Part 169

Euth. How should I not?

Socr. Husbandmen too, I think, effect many and beautiful things; but the principal thing they effect is the production of food from the earth.

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. What then? of the many and beautiful things which the gods effect, what is the principal?

Euth. I told you just now, Socrates, that it is a difficult matter to learn all these things accurately; this however I tell you simply, that if any one knows how to speak and do things grateful to the gods, by praying and sacrificing, these things are holy, and such things preserve both private houses and the general weal of cities; but the contraries to things acceptable to them are impious, which also subvert and ruin all things.

17. Socr. You might, if you had pleased, Euthyphron, have told me the principal of what I asked in fewer words. But it is clear that you are not willing to teach me. For now when you were just upon the point of doing so, you turned aside; whereas if you had answered, I should by this time have sufficiently learnt from you what holiness is. But now (for it is necessary that he who asks questions should follow the person questioned wherever he may lead) what again do you say is the holy, and holiness? Do you not say it is a knowledge of sacrificing and praying?

Euth. I do.

Socr. Is not to sacrifice to offer gifts to the gods, and to pray to beg something of the gods?

Euth. Assuredly, Socrates.

Socr. From this statement it follows that holiness must be a knowledge of begging from and giving to the gods.

Euth. You quite understand what I mean, Socrates.

Socr. For I am very anxious, my friend, to obtain your wisdom, and I apply my mind to it: so that what you say will not fall to the ground. But tell me what this service of the gods is? Do you say it is to beg of them and to give to them?

Euth. I do.

18. Socr. Must we not then, therefore, to beg rightly, beg those things of them which we need from them?

Euth. What else?

Socr. And again to give rightly must we give them in return such things as they stand in need of from us? For surely it would not be suitable to offer those gifts to any one which he does not need.

Euth. You say truly, Socrates.

Socr. Holiness, therefore, Euthyphron, will be a kind of traffic between gods and men.

Euth. A kind of traffic, if it pleases you to call it so.

Socr. But it is not at all pleasing to me, unless it happens to be true. Tell me therefore, what advantage the gods derive from the gifts which they receive from us? For the advantage arising from what they give is clear to every one; for we have no good at all which they do not impart? but how are they benefited by what they receive from us? Do we get so much the advantage over them in this traffic, that we receive all good things from them, but they nothing from us?

Euth. But do you think, Socrates, that the gods are benefited by what they receive from us?

Socr. What is the use then, Euthyphron, of all our gifts to the gods?

Euth. What else do you think except honour and reverence, and, as I just now mentioned, gratitude?

Socr. Holiness then, Euthyphron, is that which is grateful, but not profitable or dear to the gods.

Euth. I for my part think it is of all things most dear to them.

Socr. This then again is, as it seems, holiness, that which is dear to the gods.

Euth. Most certainly.

19. Socr. Can you wonder then, when you say this, that your statements do not remain fixed, but move about, and can you accuse me as being the Dædalus that makes them move about, when you yourself are far more skilful than Dædalus, and make them go round in a circle? Do you not perceive that our discussion, turning round, comes to the same point? For you surely remember that in a former part of our discussion that which is holy and that which is acceptable to the gods appeared to us not to be the same, but different from each other: do you not remember?