, was supreme; but her empire in Asia was for a moment shaken by Mithridates. This powerful king, after seizing in succession the small adjacent states, was in command of not less than two hundred and fifty thousand men, and of a fleet of four hundred vessels, of which three hundred were decked. He defeated the three Roman generals who commanded in Cappadocia, invaded Asia Minor and massacred there at least eighty thousand Roman subjects, and even sent a large army into Greece.
Sylla landed in Greece with a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand Romans, and retook Athens; but Mithridates sent in succession two large armies by the Bosporus and the Dardanelles: the first, one hundred thousand strong, was destroyed at Chæronea, and the second, of eighty thousand men, met a similar fate at Orchomenus. At the same time, Lucullus, having collected all the maritime resources of the cities of Asia Minor, the islands, and particularly of Rhodes, was prepared to transport Sylla's army from Sestos to Asia; and Mithridates, from fear, made peace.
In the second and third wars, respectively conducted by Murena and Lucullus, there were no descents effected. Mithridates, driven step by step into Colchis, and no longer able to keep the sea, conceived the project of turning the Black Sea by the Caucasus, in order to pass through Thrace to assume the offensive,--a policy which it is difficult to understand, in view of the fact that he was unable to defend his kingdom against fifty thousand Romans.
Cæsar, in his second descent on England, had six hundred vessels, transporting forty thousand men. During the civil wars he transported thirty-five thousand men to Greece. Antony came from Brundusium to join him with twenty thousand men, and passed through the fleet of Pompey,--in which act he was as much favored by the lucky star of Cæsar as by the arrangements of his lieutenants.
Afterward Cæsar carried an army of sixty thousand men to Africa; they did not, however, go in a body, but in successive detachments.
The greatest armament of the latter days of the Roman republic was that of Augustus, who transported eighty thousand men and twelve thousand horses into Greece to oppose Antony; for, besides the numerous transports required for such an army, there were two hundred and sixty vessels of war to protect them. Antony was superior in force on land, but trusted the empire of the world to a naval battle: he had one hundred and seventy war-vessels, in addition to sixty of Cleopatra's galleys, the whole manned by twenty-two thousand choice troops, besides the necessary rowers.
Later, Germanicus conducted an expedition of one thousand vessels, carrying sixty thousand men, from the mouths of the Rhine to the mouths of the Ems. Half of this fleet was destroyed on its return by a storm; and it is difficult to understand why Germanicus, controlling both banks of the Rhine, should have exposed his army to the chances of the sea, when he could have reached the same point by land in a few days.
When the Roman authority extended from the Rhine to the Euphrates, maritime expeditions were rare; and the great contest with the races of the North of Europe, which began after the division of the empire, gave employment to the Roman armies on the sides of Germany and Thrace. The eastern fraction of the empire still maintained a powerful navy, which the possession of the islands of the Archipelago made a necessity, while at the same time it afforded the means.
The first five centuries of the Christian era afford but few events of interest in maritime warfare. The Vandals, having acquired Spain, landed in Africa, eighty thousand strong, under Genseric. They were defeated by Belisarius; but, holding the Balearic Isles and Sicily, they controlled the Mediterranean for a time.
At the very epoch when the nations of the East invaded Europe, the Scandinavians began to land on the coast of England. Their operations are little better known than those of the barbarians: they are hidden in the mysteries of Odin.
The Scandinavian bards attribute two thousand five hundred vessels to Sweden. Less poetical accounts assign nine hundred and seventy to the Danes and three hundred to Norway: these frequently acted in concert.
The Swedes naturally turned their attention to the head of the Baltic, and drove the Varangians into Russia. The Danes, more favorably situated with respect to the North Sea, directed their course toward the coasts of France and England.
If the account cited by Depping is correct, the greater part of these vessels were nothing more than fishermen's boats manned by a score of rowers. There were also snekars, with twenty banks or forty rowers. The largest had thirty-four banks of rowers. The incursions of the Danes, who had long before ascended the Seine and Loire, lead us to infer that the greater part of these vessels were very small.
However, Hengist, invited by the Briton Vortigern, transported five thousand Saxons to England in eighteen vessels,--which would go to show that there were then also large vessels, or that the marine of the Elbe was superior to that of the Scandinavians.
Between the years 527 and 584, three new expeditions, under Ida and Cridda, gained England for the Saxons, who divided it into seven kingdoms; and it was not until three centuries had elapsed (833) that they were again united under the authority of Egbert.
The African races, in their turn, visited the South of Europe. In 712, the Moors crossed the Straits of Gibraltar, under the lead of Tarik. They came, five thousand strong, at the invitation of Count Julian; and, far from meeting great resistance, they were welcomed by the numerous enemies of the Visigoths. This was the happy era of the Caliphs, and the Arabs might well pass for liberators in comparison with the tyrants of the North. Tarik's army, soon swelled to twenty thousand men, defeated Rodrigo at Jerez and reduced the kingdom to submission. In time, several millions of the inhabitants of Mauritania crossed the sea and settled in Spain; and if their numerous migrations cannot be regarded as descents, still, they form one of the most curious and interesting scenes in history, occurring between the incursions of the Vandals in Africa and the Crusades in the East.
A revolution not less important, and one which has left more durable traces, marked in the North the establishment of the vast empire now known as Russia. The Varangian princes, invited by the Novgorodians, of whom Rurik was the chief, soon signalized themselves by great expeditions.
In 902, Oleg is said to have embarked eighty thousand men in two thousand boats on the Dnieper: they passed the falls of the river and debouched in the Black Sea, while their cavalry followed the banks. They proceeded to Constantinople, and forced Leo the Philosopher to pay tribute.
Forty years subsequently, Igor took the same route with a fleet said to have consisted of ten thousand boats. Near Constantinople his fleet, terrified by the effects of the Greek fire, was driven on the coast of Asia, where the force was disembarked. It was defeated, and the expedition returned home.
Not discouraged, Igor re-established his fleet and army and descended to the mouths of the Danube, where the Emperor Romanus I. sent to renew the tribute and ask for peace, (943.)
In 967, Svatoslav, favored by the quarrel of Nicephorus with the King of Bulgaria, embarked sixty thousand men, debouched into the Black Sea, ascended the Danube, and seized Bulgaria. Recalled by the Petchenegs, who were menacing Kiew, he entered into alliance with them and returned into Bulgaria, broke his alliance with the Greeks, and, being reinforced by the Hungarians, crossed the Balkan and marched to attack Adrianople. The throne of Constantine was held by Zimisces, who was worthy of his position. Instead of purchasing safety by paying tribute, as his predecessors had done, he raised one hundred thousand men, armed a respectable fleet, repulsed Svatoslav at Adrianople, obliged him to retreat to Silistria, and took by assault the capital of the Bulgarians. The Russian prince marched to meet him, and gave battle not far from Silistria, but was obliged to re-enter the place, where he sustained one of the most memorable sieges recorded in history.
In a second and still more bloody battle, the Russians performed prodigies of valor, but were again compelled to yield to numbers. Zimisces, honoring courage, finally concluded an advantageous treaty.
About this period the Danes were attracted to England by the hope of pillage; and we are told that Lothaire called their king, Ogier, to France to be avenged of his brothers. The first success of these pirates increased their fondness for this sort of adventure, and for five or six years their bands swarmed on the coasts of France and Britain and devastated the country. Ogier, Hastings, Regner, and Sigefroi conducted them sometimes to the mouths of the Seine, sometimes to the mouths of the Loire, and finally to those of the Garonne. It is even asserted that Hastings entered the Mediterranean and ascended the Rhone to Avignon; but this is, to say the least, doubtful. The strength of their fleets is not known: the largest seems to have been of three hundred sail.
In the beginning of the tenth century, Rollo at first landed in England, but, finding little chance of success against Alfred, he entered into alliance with him, landed in Neustria in 911, and advanced from Rouen on Paris: other bodies marched from Nantes on Chartres. Repulsed here, Rollo overran and ravaged the neighboring provinces. Charles the Simple saw no better means of delivering his kingdom of this ever-increasing scourge than to offer Rollo the fine province of Neustria on condition that he would marry his daughter and turn Christian,--an offer which was eagerly accepted.
Thirty years later, Rollo's step-son, annoyed by the successors of Charles, called to his aid the King of Denmark. The latter landed in considerable force, defeated the French, took the king prisoner, and assured Rollo's son in the possession of Normandy.
During the same interval (838 to 950) the Danes exhibited even greater hostility toward England than to France, although they were much more assimilated to the Saxons than to the French in language and customs. Ivar, after pillaging the kingdom, established his family in Northumberland. Alfred the Great, at first beaten by Ivar's successors, succeeded in regaining his throne and in compelling the submission of the Danes.
The aspect of affairs changes anew: Sweyn, still more fortunate than Ivar, after conquering and devastating England, granted peace on condition that a sum of money should be paid, and returned to Denmark, leaving a part of his army behind him.
Ethelred, who had weakly disputed with Sweyn what remained of the Saxon power, thought he could not do better to free himself from his importunate guests than to order a simultaneous massacre of all the Danes in the kingdom, (1002.) But Sweyn reappeared in the following year at the head of an imposing force, and between 1003 and 1007 three successive fleets effected disembarkations on the coast, and unfortunate England was ravaged anew.
In 1012, Sweyn landed at the mouth of the Humber and again swept over the land like a torrent, and the English, tired of obedience to kings who could not defend them, recognized him as king of the North. His son, Canute the Great, had to contend with a rival more worthy of him, (Edmund Ironside.) Returning from Denmark at the head of a considerable force, and aided by the perfidious Edric, Canute ravaged the southern part of England and threatened London. A new division of the kingdom resulted; but, Edmund having been assassinated by Edric, Canute was finally recognized as king of all England. Afterward he sailed to conquer Norway, from which country he returned to attack Scotland. When he died, he divided the kingdom between his three children, according to the usage of the times.
Five years after Canute's death, the English assigned the crown to their Anglo-Saxon princes; but Edward, to whom it fell, was better fitted to be a monk than to save a kingdom a prey to such commotions. He died in 1066, leaving to Harold a crown which the chief of the Normans settled in France contested with him, and to whom, it is said, Edward had made a cession of the kingdom. Unfortunately for Harold, this chief was a great and ambitious man.
The year 1066 was marked by two extraordinary expeditions. While William the Conqueror was preparing in Normandy a formidable armament against Harold, the brother of the latter, having been driven from Northumberland for his crimes, sought support in Norway, and, with the King of Norway, set out with thirty thousand men on five hundred vessels, and landed at the mouth of the Humber. Harold almost entirely destroyed this force in a bloody battle fought near York; but a more formidable storm was about to burst upon his head. William took advantage of the time when the Anglo-Saxon king was fighting the Norwegians, to sail from St. Valery with a very large armament. Hume asserts that he had three thousand transports; while other authorities reduce the number to twelve hundred, carrying from sixty to seventy thousand men. Harold hastened from York, and fought a decisive battle near Hastings, in which he met an honorable death, and his fortunate rival soon reduced the country to submission.
At the same time, another William, surnamed Bras-de-fer, Robert Guiscard, and his brother Roger, conquered Calabria and Sicily with a handful of troops,(1058 to 1070.)
Scarcely thirty years after these memorable events, an enthusiastic priest animated Europe with a fanatical frenzy and precipitated large forces upon Asia to conquer the Holy Land.
At first followed by one hundred thousand men, afterward by two hundred thousand badly-armed vagabonds who perished in great part under the attacks of the Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Greeks, Peter the Hermit succeeded in crossing the Bosporus, and arrived before Nice with from fifty to sixty thousand men, who were either killed or captured by the Saracens.
An expedition more military in its character succeeded this campaign of religious pilgrims. One hundred thousand men, composed of French, Burgundians, Germans, and inhabitants of Lorraine, under Godfrey of Bouillon, marched through Austria on Constantinople; an equal number, under the Count of Toulouse, marched by Lyons, Italy, Dalmatia, and Macedonia; and Bohemond, Prince of Tarentum, embarked with a force of Normans, Sicilians, and Italians, and took the route by Greece on Gallipolis.
This extensive migration reminds us of the fabulous expeditions of Xerxes. The Genoese, Venetian, and Greek fleets were chartered to transport these swarms of Crusaders by the Bosporus or Dardanelles to Asia. More than four hundred thousand men were concentrated on the plains of Nice, where they avenged the defeat of their predecessors. Godfrey afterward led them across Asia and Syria as far as Jerusalem, where he founded a kingdom.
All the maritime resources of Greece and the flourishing republics of Italy were required to transport these masses across the Bosporus and in provisioning them during the siege of Nice; and the great impulse thus given to the coast states of Italy was perhaps the most advantageous result of the Crusades.
This temporary success of the Crusaders became the source of great disasters. The Mussulmans, heretofore divided among themselves, united to resist the infidel, and divisions began to appear in the Christian camps. A new expedition was necessary to aid the kingdom which the brave Noureddin was threatening. Louis VII. and the Emperor Conrad, each at the head of one hundred thousand Crusaders, marched, as their predecessors had done, by the route of Constantinople, (1142.) But the Greeks, frightened by the recurring visits of these menacing guests, plotted their destruction.
