Part 54

Socr. They, therefore, who do these things do them all for the sake of good.

Pol. I allow it.

Socr. Are we not agreed, then, that we do not wish those things which we do for the sake of something else, but that for the sake of which we do them?

Pol. By all means.

Socr. We do not, then, wish simply to slay, or banish from cities, or deprive any one of his possessions; but if these things are useful we wish to do them, but if they are hurtful we do not wish to do them. For we wish, as you admit, things that are good, but we do not wish such as are neither good nor evil, nor such as are evil. Is it not so? Do I seem to you, Polus, to speak the truth, or not? Why do you not answer?

Pol. You speak the truth.

Socr. Since then we are agreed on these things, if any one slays, banishes from a city, or deprives another of his possessions, whether he is a tyrant or a rhetorician, thinking that it is better for him so to do, though it is really worse, he surely does what seems fit to him: is it not so?

Pol. Yes.

Socr. Does he, then, do what he wishes, if these things are really evil? Why do you not answer?

Pol. He does not appear to me to do what he wishes.

54. Socr. Is it possible, then, that such a man can have great power in the supposed city, if, according to your admission, to have great power is a good?

Pol. It is not possible.

Socr. I spoke truly, then, when I said that it is possible for a man to do what he pleases in a city, and yet not have great power, nor do what he wishes.

Pol. As if, Socrates, you yourself would not like to be allowed to do what you please in a city, rather than not, and would not be envious when you saw any one either slaying whom he pleased, or taking away his possessions, or putting him in bonds.

Socr. Do you mean justly or unjustly?

Pol. Whichever he should do, is he not in either case to be envied?

Socr. Good words, I pray you, Polus.

Pol. But why?

Socr. Because it is not right, either to envy those that are not to be envied, or the wretched; but to pity them.

Pol. What say you? Does such appear to you to be the case with the men of whom I am speaking?

55. Socr. How can it be otherwise?

Pol. Does he, then, who slays whom he pleases, slaying him justly, appear to you to be wretched, and an object of pity?

Socr. Not at all; nor indeed is he to be envied.

Pol. Did you not say just now that he was wretched?

Socr. I said, my friend, that he is wretched who slays another unjustly, and more than that, to be pitied; but that he who slays another justly is not to be envied.

Pol. He surely who dies unjustly is to be pitied, and is wretched.

Socr. Less so, Polus, than he who slays him; and less than he who dies justly?

Pol. How so, Socrates?