Pol. What a strange man!
Socr. I deny that they do what they wish: but confute me.
Pol. Did you not just now admit that they do what appears to them to be best?
Socr. And I now admit it.
Pol. They do, therefore, what they wish.
Socr. I deny it.
Pol. But they do what appears best to them?
Socr. I grant it.
Pol. You speak absurdly and monstrously, Socrates.
Pol. I am willing to answer, in order that I may know what you mean.
Socr. Whether, then, do men appear to you to wish the thing that they do from time to time, or that for the sake of which they do the thing that they do? As for instance, do those who drink medicine from physicians appear to you to wish the thing that they do, viz., to drink the medicine, and suffer pain, or do they wish to be well, for the sake of which they drink the medicine?
Pol. It is clear they wish to be well, for the sake of which they drink the medicine.
Socr. In like manner those who sail on the sea, and those who carry on any other commercial business, do not wish the thing that they do from time to time: for who wishes to sail and to encounter danger, and to be harassed with business; but the object for which they sail is to acquire riches; for they sail for the sake of riches.
Pol. Certainly.
Socr. Is it not so then in all cases? whosoever does any thing for the sake of some thing else, does not wish the thing that he does, but that for the sake of which he does it.
Pol. Yes.
52. Socr. Is there any thing in the world, then, that is not either good or evil, or between these, neither good nor evil?
Pol. It must needs be so, Socrates.
Socr. Do you not admit then, that wisdom, and health, and riches, and other things of the same kind, are good, but their contraries evil?
Pol. I do.
Socr. By the things that are neither good nor evil do you not mean such as sometimes partake of good, sometimes of evil, and sometimes of neither, as to sit, to walk, to run, and to sail, and again, stones, wood, and other things of the same kind? Are not these the things that you mean? Or do you call certain other things neither good nor evil?
Pol. No, but these.
Socr. Whether, therefore, do men, when they do these intermediate things, do them for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the intermediate.
Pol. The intermediate, surely, for the sake of the good.
Socr. Pursuing the good, therefore, we both walk when we walk, thinking it better, and, on the contrary, we stand when we stand, for the sake of the same thing, viz., the good. Is it not so?
Pol. Yes.
53. Socr. Do we not, therefore, if we slay any one, slay, or banish, or deprive him of his possessions, thinking that it is better for us to do so than not?
Pol. Certainly.
The Works of Plato (vol. 1 of 6) · The Wunder Library — complete classics, free to read, with narration.