Conrad, who was desirous of being first, fell into the traps laid for him by the Turks, and was defeated in detachments in several battles by the Sultan of Iconium. Louis, more fortunate, defeated the Turks on the banks of the Mender; but, being deprived of the support of Conrad, and his army being annoyed and partially beaten by the enemy in the passage of defiles, and being in want of supplies, he was confined to Attalia, on the coast of Pamphylia, where he endeavored to embark his army. The means furnished by the Greeks were insufficient, and not more than fifteen or twenty thousand men arrived at Antioch with the king: the remainder either perished or fell into the hands of the Saracens.
This feeble reinforcement soon melted away under the attacks of the climate and the daily contests with the enemy, although they were continually aided by small bodies brought over from Europe by the Italian ships; and they were again about to yield under the attacks of Saladin, when the court of Rome succeeded in effecting an alliance between the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa and the Kings of France and England to save the Holy Land.
The emperor was the first to set out. At the head of one hundred thousand Germans, he opened a passage through Thrace in spite of the formal resistance of the Greeks, now governed by Isaac Angelus. He marched to Gallipolis, crossed the Dardanelles, and seized Iconium. He died in consequence of an imprudent bath in a river, which, it has been pretended, was the Cydnus. His son, the Duke of Swabia, annoyed by the Mussulmans and attacked by diseases, brought to Ptolemais scarcely six thousand men.
At the same time, Richard Coeur-de-Lion and Philip Augustus more judiciously took the route over the sea, and sailed from Marseilles and Genoa with two immense fleets,(1190.) The first seized Cyprus, and both landed in Syria,--where they would probably have triumphed but for the rivalry which sprang up between them, in consequence of which Philip returned to France.
Twelve years later, a new Crusade was determined upon, (1203.) Part of the Crusaders embarked from Provence or Italy; others, led by the Count of Flanders and the Marquis of Montferrat, proceeded to Venice, with the intention of embarking there. The party last mentioned were persuaded by the skillful Dandolo to aid him in an attack upon Constantinople, upon the pretext of upholding the rights of Alexis Angelus, the son of Isaac Angelus, who had fought the Emperor Frederick and was the successor of those Comnenuses who had connived at the destruction of the armies of Conrad and Louis VII.
Twenty thousand men had the boldness to attack the ancient capital of the world, which had at least two hundred thousand defenders. They assailed it by sea and land, and captured it. The usurper fled, and Alexis was replaced upon the throne, but was unable to retain his seat: the Greeks made an insurrection in favor of Murzupha, but the Latins took possession of Constantinople after a more bloody assault than the first, and placed upon the throne their chief, Count Baldwin of Flanders. This empire lasted a half-century. The remnant of the Greeks took refuge at Nice and Trebizond.
A sixth expedition was directed against Egypt by John of Brienne, who, notwithstanding the successful issue of the horrible siege of Damietta, was obliged to give way before the constantly-increasing efforts of the Mussulman population. The remains of his splendid army, after a narrow escape from drowning in the Nile, deemed themselves very fortunate in being able to purchase permission to re-embark for Europe.
The court of Rome, whose interest it was to keep up the zeal of Christendom in these expeditions, of which it gathered all the fruits, encouraged the German princes to uphold the tottering realm at Jerusalem. The Emperor Frederick and the Landgrave of Hesse embarked at Brundusium in 1227, at the head of forty thousand chosen soldiers. The landgrave, and afterward Frederick himself, fell sick, and the fleet put in at Tarentum, from which port the emperor, irritated by the presumption of Gregory IX., who excommunicated him because he was too slow in the gratification of his wishes, at a later date proceeded with ten thousand men, thus giving way to the fear inspired by the pontifical thunders.
Louis IX., animated by the same feeling of fear, or impelled, if we may credit Ancelot, by motives of a higher character, set out from Aigues-Mortes, in 1248, with one hundred and twenty large vessels, and fifteen hundred smaller boats, hired from the Genoese, the Venetians and the Catalans; for France was at that time without a navy, although washed by two seas. This king proceeded to Cyprus, and, having there collected a still larger force, set out, according to Joinville's statement, with more than eighteen hundred vessels, to make a descent into Egypt. His army must have numbered about eighty thousand men; for, although half of the fleet was scattered and cast away upon the coast of Syria, he marched upon Cairo a few months later with sixty thousand fighting-men, twenty thousand being mounted. It should be stated that the Count of Poictiers had arrived also with troops from France.
The sad fortune experienced by this splendid army did not prevent the same king from engaging in a new Crusade, twenty years later,(1270.) He disembarked upon that occasion at the ruins of Carthage, and besieged Tunis. The plague swept off half his army in a few months, and himself was one of its victims. The King of Sicily, having arrived with powerful reinforcements at the time of Louis's death, and desiring to carry back the remains of the army to his island of Sicily, encountered a tempest which caused a loss of four thousand men and twenty large ships. This prince was not deterred by this misfortune from desiring the conquest of the Greek empire and of Constantinople, which seemed a prize of greater value and more readily obtained. Philip, the son and successor of Saint Louis, being anxious to return to France, would have nothing to do with that project. This was the last effort. The Christians who were abandoned in Syria were destroyed in the noted attacks of Tripoli and Ptolemais: some of the remnants of the religious orders took refuge at Cyprus and established themselves at Rhodes.
The Mussulmans, in their turn, crossed the Dardanelles at Gallipolis in 1355, and took possession, one after the other, of the European provinces of the Eastern Empire, to which the Latins had themselves given the fatal blow.
Mohammed II., while besieging Constantinople in 1453, is said to have had his fleet transported by land with a view to placing it in the canal and closing the port: it is stated to have been large enough to be manned by twenty thousand select foot-soldiers. After the capture of this capital, Mohammed found his means increased by all those of the Greek navy, and in a short time his empire attained the first rank of maritime powers. He ordered an attack to be made upon Rhodes and upon Otranto on the Italian main, whilst he proceeded to Hungary in search of a more worthy opponent (Hunniades.) Repulsed and wounded at Belgrade, the sultan fell upon Trebizond with a numerous fleet, brought that city to sue for terms, and then proceeded with a fleet of four hundred sail to make a landing upon the island of Negropont, which he carried by assault. A second attempt upon Rhodes, executed, it is stated, at the head of a hundred thousand men, by one of his ablest lieutenants, was a failure, with loss to the assailants. Mohammed was preparing to go to that point himself with an immense army assembled on the shores of Ionia, which Vertot estimates at three hundred thousand men; but death closed his career, and the project was not carried into effect.
About the same period England began to be formidable to her neighbors on land as well as on the sea; the Dutch also, reclaiming their country from the inroads of the sea, were laying the foundations of a power more extraordinary even than that of Venice.
Edward III. landed in France and besieged Calais with eight hundred ships and forty thousand men.
Henry V. made two descents in 1414 and 1417: he had, it is stated, fifteen hundred vessels and only thirty thousand men, of whom six thousand were cavalry.
All the events we have described as taking place, up to this period, and including the capture of Constantinople, were before the invention of gunpowder; for if Henry V. had cannon at Agincourt, as is claimed by some writers, they were certainly not used in naval warfare. From that time all the combinations of naval armaments were entirely changed; and this revolution took place--if I may use that expression--at the time when the invention of the mariner's compass and the discovery of America and of the Cape of Good Hope were about to turn the maritime commerce of the world into new channels and to establish an entirely new system of colonial dependencies.
I shall not mention in detail the expeditions of the Spaniards to America, or those of the Portuguese, Dutch, and English to India by doubling the Cape of Good Hope. Notwithstanding their great influence upon the commerce of the world,--notwithstanding the genius of Gama, Albuquerque, and Cortez,--these expeditions, undertaken by small bodies of two or three thousand men against tribes who knew nothing of fire-arms, are of no interest in a military point of view.
The Spanish navy, whose fame had been greatly increased by this discovery of a new world, was at the height of its splendor in the reign of Charles V. However, the glory of the expedition to Tunis, which was conquered by this prince at the head of thirty thousand fine soldiers transported in five hundred Genoese or Spanish vessels, was balanced by the disaster which befell a similar expedition against Algiers, (1541,) undertaken when the season was too far advanced and in opposition to the wise counsels of Admiral Doria. The expedition was scarcely under way when the emperor saw one hundred and sixty of his ships and eight thousand men swallowed up by the waves: the remainder was saved by the skill of Doria, and assembled at Cape Metafuz, where Charles V. himself arrived, after encountering great difficulties and peril.
While these events were transpiring, the successors of Mohammed were not neglecting the advantages given them by the possession of so many fine maritime provinces, which taught them at once the importance of the control of the sea and furnished means for obtaining it. At this period the Turks were quite as well informed with reference to artillery and the military art in general as the Europeans. They reached the apex of their greatness under Solyman I., who besieged and captured Rhodes (1552) with an army stated to have reached the number of one hundred and forty thousand men,--which was still formidable even upon the supposition of its strength being exaggerated by one-half.
In 1565, Mustapha and the celebrated Dragut made a descent upon Malta, where the Knights of Rhodes had made a new establishment; they carried over thirty-two thousand Janissaries, with one hundred and forty ships. John of Valetta, as is well known, gained an enduring fame by repulsing them.
A more formidable expedition, consisting of two hundred vessels and fifty-five thousand men, was sent in 1527 to the isle of Cyprus, where Nicosia was taken and Famagosta besieged. The horrible cruelties practiced by Mustapha increased the alarm occasioned by his progress. Spain, Venice, Naples, and Malta united their naval forces to succor Cyprus; but Famagosta had already surrendered, notwithstanding the heroic defense of Bragadino, who was perfidiously flayed alive by Mustapha's order, to avenge the death of forty thousand Turks that had perished in the space of two years spent on the island.
The allied fleet, under the orders of two heroes, Don John of Austria, brother of Philip II., and Andrea Doria, attacked the Turkish fleet at the entrance of the Gulf of Lepanto, near the promontory of Actium, where Antony and Augustus once fought for the empire of the world. The Turkish fleet was almost entirely destroyed: more than two hundred vessels and thirty thousand Turks were captured or perished, (1571.) This victory did not put an end to the supremacy of the Turks, but was a great check in their career of greatness. However, they made such vigorous efforts that as large a fleet as the former one was sent to sea during the next year. Peace terminated this contest, in which such enormous losses were sustained.
The bad fortune of Charles V. in his expedition against Algiers did not deter Sebastian of Portugal from wishing to attempt the conquest of Morocco, where he was invited by a Moorish prince who had been deprived of his estates. Having disembarked upon the shores of Morocco at the head of twenty thousand men, this young prince was killed and his army cut to pieces at the battle of Alcazar by Muley Abdulmalek, in 1578.
Philip II., whose pride had increased since the naval battle of Lepanto on account of the success he had gained in France by his diplomacy and by the folly of the adherents of the League, deemed his arms irresistible. He thought to bring England to his feet. The invincible Armada intended to produce this effect, which has been so famous, was composed of an expeditionary force proceeding from Cadiz, including, according to Hume's narrative, one hundred and thirty-seven vessels, armed with two thousand six hundred and thirty bronze cannon, and carrying twenty thousand soldiers, in addition to eleven thousand sailors. To these forces was to be added an army of twenty-five thousand men which the Duke of Parma was to bring up from the Netherlands by way of Ostend. A tempest and the efforts of the English caused the failure of this expedition, which, although of considerable magnitude for the period when it appeared, was by no means entitled to the high-sounding name it received: it lost thirteen thousand men and half the vessels before it even came near the English coast.
After this expedition comes in chronological order that of Gustavus Adolphus to Germany,(1630.) The army contained only from fifteen to eighteen thousand men: the fleet was quite large, and was manned by nine thousand sailors; M. Ancillon must, however, be mistaken in stating that it carried eight thousand cannon. The debarkation in Pomerania received little opposition from the Imperial troops, and the King of Sweden had a strong party among the German people. His successor was the leader of a very extraordinary expedition, which is resembled by only one other example mentioned in history: I refer to the march of Charles X. of Sweden across the Belt upon the ice, with a view of moving from Sleswick upon Copenhagen by way of the island of Funen,(1658.) He had twenty-five thousand men, of whom nine thousand were cavalry, and artillery in proportion. This undertaking was so much the more rash because the ice was unsafe, several pieces of artillery and even the king's own carriage having broken through and been lost.
After seventy-five years of peace, the war between Venice and the Turks recommenced in 1645. The latter transported an army of fifty-five thousand men, in three hundred and fifty vessels, to Candia, and gained possession of the important post of Canea before the republic thought of sending succor. Although the people of Venice began to lose the spirit which made her great, she still numbered among her citizens some noble souls: Morosini, Grimani, and Mocenigo struggled several years against the Turks, who derived great advantages from their numerical superiority and the possession of Canea. The Venetian fleet had, nevertheless, gained a marked ascendency under the orders of Grimani, when a third of it was destroyed by a frightful tempest, in which the admiral himself perished.
