On the Ethics of Naturalism

CHAPTER III.. The Transition to Utilitarianism.

THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM.

1. Difference of the standpoints of individual and State, 41 2. Connection between egoism and utilitarianism according to Bentham, 45 (a) Utilitarianism not a political duty, 46 (b) Nor a moral duty, 47 (c) Nor insisted on as a religious duty, 49 (d) Nor sufficiently motived in private ethics, 50 3. Exhaustive character of Bentham's treatment from his point of view, 51 (a) The religious sanction (Paley), 53 (b) Limits of the political sanction, 54 (c) Uncertainty of the social sanction, 55 (d) And of the internal sanction so far as a result of the social, 56 4. Mill's logical defence of utilitarianism, 57 (a) Distinction of kinds of pleasure, 58 (b) Ambiguities in his proof, 60 5. Actual transition to utilitarianism, 62 (a) Recognition of sympathy, 64 (b) The idea of equality, 69 6. The two sides of utilitarian theory without logical connection, 73 7. Summary of the ethical consequences of psychological hedonism, 75

CHAPTER IV.. Moral Sentiment.

MORAL SENTIMENT.

1. A uniform psychological theory not supplied by the opponents of ethical hedonism, 78 2. The non-hedonistic theory of action, 84 3. Ethics made to depend on the moral sense, 89 (a) As harmony of impulses, 90 (b) As a separate sensitive faculty, 92 (c) As an internal law, 100 4. The ethics of moral sentiment a mediating theory, 105

PART II.. The Theory of Evolution.

THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

CHAPTER V.

THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY.

1. General characteristics of the theory of evolution, 107 An assertion of the unity of life, 109 Primarily historical, but capable of ethical application, 110 2. The development of morality, 116 (a) Historical psychology, 116 Its difficulties, 117 Its result, 123 (b) Development of society, 124

CHAPTER VI.. Evolution and Ethical Theories.

EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES.

Bearing of the theory of evolution, 126 1. On theories depending on moral sentiment or intuition, 127 (a) Ethical value of moral sentiments affected by their origin, 130 (b) Organic character of moral sentiments, 132 Resultant attitude of evolutionism to intuitionism, 133 2. On egoism: relation of egoism to altruism, 134 (a) Social nature of the individual, 135 (b) Limits to conciliation of egoism and altruism, 141 (α) Continued existence of competition, 142 (β) Different and conflicting degrees of altruism, 143 (γ) Altruism of interest and altruism of motive, 143 (δ) Weakness of altruistic feelings, 146 (c) Tendency of evolution opposed to egoism, 148 Evolution not the basis of psychological hedonism, 148 Nor of ethical hedonism, 150 3. On utilitarianism, 152 Modification of the utilitarian method, 153 And of its principle, 155 Evolutionist objections to utilitarianism, 155 (a) As prescribing an unprogressive ideal, 156 (b) As a theory of consequences, 160 (c) As related solely to sensibility, 161

CHAPTER VII.. Hedonism and Evolutionism.

HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM.

1. Alliance of evolutionism and hedonism, 164 (a) From interpreting greatest happiness by the laws of life, 164 (b) From interpreting life by pleasure, 165 2. Evolutionist argument for concomitance of life and pleasure, 167 3. Objections to this argument, 168 (a) That life cannot bring more pleasure than pain, 169 (α) From the negative nature of pleasure, 171 (β) From the facts of human life, 172 (b) That the evolution of life does not uniformly tend to pleasure, 172 (α) Incompleteness of the evolutionist argument, 173 (β) The pessimist doctrine that life tends to misery, 175 (aa) The hypothesis of the unconscious, 176 (bb) The nature of volition, 177 (cc) The facts of human progress, 179 Individual progress, 179 Social progress, 181 4. The psychological analysis of pleasure and pain in relation to evolutionist ethics, 186 (a) The subjective nature of pleasure and pain, 187 (b) The conditions of pleasure and pain, 190 (c) Application of the theory of evolution, 197

CHAPTER VIII.. The Evolutionist End.

THE EVOLUTIONIST END.

