Unpopular Government in the United States

Section 1. Introductory

Introductory

In brief outline this is what has occurred: As the population of the country has grown and communities and states have passed more and more beyond the frontier stage of development, the decentralization of governmental power has constantly increased and the elective principle has been more and more extensively applied. As a consequence the burden placed upon the electorate has become more and more onerous. The voter has been called upon to vote more often and for an increasing number of officers. He must theoretically examine into the qualifications of a large number of candidates at frequent intervals. This has placed upon intelligent voting an enormous educational qualification. The task of the voter to obtain sufficient information about candidates long ago passed beyond what even the very intelligent citizen could fulfil and still maintain his place in competitive industry. The result is that the voter, though extremely intelligent in general, comes to the polls in utter ignorance of candidates and their qualifications for office. Nevertheless, he insists, in spite of his political ignorance, upon voting for someone. He takes his voting seriously and endeavors to make a show of voting intelligently. This attitude necessarily requires him to secure advice from someone as to whom to vote for. At once there is created the opportunity for the adviser to the voter. He first appears naturally as a local leader whom the electorate trusts. Soon, however, there arises the man who makes advising the politically ignorant voter his profession. Then this professional adviser becomes more of a director to the politically ignorant voter. This process goes on in every electoral district where the voter is politically ignorant enough to need some advice. It is not long before there is developed a hierarchy of professional advisers and directors to the politically ignorant voter. Sometimes there are competing hierarchies of such advisers and directors. One or the other, however, is the more generally successful, or both by agreement divide the privilege of advising the politically ignorant voter how to vote--each helping the other in its exclusive territory. Those who direct the politically ignorant majority how to vote have filled the state and municipal offices with those who are loyal to them first and to the governed afterward. The leaders of the successful organization of advisers and directors to the politically ignorant electorate have become an extra-legal but none the less real government. A decentralized legal government has been replaced by a centralized extra-legal government. Thus the power of government has again drifted into the hands of the few. These, pursuant to well-known human characteristics, use that power selfishly. The decentralized character of the legal governmental power, the fact that only part of the offices are filled at any time, and the enormous advantage which comes from having a standing army of advisers and directors to guide the mass of politically ignorant voters, make it difficult to replace at the polls with real representatives of the electorate the appointees of this extra-legal government. We have, therefore, come finally to a well-defined extra-legal but none the less real government of the few, by the few, and for the few, at the expense and against the wish of the many. We have, in a word, achieved the establishment of a substantial unpopular government.

In form the politically ignorant voter is aided by the altruistic advice of those who know who should be elected. In form the voter can take the advice or not as he pleases. In reality, however, and in actual practice, the power of the electorate to fill the state and municipal offices has been confided by the politically ignorant majority to the leaders in the successful hierarchy of professional advisers and directors to the politically ignorant voter. The elector, by being required to vote too much, has been compelled to surrender to a large extent his right to vote at all, and to permit others to cast his ballot as they see fit. Formerly people were disfranchised when they were given no opportunity to vote. Today they are disfranchised by being required to vote too much. Formerly the legal rulers of the disfranchised masses were selected for them by the few without equivocation. Today our legal rulers are selected for us by the few through the subterfuge of the masses casting their ballots according to the directions of the few. In other forms of unpopular government the central figure has been the monarch, the autocrat, the oligarch, or the aristocrat. In ours it is the politocrat. We have avoided monarchy, autocracy, oligarchy, and aristocracy, only to find ourselves tightly in the grasp of a politocracy.

So startling a conclusion with respect to our governmental condition invites a detailed consideration of each step upon which that conclusion is founded.

Section 2

The Burden upon the Electorate--The Inverted Pyramid of Governmental and Electoral Districts--The Offices to Be Filled and the Number of Electors in Each District

No doubt the average American voter in most districts will readily concede the great burden of his political duties. But unless he has analyzed his particular situation he will hardly realize how great is that burden. Of course, the condition of voters in different places will differ in detail, but the important features are much the same everywhere. For the sake of example I will analyze my own situation as a voter of the Village of Winnetka, Township of New Trier, County of Cook, and State of Illinois.

I am one of about 600 voters in a village which elects each spring, on one day, about one-half of the following officers: a president, 6 trustees, a clerk, a treasurer, a marshal and collector, 2 police magistrates, and 6 library trustees; and on another day, shortly afterward, a common-school trustee.

I am one of about 2,000 voters in a township which elects, on the same day that the principal village officers are elected, but at a different polling place, about one-half of the following officers: a supervisor, a clerk, an assessor, a collector, a commissioner of highways, 5 justices of the peace, 5 constables, and a poundmaster; and at a later day (but on the same day that the trustee for common schools is elected), 2 high-school trustees.

I am one of about 18,000 voters to elect one member of the state Senate every four years and 3 members of the House of Representatives of the state legislature every two years at the regular November election.

I am one of about 28,000 voters who elect 5 county commissioners at the regular November election every other year.

I am one of about 42,000 voters who elect one member of Congress at the regular November election and one member of the State Board of Equalization every two years.

I am one of about 322,000 voters who elect 3 sanitary trustees every two years at the regular November election and a president of the Sanitary District every five years.