In 1648, the siege of Candia began. Jussuf attacked the city furiously at the head of thirty thousand men: after being repulsed in two assaults, he was encouraged to attempt a third by a large breach being made. The Turks entered the place: Mocenigo rushed to meet them, expecting to die in their midst. A brilliant victory was the reward of his heroic conduct: the enemy were repulsed and the ditches filled with their dead bodies.
Venice might have driven off the Turks by sending twenty thousand men to Candia; but Europe rendered her but feeble support, and she had already called into active service all the men fit for war she could produce.
The siege, resumed some time after, lasted longer than that of Troy, and each campaign was marked by fresh attempts on the part of the Turks to carry succor to their army and by naval victories gained by the Venetians. The latter people had kept up with the advance of naval tactics in Europe, and thus were plainly superior to the Mussulmans, who adhered to the old customs, and were made to pay dearly for every attempt to issue from the Dardanelles. Three persons of the name of Morosini, and several Mocenigos, made themselves famous in this protracted struggle.
Finally, the celebrated Coprougli, placed by his merits at the head of the Ottoman ministry, resolved to take the personal direction of this war which had lasted so long: he accordingly proceeded to the island, where transports had landed fifty thousand men, at whose head he conducted the attack in a vigorous manner.(1667.)
In this memorable siege the Turks exhibited more skill than previously: their artillery, of very heavy caliber, was well served, and, for the first time, they made use of trenches, which were the invention of an Italian engineer.
The Venetians, on their side, greatly improved the methods of defense by mines. Never had there been seen such furious zeal exhibited in mutual destruction by combats, mines, and assaults. Their heroic resistance enabled the garrison to hold out during winter: in the spring, Venice sent reinforcements and the Duke of Feuillade brought a few hundreds of French volunteers.
The Turks had also received strong reinforcements, and redoubled their efforts. The siege was drawing to a close, when six thousand Frenchmen came to the assistance of the garrison under the leadership of the Duke of Beaufort and Navailles,(1669.) A badly-conducted sortie discouraged these presumptuous young men, and Navailles, disgusted with the sufferings endured in the siege, assumed the responsibility, at the end of two months, of carrying the remnant of his troops back to France. Morosini, having then but three thousand exhausted men to defend a place which was open on all sides, finally consented to evacuate it, and a truce was agreed upon, which led to a formal treaty of peace. Candia had cost the Turks twenty-five years of efforts and more than one hundred thousand men killed in eighteen assaults and several hundred sorties. It is estimated that thirty-five thousand Christians of different nations perished in the glorious defense of the place.
The struggle between Louis XIV., Holland, and England gives examples of great maritime operations, but no remarkable descents. That of James II. in Ireland (1690) was composed of only six thousand Frenchmen, although De Tourville's fleet contained seventy-three ships of the line, carrying five thousand eight hundred cannon and twenty-nine thousand sailors. A grave fault was committed in not throwing at least twenty thousand men into Ireland with such means as were disposable. Two years later, De Tourville had been conquered in the famous day of La Hogue, and the remains of the troops which had landed were enabled to return through the instrumentality of a treaty which required their evacuation of the island.
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Swedes and Russians undertook two expeditions very different in character.
Charles XII., wishing to aid the Duke of Holstein, made a descent upon Denmark at the head of twenty thousand men, transported by two hundred vessels and protected by a strong squadron. He was really assisted by the English and Dutch navies, but the expedition was not for that reason the less remarkable in the details of the disembarkation. The same prince effected a descent into Livonia to aid Narva, but he landed his troops at a Swedish port.
Peter the Great, having some cause of complaint against the Persians, and wishing to take advantage of their dissensions, embarked (in 1722) upon the Volga: he entered the Caspian Sea with two hundred and seventy vessels, carrying twenty thousand foot-soldiers, and descended to Agrakhan, at the mouths of the Koisou, where he expected to meet his cavalry. This force, numbering nine thousand dragoons and five thousand Cossacks, joined him after a land-march by way of the Caucasus. The czar then seized Derbent, besieged Bakou, and finally made a treaty with one of the parties whose dissensions at that time filled with discord the empire of the Soofees: he procured the cession of Astrabad, the key of the Caspian Sea and, in some measure, of the whole Persian empire.
The time of Louis XV. furnished examples of none but secondary expeditions, unless we except that of Richelieu against Minorca, which was very glorious as an escalade, but less extraordinary as a descent.
The Spaniards, however, in 1775, made a descent with fifteen or sixteen thousand men upon Algiers, with a view of punishing those rovers of the sea for their bold piracies; but the expedition, for want of harmonious action between the squadron and the land-forces, was unsuccessful, on account of the murderous fire which the troops received from the Turkish and Arab musketeers dispersed among the undergrowth surrounding the city. The troops returned to their vessels after having two thousand men placed hors de combat.
The American war (1779) was the epoch of the greatest maritime efforts upon the part of the French. Europe was astonished to see this power send Count d'Estaing to America with twenty-five ships of the line, while at the same time M. Orvilliers, with a Franco-Spanish fleet of sixty-five ships of the line, was to cover a descent to be effected with three hundred transports and forty thousand men, assembled at Havre and St. Malo.
This new armada moved back and forth for several months, but accomplished nothing: the winds finally drove it back to port.
D'Estaing was more fortunate, as he succeeded in getting the superiority in the Antilles and in landing in the United States six thousand Frenchmen under Rochambeau, who were followed, at a later date, by another division, and assisted in investing the English army under Cornwallis at Yorktown, (1781:) the independence of America was thus secured. France would perhaps have gained a triumph over her implacable rival more lasting in its effects, had she, in addition to the display made in the English Channel, sent ten ships and seven or eight thousand men more to India with Admiral Suffren.
During the French Revolution, there were few examples of descents: the fire at Toulon, emigration, and the battle of Ushant had greatly injured the French navy.
Hoche's expedition against Ireland with twenty-five thousand men was scattered by the winds, and no further attempts in that quarter were made. (1796.)
At a later date, Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, consisting of twenty-three thousand men, thirteen ships, seventeen frigates, and four hundred transports, obtained great successes at first, which were followed by sad reverses. The Turks, in hopes of expelling him, landed fifteen thousand men at Aboukir, but were all captured or driven into the sea, notwithstanding the advantages this peninsula gave them of intrenching themselves and waiting for reinforcements. This is an excellent example for imitation by the party on the defensive under similar circumstances.
The expedition of considerable magnitude which was sent out in 1802 to St. Domingo was remarkable as a descent, but failed on account of the ravages of yellow fever.
Since their success against Louis XIV., the English have given their attention more to the destruction of rival fleets and the subjugation of colonies than to great descents. The attempts made in the eighteenth century against Brest and Cherbourg with bodies of ten or twelve thousand men amounted to nothing in the heart of a powerful state like France. The remarkable conquests which procured them their Indian empire occurred in succession. Having obtained possession of Calcutta, and then of Bengal, they strengthened themselves gradually by the arrival of troops in small bodies and by using the Sepoys, whom they disciplined to the number of one hundred and fifty thousand.
The Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland in 1799 was composed of forty thousand men, but they were not all landed at once: the study of the details of the operations is, however, quite interesting.
In 1801, Abercrombie, after threatening Ferrol and Cadiz, effected a descent into Egypt with twenty thousand Englishmen. The results of this expedition are well known.
General Stuart's expedition to Calabria, (1806,) after some successes at Maida, was for the purpose of regaining possession of Sicily. That against Buenos Ayres was more unfortunate in its results, and was terminated by a capitulation.
In 1807, Lord Cathcart attacked Copenhagen with twenty-five thousand men, besieged and bombarded the city, and gained possession of the Danish fleet, which was his object.
In 1808, Wellington appeared in Portugal with fifteen thousand men. After gaining the victory of Vimeira, and assisted by the general rising of the Portuguese, he forced Junot to evacuate the kingdom. The same army, increased in numbers to twenty-five thousand and placed under Moore's command, while making an effort to penetrate into Spain with a view of relieving Madrid, was forced to retreat to Corunna and there re-embark, after suffering severe losses. Wellington, having effected another landing in Portugal with reinforcements, collected an army of thirty thousand Englishmen and as many Portuguese, with which he avenged Moore's misfortunes by surprising Soult at Oporto, (May, 1809,) and then beating Joseph at Talavera, under the very gates of his capital.
The expedition to Antwerp in the same year was one of the largest England has undertaken since the time of Henry V. It was composed of not less than seventy thousand men in all,--forty thousand land-forces and thirty thousand sailors. It did not succeed, on account of the incapacity of the leader.
A descent entirely similar in character to that of Charles X. of Sweden was effected by thirty Russian battalions passing the Gulf of Bothnia on the ice in five columns, with their artillery. Their object was to take possession of the islands of Aland and spread a feeling of apprehension to the very gates of Stockholm. Another division passed the gulf to Umeå, (March, 1809.)
General Murray succeeded in effecting a well-planned descent in the neighborhood of Tarragona in 1813, with the intention of cutting Suchet off from Valencia: however, after some successful operations, he thought best to re-embark.
The expedition set on foot by England against Napoleon after his return from Elba in 1815 was remarkable on account of the great mass of matériel landed at Ostend and Antwerp. The Anglo-Hanoverian army contained sixty thousand men, but some came by land and others were disembarked at a friendly port.
The English engaged in an undertaking in the same year which may be regarded as very extraordinary: I refer to the attack on the capital of the United States. The world was astonished to see a handful of seven or eight thousand Englishmen making their appearance in the midst of a state embracing ten millions of people, taking possession of its capital, and destroying all the public buildings,--results unparalleled in history. We would be tempted to despise the republican and unmilitary spirit of the inhabitants of those states if the same militia had not risen, like those of Greece, Rome, and Switzerland, to defend their homes against still more powerful attacks, and if, in the same year, an English expedition more extensive than the other had not been entirely defeated by the militia of Louisiana and other states under the orders of General Jackson.
If the somewhat fabulous numbers engaged in the irruption of Xerxes and the Crusades be excepted, no undertaking of this kind which has been actually carried out, especially since fleets have been armed with powerful artillery, can at all be compared with the gigantic project and proportionate preparations made by Napoleon for throwing one hundred and fifty thousand veterans upon the shores of England by the use of three thousand launches or large gun-boats, protected by sixty ships of the line.
From the preceding narrative the reader will perceive what a difference there is in point of difficulty and probability of success between descents attempted across a narrow arm of the sea, a few miles only in width, and those in which the troops and matériel are to be transported long distances over the open sea. This fact gives the reason why so many operations of this kind have been executed by way of the Bosporus.
* * * * *
In 1830, the French government sent an expedition to Algiers, composed of an army of thirty-seven thousand five hundred men and one hundred and eighty pieces of artillery. More than five hundred vessels of war and transports were employed. The fleet sailed from Toulon.
In 1838, France sent a fleet of twenty-two vessels to Vera Cruz. The castle of San Juan d'Ulloa fell into their hands after a short bombardment. A small force of about one thousand men, in three columns, took the city of Vera Cruz by assault: the resistance was slight.
In 1847, the United States caused a descent to be made upon the coast of Mexico, at Vera Cruz, with an army of thirteen thousand men, under the command of General Scott. One hundred and fifty vessels were employed, including men-of-war and transports. The city of Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa speedily fell into the possession of the forces of the United States. This important post became the secondary base of operations for the brilliant campaign which terminated with the capture of the city of Mexico.
In 1854 commenced the memorable and gigantic contest between Russia on the one side and England, France, Sardinia, and Turkey on the other. Several descents were made by the allied forces at different points of the Russian coast: of these the first was in the Baltic Sea. An English fleet sailed from Spithead, under the command of Sir Charles Napier, on the 12th of March, and a French fleet from Brest, under the command of Vice-Admiral Parseval Deschênes, on the 19th of April. They effected a junction in the Bay of Barosund on the 11th of June. The allied fleet numbered thirty ships and fifty frigates, corvettes, and other vessels. The naval commanders wished to attack the defenses of Bomarsund, on one of the Aland Isles, but, after a reconnoissance, they came to the conclusion that it was necessary to have land-forces. A French corps of ten thousand men was at once dispatched to Bomarsund under General Baraguay-d'Hilliers, and the place was speedily reduced.
Later in the same year, the great expedition to the Crimea was executed; and with reference to it the following facts are mentioned, in order to give an idea of its magnitude:--
September 14, 1854, an army of fifty-eight thousand five hundred men and two hundred pieces of artillery was landed near Eupatoria, composed of thirty thousand French, twenty-one thousand five hundred English, and seven thousand Turks. They were transported from Varna to the place of landing by three hundred and eighty-nine ships, steamers, and transports. This force fought and gained the battle of the Alma, (September 20,) and thence proceeded to Sebastopol. The English took possession of the harbor of Balaklava and the French of Kamiesch: these were the points to which subsequent reinforcements and supplies for the army in the Crimea were sent.
