Part 18

This starting-point for the judgment of the whole dispute was accepted by the Swedish Government; which also agreed to let an arbitrator settle whether the question of the spirit tax was independent of the treaty or not. Both Governments agreed to choose the Portuguese ex-Foreign Minister, Count de Casal Riberio, as arbitrator, and he expressed himself in favour of the Spanish construction. And with this the whole matter was settled.

No one can seriously think that the method of procedure on the Swedish side, which led to so distressing a violation of justice as that referred to by Herr Hedin, could prove anything against the principle of arbitration. On the other hand, it appears to betray the character of the statesmanship of our then Foreign Minister; which indeed earned for him a diamond-set snuffbox from the Emperor William II., but otherwise, the blame only of sensible people.

Herr Hedin, who has a weakness for strong expressions, had the opportunity of using some such in their right place. Unhappily, this cannot be said with truth of the closing words of his speech, where he remarks that the expressions of the Foreign Minister are so decisive against the bill that they deal the report of the committee of the Second Chamber a right deadly blow.

The committee had proposed that the king, with the authority which § 11 in the form of government accords him, should seek to bring about such agreements with foreign powers, that future possible differences between the powers named and Sweden should be settled by arbitration.

The deadly blow must be the remark of the Foreign Minister that questions affecting the existence and independence of nations must be excepted from decisions by arbitration.

This principle is known to be universally accepted, and in no way stands in antagonism to the report of the committee, which of course left the hands of the king as free as possible to promote the idea of arbitration according to circumstances.

However, the report of the committee was thrown out by eighty-eight votes against eighty-three.

Herr Hedin got his way. He has always been the consistent opposer of the active friends of peace; and this time he has besides won the gratitude even of our Government organ, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, which calls his speech glittering; meaning that upon this resolution "there was no need to waste many words," and continues thus:--

"The resolution is worthy of notice, because it shows the return of the Chamber to a sounder perception of this question. It seems at last to recognise the extravagance of the expectation certain fanatics entertain of bringing about a lasting peace by so apparently simple a means as a tribunal of arbitration. We have indeed, as Herr Hedin reminded us, now had experience ourselves of how unsatisfactory this can be; and it certainly appears that they must be lacking in common sense who would question the justice of the Foreign Minister's reminder, that arbitration cannot be appealed to when a nation's political freedom or independence is touched by the issue."

I may here beg leave to calm the ruffled feelings of the honourable Government organ by bringing to remembrance the lesson, otherwise applicable also, which our dismembered sister-land on the other side of the Sound offers us.

At the London Conference in 1864, the representative of England, Lord Russell, referred to the decision arrived at by the Paris Congress in 1856, that States which had any serious dispute should appeal to the mediation of a friendly power before taking to arms. In harmony with this the British plenipotentiary proposed that the question, whether the boundary line should be drawn between the lines of Aabenraa-Toender, on the one side, or Dannewerke-Sli on the other, should be decided by arbitration. Prussia and Austria consented to accept the mediation of a neutral power; but Denmark replied to the proposition with a distinct refusal. In the same way Denmark refused the proposal made first by Prussia, and later by France, that a means of deciding the boundary should be sought in a plebiscite of the people in Sleswick.

Denmark trusted too much upon might and too little upon right. Otherwise Sleswick had still been Danish.

If the axiom be correct, that disputes which affect the existence and independence of nations ought not to be submitted for solution to arbitration, it is of so much the greater moment to try to get international complications settled in this way, because they may swell up into questions of the kind first named; since in any case this means could be adopted as a last resource in time of need. History knows of no example of the destruction of a free nation by the impartial judgment of arbitration.

