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💡 Electrifying America: How the Countryside Got Power

In 1935, fewer than eleven of every hundred American farms had electricity — not because the technology was missing, but because a mile of line costs the same whether three families live on it or thir

9
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~45 min
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🏛️ History
subject
Adults
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What you’ll learn

  1. Two Americas, One WireGrasp the scale of the 1935 gap between electrified cities and a dark countryside, and see that the cause was not technology.By 1935, American cities had been electrified for half a century — and fewer than 11 of every 100 US farms were receiving central station electric service. The technology was not missing, the engineering was not unsolved, and the farmers were not uninterested. Something else was in the way, and the whole story is about what.
  2. The Arithmetic of the Empty MileUnderstand the density economics that made rural service unprofitable, and see the line-extension fee as the honest expression of it.A distribution line costs roughly the same per mile whether it serves thirty customers or three, so revenue per mile is what decides whether it pays. Rural co-ops today average about 6 consumers per mile against 33–43 for investor-owned and public utilities — a gap of five to seven times. Utilities responded rationally: they charged rural rates commonly twice urban rates, and demanded the farmer pay the construction cost up front. The market was not being cruel. It was being correct, on its own terms.
  3. What Dark Actually MeantUnderstand that on a farm, the absence of electricity was not an absence of light but a permanent, physical tax on human bodies — overwhelmingly women's.A farm is a workplace, and a workplace without power runs on muscle. Without electricity, water is carried, laundry is boiled and wrung by hand, milk has no refrigeration, and every hour after sundown is lit by an open flame. The burden fell hardest and most relentlessly on farm women. This is why the demand for electrification was not about convenience — and why the pre-1936 alternative, the small farm wind-charger, tells you how badly it was wanted.
  4. Eleven PagesSee how Morris Cooke's 1934 report reframed the problem, and how the REA was created and given its founding insight.Morris Cooke's eleven-page 1934 report argued the utilities' cost figures were simply wrong: he estimated $500–$800 per mile including transformers and meters, against the $1,500–$2,000 the companies quoted. The REA was created by Executive Order 7037 on 11 May 1935 with Cooke as its first administrator, and the Rural Electrification Act followed in 1936. Its real discovery, though, was not cheaper wire — it was that the sum only failed because of who was being asked to pay.
  5. The FightUnderstand the political conflict over rural electrification honestly, with both narratives stated rather than adjudicated.Rural electrification was fiercely contested, and the argument was not really about wire. It was about whether the federal government should finance an enterprise competing with private industry, and about what electricity was for. Utilities argued the REA was subsidised competition using public credit; supporters argued the market had had fifty years and left 90% of farms dark. Both descriptions are accurate; the disagreement is about what follows from them, and that is a question about values rather than facts.
  6. The Co-opUnderstand the cooperative as the actual invention — a change in who the customer was — and why it worked so well.The REA's decisive move was not lending money but lending it to consumer-owned, not-for-profit cooperatives governed by member-elected boards. That change did three things at once: it removed the required rate of return, it made the customers responsible for signing up their own neighbours, and it aligned the operator's interest with the served rather than the profitable. The result was a default rate under 1% and 380,000 miles of line by 1943.
  7. The Night the Lights Came OnSee what electrification actually changed on a working farm, and why the sequence of what people bought reveals what the burden had been.The line arriving did not merely light a house; it removed the farm's dependence on human muscle. The order in which families spent their scarce money — pump, then washer, then refrigeration, then the iron and the radio — is the clearest available evidence of what the burden had actually been. And the programme's economics depended on it: a co-op needed its members to use electricity, so teaching them to was part of the job.
  8. The PhotographersUnderstand the FSA photography programme as both an extraordinary documentary record and an explicit instrument of persuasion — and hold both facts at once.Almost every famous image of the 1930s American countryside comes from one government photography unit run by Roy Stryker, which produced around 250,000 images and left roughly 175,000 negatives, of which the Library of Congress holds about 164,000. Its photographers were among the finest of the century — and they were, in the article's own words, under instruction from Washington as to what overall impression the New Deal wanted to portray. Both things are true, and knowing the second does not diminish the first.
  9. What It Left BehindAssess what rural electrification actually settled, what it did not, and how carefully its lesson transfers to later infrastructure arguments.The co-ops still exist and still serve the same thin geography — about 6 consumers per mile — which is the clearest proof that the underlying economics never changed; only the ownership did. The REA is now routinely invoked as a precedent for rural broadband, and the analogy is genuinely strong in structure while being weak in important particulars. The durable lesson is narrower and better than the slogan: when a market has had a long, fair run and durably failed, the barrier may be the question rather than the arithmetic.

Questions this course answers

In 1935, fewer than 11 of every 100 American farms had central station electric service. What best explains why?

Nothing was technically missing: cities had been lit for fifty years and running a wire down a country road was routine work for the same companies. Farmers wanted it badly — a farm is a workplace, and an unpowered workplace runs on human muscle. The barrier was that the infrastructure costs were not believed to be recoverable from the handful of customers spread along each mile of line.

Why did the density of customers matter so much more to a rural utility than the total distance involved?

Poles, conductor, transformers and lifelong maintenance are much the same object on a country road as on a city street: the cost per mile barely varies. What varies enormously is what stands beside it — about 6 consumers per mile for rural co-ops against 33–43 for investor-owned and public utilities. Same wire, a fifth to a seventh of the revenue. That division is the entire problem.

