Part 68

Socr. You speak now of the life of a sea-lark, and not of a corpse, or a stone. But tell me, do you mean such a thing as being hungry, and, when hungry, eating?

-----

Footnote 73:

Χαραδριὸς, a bird which Aristotle tells us (Hist. Anim., l. ix. c. 11) “appears in the night and runs off in the day.” See note to Cary’s Birds of Aristophanes, act i. sc. 4.

-----

Cal. I do.

Socr. And of being thirsty, and, when thirsty, drinking?

Cal. I do mean that, and that he who has all other desires, and, having the power to do so, satisfies them, lives a joyful and happy life.

Socr. Well done, my excellent friend! Proceed as you have begun, and take care not to be ashamed. But it is right, too, as it seems, that neither should I be ashamed. And first of all, tell me if, when a man, who is scabby and itches, is able to scratch himself without stint, and passes his life in scratching himself, this is to live happily?

Cal. How absurd you are, Socrates, and a mere babbler.

Socr. Hence it is, Callicles, that I have astonished Polus and Gorgias, and made them ashamed. You, however, will not be astonished nor ashamed, for you are courageous: but only answer me.

108. Cal. I say, then, that he who scratches himself lives pleasantly.

Socr. Therefore, if pleasantly, also happily?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. Will this be the case if he only itches in his head, or must I ask you still further? Consider, Callicles, what answer you would give, if any one asks you respecting all the parts of the body in succession. And to take that which is the chief of all, is not the life of catamites dreadful, base, and wretched? Will you dare to call them happy, if they have what they desire, without stint?

Cal. Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to lead the discussion to such subjects?

Socr. Do I lead it hither, noble Sir, or does he who asserts thus broadly, that such as rejoice, in whatever way they rejoice, are happy, and does not distinguish between pleasures, what are good and what are bad? But tell me further still, whether do you say that the pleasant and the good are the same: or that there is something pleasant which is not good?

Cal. In order that my argument may not contradict itself, if I should say they are different, I say that they are the same.

109. Socr. You subvert your former statements, Callicles, and no longer search for the truth with me properly, if you speak contrary to your real opinion.

Cal. And you do the same, Socrates.

Socr. Neither, then, do I act rightly, if I do so, nor do you. But, good Sir, consider whether to rejoice in any way be not good. For it is clear that many base consequences, which were just now hinted at, will follow, if this should be the case, and many others besides.

Cal. As you think, at least, Socrates.

Socr. Do you in reality, Callicles, persist in your assertion?

Cal. I do.

Socr. Shall we then enter on the discussion, as if you were in earnest?

Cal. Most certainly.

Socr. Come, then, since you are of that opinion, explain this to me. Do you call science any thing?

Cal. I do.