Part 69

Socr. And did you not just now say, that there is a certain courage joined with science?

Cal. I did say so.

Socr. Did you speak of these two, as if courage was different from science?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. But what? Are pleasure and science the same, or different?

Cal. Different, surely, most wise friend.

Socr. Is courage also different from pleasure?

Cal. Undoubtedly.

110. Socr. Come, then, let us retain these things in our memory; that Callicles of Acharne said that the pleasant and the good are the same; but that science and courage are different both from each other and the good.

Cal. But Socrates of Alopecia does not agree to this; does he agree?

Socr. He does not agree: and I think neither will Callicles when he has rightly examined himself. For tell me, do you not think that those who fare well are affected in a manner quite contrary to those who fare ill?

Cal. I do.

Socr. If these, therefore, are contrary to each other, is it not necessary that the case should be the same with them as it is with health and disease? For, surely, a man is not at the same time well and diseased, nor at the same time separated from health and disease.

Cal. How say you?

Socr. For instance, take any part of the body you please, and consider. Has not a man sometimes a disease in the eyes, which is called ophthalmia?

Cal. Undoubtedly.

Socr. And his eyes, surely, are not at the same time well?

Cal. Certainly not.

Socr. But what? When he is freed from the ophthalmia, does he then also lose the health of his eyes, and, in a word, is he at the same time freed from both?

Cal. By no means.

Socr. For that, I think, would be wonderful and absurd. Would it not?

Cal. Assuredly.

111. Socr. But I think he, alternately, receives one, and loses the other.

Cal. I admit it.

Socr. And will it not be the same with regard to strength and weakness?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. And swiftness and slowness?

Cal. Certainly.