Part 82

Socr. Do you not, then, hear those speak in this manner who profess to instruct men in virtue?

Cal. I do. But what can you say of men of no worth?

Socr. What then can you say of those, who, while they profess to preside over the city, and to take care that it shall be as good as possible, then accuse it, when it so happens, as being very bad? Do you think that these differ at all from the former? My good man, a sophist and an orator are the same thing, or nearly so, and very like, as I said to Polus. But you, through ignorance, think that rhetoric is something exceedingly beautiful, and despise the other. But, in truth, the sophist’s art is as much more beautiful than rhetoric, as the legislative is than the judicial, and the gymnastic art than medicine. 160. But I for my part think that public speakers and sophists alone ought not to complain of the very thing that they teach, as being mischievous to themselves, or that in the very same charge they should at the same time accuse themselves for not having at all benefited those whom they profess to have benefited. Is it not so?

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Footnote 81:

See § 46.

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Cal. Certainly.

Socr. And surely to impart a benefit without a stipulated reward, as is probable, is proper for these men only, if they assert what is true. For one who has received any other kind of benefit, as, for instance, who has acquired swiftness of foot through the instructions of a teacher of gymnastics, perhaps might deprive him of his gratuity, if the teacher of gymnastics had left it to him, without having made an agreement for a fixed price, that he should be paid the money as nearly as possible at the same time that he imparted his skill to him. For men, I think, do not act unjustly through slowness, but through injustice. Do they not?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. If, therefore, any one should take away this, I mean injustice, there would be no danger of his ever being treated unjustly, but he alone might safely impart this benefit, if in truth he is able to make men good. Is it not so?

Cal. I admit it.

161. Socr. For this reason then, as it appears, it is not at all disgraceful to take money for giving advice about other things, as, for instance, about architecture, or other arts.

Cal. So it appears.

Socr. But with respect to this study, by what means a man may become as good as possible, and may best govern his own family or a city, it is reckoned disgraceful to withhold advice, except one should give him money. Is it not so?

Cal. Yes.

Socr. For it is evident that this is the reason that this alone of all benefits makes the person who has received it desirous of requiting it; so that it appears to be a good sign, if he who has imparted this benefit shall be recompensed in return; but otherwise not. Is this so?

Cal. It is.

Socr. To which method, then, of taking care of the city do you advise me? explain to me; whether to that of thwarting the Athenians, in order that they may become as good as possible, as if I were a physician, or to that by which I should serve them, and curry favour with them. Tell me the truth, Callicles. For, as you begun to speak freely to me, it is right you should continue to say what you think. And now speak well and nobly.

Cal. I say, then, that I advise you to serve them.

162. Socr. You advise me, therefore, most noble Sir, to employ flattery.

Cal. Unless you prefer calling him a Mysian, Socrates; for if you will do so—

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Footnote 82:

A name of the utmost contempt.

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Socr. Do not repeat what you have often said, that any one who pleases will kill me, lest I too should say again, that a bad man would slay a good one; nor that he will take away my property, if I have any, lest I too should say again, that after he has taken it away he will not be able to make any use of it, but as he has unjustly taken it from me, so having got it, he will make an unjust use of it; and if unjustly, basely; and if basely, wickedly.

Cal. How confident you seem to me to be, Socrates, that you will never suffer any of these things, as being one who lives out of harm’s way, and who can never be brought before a court of justice by a man, perhaps, utterly depraved and vile!