Part 115

Socr. And secondly a kind of narration, and evidence to support it; thirdly, proofs; fourthly, probabilities; and I think that a famous Byzantian tricker-out of speeches mentions confirmation and after-confirmation.

Phæ. Do you mean the excellent Theodorus?

Socr. I do. He says, too, that refutation and after-refutation must be employed both in accusation and defence. And must we not adduce the most illustrious Parian, Evenus, who first discovered subordinate intimations and bye-praises? and some say that he put into metre bye-censures, to assist the memory: for he is a wise man. 113. But shall we suffer Tisias and Gorgias to sleep, who found out that probabilities were more to be valued than truths, and who by force of words make small things appear great, and great things small, and new things old, and the contrary new, and who discovered a concise method of speaking and an infinite prolixity on all subjects? When Prodicus once heard me tell this, he laughed, and said that he alone had discovered what speeches are required by art; that we require them neither long nor short, but of a moderate length.

Phæ. Most wisely, Prodicus.

Socr. But do we not mention Hippias? for I think our Elean friend was of the same opinion with him.

Phæ. Why not?

114. Socr. But how shall we describe Polus’s new-fangled method of speaking, as his reduplication of words, his sentences, his similitudes, and the words which Licymnius made him a present of, in order to produce a graceful diction.

Phæ. But was not the system of Protagoras, Socrates, something of this kind?

Socr. His was a correctness of diction, my boy, and many other fine things besides, but in the art of dragging in speeches to excite commiseration for old age and poverty, the Chalcedonian hero appears to me to have carried off the palm. He was moreover a powerful man to rouse the anger of the multitude, and again, when enraged, to soothe them by enchantment, as he used to say; he was most skilful in raising and removing calumnies, on any ground whatever. But all seem to agree in the same opinion with respect to the conclusion of speeches, to which some have given the name of recapitulation, others a different name.

Phæ. You mean the summarily reminding the hearers, at the conclusion, of the several things that have been said.

115. Socr. I mean that, and now consider if you have any thing else to say about the art of speaking.

Phæ. Only some trifling things, and not worth mentioning.

Socr. Let us pass over trifles; and rather examine these things in the clear light, and see what influence they have in art, and on what occasion.

Phæ. A very powerful influence, Socrates, at least in assemblies of the people.

Socr. They have indeed. But, my admirable friend, do you also observe whether their web does not appear to you to be very wide as it does to me.

Phæ. Explain what you mean.

Socr. Tell me then: If any one should go to your friend Eryximachus, or his father Acumenus, and should say, “I know how to apply such things to the body, as will make it warm or cold, as I please, and if I think proper, I can produce vomitings, and again purgings, and many other things of the kind, and as I know these things I consider myself a physician, and that I can make any one else so, to whom I impart the knowledge of these particulars:” what do you think they would say on hearing this?

Phæ. What else, but ask him if he knew besides to what persons, and when, and how far, he ought to do each of these things?

116. Socr. If then, he should say, “Not in the least; but I expect that he who should learn these things from me, would be able to do what you ask?”

Phæ. He would say, I think, that the man is mad; and that, having heard from some book or other, or having met with certain drugs, he fancies that he has become a physician, though he knows nothing at all about the art.

Socr. But what if any one were to go to Sophocles and Euripides, and tell them, that he knew how to make very long speeches on a trifling subject, and very short ones on a great subject, and whenever he pleased, piteous and contrariwise, terrible and threatening speeches, and other things of the kind, and that by teaching these he thought he could impart the power of writing tragedy?

117. Phæ. They too, I think, Socrates, would laugh, if any one should suppose that tragedy was any thing else than the composition of all these, so disposed as to be consistent with each other and the whole.

Socr. But, I think, they would not upbraid him rudely, but as a musician, who happened to meet with a man who believes himself to be skilled in harmony, because he knows how to make the highest and lowest note, would not harshly say to him, “Miserable fellow, you are stark mad;” but, being a musician, he would speak more mildly; “My excellent man, it is indeed necessary for one who means to be skilled in harmony, to know these things, but at the same time there is nothing to hinder a person from possessing the knowledge you have without his understanding harmony in the least; for you know what is necessary to be learnt before harmony, but not harmony itself.”

Phæ. Most correctly.

118. Socr. In like manner, Sophocles might reply to the person who displayed his learning to them, that he knew the things before tragedy, but not tragedy itself; and Acumenus, that the medical pretender knew things before medicine, but not medicine itself.

Phæ. Most assuredly.

Socr. But what must we think the sweet-voiced Adrastus, or even Pericles would do, if they were to hear of the beautiful contrivances which we have just now enumerated, the short sentences and similitudes, and all the rest, which when we went through them, we said must be examined by the clear light, whether they, as you and I did, would rudely make some ill-mannered remark against those who had written and who teach such things as if they constituted the art of rhetoric, or, as being wiser than we are, would they not reprove us, saying, 119. “Phædrus and Socrates, you ought not to be angry with, but rather to excuse those who, through being ignorant of dialectics, are unable to define what rhetoric is, and who, in consequence of this ignorance, possessing the things necessary to be learnt preparatory to the art, think that they have discovered rhetoric itself, and, suppose that by teaching these things to others, they can teach them rhetoric in perfection; but how each of them is to be used persuasively, and the whole combined together, this, as being of no consequence in the world, they think their pupils ought to acquire for themselves in composing their speeches.”

Phæ. Such indeed, Socrates, appears to be the case with the art which these men teach and write about as rhetoric; and you seem to me to have spoken the truth: but how and from whence can one acquire the art of true rhetoric and persuasion?