Socr. And with respect to things good and happiness, and their contraries, things evil and wretchedness, does he receive and part from each of these alternately?
Cal. Most assuredly.
Socr. If, therefore, we should find certain things which a man at the same time parts from and possesses, it is clear that these would not be both good and evil. Do we agree to this? Consider well and answer me.
Cal. I agree entirely.
Socr. Let us then recur to what was before agreed on. Did you say that to be hungry is pleasant, or painful? I mean the very fact of being hungry.
Cal. I said it was painful: though to eat when hungry is pleasant.
Socr. I understand you: but to be hungry of itself is painful; is it not so?
Cal. I admit it.
Socr. And also to be thirsty?
Cal. Assuredly.
112. Socr. Whether, then, shall I ask you any more questions? Or do you allow that all want and desire is painful?
Cal. I allow it; so do not ask.
Socr. Be it so. And do you not say that for a man to drink when he is thirsty is pleasant?
Cal. I do.
Socr. In the instance then of which you are speaking, to be thirsty is, doubtless, painful?
Cal. Yes.
Socr. But to drink is the satisfying of a want, and a pleasure?
Cal. Yes.
Socr. Therefore as to drinking you say that the man rejoices?
Cal. Certainly.
Socr. But as to being thirsty?
Cal. I say—
Socr. That he suffers pain?
Cal. Yes.
Socr. Do you perceive then what follows? that you say he who is in pain at the same time rejoices, when you say that he who is thirsty drinks. And does not this happen at the same place and time, with respect either to the soul or body, whichever you please? For I think there is no difference. Is this so, or not?
Cal. It is.
Socr. You admitted, however, that it was impossible for one who fares well at the same time to fare ill.
Cal. I allow it.
The Works of Plato (vol. 1 of 6) · The Wunder Library — complete classics, free to read, with narration.