November 5, at the battle of Inkermann, the allied army numbered seventy-one thousand men.
At the end of January, 1855, the French force was seventy-five thousand men and ten thousand horses. Up to the same time, the English had sent fifty-four thousand men to the Crimea, but only fifteen thousand were alive, present, and fit for duty.
February 4, the French numbered eighty-five thousand; the English, twenty-five thousand fit for duty; the Turks, twenty-five thousand.
May 8, 1855, General La Marmora arrived at Balaklava with fifteen thousand Sardinians.
In the latter part of May, an expedition of sixteen thousand men was sent to Kertch.
In August, the French force at Sebastopol had risen to one hundred and twenty thousand men.
September 8, the final assault took place, which resulted in the evacuation of the place by the Russians. The allies had then in battery more than eight hundred pieces of artillery.
The fleet which co-operated with the land-forces in the artillery attack of October 17, 1854, consisted of twenty-five ships. There were present and prepared to attack in September, 1855, thirty-four ships.
October, 1855, an expeditionary force of nine thousand men was sent to Kinburn, which place was captured.
Marshal Vaillant, in his report, as Minister of War, to the French emperor, says there were sent from France and Algeria three hundred and ten thousand men and forty thousand horses, of which two hundred and twenty-seven thousand men returned to France and Algeria.
The marshal's report gives the following striking facts, (he refers only to French operations:-)
The artillery matériel at the disposal of the Army of the East comprised one thousand seven hundred guns, two thousand gun-carriages, two thousand seven hundred wagons, two millions of projectiles, and nine million pounds of powder. There were sent to the army three thousand tons of powder, seventy millions of infantry-cartridges, two hundred and seventy thousand rounds of fixed ammunition, and eight thousand war-rockets.
On the day of the final assault there were one hundred and eighteen batteries, which during the siege had consumed seven million pounds of powder. They required one million sand-bags and fifty thousand gabions.
Of engineer materials, fourteen thousand tons were sent. The engineers executed fifty miles of trenches, using eighty thousand gabions, sixty thousand fascines, and one million sand-bags.
Of subsistence, fuel, and forage, five hundred thousand tons were sent.
Of clothing, camp-equipage, and harness, twelve thousand tons.
Hospital stores, six thousand five hundred tons.
Provision-wagons, ambulances, carts, forges, &c, eight thousand tons.
In all, about six hundred thousand tons.
It is not thought necessary to add similar facts for the English, Sardinian, and Turkish armies.
In 1859, the Spaniards made a descent upon Morocco with a force of forty thousand infantry, eleven squadrons of cavalry, and eighty pieces of artillery, using twenty-one vessels of war with three hundred and twenty-seven guns, besides twenty-four gun-boats and numerous transports.
In 1860, a force of English and French was landed on the coast of China, whence they marched to Pekin and dictated terms of peace. This expedition is remarkable for the smallness of the numbers which ventured, at such a great distance from their sources of supply and succor, to land upon a hostile shore and penetrate into the midst of the most populous empire in the world.
The French expedition to Syria in 1860 was small in numbers, and presented no remarkable features.
Toward the close of the year 1861, the government of the United States sent an expedition of thirteen thousand men to Port Royal, on the coast of South Carolina, one of the seceding States. The fleet of war-vessels and transports sailed from Hampton Roads, under command of Captain Dupont, and was dispersed by a violent gale: the losses of men and matériel were small, however, and the fleet finally reached the rendezvous. The defenses of the harbor having been silenced by the naval forces, the disembarkation of the land-troops took place, General Sherman being in command.
England, France, and Spain are now (January 16, 1862) engaged in an expedition directed against Mexico. The first operations were the capture, by the Spanish forces, of Vera Cruz and its defenses: the Mexicans offered no resistance at that point. The future will develop the plans of the allies; but the ultimate result of a struggle (if, indeed, one be attempted by the Mexicans) cannot be doubted, when three of the most powerful states of Europe are arrayed against the feeble and tottering republic of Mexico.]
FOOTNOTES:
INDEX
Abercrombie's descent on Egypt, 384.
Accidental lines, 103.
Action, concert of, how secured, 259.
Active armies and sieges, relation between, 152.
Advanced guard, 261, 262. attack of the enemy's, in retreats, 243. in armies meeting unexpectedly, 208. in battle, 288, 289.
Advance, line of, how determined, 71.
Advantages of awaiting invasion, 17. of elevated points for observation, 276.
Aggressive wars for conquest, 22.
Agincourt, order of battle at, 192.
Albis, position of, 181.
Alcazar, battle of, 378.
Alexander the Great, 173, 362.
Alfred the Great, 369.
Algiers, French descent on, in 1830, 386. Spanish descent on, 382.
Alise, investment of, by Cæsar, 153.
Allies, at Bautzen, 187. defeat of, at Zurich, 112. error of, in 1793, 107, 108. failure of diversion of, in 1805, 219. in war, 18. march of, upon Leipsic, 123.
Alps, passage of, by Francis I., 168.
American Revolution, French maritime efforts during, 383.
Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland, 384.
Angoulême, Duke of, expedition of, 28.
Antony, retreat of, from Media, 233.
Antwerp, English expedition to, 385.
Archduke Charles, 294. concentric retreat of, in 1796,238. interior lines of, 136. opinion of, as to small-column formation, 350. opinion of, as to the valley of the Danube, 162. success of, 110, 111.
Archduke Ferdinand, 53.
Armada, Spanish, 249, 378, 379.
Armament, French, at Eylau and Marengo, 47. superior, importance of, 47, 48.
Armies, auxiliary, 170. central, observations on, 126. command of, 52. French, in the Revolution, 135. how to act, 75. in intrenchments, 154. in peace, how preserved, 47. large, fitness of central lines for, 125. large, organization of, 286. meeting unexpectedly, advanced guard in, 208. morale of, 60, 178, 322. movements of, points to be attended to in, 254-256. of French Revolution, how subsisted, 142. of Louis XIV. and Frederick II., how subsisted, 142. of Napoleon, operations of, 136. promotions in, 47. standing, effect of, on distant invasions, 171. surprises of, 209. two, on interior lines, 117. two, on the same frontier, 116. unexpected meeting of two, 207.
Armor, defensive, for cavalry, 308.
Arms and organization of cavalry, 307, 308.
Arms for irregular cavalry, 313.
Army, best means of organizing the command of, 59.
Army corps, system of, 279.
Army, defensive, proper course for, 324. defensive, when it has the advantage, 202. head-quarters of, when the most important point, 107. how perfected, 43. importance of a good, 44. number of men in, often determines battle-formation for, 285.
Army of Boulogne, 280. of four corps, 281. of seven corps, 281. offensive, proper course for, 324. of invasion, line of defense important to, 99. of the Rhine in 1800, 115. permanent, necessary condition of, 49. proportion of cavalry in, 304. pursuing, has the advantage, 241.
Artillerists, directions for, in battle, 317.
Artillery, concentration of fire of, in offensive line of battle, 290. employment of, 315-318. heavy, in defensive line of battle, 290. importance of, to infantry, 290. matériel of the French army in the Crimea, 388. Napoleon's, at Wagrani, 289, 316. post of, in line of battle, 289. proportion of, 318. protection of infantry from the enemy's, 303. rules for use of, in battle, 316-318. use of, in the offensive, 316. who should command, 318.
Art of war, definition of, 13. principal parts of, 66.
Assailant, advantages of, 186.
Assailant's best means of victory, 202.
Assault, beat formation of infantry for, 298. of field-works, instances of well-arranged, 212.
Athens, naval power of, 361.
Attack, cavalry column of, 310. close, formation for, 301. column of, in two lines, 292. columns of, 293, 356. columns of, of single battalions, 298. five methods of forming troops for, 292. formation for, at Turin, 213. in columns, order of, 194. in front, 201. in rear, 207. of field-works, directions for, 211, 212. of fortified places, 210. of intrenched lines, 214. on flank, 203. on Sank, cavalry, 310. when order in squares suitable for, 297.
Attacks and marches, arrangements of, 258. in half-deep order, 302.
Audenarde, battle of, 53.
Augustus, armament of, 365.
Aulic Council, 59.
Austerlitz, 170, 179, 206. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
Austria, course of, in the French Revolution, 106. force of, in the French Revolution, 106. fortresses of, 149. interest of, in the French Revolution, 105. intervention of, in 1813, 21.
Austrian army, situation of, in 1800, 112. camp before Mayence, 157. order at Essling and Fleurus, 200.
Austrians, surprise of, by Turenne, 246. why victorious in 1753, 107.
Austria's adaptation to parallel retreats, 240.
Authority of counselors, 53.
Balloons, difficulties in use of, 275, 276. how they might be useful, 275. used at Fleurus, 275.
Barbarossa, 373.
Bard, fort of, 152, 167. importance of defile of, 87.
Base of operations, where to be established, 84.
Bases of operations, definition of, 77 of operations, how to be chosen, 79, 80. of operations, plurality of, 78. on the sea, 83, 84. temporary or eventual, 84. temporary, when necessary, 132. with two faces, 83.
Bassano, Napoleon's march on, 131.
Battalions, deployed, in checkerwise order, 301.
Battalion squares, 296.
Batteries, 317.
Battle, advanced guard in, 288, 289. calculation of distances in, 334. classification of orders of, useful, 197. combinations of, 187. concave order of, 191. convex order of, 192. critical moment of, 203. decisive moment of, 334. defensive arrangements for, 201.
Battle-field, decisive point of, how determined, 186. decisive point of, 187. strategic point of, when important, 187.
Battle-formation in small columns, 350. influence of topography upon, 299.
Battle, formation of troops for, 347-360. influence of orders of, on result of engagements, 197. line of, arrangement of cavalry in, 288. line of, before the French Revolution, 277. line of, definition of, 179. line of, distribution of troops in, 287. line of, post of artillery in, 289. lines of, for two infantry corps, different formations of, 282-284. oblique order of, 190. of Agincourt, 192. of Alcazar, 378. of Audenarde, 53. of Austerlitz, 170, 179, 198, 206. of Bautzen, 187, 196, 317. of Blenheim, 303. of Cannæ, 191. of Crécy, 192. of Ecnomos, 363. of Essling, 192, 193, 200, 350. of Fossano, 168. of Jena, 90, 198, 305. of Leipsic, 158, 192, 193, 198, 267, 305. of Lepanto, 378. of Leuthen, 140, 190, 229, 342. of Millesimo, 111. of Mollwitz, 348. of Prague, 189, 205. of Ramillies, 312. of Rivoli, 179, 198, 205. of Torgau, 205. of Turin, 53. of Ulm, 53, 90. of Ulm, won by strategy, 198. of Waterloo, 127, 129, 130, 181, 182, 183, 196, 198, 206, 294, 295, 303-306, 354, 358, 359. offensive, object of, 188. offensive order of, 200. order of, 186. order of, at Leipsic, 193. order of, definition of, 180. orders of, 188. parallel order of, 188. reinforced, 189. when suitable, 189. with crotchet, 189. perpendicular order of, 190. position for, 341. posting troops in line of, 277. results of, depend on what, 178. rules for use of artillery in, 316-318.
Battle-order for cavalry, 312.
Battle-orders, various, 349.
Battles, 178. defensive, 179. elements of uncertainty regarding, 197. great difficulty of tactics of, 196. influence of musketry-fire in, 348. offensive, 186. of Napoleon, orders of, 198. rules for scientific, 200. success in, depends on maneuvering, 360. three kinds of, 179. what may interfere with success of, 196.
Bautzen, battle of, 187, 317. French at, 196.
Bellegarde, 166.
Benningsen, movement of, in 1807, 109.
Benningsen's artillery reserve at Eylau, 289. base on Königsberg in 1807, 152. position in 1807, 171. mixed system at Eylau, 352.
Beresina, passage of, 226, 245.
Berg-op-Zoom, assault of, 212.
Berthier at Leipsic, 267.
Berthier's error at Wagram, 267. error in campaign of 1809, 265.
Blenheim, battle of, 303.
Blücher, 53, 130.
"Boar's head" of the ancients, 194.
Bonaparte's career in Italy, 111. expedition to Egypt, 383.
Borodino, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
Boulogne, army of, 280. camp of, 279.
Bravery, first requisite for a leader, 345.
Bridges, how to secure, against fire-ships, &c., 245. in retreats, 244. means of destroying, 245. protection of, after passage, 229.
Bridge-trains, importance of, 121.
Brienne, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
Buntzelwitz, camp of, 154.
Burgundy, Duke of, 53.
Cæsar's investment of Alise, 153. maritime expeditions, 365.
Campaign, Napoleon's, of 1800, 137. of 1793, 107. of 1799, 111. of 1800, 112. of 1812, Napoleon's error in, 172. of the Spaniards in Flanders, 171. of the Swedes in Germany, 171.
Campaigns in mountains, instances of, 169. in winter, 68. of 1799 and 1800, 162.
