Part 160

Socr. There is, therefore, my friend, correct judgment accompanied with logos which must not yet be called science.

Theæ. It seems so.

Socr. We have been enriched then, as it appears, in a dream, in thinking that we possess the truest definition of science: or shall we not condemn it yet? For perhaps some one may not define logos in this manner, but may consider it to be the remaining species of the three, one of which we said would be adopted by him who defined science to be correct judgment accompanied with logos.

Theæ. You have rightly reminded me; for there is still one left. For the first was an image of the thought as it were expressed by the voice: and that just now mentioned was a proceeding to the whole by means of the elements: but what do you say the third is?

Socr. That which most men would say it is, the being able to mention some mark by which the object of enquiry differs from all other things.

Theæ. Can you give me a logos of any thing by way of example?

154. Socr. For instance, if you please, with respect to the sun, I think it would be sufficient for you to admit, that it is the most luminous of the heavenly bodies that move round the earth.

Theæ. Certainly.

Socr. Observe then why this was said. It is that which we just now mentioned, that when you find the difference of each thing, by which it differs from all others, you will find, as some say, the logos; but as long as you lay hold of some common quality, you will have the logos of those things to which this common quality belongs.

Theæ. I understand; and it appears to me very proper to call such a thing logos.

Socr. He, therefore, who together with correct judgment respecting any thing whatever can find out its difference from all other things, will have arrived at the knowledge of that of which he before only formed a judgment.

Theæ. We say it certainly is so.

Socr. Now, however, Theætetus, since I have come near what has been said, as if it were a picture in perspective, I find that I do not understand it in the least, but while I stood at a distance it appeared to me to have some meaning.

155. Theæ. How is this?

Socr. I will tell you, if I can. If, when I have a correct judgment respecting you, I likewise find your logos, then I know you, but if not, I only form a judgment.

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. But logos was the explanation of your difference.

Theæ. It was.

Socr. When, therefore, I formed a judgment only, is it not true that I reached by my thought none of those things by which you differ from others?

Theæ. It seems that you did not.

Socr. I, therefore, thought of some common qualities, none of which belong to you more than to any one else.

Theæ. Necessarily so.

Socr. Come, then, by Jupiter, how in such a case did I form a judgment of you rather than of any one else? For suppose me to be thinking that this is Theætetus, who is a man, and has nose, eyes, a mouth, and so on with each several member. Will this thought cause me to think of Theætetus rather than of Theodorus, or, as the saying is, the last of the Mysians?

Theæ. How should it?

156. Socr. But if I not only think of one who has nose and eyes, but also of one who has a snub nose and prominent eyes, shall I in that case think of you rather than of myself, or any other persons of that description?

Theæ. Not at all.

Socr. But I think I shall not form the image of Theætetus in my mind, until his snubbiness shall have impressed on me and left with me some mark different from all other instances of snubbiness that I have seen, and so with respect to the other parts of which you are made up; which, if I should meet you to-morrow, would recal you to my mind, and make me form a correct judgment respecting you.

Theæ. Most true.