Part 166

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. One does not therefore see a thing because it is seen, but on the contrary it is seen because one sees it: nor does one lead a thing because it is led, but it is led because one leads it: nor does one carry a thing because it is carried, but it is carried because one carries it. Is my meaning clear, then, Euthyphron? I mean this, that if one does any thing, or suffers any thing, one does it not because it is done; but it is done because one does it; nor does one suffer any thing because it is suffered, but it is suffered because one suffers: do you not admit this to be the case?

Euth. I do.

Socr. Is not, then, the being loved, something either done or suffered by some one?

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. And is not the case the same with this as with all the former instances; those who love it do not love it because it is loved, but it is loved, because they love it?

Euth. Necessarily so.

Socr. What then do we say respecting holiness, Euthyphron? Do not all the gods love it according to your statement?

Euth. Yes.

Socr. Is it for this reason, because it is holy, or for some other reason?

Euth. No, but for this.

Socr. They love it then because it is holy, but it is not holy because they love it.

Euth. It seems so.

Socr. Therefore because the gods love it it is beloved, and that which is pleasing to the gods is pleasing to them.

Euth. How not?

Socr. That which is pleasing to the gods, therefore, is not holy, Euthyphron, nor is that holy which is pleasing to the gods, as you say, but one is different from the other.

Euth. How so, Socrates?

Socr. Because we agree that what is holy is therefore loved because it is holy, and that it is not holy because they love it; is it not so?

Euth. Yes.

Socr. But that which is pleasing to the gods because the gods love it, is from the very circumstance of their loving it pleasing to them; but they do not love it because it is pleasing to them.

Euth. You say truly.

Socr. But, my dear Euthyphron, if the being pleasing to the gods and being holy were the same thing, since that which is holy is loved because it is holy, that which is pleasing to the gods would also be loved because it is pleasing to them; and if that which is pleasing to the gods were pleasing to them because they love it, that which is holy would also be holy because they love it. Now, however, you see that they are contrary, as being altogether different from each other. For the one is such as is loved because they love it, but the other is loved because it is of such a character that it ought to be loved. And you appear, Euthyphron, when asked what holiness is, not to have been willing to make known to me its essence, but to have mentioned an affection to which this same holiness is subject, namely the being loved by all the gods; but what it is, you have not yet told me. If therefore it is agreeable to you, do not conceal it from me, but again say from the beginning what holiness is, whether it is loved by the gods, or is subject to any other affection: for we shall not differ about this. But tell me frankly what the holy is and what the impious.

Euth. But, Socrates, I know not how to tell you what I think. For whatever we put forward some how constantly moves from its position, and will not remain where we have placed it.

Socr. What you have advanced, Euthyphron, appears to resemble the statues of my ancestor Dædalus. And if I had said and laid down these things, you would probably have joked me, for that owing to my relationship to him, my works, by way of discussion, escape, and will not remain where one places them. But now, for the hypotheses are yours, there is need of some other raillery. For they will not remain with you, as you too perceive yourself.

Euth. But it appears to me, Socrates, that what has been said needs pretty much the same raillery. For I am not the person who causes them to shift about in this way and not remain in the same place, but you appear to me to be the Dædalus. For as far as I am concerned, they would have remained as they were.

Socr. I appear, then, my friend, to have become much more skilful than him in my art, in that he only made his own works moveable, but I besides my own, as it seems, make those of others so. And this, moreover, is the most wonderful thing in my art, that I am skilful against any will. For I should wish that my reasonings should remain and be immovably fixed, rather than have the riches of Tantalus, in addition to the skill of Dædalus. But enough of this. 13. Since, however, you appear to be too nice, I will assist you to shew how you may teach me respecting holiness, and not be tired before you have done. For see, whether it does not appear to you to be necessary that every thing that is holy should be just.

Euth. To me it does.

Socr. Is, then, every thing that is just also holy, or is every thing that is holy just, but not every thing that is just holy, but partly holy, and partly something else?