Socr. Let it be then as we just now said; let the syllable be one form resulting from the several elements, connected together, as well in letters as in all other things.
Theæ. Just so.
Socr. It must, therefore, have no parts.
Theæ. Why not?
Socr. Because where there are parts, the whole must necessarily be the same as all the parts: or do you say that a whole resulting from parts is one certain species different from all the parts?
Theæ. I do.
Socr. Whether do you call all and the whole the same, or each different from the other?
Theæ. I cannot say any thing for certain, but since you bid me answer boldly, I venture to say that they are different.
Socr. Your boldness, Theætetus, is right; but whether your answer is so, must be considered.
Theæ. It must indeed.
Socr. Does not the whole, then, differ from all, according to your present statement?
Theæ. Yes.
145. Socr. But what, is there any difference between all the parts, and the all? for instance when we say one, two, three, four, five, six, or twice three, or thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and one, or five and one, whether in all these cases do we say the same thing, or that which is different?
Theæ. The same thing.
Socr. Do we say any thing else than six?
Theæ. Nothing.
Socr. And in each mode of speaking did we not mention all the parts of six?
Theæ. Yes.
Socr. Again, therefore, when we say all the parts do we say nothing?
Theæ. We necessarily do say something.
Socr. Do we say any thing else than six?
Theæ. Nothing.
Socr. In all things, then, that consist of number, do we not call the all and all the parts the same thing?
Theæ. It appears so.
Socr. Thus then let us speak of them; the number of an acre and an acre are the same; is it not so?
Theæ. Yes.
Socr. And the number of a stadium in like manner?
Theæ. Yes.
The Works of Plato (vol. 1 of 6) · The Wunder Library — complete classics, free to read, with narration.