The lesson argues the utilities were 'right' to decline rural service. In what sense?

This is the hinge of the course. The companies were not cackling; they were doing division. On their terms — their capital costs, their shareholders' expectations, a farm's likely monthly bill — the numbers really did not work, and Wikipedia's phrasing is exact: the belief was that the infrastructure costs would not be recouped. That was a correct calculation of a particular sum. What the REA changed was not the arithmetic but the sum being asked.

Why does the lesson argue that electricity on a farm was working capital rather than a convenience?

A dairy farm produces a perishable liquid twice a day and without cooling is in a race it cannot win — what could not be moved in time was simply lost. A cooler changed what the farm could be, not merely how comfortable it was. The same logic runs through the chapter: a farm without power does not stop working, it just does the work with human bodies instead.

Before 1936, some farms bought their own wind-electric plants: a windmill charging batteries at 40 volts DC, delivering lighting, washing machines and limited well-pumping. What does this tell us?

The list of what those systems ran is the tell — light, the wash, the water, exactly the three burdens of the chapter, and nothing frivolous. A Depression-era family buying a windmill, generator, batteries and wiring for a trickle of 40 V DC that could not run a serious motor is not a family that needs persuading. It had already done the sum and found even a bad version worth it — which makes the fifty-year stalemate sharper, not softer.

The lesson argues that Cooke's cost finding — $500–$800 a mile against the companies' $1,500–$2,000 — was the less important half of the story. Why?

Cheaper wire narrows the gap but cannot close it — and if cost per mile had been the whole problem, the utilities would have found Cooke's savings themselves, since there was money in it. The real discovery is in the loan terms: borrow over 25 years at 2%, with customers who own the line and want service at cost rather than a return, and the same wire serving the same six farms works. The barrier was the return demanded, not the pole.

Grounded in trusted sources

  • Wikipedia — Rural Utilities Service (less than 11% of US farms had electricity in 1934; REA created 11 May 1935 by Executive Order 7037; the Rural Electrification Act of 1936; 288,000 households served by rural electric cooperatives by 1939; farms using electric service more than doubled between 1935 and 1939; miles of line in operation rose from 400 in 1936 to 115,230 in 1939, and consumers from 693 to 268,000; nearly 50% of US farms by 1942; almost all by 1952): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rural_Utilities_Service
  • EH.net Encyclopedia — Rural Electrification Administration (private companies avoided rural markets due to 'high network construction costs and the prospect of meager immediate profits'; rural homes 'stretched too far apart and offered too little demand relative to the cost of investment'; rural rates in the 1920s 'commonly twice as high as urban rates'; Cooke's 1934 report projecting '$500 to $800 the mile' including transformers and meters for 1–3 customers, and estimated household costs of one dollar monthly for the first 10 kilowatts; REA loans over 25 years, interest fixed at 2% after 1944, default rate under 1%; REA financed 'not-for-profit consumer-owned firms' governed by member-elected boards, which could not compete with existing utilities or serve municipalities of 1,500+; 1.5 million farms across 350 cooperative projects in 45 states by 1938; in 1998 co-ops served 11% of the US population but generated 9% of revenues, at 6 consumers per mile versus 33–43 for investor/public utilities): https://eh.net/encyclopedia/rural-electrification-administration/
  • Living New Deal — Rural Electrification Administration (REA) (1935) ('Fewer than 11 of every 100 U.S. farms were receiving central station electric service' in 1935, almost 97 percent by 1960; Morris Cooke as first administrator 1935–1937; companies suggested $1,500–$2,000 per mile, which REA borrowers reduced to under $825 per mile by 1939; by 1943 the REA had lent $466 million, installed 380,000 miles of power lines and served over a million consumers; by 1965 REA-financed systems operated 1,547,143 miles of line serving 5,386,088 consumers across 46 states and territories): https://livingnewdeal.org/glossary/rural-electrification-administration-rea-1935/
  • Wikipedia — Rural electrification (electricity was not delivered to rural areas 'because of the general belief that the infrastructure costs would not be recouped'; the Red Wing, Minnesota project first delivered electricity on 24 December 1923 to nine farms; pre-1936 wind-electric plants using a 40V DC generator to charge batteries, providing 'lighting, washing machines and some limited well-pumping or refrigeration'; about 98% of US farms had electric service by the early 1970s): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rural_electrification
  • Wikipedia — Farm Security Administration (Roy Stryker's photography unit at the Resettlement Administration 1935–1937, FSA 1937–1942 and OWI 1942–1944; 'introducing America to Americans'; approximately 250,000 images produced and roughly 175,000 black-and-white negatives surviving, with 164,000 held online by the Library of Congress and some 77,000 finished prints originally made for the press, plus 644 colour images; fifteen principal photographers including Rothstein, Evans, Lange, Lee, Post Wolcott, Vachon, Delano, Shahn and Parks; photographers were 'under instruction from Washington, DC, as to what overall impression the New Deal wanted to portray'; Stryker's thematic briefs and his demand for photographs that 'related people to the land and vice versa'): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farm_Security_Administration
  • The LPE Project — 'The Legacy of the Rural Electrification Act and the Promise of Rural Broadband': https://lpeproject.org/blog/the-legacy-of-the-rural-electrification-act-and-the-promise-of-rural-broadband/
  • Wikipedia — Morris Llewellyn Cooke; Dorothea Lange; Migrant Mother; Roy Stryker; Tennessee Valley Authority

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