I am one of about 350,000 voters who elect the following county officers every other year at the November election: 2 of the 5 members of the Board of Assessors, 1 of the 3 members of the Board of Review, 6 of the 18 judges of the Superior Court of Cook County; also about one-half of the following officers: president of the Board of County Commissioners, judge of the Probate Court, judge of the County Court, state’s attorney, recorder of deeds, clerk of the Circuit Court, clerk of the Superior Court, clerk of the Criminal Court, clerk of the Appellate Court, clerk of the Probate Court, coroner, sheriff, county clerk, county superintendent of schools, and county surveyor. I am one of about 350,000 voters to elect, every other June at a special election, about 5 of the 15 judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County.

I am one of about 380,000 voters to elect 1 of the 7 justices of the Supreme Court of the state every nine years.

I am one of about 1,100,000 to elect at the regular November election every two years about one-half of the following state officers: a governor, a lieutenant-governor, a secretary of state, an auditor, a treasurer, a state superintendent of public instruction, 6 trustees of the state university, clerk of the state Supreme Court, and 2 congressmen at large.

I am one of about 15,000,000 voters who elect a president and vice-president of the United States every four years at the regular November election.

When I entered the voting booth at the regular November election in 1912, the ballot given me to mark was 22 × 28 inches in size. It called upon the voter to do his part in filling, exclusive of presidential electors, 34 offices. It presented for his consideration, exclusive of presidential electors, 181 names from which to make selections.

An enumeration of the offices to be filled by election merely emphasizes the number of candidates whom the voter should inform himself about. The extent of the burden upon the voter is not fully appreciated until it is perceived how difficult actual conditions make it for him to obtain information regarding candidates for office. The least important and most inconspicuous state and local offices, as well as the most important and conspicuous, must engage the attention of the electorate of the entire governmental district. But the candidates for inconspicuous and unimportant offices must usually be men who are inconspicuous or unimportant in the community. Furthermore, the importance and conspicuousness of subordinate offices do not increase in proportion to the increase of population. The clerk of a court or a county surveyor is not a more conspicuous officer because he holds his office in a county having over two million inhabitants. He is, therefore, proportionately less conspicuous and important as the population increases. The voter is, therefore, constantly presented with candidates whose reputations are in inverse ratio to the size and population of the electoral district. The more electors there are in the district the smaller in proportion is the reputation of the candidate. The more the character and qualifications of the candidates are hidden, the more difficult it is for the voter to obtain the information which he should have in order to vote intelligently. For instance, the 600 voters in the village where the writer resides are called upon to select a clerk, a treasurer, a marshal and collector, 2 police magistrates, and library and school trustees. In so small a community the voter may with some effort actually know who the candidates for these places are. As a matter of fact, however, that effort is considerably more than the large majority of voters will push themselves to perform. The 2,000 voters in the township where the writer resides are called upon to elect a supervisor, a clerk, an assessor, a collector, a commissioner of highways, 5 justices of the peace, 4 constables, a poundmaster, and high-school trustees. These offices are not intrinsically more conspicuous or more important than the village offices just enumerated. Hence the enlargement from 600 to 2,000 voters causes the candidates for office to be proportionately less conspicuous in the community. To the same extent the difficulty to the voter of obtaining information as to the character and attainments of the candidates has been increased. The members of the state Senate and House of Representatives are important officers because they exercise the legislative power of the state. The conspicuousness and importance of each of these offices is, however, weakened by the existence of the other, for between the representatives and senators the legislative power is divided and each is a check upon the other. The members of the House of Representatives in the state legislature are hidden to some extent from the voters because 3 are elected at large from a senatorial district containing 18,000 voters. It is more difficult for the voter to find out about a legislator when he is one of 18,000 than when he is one of 6,000 voters. Twenty-eight thousand electors of the County of Cook outside of the city of Chicago are called upon to vote for 5 of the 15 county commissioners. The office is not likely to be held by men whom it is easy for the average voter of the district to pick up direct information about. To elect one member of the state Board of Equalization 42,000 voters are called upon. Again, the size of the electorate makes it difficult to know who the candidates for the place may be. Three hundred and twenty-two thousand voters are called upon to elect 7 sanitary trustees. Here the darkness of the average voter becomes Egyptian, and he is practically excluded from any means of a personal knowledge of who the candidates for the sanitary trustees are. The same is equally true of the members of the Board of Review, members of the Board of Assessors, the 30 judges of Cook County, the president of the Board of County Commissioners, the judge of the Probate Court, the judge of the County Court, the state’s attorney, the recorder, the 5 clerks of the different courts, the sheriff, the county clerk, the county superintendent of public instruction, and the county surveyor. There are 350,000 voters who regularly cast their ballots for these officers. Among a population containing so many voters it is practically impossible, even for the voter who makes an unusual effort, to acquire any personal knowledge of who the candidates for these offices are. Take the most prominent officials in the list--the judges and state’s attorney. The intelligent man who is a voter has very little chance to acquire any personal knowledge of the fitness of the candidates for these offices. A particular judge or a particular candidate for state’s attorney may become to some extent known to the voter and have the confidence of the voter. But these are exceptional cases. The average candidate for these offices is beyond the reach of any thoroughgoing knowledge on the part of the voter. The difficulty of obtaining information about one inconspicuous member of so large a population is too great. In Illinois, to select a secretary of state, an auditor, a treasurer, a state superintendent of schools, 6 trustees of the state university, a clerk of the state Supreme Court, and 2 congressmen at large, 1,100,000 voters are called upon. Here again the inconspicuousness of the offices compared with the size of the electorate is such that the obstacle to the voter informing himself about candidates is practically insuperable.

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