Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, From 1789 to 1856, Vol. 2 (of 16)

Section One, Also Declares, "the Judicial Power of the United States

shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," and the judges of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold, &c., during good behavior. By comparing these sections of the constitution, it appears the Judiciary and the Executive are expressly created by the constitution, and nothing is left to the discretion of Congress, as to the existence of these departments; they are created by the same words; and if the Legislature claim a right to put down the Judiciary at pleasure, before the happening of that event till which the constitution secures their offices--their misbehavior--they may as well assume the right to remove the President before the happening of that event till which his office is secured, to wit, the expiration of four years. I shall attempt to establish as a first principle, that the Judiciary are a check on the Legislature, and thence to show first, that, by the spirit of our constitution, the Judiciary ought to be independent, beyond the control or influence of either of the other departments of power; and secondly, that, by the words of the constitution, they are so secured.

First, then, that the Judiciary are a check on the Legislature. In the constitution, we find certain powers delegated to Congress; we also find they are prohibited from exercising certain powers; among which are, they shall pass no ex post facto law, no bill of attainder, no law respecting religion, &c. Should, unhappily, a Legislature be found who, from weakness or wickedness, or the union of both, should transgress the bounds prescribed, what is the security of the citizen? After all the experience derived from the example of other Governments, after all the deliberation and wisdom of our sages who framed the constitution, are we left, in this important instance, as under the despotism of a monarch, to seek redress through the throes and convulsions of a revolution? No, sir. The Judiciary are our security. The Legislature may enact penalties, and denounce punishments against those who do not yield obedience to their unconstitutional acts; their penalties cannot be exacted, nor punishments inflicted, without the judgment of a court. The judges are to expound the law, and that fundamental, paramount law, the constitution. To this purpose they are sworn to support the constitution. While the Judiciary firmly, independently, and uprightly, discharge their duty and declare the act of the Legislature contrary to the constitution, to be void, the Legislature are checked, and the citizen shielded from oppression and persecution. But, ask gentlemen, whence do the courts derive this power, and the honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. THOMPSON) says, we are contending for this common law doctrine, that the courts are a check on the Legislature. If I misunderstood the gentleman, I trust he will correct me. Sir, that gentleman, I am willing to presume, knows, what I assure him no gentleman with whom on this occasion I act, is ignorant of, that this is not a common law doctrine; that in England their courts have no check on the Legislature--their Parliament are emphatically styled omnipotent, and if they violate the few natural rights that remain to the citizens, they have no remedy but in a resort to revolutionary principles; it was the want of this check to the oppressions of their rulers, which has produced civil wars, and driven one monarch from his kingdom, and sent another to the scaffold. This power exists in no other Government, because under no other Government does there exist a Legislature with limited powers; under our Government it is the very essence, the constitution of a court, the oath enjoined on them to support the constitution. The exercise and the admission of this right are not new in America; instances must be in the recollection of every gentleman. I will cite a few most prominent: The honorable member (Mr. THOMPSON) has been pleased to call the attention of the committee to the examples drawn from his State; I beg leave to profit from the same source. In 1787, the Legislature of that State passed an act making new arrangements in the jurisdiction of the courts. The judges, among whom was that venerable gentleman mentioned by the member from that State, whose merits and worth command the sincere homage of my respects, protested against this act, and refused to carry it into effect; the Legislature acquiesced, and the law was repealed.

Upon the imposition of the carriage tax by Congress, a citizen of Virginia refused to pay the tax, on the ground that it was unconstitutionally laid. He was sued for the penalty in the circuit court of that State, from whence, by writ of error, the suit came before the Supreme Court; in this case the defendant relied solely on the unconstitutionality of the act of Congress, and on this ground was defended by the attorney general of the State of Virginia, and the attorney general of the State of Pennsylvania. At this time, then, it appears that these learned gentlemen, the judges, and the citizens, thought the court competent to relieve in case the law was judged to be unconstitutional. In 1792, Congress passed an act imposing certain duties respecting invalid pensioners, upon the judges of the circuit court. The judges, at the first court after this act, protested against it; their protests were transmitted to the President of the United States--that President, who had presided in the General Convention which framed the constitution, and, therefore, as likely to understand the powers of Congress on the Judiciary as any other man, so far sanctioned their opinions as to transmit them to the next Congress, where the act was reconsidered and repealed. I beg leave, also, to allude to the authority before mentioned by my friend from Pennsylvania, (Mr. HEMPHILL,) which I should think of some weight here. It is the opinion of a gentleman, venerable for his age, respectable for legal knowledge, and distinguished for what, in the fashionable language of the day, are termed republican principles. I mean the Executive of Pennsylvania; that gentleman, in assigning to the Legislature of his State his reasons for not approving an act they had laid before him, after expressing his doubts of the constitutionality of the act, declares, "he cannot, from a confidence in the legal knowledge, integrity, and fortitude of his former brethren in the Supreme Court, risk his character in a judicial decision on this question, when he does not see any advantage to be derived to his country from a possibility of success." If any words can make more plain the opinion here conveyed, it is that he considers the judges have the power and will exercise it, to declare the act unconstitutional.

To my mind, these considerations are satisfactory, that, from the very constitution of our courts, from the practice and admission of our State courts and State Legislatures, and Federal courts, and Federal Legislature, that the judges of the United States, sitting in court, have the power, and by oath are bound to pronounce, that, an act contrary to the constitution, is void. From the establishment of this proposition, that the judges are the expounders of the constitution, and the laws made under it, and that they are thereby a check on the Legislature, I shall infer that, by the spirit of our constitution, they ought to be independent of the other branches of Government, but particularly so of the Legislature. The concentrating the branches of power either Executive and Legislative, or Legislative and Judiciary, in the same hands, is the very essence of tyranny; in proportion as we advance towards the union of those powers, in the same proportion do we recede from liberty. Are these departments separate, unconnected--if the Legislature by any means procure their will either directly or indirectly, to be substituted for or to overrule judicial judgment? Whether the Legislature expound and adjudge their acts themselves, or submit them to the exposition and judgment of a judiciary subservient to them, is essentially the same. If the Legislature exercise the power of removal from office by the direct means of a vote of removal, or by the indirect means, the legislative legerdemain of a repealing act, is precisely the same thing, the judges are no longer independent, but dependent on the Legislature for their offices, and subject to their control; a consequence entirely repugnant to the spirit of our constitution. I shall attempt to show, that by the words of our constitution, the judges are placed beyond Legislative control. Article three, section one: "The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." Until the contemplation of the present measure, I incline to believe, it never entered the mind of any man acquainted with this clause of the constitution, that judges should be removed otherwise than by impeachment for misdemeanor. The advocates for this Legislative power contend that the tenure of "good behavior" in this article of the constitution is intended to restrict Executive and not Legislative power. It does not appear probable that an express restriction should be introduced against a power which is nowhere expressly granted; for gentlemen know that the Executive power of removal from office is a power admitted from construction, and not founded on any thing drawn from the constitution. I say this rather, because, by the constitution, the aid of the Senate is necessary to appoint, and a fortiori should be necessary to remove. It is important to ascertain what was the intention of the framers of the constitution in introducing the words "good behavior." The most correct source in our power from which this aid may be derived, is the writings and opinions at that day of those who aided in the great work. Among those publications which were written for the purpose of explaining and recommending this constitution, the most celebrated are those pieces over the signature of "Publius," written by the pens of gentlemen of leading influence in the Convention, and whose talents and patriotism are still honored by the nation. In that part of this work which treats of the tenure of the office of judge during "good behavior," I find this strong expression:

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