Part 57

Socr. At least as you think, Polus.

Pol. And I probably thought the truth.

Socr. But you, on the contrary, said that they who act unjustly are happy, if they do not suffer punishment.

Pol. Certainly.

Socr. But I say that they are most miserable; and that they who suffer punishment are less so. Do you wish to refute this also?

64. Pol. But this is more difficult to refute than the former, Socrates.

Socr. By no means, Polus, but it is impossible; for truth can never be refuted.

Pol. How say you? If a man should be detected acting unjustly, as in attempting to compass absolute power, and being detected should be put to the torture, be mutilated, and have his eyes burnt out, and after having himself suffered many other great and various torments, and having moreover seen his children and wife suffer the same, should at last be crucified, or covered with pitch and burnt, will he be more happy, than if, having escaped punishment, he should become a tyrant, and ruling in the city, should pass through life doing whatever he pleases, being envied, and accounted happy, both by citizens and strangers? Do you say that it is impossible to refute these things?

Socr. You are now trying to terrify me, noble Polus, and do not refute me; but just now you adduced witnesses. However, remind me of a trifling circumstance; did you say, if a person should attempt unjustly to compass absolute power?

Pol. I did.

Socr. In that case, neither of them will ever be happier than the other, neither he who has unjustly acquired absolute power, nor he who has been punished. For, of two miserable persons, one cannot be happier than the other; but he is more miserable who escapes punishment and acquires absolute power. 65. What is this, Polus? do you laugh? Is this another species of refutation, when any one asserts any thing, to laugh at him, and not refute him?

Pol. Do you not think you are already refuted, Socrates, when you say such things as no man in the world would assert? for ask any one of these.

Socr. Polus, I am not among the number of politicians: and last year, happening to be chosen a senator, since my tribe held the presidency and it was necessary for me to collect the votes, I occasioned laughter, because I did not know how to collect them. Do not, then, require me to collect the votes of those who are present. But if you have no better mode of refutation than this, as I just now said, give the question up to me in my turn, and make trial of that mode of refutation which I think ought to be adopted. For I know how to procure one witness of what I say, that is, the person with whom I am discoursing, but I let alone the multitude; and I know how to take the vote of one person, but I do not even discourse with the multitude. Consider, then, whether you are willing in your turn to give me an opportunity of refuting by answering the questions I shall put to you. For I think, that you and I, and other men, are of opinion, that to commit injustice is worse than to suffer it; and not to be punished, than to be punished.

66. Pol. But I, on the contrary, think that neither myself nor any other man is of this opinion. For would you rather suffer injustice than commit it?

Socr. Yes, and you, and all other men.

Pol. Far from it; neither would you, nor I, nor any other man.

Socr. Will you not answer, then?

Pol. By all means. For I am anxious to know what you will say.

Socr. Tell me then, that you may know, as if I asked you from the beginning: whether does it appear to you, Polus, worse to commit an injustice or to suffer one?

Pol. To suffer one, in my opinion.

Socr. What then? whether is it more base to commit an injustice or to suffer one? Answer me.

Pol. To commit an injustice.

Socr. Is it not, therefore, worse, since it is more base?

Pol. By no means.

Socr. I understand. You do not think, as it seems, that the beautiful and the good, and the evil and the base, are the same?

Pol. Certainly not.

Socr. But what do you say to this? Beautiful things in general, such as bodies, colours, forms, sounds, and pursuits, do you call them severally beautiful, without reference to any thing else? As, for instance, first of all, with respect to beautiful bodies, do you not say that they are beautiful, on account of their usefulness, in reference to the particular thing for which each is useful, or on account of some pleasure, if in being seen they give delight to the beholders? Have you any thing else besides this to say respecting beauty of body?

Pol. I have not.