Part 7

During the Franco-German war, 1870-1, the Prussian Government complained to the guaranteeing powers of conduct at variance with neutrality on the part of Luxemburg, and threatened no longer to respect the neutrality of the Archduchy. (Despatch of Prince Bismarck, Dec. 3rd, 1870.)

In consequence of this, Count Beust, the Austrian chancellor, in an opinion given Dec. 22nd of the same year, remarked, that upon the ground of the principle of European guarantee, it belonged to the powers who had signed the document of neutralization, to inquire into and to settle whether a violation had taken place on the part of the neutral State, and not to one of the belligerent powers.

Besides the States named, a permanent neutrality has been secured to the IONIAN ISLANDS according to the treaties of London, 1863-64; and also to the SAMOAN ISLANDS, in virtue of the agreement between England, Germany, and the United States of North America, whereby, amongst other things, it was settled that in case of any difference of opinion arising; an appeal should be made to arbitration; and that a supreme tribunal should be created with a supreme judge, whom the King of Sweden and Norway has been empowered to name.

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One general advantage which neutralization affords is the simplification with respect to foreign policy thereby obtained.

The attitude of a neutralized State can be reckoned on beforehand by all parties.

In proportion to its military importance and position, a neutral country constitutes in many ways a security to all the powers.

It is in close connection with neutralization that in these days an ever-growing need is becoming apparent to localize wars as much as possible; that is, to confine them to those who begin them.

As a result of the extraordinarily rapid development of world-wide trade and intercourse, and the consequent community of interests, a war between two States necessarily occasions more or less derangement to the rest.

In this increasing solidarity lies the surest guarantee that neutrality will be respected.

We may already be justified in drawing the conclusion that the security of neutral States will continually increase.

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Supported upon these foundations of history and of international law, a discussion was raised on the neutralization of Sweden, in the First Chamber by Major C.A. Adelsköld, and by myself in the Second, in the hope thereby not only to oppose the King's bill for the extension of the war department, but also especially to open the way for a profitable solution of the tough, old, threadbare question of Defence.

Before this resolution was brought into the Riksdag, I had read it to seventy members of the Riksdag, who unanimously accepted it, as did also, later on, in the main, a majority of the [Norwegian] Storting. And as soon as the purport of the resolution became generally known through the press, there came in from popular meetings all over Sweden numerous congratulatory addresses to Major Adelsköld and myself.

But from its very commencement the proposition met with an unconquerable opposition from those in power.

With great unanimity efforts were made in this quarter to depreciate the value and the historical importance of the principle of neutrality. All possible means were used with this object, to touch the tenderest fibres of the national feelings. It would be a disgrace to us, it was said, to employ any other than military power in asserting our primeval freedom. We should thereby break off from our glorious history, and draw a black line over its brilliant warlike reminiscences. There were certainly neutral countries to be found, but their neutrality was not the result of their own desire, but proceeded from the great powers themselves. Should we then, they say further, be the first people to take such a step? Would it not be equivalent to begging peace of our neighbour, and declaring ourselves incapable before the whole world? The sensible thing would be to further develop and strengthen our army. The resolution was called a political demonstration of indigence; a disgusting nihilist plot, and so on. One member of the Riksdag proposed that it should be consigned to a committee charged with arranging for sending beasts abroad. Scoffs came thick as hail; and when it became known that the mover in the Second Chamber was its author, the really guilty one, he was branded as a universal traitor,--just as the year before, when he raised a peaceable question about extended liberty of conscience.

In my defence of the resolution in the Riksdag, I sought to anticipate all objections to it which were worthy of notice.

Amongst these I give special attention to the following five:--

1. "The powers will not enter into the neutralization of Sweden.

2. "But if, contrary to expectation, they did, the safety of the country would gain nothing by it.

3. "On the contrary, our independence would be diminished by a guaranteed neutrality.

4. "Without lessening our military burdens for defence.

5. "The proposition is untimely."

With regard to the first objection, viz., that the powers would not enter upon Sweden's neutralization, it appears to me that circumstances of great weight imply the contrary.

We may be quite sure that the powers will first and foremost consult their own interests. Scandinavia may be certainly regarded as specially valuable as a base of military operations to any of the great Baltic and Western States. But it would be quite a matter of consideration, whether these powers would not gain more by the reciprocal security of being all alike cut off from this base, than by the doubtful advantage of being possibly able to reckon upon Scandinavia as an ally.

A neutralized Scandinavia would be a Switzerland among the seas; a breakwater in the way between England and France on the one side, and Russia and Germany on the other. In case of a war between these great powers it would now be of considerable moment for any of them to get the powers along the coasts of the Sound and the Belts, upon its side. And how difficult it would be for the latter to preserve their neutrality during such a war, must be evident to everybody.

So the interests are seen to be equally great on all sides. It may therefore be deemed prudent to establish, in time, a permanent neutrality of the powers along the coast. Here, according to my view, lies a great problem for the foreign secretaries of the united kingdoms and Denmark.

My reason for speaking here of neutralizing the whole of Scandinavia is, that I am convinced that the brother-nations take entirely the same view as the Swedish. With respect to the general interests of European peace, the neutralization of Scandinavia would be more important than that of Switzerland and Belgium, because the interests of the great powers are greater and more equally balanced around the Scandinavian North than around those two small continental States.