CHAPTER XVIII.. Laches.

LACHES.

Lachês. Subject and persons of the dialogue--whether it is useful that two young men should receive lessons from a master of arms. Nikias and Lachês differ in opinion 138

Sokrates is invited to declare his opinion--he replies that the point cannot be decided without a competent professional judge 139

Those who deliver an opinion must begin by proving their competence to judge--Sokrates avows his own incompetence 140

Nikias and Lachês submit to be cross-examined by Sokrates 141

Both of them give opinions offhand, according to their feelings on the special case--Sokrates requires that the question shall be generalised, and examined as a branch of education 141

Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise Man--this man is never seen or identified 142

We must know what virtue is, before we give an opinion on education--virtue, as a whole, is too large a question--we will enquire about one branch of virtue--courage ib.

Question--what is courage? Laches answers by citing one particularly manifest case of courage--mistake of not giving a general explanation 143

Second answer. Courage is a sort of endurance of the mind--Sokrates points out that the answer is vague and incorrect--endurance is not always courage: even intelligent endurance is not always courage ib.

Confusion. New answer given by Nikias. Courage is a sort of Intelligence--the intelligence of things terrible and not terrible. Objections of Lachês 144

Questions of Sokrates to Nikias. It is only future events, not past or present, which are terrible; but intelligence of future events cannot be had without intelligence of past or present 145

Courage therefore must be intelligence of good and evil generally. But this definition would include the whole of virtue, and we declared that courage was only a part thereof--it will not hold therefore as a definition of courage 146

Remarks. Warfare of Sokrates against the false persuasion of knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently about courage without knowing what it is ib.

No solution given by Plato--apparent tendency of his mind, in looking for a solution. Intelligence--cannot be understood without reference to some object or end 147

Object--is supplied in the answer of Nikias. Intelligence--of things terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence is not possessed by professional artists 148

Postulate of a Science of Ends, or Teleology, dimly indicated by Plato. The Unknown Wise Man--correlates with the undiscovered Science of Ends ib.

Perfect condition of the intelligence--is the one sufficient condition of virtue 149

Dramatic contrast between Lachês and Sokrates, as cross-examiners 150