Camp at Kehl, 167. intrenched, influence of, 155. intrenched, on which side of a river, 157. intrenched, on river, 156. of Boulogne, 279. of Drissa, 157.
Camps and lines, intrenched, defense of, 215. fortified, 154. intrenched, connection of, with strategy, 154. intrenched, instances of, 210, 211. intrenched, maxims on, 155, 156. intrenched, Prussian system of, 158. intrenched, use of, 156. intrenched, where to be established, 155. strategic square for, 99.
Candia, siege of, 380, 381. Turkish descent on, 379.
Cannæ, order of battle at, 191.
Cantonment of Napoleon on the Passarge, 247.
Cantonments, 246. duty of staff officers in, 256. rules for establishing, 246. selection of positions for, 247.
Canute, 370.
Capitals as strategic points, 87.
Capital, when the center of power, 107.
Capture of posts, means for, 216. when important, 216.
Carbine, in cavalry-charges, 306.
Carnot, 59. operations of, 136.
Carthage, destruction of, 364.
Carthaginians, expeditions of, 361, 362.
Cavalry, 303. advantages of large corps of, 309. arms and organization of, 307, 308. arrangement of, in line of battle, 288. at Ramillies, 312. battle-order for, 312. best formation of infantry against, 294. charge at Hohenfriedberg, 305. charge, general, 305. charges, four kinds of, 306. charges of the Turks, 307. defensive armor for, 308. divisions of five regiments, 311. duties of, 304. encounters of, against cavalry, 311. flank charges of, 307. formations of, 309-311. importance of, in retreats, 243. importance of, to infantry, 290. influence of, in a war, 313, 314. in the defensive, 306. irregular, 313. light, advantages of, 314. militia as, 314, 315. morale of, 312. must be supported by infantry, 304. proportion of, in an army, 304. reserves, 288, 311. when it should charge a line of infantry, 305.
Center, when proper point of attack, 187.
Central armies, 126. line of Napoleon in Saxony, 124. lines, application of, to large masses, 125. position, when untenable, 331.
Chæronea, 365.
Charges, irregular cavalry, 313.
Charles V. of Spain, expedition of, 377. VIII., retreat of, to Naples, 233. X. of Sweden, expedition of, 379. XII. of Sweden, descent of, on Denmark, 382.
Checkerwise formation of cavalry, 310. order, infantry, 301.
Chief of staff, 57, 253.
China, English and French expedition to, 389.
Choice of objective points, 90.
Circumvallation, lines of, 152.
Civil wars, 35.
Clairfayt, victories of, 110.
Clausewitz, erroneous assertion of, 178. opinion of, as to movements in mountainous countries, 166.
Coalition against France in 1793, 37. Frederick the Great, 36, 37. Louis XIV., 36.
Coasts, influence of, on descents, 251.
Coblentz, fortification of, 157, 158. towers of, 159.
Coburg, Prince of, 109, 193.
Column of attack, cavalry, 310. of attack in two lines, 292.
Columns of attack, 293, 294, 356. of attack of single battalions, 298. of four divisions in three ranks, 294.
Combinations of battle, 187. strategic, 72.
Combined use of the three arms, 203, 319, 320.
Commander, difficulty of selecting, 55. essential qualities for a, 55. importance of, 54.
Commander, first care of, on taking the field, 66. of artillery, duties of, 319.
Command of an army, best means of organizing, 59. of armies, 52.
Commissariat, connection of, with system of marches, 141. of Louis XIV. and Frederick II., 142. the, and strategy, 141.
Committee of Public Safety, 136.
Concave order of battle, 191.
Concentration of artillery-fire, 290. in retreat, advantages of, 238.
Concentric lines, 102. retreats, instances of, 238, 239. system, 126.
Concert of action, how secured, 259. in action, importance of, 42.
Conquest, difficulties of, in national wars, 31-34. wars for, instances of, 22.
Conrad III., Crusade of, 372.
Constantinople, expeditions against, by the Russians, 368. siege of, by the Crusaders, 373. siege of, by Mohammed II., 375.
Contempt for the enemy, 63.
Contravallation, lines of, 152.
Control of operations, 52.
Convergent operations, 126.
Converging lines more advantageous than divergent, 118.
Continuous intrenched lines, 213.
Control of the sea, importance of, in an invasion, 30.
Convex order of battle, 192.
Copenhagen, siege of, 384.
Cordon system, 165.
Corps, organization by, likely to be permanent, 287. organization of an army in four, 281. organization of an army in seven, 281. system of, 279. two, one behind the other, 285.
Cossacks, 272, 273, 313, 314.
Council of war at seat of government, 59.
Councils of war, value of, 58.
Counselors, authority of, 53.
Coup-d'oeil, strategic, 337-345.
Coups de main, 215. instances of, 216, 223.
Crécy, order of battle at, 192.
Crimea, details of the allied expedition to, 387-389.
Crimean War, 387.
Critical moment of battles, 203.
Crossing a river in presence of an enemy, 120.
Crotchet, parallel order of battle with, 189.
Crotchets, danger of, 182.
Crusade of 1203, 373.
Crusades, 25, 371-375.
Cuirass, 47, 308.
Cuirassiers, 308.
Culm, 221.
Cyprus, Turkish expedition against, 377.
Danes, incursions of, 368, 369.
Danger of two wars at once, 36.
Dangers of auxiliary armies, 170.
Danube, Napoleon's passage of, 226. valley of, key of Southern Germany, 162.
Decisive direction, 328. moment of battle, 334. point at Bautzen, 187. point, how affected by arrangement of forces, 187. point of battle-field, 187. point of battle-field, how determined, 88, 186. points, 337. points, defiles as, 87. points of the theater of war, 85.
Deep columns, 356. at Waterloo, 359. masses, 298, 302. order, disadvantages of, 298.
Defeat, 68. of the French at Waterloo, causes of, 359.
Defense, in mountainous countries, 163. line of, important to an army of invasion, 99. line of, should be short, 98. of frontiers, 146. of intrenched camps and lines, 215. rivers, mountains, and defiles as eventual lines of, 96. second lines of, 147. should not be passive, 185. tactical, of Switzerland, 169. maxims for frontier, 148, 149.
Defensive armor for cavalry, 308. army has the advantage, when, 202. army, proper course for, 324. arrangements for battle, 201. battles, 179. best formation of infantry for, 298. cavalry in, 306. characteristics of infantry formation for, 297. in descents, duty of, 251. line of battle, heavy artillery in, 290.
Defensive movements, when advised, 124. -offensive war, 74. or offensive system, either may be employed, 185. the, in a level country, 164. war, 72, 73.
Defiles as decisive points, 87. as eventual lines of defense, 96. in retreats, 243.
Definitive lines, 103.
Dennewitz, Ney's error at, 130.
Deployed battalions in checkerwise order, 301. lines in two ranks, 294. lines, two, formation of infantry in, 292.
Depots, establishment of, on march, 262. command of, 263. lines of, 263. of supplies, 141. of supplies, general maxims, 143. secondary, 262, 263.
Descents, 248. cases where made, 250. difficulties of, 250. duty of defensive in, 251. effect of modern inventions on, 248. more extensive in ancient times, 248. precautions after landing, 252. rules for conducting, 251.
D'Estaing's fleet, 383.
Detached orders of Napoleon, 259. works, importance of, 154.
Detachments, field of operations of, should be large, 220. four kinds of, 217. great, 217, 219, 334. great, instances of, 221, 222. great, why made, 220, 221. multiplication of, must be avoided, 221. necessary when there is a double strategic front, 220. of Napoleon in 1805, 222. precise rules for, cannot be laid down, 222. requisites in officers of, 224. small, how useful, 224.
Detachment to form strategic reserve, illustration of, 219.
Détours, 197, 204.
Difficulty of applying theories in war, 269.
Diplomacy in invasions, 24.
Direction, lines of, their importance illustrated, 116. of lines of operations, 115.
Discipline, importance of, 42. importance of, in retreats, 242.
Distances in battle, calculation of, 334.
Distant expeditions, 169. invasions across extensive territories, 171. invasions, maxim for, 173. invasions to aid an ally, 170.
Distribution of troops in line of battle, 287.
Divergent lines, 103.
Duke of York's expedition to Dunkirk, 91. to Holland in 1799, 91.
Dumouriez, errors of, in 1792, 106, 107.
Dunkirk, expedition to, 91.
Duties of cavalry, 304. of staff officers, 254-256.
Duty of a general, 324. of statesmen in offensive wars, 17.
Diversions in zone of operations, when advantageous, 222.
Division, improper use of the term, 351.
Divisions, cavalry, of five regiments, 311. defects of system of, 278. remedied by Napoleon, 278. formation by, when preferable, 286. organization of, 279, 280. system of, 278.
Doctoroff, warning given to, in 1812, by Seslawin, 273.
Double line of operations, when applicable, 117. when necessary, 116. lines of operations, 102, 110. when advantageous, 123. lines to be avoided, 330. passages of rivers, 230. strategic front, 95. wars, 36. wars of Napoleon, 37.
Dragoons, 308. concentration of, by Emperor Nicholas, 309.
Drepanum, 363.
Dresden, 305. intrenched camp at, 155, 211. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. victory at, 124.
Drissa, camp of, 155, 157.
Divergent lines, when advantageous, 118. operations, 126. retreats, when admissible, 239.
Diversions, 218. instances of, 218. when useful, 218.
Eccentric lines, 237. retreat. Bulow's use of the term, 237.
Eccentric system, 126.
Echelon, order of battle by, 193.
Echelons, order in, 193. squares in, 297.
Ecnomos, victory of, 363.
Edward III. of England, 376.
Egypt, expedition of John of Brienne against, 374.
Ehrenbreitstein, 158.
Elchingen, Ney at, 182.
Elective governments, weakness of, 46.
Elevated points, advantage of, for observation, 276.
Elongated squares, 296, 297.
Employment of artillery, 315-318.
Encounters of cavalry against cavalry, 311.
Enemy, bodies of, near line of operations, 67. contempt for, 63. how dislodged, 188. how to drive from his position, 201, 202. should not be paid to leave a country, 242.
Enemy's movements, importance of knowing, 268.
England controls the sea, 173. invasion of, by Sweyn, 370. projected invasion of, by Napoleon, 249, 250, 386.
England's attack on Washington in 1814, 385.
English and French expedition to China, 389.
English, descents of, on France, 376. expedition against Napoleon in 1815, 385. expedition in 1762 against Havana, 382. maritime expeditions, 384-390. squares at Waterloo, 294.
Enthusiasm, importance of, 41. not military spirit, 62.
Epaminondas, 190.
Error of Napoleon in campaign of 1812, 172.
Error of the allies in 1793, 107, 108.
Errors in strategy, 91.
Essential bases of military policy, 49.
Essling, 192, 193, 200, 350. Napoleon at, 158. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. order of battle at, 192, 193.
Eugene at Turin, 153. march of, 141.
Eventual bases, 84. lines of defense, 96.
Expediency, wars of, 18.
Expedition of Prince Koudacheff, 273. to the Crimea, details of, 387-389.
Expeditions, assistance of fleets in, 174. distant, 169. marine, in modern times, 249. maritime, 361-390. of the ancients, 248. of the Middle Ages, 171. partly on land, partly by sea, 173.
Extended movements, when dangerous, 204.
Exterior lines of operations, 102.
Extermination, wars of, 34.
Eylau, 305, 306, 318, 352. French armament at, 47. Napoleon's march on, 94. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. Russian artillery reserve at, 289. Russian order at, 295.
Famous retreats, instances of, 233.
Field, strategic, of 1806, 113.
Field-works, directions for attack of, 211, 212. instances of well-arranged assaults on, 212.
Final reserves, 203.
Financial considerations, 50.
Fire-arms, influence of improvements in, on war, 347, 355, 359.
Fire-signals, how used, 276.
Flank attack, 203. attack, cavalry, 310. charges of cavalry, 307. marches, 139, 140. marches, where inadmissible, 140. tactical maneuver by, 140.
Flanks of companies, movement by, 300, 301. protection of, in tactical positions, 182.
Fleets, assistance of, in expeditions, 174.
Fleurus, 136, 193, 200. balloons used at, 275. order of battle at, 192.
Foot-artillery in line of battle, 289. in the offensive, 316.
Forests, advantages of, in retreats, 183.
Formation by divisions, when preferable, 286. for attack at Turin, 213. for battle in small columns, 350. for battle, Napoleon's system, 278, 279. for battle often determined by size of army, 285. for battle, Prussian and Austrian system, 354. for close attack, 301. of infantry for attack, five methods of, 292. in two ranks, 356. of troops for battle, 347-350.
Formations of cavalry, 309-311. of lines of battle for two infantry corps, 282-284. various, for infantry, 285.
Fortification of Coblentz, 157, 158.
Fortifications, remark upon, 151.
Fortified camps, 154. places, attack of, 210. places on the sea-coast, importance of, 152. places, when a misfortune, 152.
Fortresses at Mayence, 150. greatest advantages of, 150. large, when preferable, 150. number and position of, 149. of France and Austria, 149. on frontiers, 148. relation of, to strategy, 148, 150.