Necessity of inquiring into the ethical end suggested by the theory of evolution, 201 1. Adaptation to environment, 203 (a) As the end for present conduct, 207 Opposed to progress, 207 Does not fully represent evolution, 209 (b) As describing the ultimate condition of life, 210 Resultant absolute code, 211 (α) Abstract principles of social relation, 212 (β) Personal end only defined as adaptation, 213 (γ) Cannot be shown to lead to happiness, 213 (c) Insufficiency of adaptation as evolutionist end, 217 2. End suggested by the tendency to variation, 221 (a) Prescribes self-development rather than self-preservation, 222 (b) Standard for measuring development found in complexity of act and motive, 227 (α) Antinomy between social and individual ends, 231 (β) Psychological defects, 232 3. Development or increase of life as the end, 236 (a) Subjective standard: most persistent impulses, 242 Cannot define life without an objective standard, 244 (b) Objective standard: defined in two ways, 247 (α) Conformity to the type, 248 Which can be reduced to-- (β) Abundance and variety of vital power, 251 That is, to the subjective standard, 253 Summary as to the evolutionist end, 256 (a) Difficulty of reconciling individual and social ends, 256 (b) Hedonistic interpretation of evolution not possible, 257 (c) No independent ethical ideal, 259

CHAPTER IX.. On the Basis of Ethics.

ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.

1. Principles involved in theory of evolution, 263 2. Unsuccessful application of these principles to ethics, 264 (a) The principles being treated empirically, 265 (b) No logical transition having been effected from efficient to final cause, 267 3. Difference between causality and teleology, 269 4. Reference to self-consciousness implied in evolution, 277 (a) Attempt to trace the genesis of self-consciousness, 278 (b) Attempt to trace morality from reflex action, 283 5. The unity of self-consciousness, 284 (a) As making possible the transition from knowledge to morality, 284 (b) As determining the character of the ethical end, 286 (c) As showing that the realisation of the end must be progressive, 291

THE ETHICS OF NATURALISM.

CHAPTER I.. Ethics and Its Problems.

ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.

It is a common remark that a writer's ethical doctrine is throughout conditioned by his attitude to the problems of theoretical philosophy. The main lines of dispute in questions of ethics may be regarded as prolongations of the controversies which arise in metaphysics and psychology. The Realism or Idealism which marks a speculative system reappears in its ethics, whilst differences in the psychological analysis of mental states, or concerning the relation of pleasure to desire, are grounds of distinction between schools of moralists. And not only are the special controversies of ethics decided in different ways, but the scope of the whole science is differently conceived, as the speculative standpoint changes. Thus, not for one school only, but for a whole period in the history of reflection, ethics was regarded as an inquiry into the highest human good. Opposed schools agreed in looking from this point of view, however much they might differ from one another in defining the nature of that highest good. At other times, according to the prevailing view, to investigate and systematise the rules of conduct has exhausted the scope of ethics--controversies being carried on as to the nature of those rules, and their source in external authority or in the internal revelation of conscience. Again, ethical inquiry has been apparently identified with the analysis and history of the moral affections and sentiments; while a purely external point of view seems to be sometimes adopted, and ethics held to be an investigation of the historical results of action, and of the forms, customary and institutional, in which those results find permanent expression.

These different ways of looking at the whole subject proceed from points of view whose effects are not confined to ethics, but may be followed out in other lines of investigation. They correspond to ideas which dominate different types of thought and form different philosophical standpoints. The first starts from a teleological conception of human nature, as an organism consciously striving towards its end. The second assimilates ethics to a system of legal enactments, and is connected with the jural conceptions of theology and law. The two last are concerned to show that the subject-matter of ethics are facts which have to be treated by the ordinary inductive and historical methods. These different points of view, however, are to be regarded as complementary rather than as conflicting, although their complete synthesis must be worked out in the region of general philosophy, and not on purely ethical ground. Philosophy has thus to deal with the notions which determine the scope and character of ethical thought; and in this way it must necessarily pass from the purely speculative to the practical point of view. If it is the business of philosophy to bring into rational order the material supplied by experience, cosmical and anthropological, it cannot be without bearing on the function of man as a source of action in the world. The question, What are the ends man is naturally fitted to attain? or--if we prefer so to express it--What are the ends he ought to pursue? is not merely as natural as the question, What can a man know of the world and of himself? But the two questions are inseparably connected. To know man is to know him not only as a thinking but also as an active being; while to solve the problem of the ends of man implies knowledge both of his nature and of the sphere of his activity.

Continue reading On the Ethics of Naturalism free in the Wunder reader →