The Federalist Papers

Part 1

The Federalist Papers

by Alexander Hamilton and John Jay and James Madison

Contents

FEDERALIST No. I. General Introduction FEDERALIST No. II. Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence FEDERALIST No. III. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) FEDERALIST No. IV. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) FEDERALIST No. V. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) FEDERALIST No. VI. Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States FEDERALIST No. VII. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States) FEDERALIST No. VIII. The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States FEDERALIST No. IX. The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection FEDERALIST No. X. The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection) FEDERALIST No. XI. The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy FEDERALIST No. XII. The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue FEDERALIST No. XIII. Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government FEDERALIST No. XIV. Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered FEDERALIST No. XV. The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union FEDERALIST No. XVI. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) FEDERALIST No. XVII. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) FEDERALIST No. XVIII. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) FEDERALIST No. XIX. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) FEDERALIST No. XX. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) FEDERALIST No. XXI. Other Defects of the Present Confederation FEDERALIST No. XXII. The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation) FEDERALIST No. XXIII. The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union FEDERALIST No. XXIV. The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered FEDERALIST No. XXV. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered) FEDERALIST No. XXVI. The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered. FEDERALIST No. XXVII. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) FEDERALIST No. XXVIII. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) FEDERALIST No. XXIX. Concerning the Militia FEDERALIST No. XXX. Concerning the General Power of Taxation FEDERALIST No. XXXI. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) FEDERALIST No. XXXII. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) FEDERALIST No. XXXIII. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) FEDERALIST No. XXXIV. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) FEDERALIST No. XXXV. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) FEDERALIST No. XXXVI. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) FEDERALIST No. XXXVII. Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government. FEDERALIST No. XXXVIII. The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed. FEDERALIST No. XXXIX. The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles FEDERALIST No. XL. On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained. FEDERALIST No. XLI. General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution FEDERALIST No. XLII. The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered FEDERALIST No. XLIII. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered) FEDERALIST No. XLIV. Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States FEDERALIST No. XLV. The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments. FEDERALIST No. XLVI. The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared FEDERALIST No. XLVII. The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts. FEDERALIST No. XLVIII. These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other. FEDERALIST No. XLIX. Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention. FEDERALIST No. L. Periodical Appeals to the People Considered FEDERALIST No. LI. The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments. FEDERALIST No. LII. The House of Representatives FEDERALIST No. LIII. The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives) FEDERALIST No. LIV. The Apportionment of Members Among the States FEDERALIST No. LV. The Total Number of the House of Representatives FEDERALIST No. LVI. The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives) FEDERALIST No. LVII. The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation. FEDERALIST No. LVIII. Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands. FEDERALIST No. LIV. Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members FEDERALIST No. LX. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) FEDERALIST No. LXI. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) FEDERALIST No. LXII. The Senate FEDERALIST No. LXIII. The Senate Continued FEDERALIST No. LXIV. The Powers of the Senate FEDERALIST No. LXV. The Powers of the Senate Continued FEDERALIST No. LXVI. Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered. FEDERALIST No. LXVII. The Executive Department FEDERALIST No. LXVIII. The Mode of Electing the President FEDERALIST No. LXIX. The Real Character of the Executive FEDERALIST No. LXX. The Executive Department Further Considered FEDERALIST No. LXX. The Executive Department Further Considered FEDERALIST No. LXXI. The Duration in Office of the Executive FEDERALIST No. LXXII. The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered. FEDERALIST No. LXXIII. The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power FEDERALIST No. LXXIV. The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive. FEDERALIST No. LXXV. The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive FEDERALIST No. LXXVI. The Appointing Power of the Executive FEDERALIST No. LXXVII. The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered. FEDERALIST No. LXXVIII. The Judiciary Department FEDERALIST No. LXXIX. The Judiciary Continued FEDERALIST No. LXXX. The Powers of the Judiciary FEDERALIST No. LXXXI. The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority. FEDERALIST No. LXXXII. The Judiciary Continued. FEDERALIST No. LXXXIII. The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury FEDERALIST No. LXXXIV. Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered. FEDERALIST No. LXXXV. Concluding Remarks

THE FEDERALIST. No. I.

General Introduction

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government.

Continue reading The Federalist Papers free in the Wunder reader →