Part 170

Euth. I do.

Socr. Now, then, do you not perceive that you say that holiness is that which is dear to the gods? But is this any thing else than that which is acceptable to the gods? is it not so?

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. Either, therefore, we did not then admit that properly, or, if we did, our present statement is not correct?

Euth. It seems so.

Socr. From the beginning, therefore, we must consider again what holiness is; for I shall not willingly run away like a coward, until I have learnt it. Do not then despise me, but by all means apply your mind earnestly to it and tell me the truth. For you know it, if any man does; and I cannot let you go like Proteus, until you have told me. For if you had not known clearly both what is holy and what is impious, it is not possible that you could ever have attempted, for the sake of a hireling, to prosecute your aged father for murder; but you would have feared both to incur the anger of the gods, in case you should not act rightly in this matter, and would have been ashamed in the sight of men. But now I am sure that you think you clearly know both what is holy and what is not. Tell me, therefore, most excellent Euthyphron, and do not conceal from me what you believe it to be?

Euth. At some other opportunity then, Socrates: for now I am in haste to go somewhere, and it is time for me to depart.

Socr. What are you about, my friend? By going away you deprive me of the great hope I entertained that by learning from you what things are holy and what not, I might get rid of Melitus’s indictment, by shewing him that I had now become skilled in divine things by the aid of Euthyphron, and that I no longer through ignorance speak rashly, or introduce innovations respecting them, and that therefore I should lead a better life for the future.

INTRODUCTION TO THE LYSIS.

As Socrates was one day going from the Academy to the Lyceum he met with Hippothales, Ctesippus, and other youths, who were on that day celebrating the Hermæan festival in a newly-erected palæstra hard by. They invite him to come in and join their conversation; he promises to do so on condition that they will first tell him who is the beauty among them. Hippothales, to whom he first puts the question, shews, by his embarrassment, that he is himself far gone in love; and on being taxed with it by Socrates blushes still more, whereupon Ctesippus says that he is constantly overwhelming them with his poems and speeches on his favourite Lysis. Socrates, on hearing this, begs Hippothales to inform him how a lover ought to speak of or address his favourite. Hippothales, though he does not deny his being in love, does deny that he makes verses or speeches; but Ctesippus shews that he is constantly giving utterance to the most extravagant praises of his favourite and his family; on which Socrates remarks that he should not celebrate his victory before it is won; for that it is not wise to praise the object of one’s affection before a return of affection on his part is secured, and moreover such as are beautiful when highly praised are apt to become arrogant, and so are more difficult to be won. Hippothales takes these suggestions in good part, and begs Socrates to advise him how to address his favourite so as to win his affection, which Socrates readily promises to do if they will give him an opportunity of conversing with Lysis. To this end they all enter the palæstra, and almost as soon as Socrates, Ctesippus, Menexenus and others had seated themselves down in a quiet corner, Lysis, who is very fond of listening to conversations, comes and takes his seat next his friend Menexenus, while Hippothales is concealed in the back-ground out of sight of his favourite.

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Footnote 166:

§ 1-10.

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Socrates begins by addressing a few words to the latter, but on Menexenus being called out by the master of the palæstra, he turns to Lysis, and asks him whether his parents do not love him very much. On Lysis replying that they certainly do, Socrates shews him that though, since they love him, they must needs wish to make him as happy as possible, yet they are so far from letting him do whatever he pleases, that they put him under the government of others, even of slaves, and this not on account of his youth, but because he has not yet acquired sufficient experience and knowledge to be entrusted with the government of himself; but that whenever he is wise enough, not only his father, but all others, will entrust him with the management of themselves and their affairs.

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Footnote 167:

§ 10-18.

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At this point of the conversation Menexenus returned and resumed his seat near Lysis, who begs of Socrates to say over again to Menexenus what he had been saying to him; but Socrates desires him to tell it himself on some future occasion, and for the present engages to converse on some other subject with Menexenus. Having observed, therefore, the friendship that subsisted between Lysis and Menexenus, he asks the latter, when any one loves another, which of the two becomes a friend of the other, the lover or the beloved? Menexenus replies that there is no difference. But Socrates shews that it frequently happens that a lover is not only not loved in turn, but is even hated. In that case, then, which is the friend? Menexenus is forced to admit that unless both love neither can be a friend to the other. But here Socrates interposes this difficulty; he remarks that men often love horses, dogs, and other things which cannot love in turn; and the poet, as Menexenus admits, speaks truly who says, “Happy the man who has boys for his friends and horses and dogs,” so that the beloved now appears to be a friend of the lover, and not the lover of the beloved; and by the same reasoning he who is hated is an enemy, and not he who hates, whence the absurd conclusion follows that people are beloved by their enemies and hated by their friends. This, however, is impossible; therefore the reverse must be the case, and the lover must be a friend of the beloved. “If, then, neither those who love are to be friends, nor those who are loved, nor yet those who both love and are loved,” who are to be called friends? Lysis interposes with the remark that they do not appear to him to have conducted their enquiries aright; so Socrates avails himself of the opportunity thus offered him, and directs his discourse to Lysis.

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Footnote 168:

§ 18-24.

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“The poets say,” he observes, that “God ever conducts like to like,” and the wisest among men say the same, “that like must ever needs be friendly to like.” Lysis agrees to this. But, objects Socrates, only half of this appears to be true, for the more wicked men are the more hostile are they to each other; so that it appears that the good man only is a friend to the good man only, but that the bad man never arrives at true friendship. But here again a new doubt is started.

The like can derive no benefit from the like; how, therefore, can they be held in regard by each other? and how can that which is not held in regard be a friend? In like manner, the good man is sufficient for himself; but he who is sufficient needs nothing, and so will not regard any thing, and therefore not love. So that from this it appears, that not even the good will be friends to each other.

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Footnote 169: