Part 116

120. Socr. The ability, Phædrus, to become a perfect proficient, probably, or rather necessarily, depends on the same things as in other cases: for, if you naturally possess rhetorical abilities, you will be a distinguished orator by adding science and practice; but in whichever of these you are deficient, in that respect you will be imperfect. But so far as it is an art, its method, I think, will not be found in the way that Lysias and Thrasymachus are proceeding.

Phæ. In what way then?

Socr. Pericles, my excellent friend, appears, with good reason, to have been the most perfect of all men in rhetoric.

Phæ. How so?

Socr. All the great arts require a subtle and speculative research into the law of nature: for that loftiness of thought and perfect mastery over every subject seems to be derived from some such source as this; which Pericles possessed in addition to a great natural genius. For meeting, I think, with Anaxagoras, who was a person of this kind, and being filled with speculative research, and having arrived at the nature of intelligence and want of intelligence, about which Anaxagoras made that long discourse, he drew from thence to the art of speaking whatever could contribute to its advantage.

121. Phæ. What mean you by this?

Socr. The method of the art of rhetoric is, in a manner, the same as that of medicine.

Phæ. How so?

Socr. In both it is requisite that nature should be thoroughly investigated, the nature of the body in the one, and the soul in the other, if you mean not only by practice and experience, but by art, to give health and strength to the former by applying medicine and diet, and to impart such persuasion as you please and virtue to the latter, by means of speeches and legitimate employments.

Phæ. This indeed seems probable, Socrates.

Socr. But do you think it possible rightly to understand the nature of the soul, without understanding the nature of the universe?

Phæ. If we are to believe Hippocrates, of the family of Æsculapius, we cannot understand even the nature of body without this method.

Socr. For he says well, my friend. But it is necessary, in addition to the authority of Hippocrates, to examine our argument, and consider whether it is consistent.

Phæ. I agree.

122. Socr. Consider, then, with respect to nature, what Hippocrates and true reason say. Is it not thus necessary to examine into the nature of any thing? In the first place, whether that is simple or manifold about which we are desirous, both ourselves to be skilled, and to be able to make others so; and, in the next place, if it be simple, to examine the power it naturally possesses of acting on each particular thing, or of being acted upon by each particular thing? And if it possesses several species, having enumerated these, as in the case of the one, ought we not to consider this in each of them, what active and passive power they naturally have?

Phæ. It seems so, Socrates.

123. Socr. The method, then, that neglected these, would resemble the walk of a blind man. He however who proceeds by art, ought on no account to be compared either to a blind or a deaf man; but it is clear that whosoever teaches another speaking by art, should accurately shew the real nature of the things to which he will have to apply his speeches; and this surely is the soul.

Phæ. How not?

Socr. His whole endeavour, therefore, must be directed to this; for in this he attempts to produce persuasion. Is it not so?

Phæ. Yes.

Socr. It is clear, therefore, that Thrasymachus, and any one else who seriously endeavours to teach the art of rhetoric, will in the first place describe with all possible accuracy, and make it be seen whether the soul is naturally one and similar, or, like the form of the body, composed of different elements; for this we say is to make known nature.

Phæ. Most assuredly.

Socr. And, in the second place, in what respect it naturally acts or is acted upon by any thing.

124. Phæ. How not?

Socr. In the third place, having set in order the different kinds of speech and of soul, and the different manners in which these are affected, he will go through the several causes, adapting each to each, and teaching what kind of soul is necessarily persuaded, and what not persuaded, by particular kinds of speech, and for what reason.

Phæ. It will assuredly be best done in this way, as it seems.

Socr. Never then, my dear friend, will any thing that is otherwise explained or spoken, be spoken or written by art, either in any other case or in this. But the modern writers on the art of speech-making, whom you yourself have heard, are dissemblers, and conceal the very admirable knowledge they have of the soul. Until, then, they both speak and write according to this method, let us never be persuaded that they write artistically.

Phæ. What method is this?