The Philosophical Theory of the State

CHAPTER II. Sociological Compared With Philosophical Theory 17-52

SOCIOLOGICAL COMPARED WITH PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY 17-52

1. Problems of Social Physics and of Idealism 17

2. Social Theory as influenced by special sciences 19 (i) Mathematics 19 (ii) Biology 21 (iii) Economics 27 (iv) Jurisprudence and the theory of Right 34 (a) Law as “ideal fact” 34 (b) Sociological analysis of Law 36 (v) Idea of the “spirit of laws” or mind of peoples; Anthropology in widest sense 39 (vi) Psychology 42 (vii) Connection of points of view and kinds of fact 47

3. Comparison of Psychological Sociology and Social Philosophy 48

CHAPTER III. The Paradox of Political Obligation; Self-Government 53-78

THE PARADOX OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION; SELF-GOVERNMENT 53-78

1. The conception of self-government 53

2. Law and Liberty in Bentham 56

3. Examination of Mill’s “Liberty” 60 (i) Mill’s idea of Individuality 60 (ii) His view of the authority of Society over the Individual 61 (iii) His applications of his principle 66

4. Views of Herbert Spencer 69 (i) Spencer and Bentham on Natural Right 70 (ii) Liberty and restraint in Spencer and Huxley 71

5. Mill’s criticism of Self-Government 73

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION MORE RADICALLY TREATED 79-102

1. Nature of above theories not expressed by term Individualism. “Theories of the first look” 79

2. Rousseau’s earlier Essays 84

3. Problem of the Contrat Social 87

4. Conflict of ideas in Rousseau’s statement 89

5. Nature of his solution 91

6. Reality of the “Moral Person” and conception of Civil Liberty 94

CHAPTER V.. The Conception of a “real” Will 103-123

THE CONCEPTION OF A “REAL” WILL 103-123

1. The Supreme Will in Hobbes and Locke 103

2. Meaning of the General Will for Rousseau 107

3- The General Will contrasted with the Will of All 111

4- The General Will and the work of the Legislator 117

CHAPTER VI. The Conception of Liberty As Illustrated by the Foregoing

THE CONCEPTION OF LIBERTY AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FOREGOING SUGGESTIONS 118-154

1. Liberty as the condition of our being ourselves 118

2. Illustrated by the idea of Nature and Natural 128

3. Phases of idea of Liberty 133 (a) Juristic phase = “absence of restraint” 134 (b) Political phase = “rights of citizenship” 135 (c) Positive connection of (a) and (b) 136 (d) Philosophical phase = “being oneself in fullest sense” 137 (e) Danger and justification of using same term for (a) and (d) 142

4. Liberty as attribute of the will that wills itself 146

5. This “real” will identified with State 149 (a) State in this sense is social life as a whole 150 (b) How State is force as extension of “individual” mind 152

CHAPTER VII. Psychological Illustration of the Idea of a

PSYCHOLOGICAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE IDEA OF A REAL OR GENERAL WILL 155-179

1. Object of the Chapter 155

2. Connection between social and mental groupings 156 (1) Analogy between them 156 (i) Associations of persons and of ideas 156 (ii) Organisation of social groups and of ideas 159 (2) Identity of social and mental groupings 170 (i) Social groups as an aspect of mental systems 170 (ii) Individual minds as structures of appercipient systems 173 (iii) Social whole as a system of mental systems 175

CHAPTER VIII

NATURE OF THE END OF THE STATE AND CONSEQUENT LIMIT OF STATE ACTION 180-234

1. Distinction between Individual and Society irrelevant to question of Social Means and End 180

2. True contrast: Automatism and Consciousness 181

3. End of State, and Means at its disposal qua State 184

4. State can only secure “external” actions 186

5. Principle of the hindrance of hindrances 190

6. State action as the maintenance of rights 201 (a) System of rights from standpoint of community 203 (b) From standpoint of individuals. “Position” 204 (i) As Rights or recognised claims 206 (ii) As Obligations or recognised debts 206 (c) Rights as implying Duties 208 (i) When Duty = Obligation 208 (ii) When Duty = Purpose, which is source of Right 209 (d) Rights, why recognised claims? 210 (i) A “Position” involves recognition 210 (ii) No right based on individual caprice 212

7. State action as punishment 216 (i) Punishment as reformatory 221 (ii) Punishment as retributory 223 (iii) Punishment as deterrent 228

Conclusion. State Action as exercise of a General Will 232

CHAPTER IX. Rousseau’s Theory As Applied to the Modern State:

ROUSSEAU’S THEORY AS APPLIED TO THE MODERN STATE: KANT, FICHTE, HEGEL 235-255

1. Rousseau’s literary influence in Germany 235

2. Freedom and Social Contract in Kant 238

3. Freedom and Social Contract in Fichte 244

4. Freedom in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 247 (a) Supposed reactionary tendency in Hegel 248 (b) Relation of analysis and idealisation 290

5. The Philosophy of Right as a chapter in the Philosophy of Mind 252

CHAPTER X

THE ANALYSIS OF A MODERN STATE. HEGEL’S “PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT” 256-295

1. Logic of Society as an ideal fact 256

2. Sphere of Right or Law and its sub-divisions 258

3. The Letter of the Law 260

4. The Morality of Conscience 262

5. Social Ethics 266 (i) Social Ethics as an actual world 266 (ii) Social Ethics as the nature of self-consciousness 267

6. Sub-divisions of Social Ethics. The Family 269 (a) Depends on natural fact 269 (b) Is factor in the State 270 (c) Ethical and Monogamous Household 271 (d) Relation to Property 272

7. Bourgeois Society. Justice, State Regulation, and Trade Societies 272

8. The State proper, or Political Constitution 280

9. Public discussion and public opinion 285

10. Criticism of such an analysis of the Modern State 287

CHAPTER XI. Institutions Considered As Ethical Ideas 296-334

INSTITUTIONS CONSIDERED AS ETHICAL IDEAS 296-334

1. The individual soul and the social mind 296

2. Institutions as common substance of minds 297

3. The Family and Property as elements of mind 299

4. The District or Neighbourhood as an element of mind 304

5. Class as an element of mind. “The Poor” as an ethical idea 310

6. The Nation-State as an element of mind 320

7. Morality of public and private action 322

8. Humanity as an element of mind 328 (a) Humanity not predicable of mankind as a whole 328 (b) Humanity does not = mankind as a true community 329 (c) Dichotomous expressions for humanity and mankind 330 (d) The self beyond any actual society; Art, Philosophy, Religion 332

INDEX 335

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CHAPTER I.. Rise and Conditions of the Philosophical Theory of the State

RISE AND CONDITIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF THE STATE

1. First, it will be well to indicate, in a very few words, what is implied in a “philosophical theory,” as distinguished from theories which make no claim to be philosophical. The primary difference is, that a philosophical treatment is the study of some thing as a whole and for its own sake. In a certain sense it may be compared to the gaze of a child or of an artist. It deals, that is, with the total and unbroken effect of its object. It desires to ascertain what a thing is, what is its full characteristic and being, its achievement in the general act of the world. History, explanation, analysis into cause and conditions, have value for it only in so far as they contribute to the intelligent estimation of the fullest nature and capabilities of the real individual whole which is under investigation. We all know that a flower is one thing for the geometrician, another for the chemist, another for {2} the botanist, and another, again, for the artist. Now, philosophy can of course make no pretension to cope with any one of the specialists on his own ground. But the general nature of the task imposed upon it is this: aiding itself, so far as possible, by the trained vision of all specialists, to make some attempt to see the full significance of the flower as a word or letter in the great book of the world. And this we call studying it, as it is, and for its own sake, without reservation or presupposition. It is assumed, then, for the purpose of a philosophical treatment, that everything, and more particularly in this case the political life of man, has a nature of its own, which is worthy of investigation on its own merits and for its own sake. How its phases come into being, or what causes or conditions have played a part in its growth, are other questions well worthy of investigation. But the philosophical problem is rather to see our object as it is and to learn what it is, to estimate, so to speak, its kind and degree of self-maintenance in the world, than to trace its history or to analyse its causation.

Yet such phrases as “what it is” and “for its own sake” must not mislead us. They do not mean that the nature of any reality which we experience can be appreciated in isolation from the general world of life and knowledge. On the contrary, they imply that when fully and fairly considered from the most thoroughly adequate point of view, our subject matter will reveal its true position and relations with reference to all else that man can do and can know. This position and these relations constitute its rank or significance in the totality {3} of experience, and this value or significance--in the present case, what the form of life in question enables man to do and to become--is just what we mean by its nature “in itself,” or its full and complete nature, or its significance when thoroughly studied “for its own sake” from an adequate point of view. Further illustrations of the distinction between an adequate point of view and partial or limited modes of consideration, and of the relations between the former and the latter, will be found in the following chapter.

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