Forts in a mountainous country, 151. purposes of, 146.
Fossano, battle of, 168.
Four-rank formation of infantry, 291.
France adapted to parallel retreats, 240. coalition against, in 1793, 37. course and error of, in 1792, 105. fortresses of, 149. intention of, when declaring war in 1792, 105. invasions of, by the English, 376.
Francis I., passage of the Alps by, 168.
Frederick the Great, 36, 37. at Leuthen, 229. at Prague, 205. at Torgau, 206. commissariat of, 142. defensive-offensive operations of, 74. maneuver of, at Leuthen, 141. military genius of, 16.
Frederick II., Crusade of, 374.
French and English expedition to China, 389.
French armies in the Revolution, 135. armies, situation of, in 1800, 112. at Bautzen, 196. at Fleurus, why successful, 193. at Waterloo, 196. capture of Vera Cruz by, in 1838, 386. causes of defeat of, at Waterloo, 359. cavalry, 313. columns at Waterloo, 351. defeat of, at Stockach, 111. descent on Algiers in 1830, 386. errors in 1795, 136. expedition to Syria, 390. in Bohemia in 1742, 171. invasions of 1766 and 1795, 120.
French, maritime efforts of, during American Revolution, 383. operations in Italy, 112. operations of, at close of 1793, 331-333. operations of, in 1794, 108. order at Essling and Fleurus, 200. order at Minden, 278. plan in 1799, error of, 110. Revolution, 26-28. Revolution, armies of, how subsisted, 142. Revolution, course of Austria in, 106. Revolution, course of Prussia in, 105, 106. Revolution, interest of Austria in, 105. Revolution, lines of operations in the wars of, 104. Revolution, relation of Italy to, 104. Revolution, relation of Prussia and Austria to, 104. Revolution, theater of operations in, 104. Revolution, zones of operations in, 105.
Frontier defenses, maxims for, 148, 149. when a permanent line of defense, 96.
Frontiers, defense of, 146. disadvantage of fortresses on, 148. how to be fortified, 152. mountains as, 146. rivers as, 147.
Front of operations, 330, 338. of operations, extent of, 98. of operations, how varied, 93. strategic, change of, 94. strategic, not to be too extended, 98.
Fronts of operations, 92.
Fronts, strategic, 92.
Fundamental principle of war, 66. maxims of, 70. principles for employment of troops, 328.
Gallop, when best for cavalry charge, 306, 307.
General advanced guard, how composed, 262. cavalry charge, 305.
General, essential qualities of a, 55. importance of a skillful, 43. one of the greatest talents of, 74. qualities of a skillful, 334. what constitutes a, 327.
General principle of war, manner of applying, 175. staff, employment of, in time of peace, 49. staff, usefulness of, 57.
Genoa, panic at siege of, 64.
Geography, military, 39.
Geographical objective points, 88.
Germanicus, expedition of, 366.
Girondists, 26, 37.
Gosa, French charge on, 305.
Governments, elective, weakness of, 46. should not be unprepared for war, 46.
Grand tactics, 69, 70, 178. principles of, 360.
Great detachments, 217, 219, 334. instances of, 221, 222. why made, 220, 221.
Grouchy, 127.
Guard, advanced, 261, 262. in battle, 288, 289. in unexpected battles, 208.
Gunpowder, effect of invention of, on distant invasions, 171.
Gustavus Adolphus, expedition of, 375.
Half-deep order, infantry-formation, 295. attacks in, 302.
Halts and departures in retreats, hours of, 236.
Halts in retreats to relieve rear-guards, 236.
Hannibal at Cannæ, 191. at Zama, 179.
Harold, 370, 371.
Head-quarters of the army, when the most important point, 107.
Heights to be secured in mountainous countries, 167.
Hengist, 367.
Henry V. of England, descents of, on France, 376.
Hoche's expedition to Ireland, 383.
Hochkirch, 303. surprise of, 209.
Hohenfriedberg, 305.
Hohenlinden, 183, 206.
Holland, expedition to, 91.
Horse-artillery in line of battle, 289. in the offensive, 316.
Houchard, 333.
Hougoumont, 303.
Hungary, strategic character of the mountains of, 161.
Hypotheses as to the enemy's movements, 270.
Hypotheses of the author in 1806, 271. how events justified them, 272.
Igor, expeditions of, 368.
Illustrations of importance of logistics, 263-268.
Improvements in fire-arms, effect of, on infantry formations, 299. effects of, on war, 347, 355, 359.
Industrial pursuits secondary to heroic virtues, 60, 61.
Infantry, battle-formation of, in two lines, 287. best formation of, for assault, 298. best formation of, for the defensive, 298. cavalry must be supported by, 304. checkerwise formation, 310. formation of, in two deployed lines, 292. formations, effect of improvements in fire-arms on, 299. importance of, 290. in three-rank formation, 293. in what movements should be exercised, 300. lines of battle for, 282-284. mixed order, 295. mounted, 308. needs support of cavalry and artillery, 290. protection of, from enemy's artillery, 303. squares, 294, 296. supports of artillery, 316, 317. three-rank formation of, 291. various formations for, 285. when a line of, should be charged by cavalry, 305.
Information from partisans, 270. of enemy's movements, rules for gaining, 273, 274. of the enemy's movements, four means of acquiring, 269.
Initiative, advantages of, 184.
Institutions, military, 43.
Interior and simple lines, advantage of, 114.
Interior lines, observations on, 123. of Archduke Charles, 136. of operations, 102. of operations, why preferable, 127. should not be too much extended, 117. two armies on, 117.
Intervention, instances of, 20-22. kinds of, 19. reasons for, 19. wars of, 19. wars of, essentials in, 21.
Intestine wars, 35.
Intrenched camp, on which side of a river, 157.
Intrenched camps and lines, defense of, 215. connection of, with strategy, 154. how differ from têtes deponts, 160. influence of, 155. instances of, 210, 211. maxims on, 155, 156. on river, 156. Prussian system of. 158. use of, 156. where to be established, 155.
Intrenched lines, 146, 153. attack of, 214. continuous, 213.
Intrenched positions, 181.
Intrenchments, armies in, 154
Invaded country, how made to contribute to success, 142.
Invasion, advantage and disadvantage of, 72. advantages of awaiting, 17. army of, line of defense important to, 99. control of the sea important in, 30. difficult in national wars, 144. how rendered feasible, 106. of a mountainous country, 169. of England contemplated by Napoleon, 249, 250, 386. of Turkey by Russia, 23. two kinds of, 22. wars of, when advantageous, 17.
Invasions, diplomacy in, 24. distant, across extensive territories, 171. distant, effect of standing armies on, 171. distant, how affected by invention of gunpowder, 171. distant, maxim for, 173. distant, to aid an ally, 170. how to be carried on, 24. neutrality of states adjoining the theater of war important in, 174. of neighboring states, 174. of Spain, 23. when excusable, 23.
Investing a city, false system of, 152. force, how strengthened, 153.
Irregular cavalry, 313. arms for, 313.
Islamism, wars of, 25.
Italy, operations of the French in, 111, 112. parallel retreats in, 241. relation of, in the French Revolution, 104.
Ivar, expedition of, 369.
James II., expedition of, in Ireland, 381.
Jemmapes, 342.
Jena, battle of, won by strategy, 198. maneuvers at, 90. Napoleon's march on, 94. Ney's charge at, 305.
Jourdan, 229. at Stockach, 205. balloons used by, at Fleurus, 275.
Jourdan's passage of the Rhine in 1795, 120.
Julian, retreat of, from Parthia, 233.
Kagoul, panic at, 64.
Katzbach, 124.
Kehl, intrenchments at, 157, 210, 211.
Kolin, 303.
Koudacheff's expedition, 273.
Koutousoff, 170.
Krasnoi, combination at, 342.
Kray, 87.
Kunnersdorf, 304.
Lance, importance of, 47. when best for cavalry, 307. when useful, 306.
Lender, bravery the first requisite for, 345.
League, wars of the, 25.
Leipsic as a decisive and strategic point, 87. battle of, 192, 193, 267, 305. march of the allies upon, 123. march on, modified, 140. / Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. order of battle at, 193.
Lepanto, battle of, 378.
Leuthen, battle of, 190, 229, 342. maneuver of Frederick at, 140.
Level country, defensive in, 164
Light cavalry, advantages of, 314.
Ligny, 195.
Line of advance, how determined, 71. of battle, arrangement of cavalry in, 288. of battle before the French Revolution, 277. of battle, definition of, 179. of battle, defensive, heavy artillery in, 290. of battle, distribution of troops in, 287. of battle, offensive, concentration of artillery fire in, 290. of battle, posting troops in, 277.
Line of battle, post of artillery in, 289. of defense important to an army of invasion, 99. of defense should be short, 98. of operations, double, when necessary, 116. of operations, how protected, 132. of operations, single, when advantageous, 116. of retreat, 261, 341-343.
Lines and camps, intrenched, defense of, 215. and points, strategic, 85. central, application of, to large masses, 125. deployed, in two ranks, 294. double, to be avoided, 330. eccentric, 237. interior, observations on, 123. interior, two armies on, 117. intrenched, 146, 153. intrenched, attack of, 214. of battle for two infantry corps, different formations of, 282-284. of circumvallation, 152. of contravallation, 152. of defense, second, 147. of defense, eventual, 96. of defense, permanent, 95. of defense, strategical and tactical, 95. of depots, 263. of direction, importance of, illustrated, 116. of maneuver, importance of, 114. of operations, 100-103. of operations at home and in hostile countries, contrasted, 121. of operations, best direction of, 115. of operations, change of, 118. of operations, converging and divergent, 118. of operations, double, 110. of operations, double, when advantageous, 123. of operations, great art of directing, 120. of operations, how established, 114. of operations, how influenced, 119. of operations, illustration of, by strategic field of 1806, 113. of operations in fertile and barren countries, contrasted, 122. of operations in the wars of the French Revolution, 104. of operations, maxims on, 114. of operations, rivers as, 76. of operations, selecting of, 80.
Lines of operations, to have a geographic and strategic direction, 115. of Stollhofen, 154. of Turin, 153. of Turin, capture of, 213. parallel, 200. strategic, 128, 129. strategic, of Napoleon in 1796, 131.
Linz, towers of, 158.
Lloyd's proposed fourth rank in infantry formation, 291.
Logistics, 69, 252-268. derivation of the term, 253. faulty, instances of, 265-267. illustration of importance of, 263-268. of battle of Leipsic, 267. principal points of, 254-256.
Louis VII., Crusade of, 372. IX., Crusade of, 374. IX., expedition of, to Tunis, 375. XIV., coalition against, 36. XIV., commissariat of, 142.
Louvois, 59.
Lyons as a strategic and decisive point, 87.
Macdonald's column at Wagram, 295, 296. error at Katzbach, 124.
Mack, 164, 170. at Ulm, 53.
Magnesia, victory of, 364.
Malplaquet, 183.
Malta, descent of Mugtapha on, 377.
Maneuvering, success in battle depends on, 360.
Maneuver line, 114, 115. lines, 103. lines of, their importance, 114. objective points of, 88. pivots of, 98. tactical, by flank, 140. turning, 179, 206.
Maneuvers, 200, 201, 207. at Ulm and Jena, 90. for breaking through a line, 197. must conform to strategic principles, 333. objective points of, 89. of Napoleon in 1814,118. simplest, most likely to be successful, 196. strategic lines of, 128. sudden, generally better than predetermined, 196. transversal, 163.
Maneuvers, turning, rules for, 204.
Mantua, siege of, 111. Wurmser at, 156.
March, establishment of depots on, 262.
Marches and attacks, arrangements of, 258. effects of systems of, 138. flank, 139. instructions to generals commanding corps in, 260, 261. particulars to be considered in, 260. system of, 135, 138. rapid, 176. rules for, 257-263. transversal, in mountainous countries, 163. two kinds of, 260.
Marengo, French armament at, 47. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
Maritime expeditions, 361-390.
Marmont at Salamanca, 206.
Marsin, 53.
Masonry towers, Archduke Maximilian's system of defense by, 158.
Massena, position of, in Switzerland in 1799,165, 166.
Massena's position of the Albis, 181.
Matériel of war, 49. should be inspected by staff officers, 257.
Maurice of Saxony, 22.
Maxim for distant invasions, 173.
Maxims for frontier defenses, 148, 152. of fundamental principle of war, 70. on intrenched camps, 155, 156. on lines of operations, 114-122. on operations in mountainous countries, 163. on strategic fronts, 98, 99. on strategic operations, 90. relative to supplies, 143-146.
Mayence, Austrian camp before, 157. fortresses at, 150. intrenched camp at, 211.
Mexico, expedition against, in 1862, 390.
Middle Ages, expeditions of the, 171.
