Part 154

Socr. What is that?

Theæ. That true judgment is science. For to judge truly is surely free from error, and whatever results from it is beautiful and good.

Socr. He who acted as guide in fording a river, Theætetus, said that it would shew its own depth; so if we go on in our enquiries, perhaps the impediment that we meet with will shew us what we are in search of, but if we stop nothing will be clear.

Theæ. You say well; let us go on then and examine it.

138. Socr. This then requires but a brief examination, for one whole art shews that it is not science.

Theæ. How so? and what art is it?

Socr. That which belongs to those who are most renowned for wisdom, whom they call orators and lawyers. For they, in fact, persuade, not by teaching, but by making men form such judgments as they please. Do you think that there are any teachers so clever as, when persons have not been present while others were robbed of their money, or treated with some other violence, to be able, while a little water is running, to teach those persons sufficiently of the truth of what took place?

Theæ. I by no means think so, but that they can persuade.

Socr. But do you not say that to persuade is to make a person form a judgment?

Theæ. How otherwise?

Socr. When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about things which can only be known by seeing and in no other way, then judging these things from hearsay, do they not, when they form a true opinion, judge without science, being persuaded properly, since they decide correctly?

Theæ. Assuredly.

139. Socr. But, my friend, if true judgment and science are the same, a perfect judge could never form a correct judgment without science; but now each appears to be different from the other.

Theæ. I had forgotten, Socrates, what I heard some one say, but now I remember it: he said that true judgment in conjunction with reason is science, but that without reason it is out of the pale of science, and that things for which a reason cannot be given cannot be known; these were his very words; and that things for which a reason can be given are known.

Socr. You speak admirably well. But how do you distinguish the things that can be known from those that cannot? tell me, for perhaps you and I have heard the same thing.

Theæ. I know not whether I can explain it; but I could follow another person describing it, I think.

Socr. Hear, then, a dream for a dream. For I too seem to myself to have heard some people say, that the first elements, as it were, from which we and all other things are composed, cannot be explained by reason; for that each several element by itself can only be named, but that nothing else can be predicated of it, neither that it exists nor does not exist; for that this would be to attribute to it existence or non-existence, whereas nothing ought to be added to it, if one means to speak of the thing itself only; neither must we add to it the term the, or that, or each, or only, or this, or many others of the same kind; for these are constantly varying and are applied to all things, and are different from the things to which they are added. 140. But we ought, if it were possible, to speak of the thing itself, and, if it has a definition peculiar to itself, to speak of it without the addition of any thing else. Now, however, it is impossible for any of the first elements to be explained by a definition, for it does not admit of any thing else than being named, for it has only a name; but the things that have been composed from these, as they are complex, so their names, when connected together, constitute a definition; for a connection of names is the essence of definition. Thus the elements themselves cannot be defined or known, but only perceived, but things compounded of them can be both known and defined, and apprehended by true judgment. When, therefore, any one forms a true judgment of any thing, without explanation, his soul indeed perceives the truth respecting it, but does not know it, for he who is not able to give and receive an explanation of a thing must be ignorant of that thing, but when he adds an explanation to it then he is capable of knowing all these things, and may be perfect in science. Is it thus that you have heard the dream, or in some other way?

Theæ. In this way precisely.

141. Socr. Are you willing then that we should settle it thus, that science is true judgment in conjunction with reason?

Theæ. Exactly so.

Socr. Have we, then, Theætetus, thus on this very day discovered what of old so many sages sought for and grew old before they found it?

Theæ. For my part, Socrates, it appears to me that what has been now stated is well said.

Socr. And it is reasonable that this very thing should be the case; for what science could there be without reason and right judgment? However one of the things that were stated displeases me.

Theæ. Which is that?

Socr. That which seems to be very forcibly said, that the elements are unknown, but that the natures of things compounded of them are known.

Theæ. Is not that right?

Socr. We must see. For we have as sureties for this doctrine the examples which he used who said all these things.

Theæ. What are they?