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Now it may well appear honourable on the part of the free nations of the Scandinavian peninsula that they should openly show to the whole world that they are prepared (in full harmony with King Oscar II.'s pacific expressions in the speech from the throne to the Riksdag and the Storting in 1890), for their own part, in all international circumstances to substitute justice for brute force, and this without compromising and meaningless limitations. In the Swedish arbitration resolution, as well as in the Norse, lies the road certainly to efficiently carrying out the neutral policy so strongly emphasized in the speech from the throne. Besides the public gain, which a favourable result in both Chambers would have been, a unanimous co-operation in this cause would in a great degree have facilitated the solving of the important QUESTION OF THE UNION (UNIONELLE TVISTEMAAL).

The last named consideration will indeed claim more attention as the consequences of the divergent decisions of the Storting and the Riksdag develop themselves. That these consequences will be scattering, rather than uniting, the friends of peace in both lands must keep in view; and must look out, in time, for means to soothe them, as long as they continue.

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That which lies nearest my heart has been to help, with cheering words, to strengthen the faith of my fellow-workers. If these words have succeeded also, here and there, in scattering doubts, so much the better. Little-faith is faint-hearted. Without confidence in a cause, there is no action. Ignorance may be enlightened, superstition wiped out; intolerance may become tolerant, and hate be changed into love; ideas may be quickened, intelligence widened, and men's hearts may be ennobled; but from pessimism which can see nothing but gloomy visions nothing is to be expected. This offspring of materialism is one of the most powerful opponents which the cause of international law and justice has to encounter. It is only self-deception to conceal the fact that it still reigns in our Christian community.

These gloomy-sighted people refer us to history, which on every page tells of crime and blood, sorrow and tears. We answer by pointing to the development of civilization, and show how all things slowly grow and ripen, whether in human life or in the world of nature.

Human perfection does not provide for an individual being a law-abiding member of a human community, and exclude a community from being a law-abiding member of an alliance of States. The abolition of war therefore in no way pre-supposes universal righteousness, but only a certain degree of moral cultivation.

But that this perfection is not attained to cannot be any rational objection against striving after the perfect. Discontent with imperfection ought much rather to goad us on to work for what is better.

Now, war is not something imperfect only: it is a summing up of all human depravity--a condition which we might expect all enlightened men and women would turn against with combined energies. That this does not take place is an evidence that the enlightenment is not so great among so-called cultivated people.

The dazzling external show of war conceals from many its inner reality. This applies not only to the horrors of the battle-field and their ghastly accompaniments. Fancy's wildest pictures of the infernal abyss are nothing to the descriptions eye-witnesses give of this veritable hell. Tolstoï's pen and Veretschagin's pencil give us an idea of it. From this misery spring untold sufferings for thousands upon thousands of innocent victims; and, besides, it remains to be a flowing source of fresh calamities.

The ARMED PEACE is a similar calamity, which threatens European civilization with complete overthrow. We have got so far in the general race in the science of armaments that the yearly outlay in Europe for military purposes, including the interest of national debts, is reckoned as about twelve milliards of kroner, 650 millions sterling, which of course must imply a corresponding limitation of productive labour.

In time of peace the European armies are reckoned at four millions of men. In time of war this can grow to nineteen millions; and in a few years when, as intended, the new conscription law comes into full effect, to something like thirty millions.

War, the personification of all human depravity, desolates the progressive work of culture, and the armed peace which ruins the nations prepares new wars and augments the misery. Ignorance, war, and poverty follow one another in an unvarying circle.

By the side of this wild race for armaments goes on a terrible struggle for existence, and discontent reigns in all lands. This condition of things, which fills the world with unrest and fear, must in the near future have an end. It will either come in the form of a social revolution, which will embrace the whole of our continent, or it may come by the introduction of an established condition of international law.

It is the last named outcome that active friends of peace labour for. They strive to enlighten the nations as to the means of removing and preventing these calamities; and they hope that the so-called educated classes will cease to be inactive spectators of these efforts. While they do not feel called upon to oppose the nonsense of folly, they listen respectfully to objections dictated by a sincere patriotism. In that feeling we ought all to be able to join. It depends upon the way in which this is expressed whether we can work together or must go on separate lines.