Military education important to a ruler, 49. geography and statistics, importance of a knowledge of, 40. geography, Lloyd's essay on, 40. institutions, 43. institutions of Rome, 61. instruments, signals by, 276. operations influenced by a cabinet, 42. policy, 38. policy, essential bases of, 49. sciences, study of. 49. spirit, how encouraged, 61. spirit, how maintained, 63. spirit of nations, 60. statistics and geography, 39.
Militia as cavalry, 314, 315.
Millesimo, effect of the battle of, 111.
Minden, French order at, 278.
Mithridates, 364, 365.
Mixed order, infantry formation, 295. system of Benningsen at Eylau, 352.
Modern inventions, effect of, on character of naval armaments, 376. marine expeditions, 249.
Mohammed II., 375.
Molitor, General, 167.
Mollwitz, battle of, 348.
Montesquieu, opinion of, as to great enterprises, 125.
Moors, invasion of Europe by, 367.
Morale of armies, 60, 178, 322. of cavalry, 312.
Moreau at Engen, 203. base of operations of, in 1800, 82. retreat of, in 1796, 233.
Moreau's diversion toward Kastadt in 1800, 222. passage of the Rhine in 1800, 224, 225.
Morocco, Spanish descent on, in 1859, 389.
Moscow, retreat of the French from, 233.
Mountain-campaigns, instances of, 169.
Mountainous countries as principal fields of operations, 162. countries, cavalry in, 304. countries, defense in, 163. countries, heights to be secured in, 167. countries, strategic defense in, 164. countries, strategic positions of, 76. countries, the offensive in, 167. countries, transversal marches in, 163. country, character of a war in, 169. country, forts in a, 151. country, invasion of a, 169.
Mountains as eventual lines of defense, 96. as frontiers, 146. campaigns in, 169. importance of, when secondary, 161, 162. of European countries, relation of, to warlike operations, 161. strategic operations in, 160.
Mounted infantry, 308. militia, 315.
Movement by flanks of companies, 300, 301.
Movements, extended, when dangerous, 204. in which infantry should be exercised, 300. of armies, points to be attended to, 254-256. of the enemy, rules for gaining information of, 273, 274.
Murat, surprise of, at Taroutin, 209.
Murray's descent in 1813, 385.
Musketry-fire better for defensive, 203. influence of, in battles, 348.
Nansouty's charge at Chateau-Thierry, 212.
Naples, French army at, 112.
Napoleon, 111, 164, 166, 170, 171, 177, 185, 198, 218. and Grouchy at Waterloo, 127,130. at Austerlitz, 206. at Essling, 158. at Ligny, 195. at Ratisbon, 274. at Wagram, 195. double wars of, 37. English expedition against, in 1815, 385. his own chief staff officer, 264. operations of the armies of, 136.
Napoleon's artillery, 318. artillery at Wagram, 316. base of operations in 1806, 80-82. battles, orders of, 198. bold maneuvers in 1814, 118. campaign of 1800, 137. cantonment on the Passarge, 247. central lines in Saxony, 124. central position in 1813, why disastrous, 123. changes of line of operations, 118. choice of objective points, 89. concentric retreat in 1796, 238. defense in Champagne in 1814, 125. detachments in 1805, 222. error after his victory at Dresden, 124. error in the campaign of 1812, 172. favorite objective, 330. front of operations in 1796, 93. front of operations in 1813, 93. infantry, panic of, at Wagram, 64. line of defense in 1813, 93. logistics in 1806 and 1815, 264, 265. march on Bassano, 131.
Napoleon's march on Eylau, 94. march on Jena in 1806, 94. march on Naumburg in 1806, 94. march to Königsberg, 20. mode of issuing orders, 259. motives and necessities, 22. operations, comments on, 116. order at the Tagliamento, 295. passages of the Danube, 226, 266. passage of the Saint-Bernard, 168. passage of the Po in 1800, 225. projected invasion of England, 249, 250, 386. reserves, 133. retreat from Smolensk, 235. return from Egypt in 1800, 112. rule for the passage of an army, 147. strategic lines in 1796, 130, 131. strategic positions, 97. system of formation for battle, 278, 279. system of marches, 137. victories and disasters, lesson taught by them, 23.
National wars, character of, in mountainous countries, 167. wars, definition of, 29. wars, difficulties of conquest in, 31-34. wars, effect of the nature of the country in, 30. wars, how prevented, 33, 34. wars, how success attained in, 33. wars, invasion difficult in, 144. wars, military precepts for, 27.
Nations, military spirit of, 60.
Nature and extent of war, how influenced, 14.
Naumburg, Napoleon's march on, 94.
Naval armaments, effect of modern inventions on, 376.
Neutrality of states adjoining theater of war, important in invasions, 174.
Ney, 31, 168, 196. at Bautzen, 317. at Dennewitz, 130. at Elchingen, 182. at Jena, 305.
Nicholas I., concentration of dragoons by, 309.
Objective point, how held, 67. point, manner of approach to, 67. point of Napoleon in 1800, 87. point, selection of, 66. points, geographical, 88. points, how chosen, 90.
Objective points in strategy, how determined, 88. points of maneuver, 88, 89. points of operations, 85. points, political, 91.
Objectives of operations, 329, 330.
Objects of war, 14.
Oblique order, 199, 200. order, antiquity of, 199. order assumed by Napoleon at Marengo, 198. order of battle, 190.
Offensive, advantage of the, in strategy, 184. army, proper course for, 324. battle, object of, 188. battles, 186. characteristics of infantry formation for, 297. line of battle, concentration of artillery-fire in, 290. movements, when advised, 124. or defensive system, either may be employed, 185. order of battle, 200. system to be followed in, 176. the, disadvantages of, in tactical operations, 184. the, in mountainous countries, 167. use of artillery in, 316. war, 72, 73. war, duty of staff officers in, 258. war, reserves, how posted in, 133, 135. wars, duty of statesmen in, 17. wars, how conducted, 16. wars to reclaim rights, 16.
Oleg, expedition of, 867.
Open positions, 181.
Operations, base of, where to be established, 84. bases of, definition of, 77. how to be chosen, 79, 80. plurality of, 78. change of lines of, 118. control of, 52. divergent and convergent, 126, 127. double lines of, 102, 110, 123. exterior lines of, 102. fronts of, 92, 330, 338. in mountainous countries, maxims on, 163. interior lines of, 102. line of, how protected, 132. lines of, 100, 120. lines of, converging and divergent, 118. lines of, how established, 114. lines of, how influenced, 119. lines of, maxims on, 114. military, influenced by a cabinet, 42. objective points of, 85. objectives of, 329, 330. of 1809 and 1814, 176, 177. of the French at the close of 1793, 331-333. pivots of, 98. simple lines of, 101. system of, 72. system of, how to be judged, 125. system of, necessary in war, 50. theater of, 74, 75. theater of, between the Rhine and the North Sea, 338-340. theater of, how divided, 71. zone of, 66. zone of, how to select, 329. zones of, 100, 338.
Opinion, public, danger of, 55. wars of, 25.
Orchomenus, 365.
Order, checkerwise, battalions deployed in, 301. half-deep, attacks in, 302. half-deep, infantry formation, 295. importance of, 42. in deep masses, infantry formation, 295, 296. in echelons, 193. in squares, when suitable for attack, 297. mixed, infantry formation, 295, oblique, 199, 200. of attack in columns, 194. of battle, 186. of battle at Agincourt, 192. at Cannæ, 189. at Crécy, 192. at Essling, 192, 193. at Fleurus, 192. at Leipsic, 193. at Mollwitz, 348. at passage of a river, 192. by echelon, 193. convex, 192. definition of, 180. oblique, 190. offensive, 200. of the generals of the Republic, 349. of infantry as skirmishers, 292. shallow, infantry, 292.
Orders, best mode of issuing, 259. how issued by Napoleon, 259. inaccurate transmission of, 196. of battle, 188. of battle, classification of, useful, 197.
Orders of battle, influence of, on result of engagements, 197. of Napoleon's battles, 198. should be clear, 258. two methods of issuing, 258, 259.
Organization and arms of cavalry, 307, 308. by corps, likely to be permanent, 287. of an army in four corps, 281. in seven corps, 281. of divisions, 279, 280. of very large armies, 286.
Panics, cause and remedy of, 65. instances of, 64. officers and troops to be warned against, 63.
Parallel lines, 200. order of battle, 188. order of battle reinforced, 189. order of battle, when suitable, 189. order of battle with crotchet, 189. retreat, 237. retreats, countries adapted to, 240, 241. retreats, when preferable, 239.
Partisans, information from, 270.
Partisan troops, services of, illustrated, 273.
Paskevitch's passage of the Vistula in 1831, 120.
Passage of an army, Napoleon's rule for, 147. of a river, best position for, 226. of the Beresina, 226, 245. of the Danube by Napoleon, 266. of the Rhine in 1795, 120. of the Saint-Bernard by Napoleon, 168. of rivers, 224, 343. of rivers, double, 230. of rivers, famous modern, 226. of rivers in retreats, 243, 244. of rivers in retreats, rules for, 245. of rivers, rules for, 227. of rivers, rules for preventing, 228.
Peninsular War, 32.
Perfect army, essential conditions of, 43.
Permanent lines of defense, 95.
Perpendicular order of battle, 190.
Peter the Great, expedition of, against Persia, 382.
Peter the Hermit, 371.
Peterwardein, panic at, 64.
Philip II. of Spain, 378.
Pichegru, movements of, in 1794, 109.
Pistol-firing, in cavalry charges, 306.
Pivots of maneuver, 98.
Pivots of operations, 98.
Points, decisive, 337. decisive and objective, 86. decisive geographic, 87. decisive, how affected by arrangement of forces, 187. decisive, of battle-field, now determined, 186. decisive strategic, 86. of operations, objective, 85.
Political objective points, 91. objective points subordinate to strategy, 91. wars, 26.
Po, Napoleon's passage of, in 1800, 225.
Portable telegraphs, 275.
Port Mahon, assault of, 212.
Port Royal, expedition of U.S. government to, 390.
Position, defensive, means of retreat to be considered in, 183. for battle, 341. how to drive an enemy from, 201, 202. strong, essentials for, 181. system of wars of, 135. tactical, protection of flanks in, 182.
Positions, 179. for cantonments, selection of, 247. intrenched, 181. open, 181. strategic, 66, 97, 330, 331. tactical, 181. tactical, rules for selecting, 181. two kinds of, 180, 181.
Post, capture of, when important, 216.
Posting troops in line of battle, 277.
Posts, means for capture of, 216.
Prague, battle of, 189, 205.
Preservation of armies in time of peace, 47.
Prince, duty of, when not conducting his armies, 54.
Prince Eugene, 54, 141, 153, 213. of Coburg, error of, in 1794, 109.
Principle of decisive points of maneuver, 88.
Principles of strategy, 331. of strategy always the same, 17.
Promotions in armies, 47.
Protection by trees and brushwood, 303.
Provisional lines, 103.
Prussia, course of, in the French Revolution, 105, 106. parallel retreat in, 241. relation of, in the French Revolution, 104.
Prussian army at Waterloo, 129. reserves in 1806, 134. system of forming columns, 294. system of intrenched camps, 158.
Public opinion, danger of, 55.
Punic wars, 363, 364.
Pursuit, rules for, 242.
Pursuits, 241.
Pyramids, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
Pyrrhus, descent of, on Italy, 362.
Qualities of a skillful general, 334.
Ramillies, 312.
Ramrods, 348.
Rapid marches, 176.
Ratisbon, Napoleon at, 274. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
Rear, attack in, 207.
Rear-guard in retreat, 243.
Rear-guards in retreat, 234.
Rear-guard in retreat, duty of, in passage of rivers, 244.
Reconnoissances, 268. give but limited information, 269. to gain information of the enemy's movements, 268.
Religion, wars of, 35.
Reports of prisoners, 269.
Reserve, cavalry, 311. final, 203. horse-artillery, advantages of, 289.
Reserves, cavalry, 288. importance of, 133, 134. in offensive war, how posted, 133, 135. nature of, 133. of Napoleon, 133. Prussian, in 1806, 134. strategic, 67, 133.
Retreat along converging roads, 236 along diverging roads, 237. along parallel roads, 236. by several corps, 235. difficulty of deciding method of, 231. five methods of arranging, 234. in single mass, when preferable, 234. line of, 261, 341-343. means of, to be considered in a defensive position, 183. parallel, 237. well effected, should be rewarded, 63.
Retreats, 230. at night, 231. attack of the enemy's advanced guard in, 243. bridges in, 244. by diverging roads, danger of, 238. cavalry in, 243. circumstances influencing, 232, 233. concentration in, 238. concentric, instances of, 238, 239. defiles in, 243. divergent, when admissible, 239. duty of staff officers in, 256. firmness of Russians in, 64. halts in, to relieve rear-guard, 236. hours of departures and halts in, 236. in daylight, 231. instances of famous, 233. measures to insure success of, 242, 243. parallel, countries adapted to, 240, 241. parallel, when preferable, 239. passage of rivers in, 243, 244. Prince de Ligne's remark on, 230. rear-guard in, 234, 243. should be slow, 232. various kinds of, 231.
