Part 165

Euth. They by no means say this.

Socr. They do not, therefore, do and say every thing in their power. For I think they dare not say nor doubt this, that if they act unjustly they ought to suffer punishment; but, I think, they deny that they have acted unjustly: is it not so?

Euth. You say truly.

Socr. They do not, therefore, doubt this, whether he who acts unjustly ought to be punished; but this, perhaps, they doubt, who has acted unjustly, and by doing what, and when.

Euth. You say truly.

Socr. Do not, then, the very same things happen to the gods if they quarrel about things just and unjust, according to your statement, and do not some say that they act unjustly towards each other, and others again deny it? For surely, my admirable friend, no one, either of gods or men, dare maintain this, that he who acts unjustly ought not to suffer punishment.

Euth. Yes, and what you say is true, Socrates, at least in general.

Socr. But they who doubt, Euthyphron, doubt, I think, about each particular that has been done, both men and gods, if the gods do doubt: and when they differ about any action, some say that it has been done justly, and others unjustly: is it not so?

Euth. Certainly.

10. Socr. Come then, my dear Euthyphron, teach me too, that I may become wiser, what proof you have that all the gods think he died unjustly, who serving for wages and having committed homicide, and being put in chains by the master of the deceased, died in his fetters before he that put him in chains received an answer respecting him from the interpreters, as to what he ought to do; and that for such a cause it is right for a son to prosecute and demand judgment against his father. Come, endeavour to make it clear to me, with respect to this, that all the gods without exception consider this action to be right. And if you make this sufficiently clear, I will never cease extolling you for your wisdom.

Euth. But perhaps this is no trifling matter, Socrates; though I could prove it to you very plainly.

Socr. I understand you; I appear to you to be more dull of apprehension than the judges; for it is evident that you will prove to them that it was unjust, and that all the gods hate such actions.

Euth. Very plainly, Socrates, if only they will hear what I have to say.

11. Socr. But they will hear you, if only you shall appear to speak well. However, while you were speaking, I made this reflexion, and considered within myself: if Euthyphron should certainly convince me that all the gods think such a death to be unjust, what more shall I have learnt from Euthyphron as to what is holy, and what impious? For this action, as it seems, would be hateful to the gods. Yet what was lately defined has not appeared from this, namely what is holy, and what not: for that which is hateful to some gods appeared also to be pleasing to others. So that I grant you this, Euthyphron, and if you please let all the gods think it unjust, and let them all hate it. Shall we, then, make this correction in the definition, and say, that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love is holy; but that what some love, and others hate, is neither, or both? Are you willing that we should give this definition of the holy and the impious?

Euth. What hinders, Socrates?

Socr. Nothing hinders me, Euthyphron; but do you, for your part, consider whether, assuming this, you can thus easily teach me what you promised?

Euth. But I should say that the holy is that which all the gods love, and the contrary, the impious, that which all the gods hate.

Socr. Shall we examine this, then, Euthyphron, whether it is well said? or shall we let it pass, and thus concede both to ourselves and others, that if any one only says that any thing is so, we shall allow that it is? or must we examine what the speaker says?

Euth. We must examine it: for my part, however, I think that this is now well said.

12. Socr. We shall soon, my good friend, know this more clearly. For consider it in this way: Is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy; or is it holy, because it is loved?

Euth. I don’t understand what you mean, Socrates.

Socr. I will endeavour, then, to express myself more clearly. We say that a thing is carried, and carries; that it is led, and leads; that it is seen, and sees: and you understand that all things of this kind are different from each other, and in what they differ?

Euth. For my part, I seem to understand it.

Socr. Is not, then, that which is beloved one thing, and that which loves different from it?

Euth. How not?

Socr. Tell me, then, is that which is carried, carried because one carries it, or for some other reason?

Euth. No, but for this.

Socr. And that which is led, because one leads it, and that which is seen, because one sees it?