Part 157

Socr. And moreover the number of an army, and an army, and in like manner with respect to all other things of the kind? For all number is all that which each of them is.

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. But is the number of each of them any thing else than its parts?

Theæ. Nothing.

Socr. Such things, then, as have parts must consist of parts?

Theæ. It appears so.

Socr. But it is admitted that all the parts are the all, since all number is the all.

Theæ. Just so.

Socr. The whole, therefore, does not consist of parts; for it would be all, if it were all the parts.

Theæ. It seems not.

Socr. But is a part a part of any thing else than a whole?

Theæ. Yes, of the all.

146. Socr. You fight manfully, Theætetus. But is not this very all, the all when nothing is wanting to it?

Theæ. Necessarily so.

Socr. And will not the whole be this very same thing when nothing is wanting to it? but when any thing is wanting, it is neither the whole, nor all, each becoming the same thing from the same cause?

Theæ. It appears to me now, that the whole and the all in no respect differ from each other.

Socr. Did we not say, that where there are parts, the whole and the all will be all the parts?

Theæ. Certainly.

Socr. Again, therefore, to return to what I just now attempted to prove, if a syllable is not the elements, does it not necessarily follow that it has not elements as parts of itself, or that, if it is the same with them, it must be equally known with them?

Theæ. Just so.

Socr. In order that this might not follow, did we not suppose it to be different from them?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. What then? if the elements are not parts of a syllable, can you mention any other things that are parts of a syllable, and yet not its elements?

147. Theæ. By no means; for if, Socrates, I should admit that it has parts, it would surely be ridiculous to reject the elements and search for other things.

Socr. From what you now say, therefore, Theætetus, a syllable must certainly be some one indivisible form.

Theæ. So it seems.

Socr. Do you remember then, my friend, that we admitted a little before, and thought it was well said, that there cannot be a definition of first elements, of which other things are composed, because each considered by itself is uncompounded, and neither can the term “being” be correctly attributed to it nor the term “this,” because these things would be said as different and foreign to it; and indeed this very cause makes it undefinable and unknown.

Theæ. I do remember.