Reverse fire, 317.
Rhine, passages of, 120, 224, 226.
Rhodes, capture of, by the Turks, 377.
Richard Coeur-de-Lion, 373.
Richelieu, expedition of, against Minorca, 382.
River, best position for passage of, 226. crossing of, in presence of an enemy, 120. order of battle at passage of, 192.
Rivers as eventual lines of defense, 96. as frontiers, 147. as lines of operations, 76. double passage of, 230. famous modern passages of, 226. passage of, 224, 343. passage of, in retreats, 243, 244. rules for, 245. points of passage of, in presence of an enemy, 121. rules for passage of, 227. rules for preventing passage of, 228.
Rivoli 179, 205. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
Rocket-batteries, use of, 318.
Rollo, 369.
Roman legions, cause of the ruin of, 63. nation, cause of the decline of, 60.
Romans, naval expeditions of, 363.
Rome, military institutions of, 61.
Rossbach, 207.
Ruler, a, should be able to arrange plans of operations, 328.
Rules for conducting descents, 251. for fighting battles scientifically, 203. for gaining information of enemy's movements, 273, 274. for offensive or defensive operations, 185. for passage of rivers, 227. for passage of a river in retreat, 245. for pursuit, 242. for preventing passage of rivers, 228. for use of artillery in battle, 316-318. to be observed in selecting tactical positions, 181.
Russian army, firmness of, in retreats, 64. army, skirmishers in, 293. base in 1828 and 1829, 84. cavalry, 314. expeditions in 1809, 385. order at Eylau, 295. retreat in 1812, 233. system of forming columns, 294.
Russians, early maritime expeditions of, 368, 369.
Saber, when best for cavalry, 308. when useful, 306.
Saint-Bernard, Napoleon's passage of, 168.
Saint-Cyr at Stockach, 205.
Saxons, expedition of, 367.
Saxony, Napoleon's central lines in, in 1813, 124.
Savoy, Duke of, 22.
Scandinavians, 366.
Science of marches, essential point in, 139. of marches, includes what, 138.
Sciences, military, study of, 49.
Scipio, 364.
Sea-coast as a base of operations, 83, 84.
Sea, control of, held by England, 173. control of, important in an invasion, 30.
Secondary lines, 103.
Sebastian of Portugal, descent of, on Morocco, 378.
Sebastopol, 347.
Secondary depots, 262, 263.
Shallow order, 298. order, infantry, 292.
Shumla, camp of, 155.
Siege, how covered, 153. of Candia, 380, 381. of Copenhagen, 384. of Mantua, 111.
Sieges and active armies, relations between, 112. duty of staff officers in, 256. wars of, 146.
Signaling by fires, 276.
Signals by military instruments, 276. simultaneous shouts as, 277. system of, 274.
Simple and interior lines, advantage of, 114. lines of operations, 101.
Simultaneous shouts as signals, 277.
Single line of operations, when preferable, 116.
Sizeboli, capture of, 223.
Skill, superiority in, 42.
Skirmishers, 359, 360.
Skirmishing-order, 292.
Small detachments, how useful, 224.
Smolensk, Napoleon's retreat from, 235.
Southern Germany, valley of the Danube the strategic key of, 162.
Sovereign as commander, 52.
Spain adapted to parallel retreats, 240. and Portugal, Wellington's tactics in, 358. invasions of, 23. war in, in 1823, 27.
Spanish Armada, 249, 378, 379. capture of Vera Cruz by, 390. descent on Algiers, 382. descent on Morocco in 1859, 389.
Spies, 269. best course for, 270. difficulties in their way, 270. use of, neglected in many modern armies, 270. when especially useful, 270.
Squares in echelons, 297. infantry, 294, 296, 297. in two ranks, 294.
Staff, chief of, 253, chief of, how selected, 57. general, usefulness of, 57. officers and general must act in concert, 257. officers, duties of, should be defined, 253. officers, duty of, in offensive war, 258. officers should inspect matériel, 257. officers, summary of duties of, 254-256.
Standing armies, effect of, on distant invasions, 171.
State, how rendered secure, 138.
Statesmanship, relation of, to war, 14.
Statesmen, duty of, in offensive war, 17.
Statistics, military, 39.
St. Domingo, expedition to, in 1802, 384.
Stockach, 179, 205. defeat of the French at, 111.
Strategic defense in mountainous countries, 164.
Stollhofen, lines of, 152.
Strategical and tactical lines of defense, 95.
Strategic combinations, 72. combinations, when better than tactical, 179. coup-d'oeil, 337-345. field of 1806, 113. front and line of defense may coincide, 92. front, change of, 94. front, double, 95. front not to be too extended, 98. front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau, 94. fronts, 92. fronts, maxims on, 98. lines, 128, 129. lines and points, 85. lines at Waterloo, 130. lines of maneuvers, 128. lines of Napoleon in 1796, 130, 131. operations in mountains, 160. operations, maxims on, 90. point, Leipsic as a, 87. Lyons as a, 87. point of a battle-field, when important, 187. points, capitals as, 87. position, essential conditions for, 99. positions, 66, 97, 330, 331. positions of mountainous countries, 76. positions of Napoleon, 97. reserves, 67, 133. square for camps, 99.
Strategy, 322, 337. advantage of the offensive in, 184. and the commissariat, 141. battles of Ulm and Jena won by, 198. connection of intrenched camps with, 154. connection of têtes de ponts with, 154. definition of, 66. directs movements, tactics executes them, 175. errors in, 91. how it should be studied, 337. illustration of, by operations of 1793, 331-333. illustrations of, 339-341. in what it consists, 328. objective points in, how determined, 88. one great end of, 177. points embraced by, 68. political objective points subordinate to, 91. principles of, 331. principles of, always the same, 17. province of, 178. relation of fortresses to, 148, 150. science of marches in, 138. system of, developed in 1800, 137. the art of, 69.
Strong position, essentials for a, 181.
Study of strategy, how made profitable, 337.
Successful retreat, how to insure, 242, 243.
Surprises of armies, 209. difficulty of, 209.
Suwaroff, 55, 170.
Suwaroff's expedition in Switzerland, 166.
Supplies, depots of, 141, 143.
Suza, position of Swiss and Italians at, 168.
Svatoslav, expedition of, 308.
Sweyn, 369, 370.
Switzerland, invasion of, by French Directory, 162. Massena in, in 1799, 165. Suwaroff in, 166. tactical defense of, 169.
Syria, French expedition to, 390.
System, concentric or eccentric, 126. of corps, 279. of divisions, 278. of marches, 135. of marches, effects of, 138. of marches, includes what, 138. of marches, relation of, to commissariat, 141. of marches the result of circumstances, 135. of operations, 72. of operations, how to be judged, 125. of signals, 274. of strategy developed in 1800, 137. of wars, change of, 135. of wars of position, 135.
Systems modified by forms of government, 45.
Tactical combinations, guiding principle in, 178. defense of Switzerland, 169. operations, disadvantages of the offensive in, 184. position, protection of flanks in, 182.
Tactical positions, 181. positions, rules for selecting, 181.
Tactics, 322. executes movements, strategy directs them, 175. grand, 69, 70. of battles, great difficulty of, 196. of Wellington in Spain and Portugal, 358.
Tagliamento, Napoleon's order at, 295.
Taroutin, surprise of Murat at, 209.
Telegraphs, portable, 275.
Temporary bases, 84. bases, when necessary, 132.
Têtes de ponts, 160. connection of, with strategy, 154. how differ from intrenched camps, 160.
Theater of operations, 74, 75. of operations between the Rhine and North Sea, 338-340. of operations, how composed, 75. of operations, how divided, 71. of operations in the French Revolution, 104. of war, border of the, 80, 81. of war, decisive points of the, 85. of war, definition of, 74.
Theories, difficulty of applying, in war, 269. use of, in war, 323.
Thirty Years' War, 25.
Three-rank formation of infantry, 291, 293.
Topographical and statistical reconnoissances, 268.
Torgau, battle of, 205.
Torres-Vedras, camp of, 155. intrenched camp at, 83.
Towers, masonry, 158. of Coblentz, 159. of Linz, 158.
Transversal maneuvers, 163. marches in mountainous countries, 163.
Trees, clumps of, should be occupied, 303.
Troops, distribution of, in line of battle, 287. employment of, 328.
Trot, when best for cavalry charge, 306, 307.
Turenne's surprise of the Austrian cantonments, 246.
Turin, battle of, 53. intrenched camp at, 211. lines of, 153, 213.
Turkey, invasion of, 23.
Turkish war of 1828 and 1829, 84. wars, squares in, 296, 297.
Turks, cavalry charge of, 307. naval expeditions of, 377, 378, 380.
Turning maneuvers, 179, 201, 206. maneuver, rules for, 204.
Two corps, one behind the other, 285.
Two-rank formation, 346.
Two wars at once, danger of, 36.
Ulm, battle of, 53. battle of, won by strategy, 198. camp of, 154. maneuvers at, 90.
Uncertainty regarding battles, elements of, 197.
Unexpected battles, advanced guard in, 208. meeting of two armies, 207.
United States, capture of Vera Cruz by, 387. English expeditions against, in 1814 and 1815, 385, 386. expedition to Port Royal, 390.
Use of spies neglected in many modern armies, 272. of the three arms combined, 203.
Vandals, 366.
Vandamme's disaster at Culm, lesson of, 221.
Venice, 379, 380.
Vera Cruz captured by the Spaniards, 390. taken by the French, 386. taken by the United States, 387.
Vessels, Roman, 363. Scandinavian, 366.
Victories, French, of 1793, why indecisive, 333.
Victory, assailant's best means of, 202. on what it depends, 309, 310. when it may be expected, 360.
Villages, importance of, on front of a position, 303.
Villars's infantry, panic among, 64.
Vistula, passage of, by Paskevitch, 120.
Wagram, 195, 206, 266, 317, 343, 350. Macdonald's column at, 295, 296. Napoleon's artillery at, 289, 316. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. panic at, 64.
War an art, 321. border of the theater of, 80, 81. character of, from Middle Ages to French Revolution, 135. circumstances which influence result of, 321. council of, at seat of government, 59. councils of, 58. decisive points of the theater of, 85. defensive-offensive, 74. definition of the art of, 13. fundamental principle of, 66, 70. governments should not be unprepared for, 46. how to be conducted, 15. influence of cavalry in a, 313, 314. influence of improvements in fire-arms on, 347, 355, 359. manner of applying general principle of, 175. matériel of, 49. maxims of fundamental principles of, 70. nature and extent of, how influenced, 14. not an exact science, 344, 350. objects of, 14. of the Crimea, 387. offensive and defensive, definition of, 72. offensive, duty of staff officers in, 258. operations of, how directed, 150. principal parts of the art of, 66. relation of statesmanship to, 14. theater of, definition, 74. use of theories in, 323.
Warsaw, intrenchments at, 211.
Wars, aggressive, for conquest, 22. change of system of, 135. civil, 35. defensive politically, offensive militarily, 17. double, 36. for conquest, instances of, 22. intestine, 35. natural character of, in mountainous countries, 167. national, definition of, 29. national, difficulties of conquest in, 31-34. national, effect of nature of the country on, 30. national, how prevented, 33, 34. national, invasion difficult in, 144. offensive, how conducted, 16. offensive, to reclaim rights, 16. of expediency, 18. kinds of, 18. of extermination, 34. of intervention, 19. of intervention, essentials in wars of, 21. of intervention, military chances in, 20. of invasion, when advantageous, 17. of opinion, 25. of opinion, character of, 26. of opinion, instances of, 25. of opinion, military precepts for, 27. of position, system of, 135. of religion, 35. of sieges, 146. political, 26. political part of, how modified, 17. Punic, 363, 364. Turkish, squares in, 296, 297. when most just, 16. with or without allies, 18.
Waterloo, 127, 183, 206, 295, 303-306, 354. Blücher at, 130. campaign of, 129, 130. English squares at, 294 formations at, 351. French at, 196. Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. Ney at, 182,183. strategic lines at, 130. Wellington's position at, 181, 388.
Wellington, 181, 185, 353, 357, 358, 381, 382, 384, 385. and Blücher at Waterloo, 127, 130. at Salamanca, 206. at Torres-Vedras, 83. defensive-offensive operations of, 74.
Wellington's position at Waterloo, 181.
Weyrother, 205, 206.
William the Conqueror, 370, 371.
Winkelried, column of, 194.
Winter campaigns, 68. quarters, countries adapted to, 246. quarters, when dangerous, 247. quarters, when strategic, 97.
Woods, importance of possession of, 303.
Wurmser at Mantua, 156. eccentric retreat of, in 1796, 238. error of, 111.
Xerxes, 173. army of, 362.
Zama, battle of, 364.
Zimisces, 368.
Zone of operations, 66, 100, 338. of operations, how to select, 329. of operations in 1813, 101.
Zones of operations in the French Revolution, 105.
Zurich, defeat of the allies at, 112.
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