Part 56

Socr. If not, at all events I hear of him.

Pol. Does he appear to you to be happy or miserable?

Socr. I do not know, Polus: for I have never yet had any intercourse with him.

Pol. What then? if you had intercourse with him, should you know? And do you not know otherwise, from the circumstances of the case, that he is happy?

Socr. By Jupiter, certainly not.

Pol. It is evident then, Socrates, you will say, that you do not even know whether the great king is happy?

Socr. And I should say the truth. For I do not know what his state is with regard to enlightenment and justice.

Pol. What? Does all happiness consist in this?

Socr. In my opinion, Polus. For I say that an honest and good man or woman is happy; but an unjust and wicked one is miserable.

Pol. This Archelaus, then, is miserable, according to your account?

Socr. At least, my friend, if he is unjust.

59. Pol. But how can he be otherwise than unjust, who had no right to the empire which he now possesses, as he was born of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas, and according to justice was the slave of Alcetas, and, if he had wished to do what is just, would have served Alcetas as a slave, and would have been happy, according to your account? whereas now he has become wonderfully miserable, since he has committed the greatest injustice. For, first of all, having sent for this his master and uncle, as if he would restore the government which Perdiccas had taken from him, and having entertained and intoxicated both him and his son Alexander, his own cousin, and nearly his equal in age, he forced them into a carriage, and having carried them off by night, had their throats cut and made away with them both. And after he had committed these wrongs, he was not aware that he had become most miserable, and did not repent, but shortly afterwards, he did not wish to become happy by nurturing his legitimate brother, the son of Perdiccas, a child about seven years of age, to whom the government of right belonged, and by restoring it to him; but having thrown him into a well, and suffocated him, he told his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in in pursuing a goose, and so met with his death. 60. Wherefore since he has committed the greatest wrongs of all in Macedonia, he is the most miserable of all the Macedonians, and not the most happy. And perhaps there are some among the Athenians, beginning with you, who would rather be any other of the Macedonians than Archelaus.

Socr. At the beginning of our conference, Polus, I praised you, because you appeared to me to be well instructed in rhetoric, though you had neglected the art of dialectics. And now, what else is this reasoning, by which even a child could confute me, and I, as you suppose, am now confuted by this reasoning of yours, when I said that a man who acts unjustly is not happy? How so, my friend? For I do not grant you any one of the things you assert.

Pol. Because you are not willing to do so; though it appears to you as I say.

Socr. My excellent friend, you attempt to confute me rhetorically, like those who think they confute their adversaries in courts of justice. For there some fancy they confute others when they produce many reputable witnesses in favour of what they say, whereas the adverse party produces some one only, or none at all. 61. But this mode of confutation is worth nothing with reference to truth. For sometimes a man may be borne down by the false testimony of many witnesses who seem to be somewhat. And now, with respect to what you say, almost all the Athenians and strangers will agree with you, and if you wish to produce witnesses against me to prove that I do not speak the truth, there will testify for you, if you wish it, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and his brothers with him, who gave the tripods that stand in a row in the temple of Bacchus; or again, if you wish it, Aristocrates, son of Scellius, who gave that beautiful offering in the temple of Pythian Apollo; or if you wish it, the whole house of Pericles, or any other family, that you may think proper to choose out of this city. But I, who am but one, do not agree with you. For you do not convince me by arguments, but producing many false witnesses against me, you endeavour to eject me from my substance and the truth. But I, unless I shall be able to adduce you, who are one, as a witness agreeing with what I say, shall think that I have accomplished nothing worthy of mention with respect to the subject of our discussion; nor shall I think that you have done so, unless I, being one, alone testify for you, and you dismiss all those others. 62. This, then, is one mode of refutation, as you and many others think: but there is also another mode, which, on the contrary, I adopt. Let us, therefore, compare them with each other, and consider whether they differ at all from one another. For the matters about which we differ are by no means trifling; but they are indeed such as to know which is most honourable, and not to know most disgraceful, for the sum of them is to know, or to be ignorant, who is happy, and who is not. For instance, in the first place, with respect to the subject of our present discussion, you think it possible that a man may be happy who acts unjustly and is unjust; since you think that Archelaus, though unjust, is happy. Must we not suppose that such is your opinion?

Pol. Certainly.

Socr. But I say it is impossible. On this one point, then, we differ. Be it so. But will he who acts unjustly be happy if he meet with justice and is punished?

Pol. By no means, for in that case he would be most miserable.

Socr. If, therefore, he who acts unjustly does not meet with the punishment he deserves, according to your account he will be happy.

Pol. So I say.

63. Socr. But, according to my opinion, Polus, he who acts unjustly, and is unjust, is in every way miserable; though more miserable if he does not suffer punishment, and does not meet with chastisement for his unjust actions; but less miserable if he suffers punishment, and meets with his just deserts both from gods and men.

Pol. You attempt, Socrates, to advance strange paradoxes.

Socr. Yet I shall endeavour, my friend, to make you say the same things as I do: for I consider you as a friend. Now, then, the things about which we differ are these: and do you also consider. I said in a former part of our discussion, that to commit an injustice is worse than to suffer one.

Pol. Just so.

Socr. But you say it is worse to suffer an injustice.

Pol. Yes.

Socr. And I said that they who act unjustly are miserable, and was confuted by you.

Pol. You were so, by Jupiter.