Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd Ed. Volume 2

CHAPTER XII.. Alkibiades I. and Ii.

ALKIBIADES I. AND II.

Situation supposed in the dialogue. Persons--Sokrates and Alkibiades 1

Exorbitant hopes and political ambition of Alkibiades 2

Questions put by Sokrates, in reference to Alkibiades in his intended function as adviser of the Athenians. What does he intend to advise them upon? What has he learnt, and what does he know? ib.

Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on questions of war and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must fight those whom it is better to fight--to what standard does better refer? To just and unjust 3

How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one; he always knew it, even as a boy 4

Answer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the multitude, as he learnt to speak Greek.--The multitude cannot teach just and unjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it. Alkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself 5

Answer farther amended. The Athenians do not generally debate about just or unjust--which they consider plain to every one--but about expedient and inexpedient, which are not coincident with just and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the expedient. He asks Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do nothing but question 6

Comment on the preceding--Sokratic method--the respondent makes the discoveries for himself ib.

Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is just, is good, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts honourably, both does well, and procures for himself happiness thereby. Equivocal reasoning of Sokrates 7

Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen are equally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades is to measure himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia. Eulogistic description of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must make himself as good as possible 8

But good--for what end, and under what circumstances? Abundant illustrative examples 9

Alkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his ignorance. Encouragement given by Sokrates. It is an advantage to make such discovery in youth 10

Platonic Dialectic--its actual effect--its anticipated effect--applicable to the season of youth 11

Know Thyself--Delphian maxim--its urgent importance--What is myself? My mind is myself ib.

I cannot know myself, except by looking into another mind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice are the conditions both of happiness and of freedom 11

Alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and declares that he will never quit Sokrates 12

Second Alkibiades--situation supposed ib.

Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts which may prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the generic word: madmen, a particular variety under it ib.

Relation between a generic term, and the specific terms comprehended under it, was not then familiar 13

Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed benefits, and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every one fancies that he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of ignorance 14

Mistake in predications about ignorance generally. We must discriminate. Ignorance of what? Ignorance of good, is always mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always ib.

Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground do we call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special arts or accomplishments, but because they know besides, upon what occasions and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used 15

Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of the good or profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial 16

It is unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his sacrifice, until he has learnt what is the proper language to address to the Gods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the counsel of Sokrates ib.

Different critical opinions respecting these two dialogues 17

Grounds for disallowing them--less strong against the Second than against the First 18

The supposed grounds for disallowance are in reality only marks of inferiority ib.

The two dialogues may probably be among Plato's earlier compositions 20

Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic Memorabilia--Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men 21

Fitness of the name and character of Alkibiades for idealising this feature in Sokrates ib.

Plato's manner of replying to the accusers of Sokrates. Magical influence ascribed to the conversation of Sokrates 22

The purpose proclaimed by Sokrates in the Apology is followed out in Alkibiades I. Warfare against the false persuasion of knowledge 24

Difficulties multiplied for the purpose of bringing Alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance 25

Sokrates furnishes no means of solving these difficulties. He exhorts to Justice and Virtue--but these are acknowledged Incognita 26

Prolixity of Alkibiadês I.--Extreme multiplication of illustrative examples--How explained ib.

Alkibiadês II. leaves its problem avowedly undetermined 27

Sokrates commends the practice of praying to the Gods for favours undefined--his views about the semi-regular, semi-irregular agency of the Gods--he prays to them for premonitory warnings 28

Comparison of Alkibiadês II. with the Xenophontic Memorabilia, especially the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydemus. Sokrates not always consistent with himself 29

Remarkable doctrine of Alkibiadês II.--that knowledge is not always Good. The knowledge of Good itself is indispensable: without that, the knowledge of other things is more hurtful than beneficial ib.

Knowledge of Good--appears postulated and divined, in many of the Platonic dialogues, under different titles 31

The Good--the Profitable--what is it?--How are we to know it? Plato leaves this undetermined ib.

CHAPTER XIII.. Hippias Major--Hippias Minor.

HIPPIAS MAJOR--HIPPIAS MINOR.

Hippias Major--situation supposed--character of the dialogue. Sarcasm and mockery against Hippias 33

Real debate between the historical Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic Memorabilia--subject of that debate 34

Opening of the Hippias Major**--Hippias describes the successful circuit which he had made through Greece, and the renown as well as the gain acquired by his lectures 35

Hippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the Spartans did not admit his instructions--their law forbids ib.

Question, What is law? The law-makers always aim at the Profitable, but sometimes fail to attain it. When they fail, they fail to attain law. The lawful is the Profitable: the Unprofitable is also unlawful 36

Comparison of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates 37

The Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable. This is the only explanation which Plato ever gives and to this he does not always adhere 38

Lectures of Hippias at Sparta not upon geometry, or astronomy, &c., but upon the question--What pursuits are beautiful, fine, and honourable for youth? 39

Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the background, who has just been puzzling him with it--What is the Beautiful? ib.

Hippias thinks the question easy to answer 40

Justice, Wisdom, Beauty must each be something. What is Beauty, or the Beautiful? ib.

Hippias does not understand the question. He answers by indicating one particularly beautiful object ib.

Cross-questioning by Sokrates--Other things also are beautiful; but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or under some particular circumstances--it is sometimes beautiful, sometimes not beautiful 41

Second answer of Hippias-- Gold, is that by the presence of which all things become beautiful--scrutiny applied to the answer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies ib.

Third answer of Hippias--questions upon it--proof given that it fails of universal application 42

Farther answers, suggested by Sokrates himself--1. The Suitable or Becoming--objections thereunto--it is rejected 43

2. The useful or profitable--objections--it will not hold 44

3. The Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable--that which is received through the eye and the ear 45

Objections to this last--What property is there common to both sight and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of these two senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful? ib.

Answer--There is, belonging to each and to both in common, the property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures--upon this ground they are called beautiful 46

This will not hold--the Profitable is the cause of Good, and is therefore different from Good--to say that the beautiful is the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this has been already declared inadmissible ib.

Remarks upon the Dialogue--the explanations ascribed to Hippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed to Sokrates are attempts to assign some general concept 47

Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to Sokrates, and those given by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia 49

Concluding thrust exchanged between Hippias and Sokrates 51

Rhetoric against Dialectic 52

Men who dealt with real life, contrasted with the speculative and analytical philosophers ib.

Concrete Aggregates--abstract or logical Aggregates. Distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for the Dialectician 53

Antithesis of Absolute and Relative, here brought into debate by Plato, in regard to the Idea of Beauty 54

Hippias Minor--characters and situation supposed 55

Hippias has just delivered a lecture, in which he extols Achilles as better than Odysseus--the veracious and straightforward hero better than the mendacious and crafty 56

This is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man and the mendacious man are one and the same--the only man who can answer truly if he chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses, i. e. the knowing man--the ignorant man cannot make sure of doing either the one or the other 57

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