Part 117

Socr. It is not easy to mention the very words themselves; but how it is proper to write, if a man means to be as artistic as he possibly can, I am willing to tell you.

Phæ. Tell me then.

125. Socr. Since the power of speech is that of leading the soul, it is necessary that he who means to be an orator should know how many kinds of soul there are: but they are so many, and of such and such kinds; whence some men are of this character and some of that character. These then being thus divided, there are again so many kinds of speech, each of a certain character. Now men of such a character are for this particular reason easily persuaded by certain speeches, and persons of a different character are for these reasons with difficulty persuaded. It is necessary, therefore, that he, after having sufficiently understood all this, when he afterwards perceives these very things taking place in actions, and being done, should be able to follow them rapidly by perception, otherwise he will know nothing more than the very things which he formerly heard from his preceptor. 126. But when he is sufficiently competent to say, what kind of person is persuaded by what kind of speeches, and is able, when he sees him before him, to point out to himself that this is the person and this the nature for which those speeches were formerly made now actually present before me, and to which these particular speeches are to be addressed, in order to persuade him to these particular things,—when he has acquired all this, and has learnt moreover the proper seasons for speaking and being silent, and again has made himself master of the seasonable and unseasonable occasions for brevity, plaintiveness, and vehemence, and all the other several kinds of speech which he has learnt, then his art will be beautifully and perfectly accomplished, but not before. But whoever is deficient in any of these particulars, either in speaking, or teaching, or writing, and yet asserts that he speaks by art, is overcome by the person who will not be persuaded. 127. “What then,” perhaps the writer on rhetoric will say, “does it appear to you, Phædrus and Socrates, that the art of speaking, as it is called, must be obtained in this or some other way?”

Phæ. It is impossible, Socrates, that it should be obtained in any other way; though it seems to be a work of no small labour.

Socr. You say truly. And on this account we ought to turn over all speeches again and again, and consider whether any easier and shorter way to it can be found, in order that we may not in vain go by a long and rough one, when we might have taken a short and smooth one. If, therefore, you have heard of any thing that will assist us, from Lysias or any one else, endeavour to call it to mind, and tell it me.

Phæ. If the endeavour were enough I should be able to do so, but just at present I cannot.

128. Socr. Are you willing, then, that I should repeat to you a statement which I heard from persons who take an interest in such matters?

Phæ. How not?

Socr. It is said, however, Phædrus, to be right to state even the wolf’s case.

Phæ. And do you do so.

Socr. They say, then, that there is no occasion to treat these matters so solemnly, nor to carry them back so far, by such long windings. For as we said in the beginning of our discussion, there is no need at all for one who wishes to become a competent orator to have any thing to do with the truth respecting actions just or good, or men who are such, either by nature or education. For that in courts of justice no attention whatever is paid to the truth of these things, but only to what is plausible, and that it is probability to which one who wishes to speak by art ought to apply himself. And that sometimes even facts that have actually happened must not be stated, unless they are probable, but probabilities both in accusation and defence: and, in short, that a speaker should pursue the probable, and pay no regard at all to truth. For that when this method is observed throughout the whole speech, it constitutes the perfection of the art.

129. Phæ. You have described the very things, Socrates, which they say who profess to be skilled in speech-making; and I remember that we touched briefly upon this in a former part of our discussion; but this appears to be matter of the utmost consequence to those who study these things.

Socr. However you have thoroughly fumbled Tisias himself. Let Tisias then tell us this, whether he means any thing else by the probable than that which accords with the opinion of the multitude.

Phæ. What else can it be?

Socr. Having made, then, as it seems, this wise and artistic discovery, he has written, that if a weak but brave man should be brought to trial for having knocked down a strong and cowardly one, and for having robbed him of his clothes or any thing else, then that neither of them ought to speak the truth, but the coward should say that he was not knocked down by the brave man alone, and the latter should prove this, that they were alone, and then urge this; “How could a man like me ever attack a man like him?” But the other will not admit his own cowardice, but, in attempting to tell some other falsehood, will perhaps supply his adversary with the means of refuting him. And in other cases, such things as these are said according to art. Is it not so, Phædrus?

130. Phæ. How not?

Socr. Wonderfully clever seems to have been the inventor of this abstruse art, whether Tisias or whoever else he was, and by whatever name he delights to be called. But, my friend, shall we say to him or not?

Phæ. What?

Socr. Tisias, long since before your arrival, we happened to say, that this probability of yours derives its influence with the multitude from its resemblance to truth; and we just now concluded that in all cases he knows best how to discover resemblances who is best acquainted with the truth. So that, if you have any thing else to say about the art of speaking, we will listen to you; but if not, we shall hold to the conclusions we have lately come to, that unless a man has reckoned up the different natures of those who will have to hear him, and is able to divide things themselves into species, and to comprehend the several particulars under one general idea, he will never be skilled in the art of speaking so far as it is possible for a man to be so. 131. But this he can never acquire without great labour, which a wise man ought not to bestow for the purpose of speaking and acting amongst men, but that he may be able to speak such things as are acceptable to the gods, and act acceptably to them, to the utmost of his power. For, as wiser men than we say, Tisias, a man of understanding ought not to make it his principal study to gratify his fellow-servants, except by the way, but good masters and of good extraction. If therefore the circuit be long, wonder not; 132. for it is to be undertaken for the sake of great ends, not such as you think. And even these, as our argument proves, if any one is willing, will be best attained by those means.

Phæ. This appears to me, Socrates, to be very finely said, if only a man could attain to it.

Socr. But when one is attempting noble things, it is surely noble also to suffer whatever it may befal us to suffer.

Phæ. Assuredly.

Socr. As regards, then, the art and want of art in speaking, let this suffice.

133. Phæ. How should it not?

Socr. But as regards elegance and inelegance in writing, in what way it may be done well, and in what way inelegantly, remains to be considered. Does it not?

Phæ. Yes.

Socr. Do you know, then, how you may best please God with regard to speeches, both acting and speaking?

Phæ. Not at all. Do you?