Part 159

150. Socr. Every one, therefore, is able to do this more quickly or slowly, that is, can shew what he thinks about every thing, unless he is altogether dumb or deaf, and thus all who form right judgments on any matter, will be found to do so in conjunction with logos, and right judgment will never subsist without science.

Theæ. True.

Socr. We must not, therefore, too readily condemn him as having spoken nothing to the purpose, who asserted that science is that which we are now examining. For perhaps he who said it did not mean that, but that a person, when asked what each thing is, should be able to give an answer to the questioner by means of each thing’s element.

Theæ. For instance, how do you mean, Socrates?

Socr. As Hesiod for instance says of a chariot, that it is made of a hundred pieces of wood, which I, for my part, could not enumerate, neither do I think could you, but we should be contented, if when asked what a chariot is, we could say wheels, axle, frame, rails, and yoke.

151. Theæ. Certainly.

Socr. But he probably would think us ridiculous, just as if we, when asked concerning your name and having answered syllable by syllable, thereby judging and saying correctly what we do say, should think ourselves grammarians, and that we know and speak grammatically the definition of the name of Theætetus; whereas it is not possible to say any thing scientifically, before one has given a complete account of each thing by means of its elements, together with true judgment, as was observed before, if I mistake not.

Theæ. It was observed.

Socr. So, too, we have a correct judgment respecting a chariot, but he who is able to describe its nature by means of those hundred pieces, by adding this, both adds logos to true judgment, and instead of forming a mere judgment becomes an artist and knowing in the nature of a chariot, in that he gives a complete account of the whole, by means of its elements.

Theæ. Does not this appear to you, Socrates, to be well said?

Socr. If it appears to you, my friend, and you allow that the description of each thing by its element is logos, and that that made by syllables, or even larger parts is devoid of logos, tell me, that we may examine it.

Theæ. I certainly do allow it.

Socr. Whether do you think that any one has a scientific knowledge of any thing, when the same thing appears to him at one time to belong to the same thing and at another to a different thing, or when he forms at one time one judgment and at another a different judgment about the same thing?

Theæ. By Jupiter, not I.

152. Socr. Have you forgotten then, that in learning your letters at first both you and others did this?

Theæ. Do you mean that we thought that at one time one letter, and at another time another, belonged to the same syllable, and that we placed the same letter at one time to its proper syllable, and at another time to another?

Socr. I do mean that.

Theæ. By Jupiter, I do not forget, nor do I think that they have knowledge who are in this condition.

Socr. What then? when a person at that time of life writing the name Theætetus, thinks that he ought to write and does write Th and e, and again attempting to write Theodorus, thinks that he ought to write and does write T and e, shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?

Theæ. We have just now admitted, that a person in this condition does not yet know.

Socr. Does any thing, then, hinder the same person from being in this condition with respect to the second, third, and fourth syllable?

Theæ. Nothing.

153. Socr. Will he not then have the description by means of the elements, and write Theætetus with correct judgment, when he writes it in its proper order?

Theæ. Clearly.

Socr. Will he not still be void of science, though he judges correctly, as we said?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. And yet he has logos together with correct judgment; for he wrote it knowing the order of the elements, which we allowed to be logos.

Theæ. True.