Part 8

We have old friends in the Western powers; we have gained a new friend in united Germany and by the neutralization of Scandinavia we shall not only make friendship with Russia, but Denmark will gain that of Germany, perhaps causing the last-named power to fulfil its duty to Denmark with respect to North Sleswick, seeing that it need no longer fear that its small neighbour would ever be forced into an alliance with a powerful enemy of Germany.

But it is not only the political interests of the powers which would be advanced by the neutralization of Scandinavia.

In the course of the last ten years world-wide traffic has made an unheard-of growth and connecting links between nations have been formed in many regions. As an example of the effect of these we may mention that even thirty years ago the normal freightage for corn was 50-60 shillings sterling per ton, from the Black Sea to North Europe; but the freightage from California and Australia to Europe, now, hardly exceeds the half. A European war would exercise a paralyzing effect here. Every one who has any conception of the influence of the price of corn on, to speak broadly, the whole civilization of modern times, will easily understand this.

Before the century closes this development will have woven a net of common interest all over our continent, and necessarily called forth such a sensitiveness in the corporate body of Europe, that, for example, an injury in the foot of Italy may be said to cause pain right up to Norway.

The merchant fleet of Norway, alone, is indeed the third in rank of all the merchant fleets of the world. As is well known, the united kingdoms take an advanced place in the carrying trade by sea. According to what was told me by a distinguished merchant, the transport trade undertaken by Norwegian and Swedish ships between foreign countries is five times greater than that between home and foreign lands. Consequently, as the keen competition between steam and sailing vessels increases, the only country which can dispense with the service of our sailing vessels is England, the great power upon which we may reckon always as an ally. Most of the remaining countries, on the other hand, require our merchant fleet.

Since, now, we could not of course defend our merchant service in a war, and other and greater nations may be jeopardized as much as we, it may be assumed that they would be willing, through the neutralization of Scandinavia, to secure its fleet against the eventualities of war.

If we add such interests as affect trade and credit, civilization and humanity, to the political interests, it appears that we may plead on grounds of strong probability that the great powers would be willing to guarantee our neutrality.

According to the second objection, the country would gain no security from a guaranteed neutrality, even if, contrary to expectation, such could be obtained.

Perfect safety cannot be attained here on earth by any system. This is as true for nations as for individuals but I believe that a neutrality thus guaranteed would be a strong protection to our national independence, whilst in a not inconsiderable degree it would contribute to the preservation of peace, and gradually help to lessen the military burdens of all lands; consequently, and in the first place, of our own.

Treaties, it is said, are broken as easily as they are made. Even if it be true that this has occurred, it does not necessarily follow that it must continue to occur. New factors may come in making it more difficult to break engagements that have been entered into.

Experience shows that righteous laws have been transgressed, but no one would aver that they are therefore unnecessary. As the moral power of the law makes it possible to diminish the police force, so also treaties of neutrality make it possible to diminish the military forces.

Besides, our opponents ought to bring forward evidence that the rights of States at present neutralized have been violated. That they have been threatened is true, and it would have been a wonder if this had not happened under the lawless condition which has obtained among nations.

The idea of neutrality has, nevertheless, as I have tried to show by many examples, little by little developed into a valid principle of justice; and the growth continues. The neutralization of Scandinavia would bring it a great step forward, to the blessing both of ourselves and of other nations.

According to objections 3 and 4, a guaranteed neutrality would diminish our independence without contributing to lessen our burdens for defence.

The truth is, that international law as at present constituted does not permit another power to interfere under any pretext with the internal concerns of a neutral state, and therefore not with anything which affects its system of defence or its measures for preserving its neutrality. With these the neutral State, and it only, can deal.

As a proof of this being so, Luxemburg was neutralized in 1867 upon condition that the strong fortress bearing that name should be demolished. But this circumstance, imperative for the general peace of Europe, shows on the other hand that guaranteeing powers do not willingly impose upon a State any serious duty of fortifying itself in order to defend its rights. Nevertheless the powers found it needful to make a supplementary clause to the protocol by which the congress concluded the neutrality of Luxemburg, whereby it was emphasized, as a matter of course, that the article respecting the destruction of the fortress of Luxemburg did not imply any sort of limitation of the right of the neutral State to maintain, or, if it chose, to improve its own works of defence. Belgium did indeed construct the great fortresses around Antwerp long after the country was neutralized.

In reference to what one and another has said about the value of the subject, nothing is needed beyond the fact that neutral rights have, even in its present position, been respected in all essentials. That a neutral power must abstain from mixing itself up with the policy of other powers cannot imply a greater limitation of its right to self-regulation than that a guaranteeing power shall abstain from attacking a neutralized State or from making military alliance with it. There is certainly a limitation for both parties, as far as is necessary for adopting an intelligent union between States,--a limitation of physical force and of love of war.

The neutral State has not to submit to any guardianship beyond what any man must do and does, when he subjects his passions to the control of a moral purpose.

Seeing that a guaranteeing State has no right to interfere in our internal concerns, not even in anything we think good for our defence, we shall always be free to keep up a military force, large or small. But a neutralized State is obliged to disarm the troops of other belligerent powers that may overstep its frontiers, just as of course, under the lawless condition which war is and which it entails, it has, according to its ability, to protect its boundaries with arms. But if this duty cannot exempt Switzerland and Belgium from proportionately large war burdens in time of peace, this would not at all in the same degree affect the neutralization of the Scandinavian peninsula, since there could never be a question of disarming troops which had overstepped its boundaries, but only of preventing the war-ships of a belligerent power from entering Norwegian or Swedish seas, a thing which, under the protection of a guaranteed neutrality, could not take place.

Respecting the fifth objection, which declares that the proposition is untimely, I do not hesitate to express my opinion that just now, during the truce which prevails, is the time to bring it forward. The need of a settled peace increases everywhere, and it is therefore probable that a proposition to the great powers respecting a guaranteed neutrality for the united kingdoms would meet with general sympathy in Europe.

On these and many other grounds I sought to maintain my proposition.

It was opposed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Hochschild, amongst others, who declared that he could not possibly support it. He informed us that the whole of his colleagues in the Government took the same view of the subject as himself. He desired that the bill as well as the contingent appointment of a committee should be thrown out totally and entirely.

As the minister in this way has made the matter into a cabinet question, there could not well, under the present conditions, be any question of the adoption of the bill.

In spite of this, however, the request of the Foreign Minister was not complied with, seeing the Second Chamber adopted an amendment after fifty-three members had voted for the acceptance of the original bill.

By the amendment which was adopted, the Chamber did not accept the grounds of the committee's opinion--which the Foreign Secretary approved--but, in the hope that the Government would spontaneously carry out the chief object of the bill, accepted for the present the report of the committee that no address be sent to the King on the subject.

By reason of this result in the Second Chamber no action was taken in the First on the matter.

During the debate in the Second Chamber, April 28, the Foreign Secretary remarked that I must have overlooked the fact that the European powers had, ever since 1814, looked upon the two kingdoms of the Scandinavian peninsula as a political unity in questions relating to peace and war; why otherwise should I propose from the first that the sister kingdom should have the opportunity of expressing itself on a matter which concerned Norway equally with Sweden. This objection was without foundation.

During the drawn debate, March 3, I had already taken occasion to point out that it would not be seemly for one moving a resolution in the Swedish Riksdag to act as spokesman for Norway at the same time expressing my confidence that the Storting would meet us in a friendly manner, if the Riksdag approved the bill with respect to Sweden.