Part 81

Socr. Gratify me, then, by answering this too, whether man is of the class of animals, or not?

Cal. How should he not be?

Socr. Had not Pericles, then, the care of men?

Cal. Yes.

153. Socr. What then? Ought they not, as we just now admitted, to have become more just, instead of more unjust, under his management, if he who took charge of them was a good politician?

Cal. Certainly.

Socr. And are not the just gentle, as Homer says? What say you? Is it not so?

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Footnote 80:

Odyss. vii. 120.

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Cal. Yes.

Socr. However, he made them more savage than he received them, and this against himself, which he would least of all have wished.

Cal. Do you wish that I should agree with you?

Socr. If I seem to you to speak the truth.

Cal. Be it so, then.

Socr. If, then, he made them more savage, he must have made them more unjust, and worse?

Cal. Be it so.

Socr. According to this reasoning, then, Pericles was not a good politician?

Cal. Not, as you say.

Socr. By Jupiter, nor as you say either, from what you have admitted. But, again, tell me with respect to Cimon. Did not they whom he took care of pass a sentence of ostracism upon him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years? And did they not do the very same to Themistocles, and beside punish him with exile? And did they not sentence Miltiades, the conqueror at Marathon, to be thrown into the Barathrum, and but for the Prytanis, would he not have been thrown into it? These, however, if they had been good men, as you say, would never have suffered these things. 154. Good drivers, surely, do not at first keep themselves from falling from their cars, but, when they have trained their horses, and have themselves become better drivers, then fall off. This is never the case, either in driving, or in any other employment. Does it appear so to you?

Cal. To me it does not.

Socr. Our former statements, then, as it appears, are true, that we do not know any man who has been a good politician in this city. You admit that you know of none at present, but you say that formerly there were some, and you have selected these men: but these have appeared to be much the same as those of the present day, so that, if they were orators, they did not make use of the true rhetoric, for in that case they would not have fallen, nor yet did they employ flattery.

Cal. However, Socrates, it is far from being the case, that any one of the present day will ever do such deeds as were done by any one of those.

Socr. Neither, my excellent friend, do I blame these men, as servants of the city, but they appear to me to have been more efficient than those of the present day, and better able to procure for the city what it desired. But in changing and repressing their desires, by persuading and compelling them to such a course as would make the citizens become better, they scarcely differed at all from those of the present day; yet that is the only duty of a good citizen. But, with respect to providing ships, walls, and docks, and many other such things, I agree with you, that they were more able than the men of our day. 155. You and I, however, act ridiculously in our discussion. For during the whole time that we have been conversing we have not ceased to go round and round the same subject, and to misunderstand each what the other says. I think that you have often admitted and acknowledged that there is a twofold method of treatment, both with respect to the body and with respect to the soul: and that the one is ministerial, by which we are enabled to procure food, if our bodies are hungry, drink, if they are thirsty, and if they are cold, garments, coverlids, shoes, and all other things which the body stands in need of. And I purposely speak to you through these images, in order that you may understand me more easily. For when any one supplies these things, being either a retail tradesman or a merchant, or a manufacturer of any of them, a baker, a cook, a weaver, a shoemaker, or tanner, it is not at all surprising that such a person should appear, both to himself and others, to be concerned in the care of the body, that is, to all who are ignorant that, besides all these, there is a gymnastic and medicinal art, to which the care of the body really belongs, and whose duty it is to rule over all these arts, and to use their respective productions, through knowing what meats or drinks are good and bad for the health of the body, whereas all those others are ignorant of this; for which reason all those other arts are servile, ministerial, and base, as regards the management of the body, but the gymnastic art and medicine are justly the mistresses of these. 156. That the case is the same with respect to the soul, you, at one time, appeared to me to have understood, and admitted it as if you knew what I meant; but shortly afterwards you went on to say that there have been good and upright men in this city, and when I asked you who they were, you appeared to me to adduce men very similar with respect to politics, as if, on my asking with respect to gymnastics, who have been or are good managers of the body, you had very seriously said to me, Thearion the baker, Mithæcus, who wrote on Sicilian cookery, and Sarambus the tavern-keeper, and that they take wonderful care of the body, the first making admirable bread, the second, made-dishes, and the third, wine. Perhaps, then, you would be angry if I said to you, My friend, you know nothing about gymnastics; you tell me of men who are ministers and purveyors to desires, but who do not understand any thing great and good respecting them, and who, it may so happen, having filled men’s bodies, and made them gross, and having been praised by them, end by ruining their old flesh. These men, on the other hand, through their ignorance, will not blame those who have pampered their appetites, as being the causes of their diseases, and of the loss of their old flesh, but they who may happen to have been with them, and to have given them some advice, when, after a long time, repletion, having been indulged in without any regard to health, comes bringing disease with it, these they will accuse and blame, and do them some mischief if they can, but those others, who are the causes of their maladies, they will extol. 157. And now you, Callicles, act in very much the same way; you extol men who have pampered the Athenians by satiating their desires, and who they say have made the city great; and they do not perceive that it is swollen, and unsound through means of those ancient politicians: for, without considering temperance and justice, they have filled the city with harbours and docks, and walls and tributes, and such trifles. When, therefore, the crisis of their weakness comes, they will blame the advisers who are then present, but will extol Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles, who were the causes of the mischief: and you perhaps, unless you are on your guard, and my friend Alcibiades, they will seize, when they have lost what they had before in addition to what they have acquired, although you are not the causes of the mischief, but perhaps accomplices. 158. Moreover, I both now see a very foolish thing happening, and I hear of it with respect to men of former times. For I perceive that when a city punishes any of its politicians as guilty of wrong, they are angry, and complain bitterly that they are treated shamefully; and having done the city many good services, they are then unjustly ruined by it, as they allege. But the whole is a falsehood. For no president of a city can ever be unjustly ruined by the very city over which he presides. For the case seems to be the same with such as profess themselves to be politicians, as it is with the sophists. For the sophists, though wise in other things, commit this absurdity; whereas they affirm that they are teachers of virtue, they often accuse their disciples of acting unjustly towards them, by defrauding them of their wages, and not making other requitals for the benefits they have received from them. But what can be more unreasonable than such language as this, that men who have become good and just, who have been freed from injustice by their teacher, and have acquired justice, should yet act unjustly from that very quality which they have not? Does not this, my friend, appear to you to be absurd? Of a truth, Callicles, you have compelled me to make a speech by your unwillingness to answer me.

159. Cal. But should you not be able to speak unless some one answered you?

Socr. It seems as if I could: for now I have carried my discourse to a great length, seeing that you will not answer me. But my good friend, tell me, by Jupiter, the guardian of friendship, does it not appear to you unreasonable, that a man who says he has made another person good, should blame that person, because having been made good through his means, and being so, he has afterwards become bad?

Cal. To me it appears so.